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PREFACE
The purpose of this dissertation is to'present an
historical analysis of t h e diplomatic relations between the
United States and Horocco.

A survey of such items as the

cultural, commercial, and milit a ry intercourse between the
tvro nations will not be attempted except as these are
directly involved in the diplomatic interchange.

Following

a brief description of Aorocco from a physical and historical perspective and an indication as to the importance of
.the North African area in Western history, this paper will
survey the pattern of American diplomatic interest in Morocco
from the latter decades of the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth
century.
The aim of this survey is to provide as complete an
account as possible of the whole picture of the

r~lations

between the Shereefian Emoire of Norocco and the United
States.

Although there is material covering brief .periods of

international relations in which the Moroccan element is
incidental, nothing is available as yet .which attempts to
describe the nearl.y-· t 1..vo hundred year course of history
specificaltf i.nv6l~ American- ~I oroccan relations.
fore, it has been tho.":lght

wor~hwhile

There-

to attempt this survey

in the hope that students of Arab and American po'litical
history .will find some information that has not hitherto been

v
readily ava4l able.

Furthermore, the writer's interest in

Horocco has led him to ho pe that relations bet.ween the United
States and Morocco may in some small way be improved through
a more complete underst anding of their extensive history of
predominantly

fri ~ndly

rela tions.

In gathering material for this re port, primary sources
have been used as muc h as possible.

The records of the

Continental Congress, the American St ate Papers, the Papers
Relating to t h e Forei gn Rel atio ns of t he United St ates,
Congressional documents, ·State Department bulletins, anci
microfilm records of papers in t h e National Arc hives have
been consufteci extensively in an effort to provide as reli"Abl~

a background as ava ilable for t his survey .

Diplomatic

correspondence of the United States after 1940 has not yet
b€en released to t h e

p~blic;

therefore, for t h e period of

World \'Jar II and the following decade, it has been necessary
to consult cont'emporary accounts relating to ~~erican relations with Morocco, as well as State Department news releases
and
recent files of the New York Times.
.
·-· ...

Secondary material

has been used when necessary to fill in gaps in official
accounts and to provide interesting sidelights not available
elsewhere.
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CHAPTER I
MOROCCO:

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In an account of diplomatic relations between Morocco
and the United Sta-::.es, it

w~. l.l

not be amiss to make a brief

survey of the pertinent physical features of the former
country and to review the salient points of Morocco's history
prior to 1786 when it first recognized the independent status
of the United States.

I.

THE PEOPLE A:ND THEIR COUNTRY

Located as it is on the northv-1est shoulder of Africa
and thus the westernmost representative of Islamic culture
and history, Morocco is more accurately known in the Arabic
I

speaking world as Maghreb al Acksa--"the land of the farthest
west."

Coming to an agreement as to its name is far easier

than attempting ·to determine its area by quoting figures
given by authorities in the twentieth century.

In l<}Jl, .one

writer used the calculations of "geographers" and arrived at
the size of two-hundred and twenty tbousandsquare miles.l
The various area figures vary from a high of two-hundred and
seventy thousand to a low of one-hundred and fifty thousand,

lBudgett Meakin, The Land of the Moors (London:
Sonnenschein & Co. Lim., 190~p. 15.

Swan

2

with the best estimate placed at one-hundred and seventy
thousand square miles, roughly the size of Ca~ifornia.2

The

major problems in determining 1-1orocc-o' s· size seem to be that
there never has been a modern survey and that there is little
agreement as to the position of the Algerian-Moroccan boundary in the Sahara region where the border markers are many
miles apart.

The southern boundary is still a matter of dis-

pute between the Spanish authorities in the Rio de Oro and
the Moroccan government.
Topographically, Morocco can be best divided into four
main sec.tions.

The most obvious is the Atlas

I~ountain

ranges

which climb to the elevations of perpetual snow at more than
fourteen thousand feet.

This range extends diagonally from

the Spanish enclave of Ifni on the Atlantic across the country to the Algerian border.

In what used to be the Spanish

zone and marking part of its still-maintained border, the Rif
~1ountains

the the country to the north make"up the second

main division of the country.

i
t

,

The third section is the fer-

tile plain stretching from the foothills of the High and
Middle Atlas Mountains westward to the Atlantic.

The fourth

section of Morocco is southeas.t of the Atlas ranges and can
best be characterized as a rugged semi-desert wilderness
""±nters-p_ersed by marvelously fertile oases that make life

2Rom Landau, ·Moroccan Drama, 1900-1955 (San Francisco:
American Academy of Asian Studies, 1956), p. 24.

I
;

3
possible in so inhospitable a region.

i

Morocco's natural resources are being

!

~xploited

at an

ever-increasing rate to meet the world's demand--for mineral
supplies.

The phosphate deposits in the region southeast of

Casablanca are some of the largest in the world and in 1956
were producing over five and one-half million tons per year.

~

i

Nearly a half million tons of high grad e manganese ore were

f
t

mined in the same year and increasing amounts of lead and
zinc are finding their way to the smelters.3

Iron, copper,

antimony, and petroleum are among the many other minerals
that Morocco is just beginning to produce.

What the sands of

the Moroccan Sahara are covering in the way of radioactive
ores and rich pools of petroleum is being investigated by
domestic and foreign interests.
As important as mineral production is becoming, agriculture is still the mainstay of the Moroccan economy.

Grain

is the single most important crop raised, and wheat accounts
for nearly three-fourths of the production.4

Barley and

maize, which are grO\V"n principally in the south, rank next in
agricultural importance.

The French point with pride to the

one-hundred thousand acres of vineyards as an indication of

3"Production Minere du Maroc en 1956," LeMar££_ Economigue (n.p.: Ministere de L'Info!'!Ilation et du TourismeT;'"
Lundi, 19 Aout 1957, pp. 29-3 2.
·
4French Government Publication, Morocco Today (Rabat:
Perceval, n.d. LCa. 195Q7), p. 58.

-

-

-

.-=:

Jllli!!::.

:-

4
the progress that Moroccan agriculture has made under the
r

i

egis of colonial rule, but they neglected to mention that such
- land was a loss to the Moroccans as it was- withdrawn- from food
production and used to produce wine-grapes--the end result of

J

which was kept exclusively in French hands.

Some olive oil

is produced for native use and various types of citrus fruit,
dates, and almonds bulk large in Moroccan foodstuff production.

l

f

f

l

'

If one finds confusing the conflicting figures concerning the area of Morocco, the various estimates of its
population over the years will not servB to clarify the
issue.

The main problems which faced the census taker in

Morocco were the lack of machinery available · for such a task

I

and the unwillingness of the Moroccans to disclose birth and

I

death statistics to their erstwhile French rulers.

the ·French authorities were able to make only estimates, but

f'

their colonial regime in the most advantageous light.

f

At best,

usually they felt compelled to use the estimates that placed
The

most accurate figures now place the population of the country
at about ten million,5 one-third of whom are Arabs, one-third
are Berbers, and the remainder of mixed strains.6

Just what

is the origin of the Berbers in N 0 rocco is still an anthropological mystery.

Although some French writers

hav~

attempted

5Moroccan News Bulletin (Ne\"1 York: Moroccan Information
Office, 1953-55} April 20 , 1953, p. 2.

~andau, .2.E.• cit., p. 25,

5
to make much ' of Berber physical and linguistic similarities
to Europeans to demonstrate their independence from Arab
ties, 7 the- fact is that we know little of their racial ori-

t
f

g ins.

While the physical differences between the Berbers and

the Arabs are ve1y appare~t, the former have taken over many
of the elements of Arab culture. 8

1
f

The most important feature

of the life of the settlers from the east adopted by the Berbers has been Islam--a factor \.Jhich has broken down any serious divisions between the two groups.

Historically, both

groups have supplied royal dynasties and, at present, · representatives of both groups are leaders in the Moroccan
government.9
Historically, Iviorocco is of great interest because it
was isolated enough from the surrounding world to form an
individual culture and civilization during a period when the
rest of the Islamic world was continually being overrun by
invading armies and forei gn dynasties.

The Maghreb was ·not a

crossroads of commerce or war as were the lands of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean

7Edouard Bremond, Berberes et Arabes (Paris: Payot,

1950}, P• 114o
.
8Edwo.rd Westermarck, Ritual and Belief in Morocco

(London: Macmillan and Co., Limited-;--1926), · Vol • . II, p~ 12.
9Moroccan News Bulletin, QE• cit., p. 2.

;;.:

.--

•
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Sea to the west and -north, the vast Sahara on the south, and
the mountain systems of the

Atlas and the Riff combined to

protect Morocco from the waves of foreign invasions that
swept again and again

throu~~

the rest of the Muslim world.

This relative isolation, lasting from the late seventh
j
,

century until the beginning of the twentieth century and

f

coupled with the influence of a strong indiginous population,
the Berbers, allmved Morocco to develop a way of life that

J

was on occasion crude and inefficient but, nonetheless,
peculiarly its own.

characterize this inner drive in one word, it would be "passion. n

I

Il

This

p~ssion

is expressed in three forms that c·ombine

to provide the motivating factor in the life of the Ivlaghreb.
The first is a fighting spirit that is especially demonstrated by theBerber element who, down through the course of
history, have provided the military force of their country.
A more important form of the .p assion that typifies the

Moroccans is the urge toward_,independence.

The Berber tribes

were the first group who demonstrated this· fe·e i'±ng, and until
the recent elimination of Fre_pch control, they -prided themselves on their freedom from domination by a central govern-

-

-~--

7

..

ment.

When the Arabs came into the Maghreb, they left behind

them their strong tribal ties that had claimed their alle.!,_ _

_

_g).ance a_nd developed_, __a_reaL_consci.ousness QJ;--their- personal
freedom.

This desire for individual liberty was transformed

into an all-consuming drive toward national independence that
never allowed the Moroccan to be content unless he was in
command of his own destiny.

I

The religious drive ,.;as the third element of the force
that shaped l•1orocco.

Both the Arabs · and the Berbers joined

in devotion to the Sultan as the center tmvard which their
religious life focused.

As a Shereef--a descendent of

Mohammed--he was the possessor of the: power to bless and to

I

do good; and, as such, was revered and honor~d even if not
always politically obeyed.

The reverence for Islam, the

fighting spirit of the Moroccans, and their passion for independence thus combined to give an individual character to the
history of their country.
II.

AN HISTORICAL SURVEY

The history of Io.lorocco is long and varied and goes
back far beyond the Arab invasions of the seventh century.
Archeologists have uncovered evidences of human occupation in
this area that probably date back some fifty thousand years.
In the fifth century B.C., Herodotus .::nentions this area, an,d
such important figures as Pliny the 'Elder and Ptolemy ·w rote

about the 1-Ioroccan area..

Carthage established a colony at

Tingis (Tangier), and the Romans occupied outpost's in parts
_of northern Morocco but never at any t..ime were able to subdue wholly the Berber tribes or to conquer the whole country.
\Hth the exception of the Roman ruins at Volubilis near the
modern city of Meknes, little remains to show evidence of the
~

~

centuries of Roman occupation.

Following the collapse of

Roman .power in Morocco, a confused period of Vandal and Goth
invasions from Spain characterized the history of the country
until the middle of the seventh century.

f

The Islamic invasion of Morocco was the continuation

I

of the spread of Muslim forces across North Africa that

IJ . _. '
L<

started within a decade of Mohammed's death.

Under the lead-

ersh_i _}? of Uqbah ibn-Nafi in 6&J, the armies of the Ummayads
were able to penetrate the Berber lands, the holdings of the
Byz.a:o~Jnes,
sho!"e~

and those of the Visigoths all the way to the

of the Atlantic.

But for the better part of a century,

the Berbers resisted the attempts of the Muslims to control
them, and it v;as not until the arrival of Idris, one of the
descendents of Mohammed, in Jl.1orocco that they agreed to
cooperate in any way with the Arab invaders.
f

Idris was

accepted by the Arabs and Berbers as a Shereef in 799 and was

t

.. ..
-

..

able ·-to consolidate much of Morocco into one country that

.
-

-

9
recognized hi s contro1.10
only~ubmitted

However, even then, the Berbers

themselves to him and his sons as . religi ous

leaders and not always as political rulers.
At about the time the Normans invaded England, a
powerful dynasty was supplanting the divided families that
had succeeded the Idrisis.

In common with most of the major

dynasties of Morocco, these Almoravides began as a religious
_j

i
I

movement from the south of the country.

Under the direction

of a remarkable leader, Youssef ibn-Tashfin, the· Almoravides
began to spread from the south of Morocco, capturing the
cities . of the Idrisis and soon ruling the entire country and
extending their control into Spain.ll

I

Even while the Almoravide dynasty was in control of
Morocco and Spain, a ne\v force was forming in the south that

I

subsequently ruled the empire. and far surpassed the previous ·
fami1.y:;~. ·

Muhammad ibn-Tu.mart (born co 1075) org<,m ized a kind

of democratic state based on the concept of the absolute unity
of 'Go.<l...
~and with the · help of t h e real founder of the ne\-1
. . ..
'

~

dynasty, Abd al-Mumin, eliminated all vestiges of opposition
in Spain . and Morocco and expanded Jvloroccan sovereignty eastward as far as Libya.

During the latter part of the twelfth

y, •.,tOphilip ~ X .
Hitti, History of the Arabs (London:
Macm:iJ,.lan and c-ompany, Limited, 1 95b), p. 450.

llcharles Andre Julien, Histoire de L'Afriaue du Nord

~- fa. ·:·Conauete Arab a 1830 (Paris: Payot-,-1 952), PP• 80 -r:--

10
century, the most important of the Almohade sultans, Yakub
al- Mansur controlled an area stretching from the Sahara to
Spain and from the Atlantic to the '\Arestern borders of
Egypt .12

However, the very size of .t he empire proved to be

its undoing, and rebellions in outlying areas soon weakened

it to a point of collapse.
Although the Almohades, far more than any other

,.

dynasty, left behind them a history that is distinctive and

l

peculiarly their own, it too was fated to follow the pathway

f

of the .preceeding families.

'

virile, nomadic Berber tribe called the Beni

Ineffectual rulers permitted a
Y~rin

to move

f

into Morocco from Algeria and dominate the rapidly decaying
empire.

Yakub II, the greatest representative of the Marinide

dynasty, completed the conquest of Morocco~lJ but his successors allowed the Portuguese to occupy several port towns and
even to control Tangier for a time.

Even though the dynasty

was not as successful militarily as some of its predecessors,
it did make some impo.rtant contributions to the cultural
heritage of Morocco.

f'

The great historian Ibn Khaldun was

employed at the court of the Marinides, and schools were
established and books produced that helped to revitalize

12stanley Lane~Poole, The Barbary Corsairs (London:
T. Fisher Unwin, 1890), p. 26.
l)Julien, ££• cit., p. 166-7.

: ·:c. -

11

f

Islam.

To summar...;i.ze the effect of the Marini des on Morocco,

it can be said that they instituted an urban culture that has

influenced Moroccan society to the present.
As the Berbers and the Portuguese began to feel the
loosening control of the Marinides, the first Arab dynasty

f

since the eighth century began to take over the Iviarinide
empire.

This new Saadien · dynasty was able to defeat the

Portuguese at the ,famous battle of tne '"Three Kings" in 1578,
ending any serious. European threat to Morocco's independence
until the French occupation pf the twenti~th century .14

The

humiliation of the Portuguese army by the Moroccans impressed
the courts of Europe so much that they began sending envoys
to the Saadien kings.

Ahmed al-Mansur, the most capable of

the dynasty's leaci.e rs, wa~. ~gle to elim:lnate all foreign
holdings in his country and to conquer .the area south of
Morocco into the western Sudan.

During his reign, the coun-

try began to divide· itself into areas that were submissive to
the government, Bled al Makhz.€m, and~ the Bled ~ Siba, those
areas which refused to support the central authority of the
sultan.l5

This divisioti"'tl~"';persisted to some extend down to

Morocco's independence from France in 1956.

In spite of the

authority that al-Mansur exe:rcized, he was unable to insure

14rbid., p. 209.

15ill.£., p. 212. '

12

+

the continuation of the Saadien dynasty as a real power in
Vorocco.

At his death in 1603, there was an immediate

scramble for power that within fifty years had so enervated
4

the empire that a nevr dynasty swept away the last remnant of

t

Saadien power.
The dynasty that stepped into the position of the
Saadiens had a remarkably similar background.

I

This Shereef-

ian family, the Filalis, had set up an independent kingdom in
southern 14orocco which spread northward as the Saadiens faded

1

out of the Moroccan picture.

The best known and certainly

t

the most notorious of the early Filalis was Moulay Ismail, a

l

contemporary of Louis XIV, who ruled. from 1672 to 1727.

ness-like basis and stimulated foreign trade.
death,

Morocc~

After his

history began to repeat itself in confusion

and unrest in \'lhich one sultan gained the throne and was
deposed no less than six times.

Fortunately, a strong and

just ruler .in the person of Mohammed ibn-Abdullah controlled

f

Morocco from 1757 to 1790.

!

treaties with foreign pov-rers and it was to him that George

!

During his reign, Morocco signed

Washington sent a ietter of thanks for Mor.occ.o's recognition

~

of the new republic on the North American continent .1.6 ·

lq1orocco Office of Information and Documet;1tation,
Free Morocco (New York: Istiqlal Party, 1953-1 955),
~25, 1953, p. 2.

13
By the end of the nineteenth century, the situation in
~.~ orocco

was serious.

Inefficiency was the keynote of an

administration which was hamstrung by isolation, fear of foreign influence, and foreign intrigue.
preserved by t h e

f
)

t~ibal

Local democracy was /

djmaa or council, but a primitive

autocracy typified the central administration.

This poor

administration, coupled with increased .taxation and the distrust of the people, served to open the way for serious
revolts among the tribes and to give some foreign powers an

l

I
l

excuse for intervention.
Although several European countries would have liked
to influence the course of
who succeeded.

~~ oroccan

history, it was the French

For the first half of this century, Morocco

lost its independence which had been its pr6udest possession
since the eighth century and became inextricably bound to

r

French politics and administration.
Ever since France had occupied Algeria in U5JO and had
made it a .complement to its economy, the French had a more

•

I

than brotherly interest in the future of Morocco.

To gain

control ·of l'<Ioroccan · economy for French profit, France
embarked on a three-fold strategy of conquest:
military, and diplomatic.

financial,

To gain economic control of the

country, France loaned Morocco large sums of money that the
local econ9my was unable to repay.

The French then convi~ced

the other powers that everyone's best interests would be

14
fr

t

f
f

s erved if France were allowed to administer Morocco's
internal affairs.

Militarily, . France used some incidents of

unrest in 1906 and 1907 as an excuse to rush troops into
r~o rocco

to "preserve order."

This temporary occupation

l a sted for the better part of fifty years.

The diplomatic

phase of France's domination of Ivlorocco was probably the most
complicated because she had to gain the assent of Great
Britain who was fearful for the safety of Gibraltar.

Spain

also had to be placated, and Germany demanded some territory
in exchange for relinquishing any claims she might have in
Morocco.l7
Secret agreements with England and Spainand a "gift"
of land in French West Africa to Germany cleared France's
path to control in Morocco. · The Conf·e rence of Algeciras in

1906 ostensibly assured Moroccan independence, but those
pledges came to naught when in 1912 the · Fr.ench forced the
1-ia.khzen to · sign :the Treaty · of Fez that effectively ended
Moroccan independence and permitted France to dominate all
aspects of I'. forocc an life until 195 6.

17Landau,

2£·

cit., Chaps. II-III.
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CHAPTER II
PIRACY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

-.
To understand why the Congress of the United States
.j

and the President of this republic should have turned to
~! orocco,

a nation on the shores of a continent that was then

almost completely terra incognita, for the purpose ofopening
.. ·( :.-....~._:;

diplomatic relations, one must explore briefly the state of

J

!

· 1"
1

i

i'

.

l
'

,.

The northwest corner of Africa was ideally suited as a
base for pirates because of iti strategic iocation near the

.

fi,

.

.ev_e~~s that led u p to this display of interest.

western doorway of the Mediterranean and, due to a shoreline
filled wi·t h numerous harbors and inlets that Offered ready haven

'

for sailing galleys, this coast see.rned
ical -e ndeavors.

ready~made

for pirat--:-

Although one of Rome' 5 _largest battles was

Pompey's attack against the Mediterranean sea-rovers,l piracy _
had become a relatively minor hazard by the beginning of the
Hiddle Ages, at which time both the rulers of Barbary and those
o.f Christendom joined in condemning and suppressing the depredations of the corsairs.

lfJ ith the exception . of a few isolated

outbreaks such as that recorded by Hakluyt in which a Genoese
force consisting of

a"· ..

great number of lords, knights,

lTheodore Lyman; Jr., Tl1e Diplomacy of t h e United
States (Boston: Wells & Lilly, 1828), Volo II, p. 336.
'

f

1

i
r
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'•

and gentlemen of France and England" attacked Tunis,2 rela-

'I

tion s between the commercial powers _of Europe and the African
states of the Mediterranean were amicable and profitable to
both sides.

j

It was the Christian pov..rer$ that had to negotiate with
ea ch other rather than Nith the

r.fus~ims,

for, although ·piracy

was an occupation condemned by all nations, the most com.rnon
violators of the freedom of the seas were adventurers from
Europe.J

I

I
r

I1

These men, dealt~g largely in slaves and booty,

were supplemented by more organ-ized bands sucl!. as the _Knights
of 1>1alta and Rhodes who preyed

principally on the shipping

of the Muslim nations.
However, the. relat-ively minor raids on shipping up to
the sixteenth century soon chang ed in character as a new .
state of affairs began making itself felt in Barbary.

For

i

over seven centuries, Muslims, . Jews, .and Christians had been
living in comparative peace in Spain and North Africa, and a.

I

1
t

great civilization that surpassed anything tha.t Europe could
offer had developed among the Moors of Andalusia. · But with
the decay of Moorish power in Spain., Christian rulers be_g an

2R. L. Pl:a yfa ir, The Sc ourp:e of Christendom (London:
Smith Elder & Co., 1884), p . 1, citing Hakluyt, Vol. II, p. 69.

JLouis le Comte de MasLastrie, Relations et Commerce
de L'Afriaue Sept entrionale ou I>'I a.e:reb ~ l es Nations
'Chretiennes au r-:Ioyen Age (Paris: Librairie de Firmin-Didot et
Cie, 1886), ?: 175.
I

I
-

-

-
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reconquering more and more of the peninsula and pushing the

.

This drive culminated
in the triumoh of
.
- ~ er d i nand
~: oo rish

and Isabella in 1 492 when th e

l as~

vestige of

authority was swept from its final _refuge--Granadao

"'hi s victory occasioned great re joicing in Christendom where
it was felt _that _ri ght had vanquished wrong and the infidel

had been finally

elimina~ ed

from Europe.

On this historic occ as ion, few were farsi ghted enough
to envisage the terrible harvest _that would be reaped by the
Christian powers that joined \'lith the Spanish in hailing this

I

I

feat of arms.

Now, instead · of cooperating with the peaceful

and productive Moors in an integrated Spain, the European
world of .·th-e ..sixteenth ~entury began to experience the·
effects

~hat

religious intolerance and bigoiry produce.

The

highly civilized Moor, who had been cast -out of his home land
on to the shores of North Africa, was understandably bitter
toward his persecutors.

In addition, poverty and starvation

faced a people who flooded into towns and villages that were
<

;

in no way able or prepared to assimilate such a tremendous
influx.

1
t

When one contrasts the eleg ance and luxury of

Cordova or Granada with the poverty of the Barbary States, it
is not difficult to see why the Moor turned his bitterness
a:g·a inst the Christian nations in the most effective way he

18

f

could devise.4
Attacking commercial shipning , which, up to that time,
- -

-

had been a relatively min or occu pation, novr became the religious duty of the Muslims who felt that such action took oh
the nature of a holy war against the unbeltever who not only
had driven them from t heir homes but now began to wield the
torch of persecution on those followers of Islam still
remaining in Spain.5

The religious toleration that up to

this time had been the rule of the Muslim turned to _intolerance, and all possible efforts were made to exalt the Crescent
and to inflict death and damage on their erstwhile Spanish
countrymen.

The situation would probably not have become so

critical if the Christian

pov1er.s

of Spain and Portugal ha.d

let well enough alone, but, encouraged by their success in
expelling the Moors and stimulated by the adulation of Christendom, they launched attacks on the Muslim states of North
Africa.
Such to'WTls as Ceuta, Oran, .and Al giers were controlled
for varying lengths of time, but the European attacks did
little more than redouble the enmity of the Moors and give
them even more reason to launch vigorous raids on their

4E. Hamilton Currey, Sea Wolves of the Medit-erranean
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Com pany, 1 910), p . 63. 5Philip K. Hi tt i, History of the Arabs (London:
Macmillan & Co., 1956), p . 711.
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enem ies' shipping.

One writer states concerning these futile

invas ions of the Barbary coast:
~ • • Algerine pi~acy owes its or~ g1 n i n part to the
Christian charities of Cardinal Ximenes • • • who, not
satisfied with ruining Spain by expelling the Moors,
strove to Christianize Africa by fire and s word.6

t

I n all, it is estimated that som e three million Moors were
ban ished from their country or were executed during the
oeriod
.
- from the f al l of Granada to the beginning of the ·
seventeenth century, and a large percentag e of the refugees
·--

~

.....

-

swelled the ranks of t he burgeoning corsair fleets.?
Although reli gious ardor and the de s ire for revenge
stimulated the development of piracy in the Mediterranean,

.

its growth into a profession was stimulated by the profitable
j -.- .... ~--- .

f ·i-nan.e4al returns so readily available.
pro~_~t:-··

In addition to the

made by the individual pirate bands, the various Bar-

bary g-overnments also received financial gain by levying a

l

duty on ail

plunde~

and keeping a

slaves brought into their ·ports.

c~rtain

percentage of

~11

So valuable was this tttr.ade"

to these states that often .they \'fere reluctant to treat with
the.. European pb\'fers to ·settle their differences by tribute or
treaty, and for nearly three centuries the revenue from

'

l

t

*

_
6John R~ Morrell, Algeria: The Topography and History,
Political, Social, and Natural o£' _French Africa (London:
Nathaniel Cooke, 1854'f, · p . 429o

7Hitti, .9.£• cit., p. 556.
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o1 ratical activities remained the principal source of
na tional income.

t

---- --rt · would have seemed the obvious thing for the great
ma ritime powers of Europe to have. joined in an active cam..,.
~ ai g n

of extermination against the Barbary nations, for the

t remendous financial loss inflicted on shipping caused
anr,uished cries i n all of the commercial centers of the
world, and insura nce rates began skyrocketing until passag e
throu gh the Straits of Gibraltar became economically prohibitive.

Even more than the monetary los .s , the traffic in

slaves caused much anger, and the citizens -of the maritime
nations of Europe brought pressure to bear on their governments to eradicate the pirate nests of the Mediterranean.

So

large had the slave busines_s grown, that it is estimated that ·
at its height there were over twenty-five thousand slaves at
a time in Algiers alone, g and since these captives represented
almost every nation and level of society, the furor and clamor
for their releas·e can easily be imagined.
The miserable condition of the majority of the slaves
in the hands of the corsairs does not have to be recounted
here, but in all fairness it must be stated that the Christian
powers also indulged in this traffic--especially to fill the
ranks of their galley slaveso

In the

gPlayfair, .2P..· cit., p. ·So

~arly

part of the

.

1
f
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s eventeenth century, a British admiral went so far as to sug-

l

;; est that all the maritime pmvers of Europe cooperate in the
.1.

t

t·

expense of a war against the Barbary powers, "· •• and participate in the gains by sale of Moors and Turks a s slaves.n9
The living grave of the galley 1'Tas equ_ally horrible in: both
Muslin and Christian nations; the condition of the slave at
the oar of Andrea Doria's galley or on the bench of Khyar-alDin Barbarossa's ship differed only in the languag e spoken by
the ship's crew, and sometimes even this was the same in both
fleets since nearly eight thousand Christian renegades served

I

voluntarily "\'~lith the corsairs.lO
In a Europe that rocked with fulminations against the

f
I

1-

"barbarians" of the Iv'1editerranean and that was barraged with
pamphlets and periodicals recounting the atrocities allegedly
perpetrated on Christian captives, the common man must have
wondered just what was preventing his government from sweeping the pirates from the sea.

Similar . questions ·p lagued the

new republic in Nor.t h America, and John Adams was asked for

lI
f

J

his answer \'lhen he, with Franklin and Jefferson, was represent.ing his country at the courts of Europe.

He stated that,

first of aLl, the minor nations of Europe were afraid to

f

9Ibid., P• 37o
lOLouis B. W.right and Julia H. IV.I cCleod, The First

.

~mericans in North Africa (Princeton University Press, 1945),

p. 12.

:....~~-;ell
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.L

ra unch an attack on the · corsafrs because their citizens who
ight be captured in battle \vould be sold into slavery.
Adams also wrote that many of the European countries were

pr eoccu pied with internal affairs and were unwilling to
·.-

engage in what would probably prove anrway to be a futile
eff ort.ll
However, the most i inportant reason that the Barbary

l

powers enjoyed such immunity from united European opposition

f

wa s a com.'TierC'i al one.

i

of Tunis, Algiers, or Tri poli were at war with some European

t

power, any rieutral nation had a relative monopoly on the

i

carrying trade of the Mediterranean.

I.

s air~

During a period in which the Regencies

f

If there were no cor-

to threaten shippfng, . this very profitable revenue

would cease and all nations would have to compete on equal
tenns.

It was

general~ Z.

to the advantage of England and France

to exert their naval po\ver or to pay tribute to the Barbary
powers to insure the

saf~

passage of their ships and to

main~

ta i-n their favored position in the commerce of the Mediter-

..

I
l

t

i

ranean.l2

Usually the smaller maritime powers such as

Holland, Denmark, or Sweden attempted to bribe Barbary, but
fo r the most part, they had not the vast resources necessary,

i.
t.
!

11Ray W. Irwin, The Dipl omatic Relations of the United
The
~ates with t he Barbary Powers 177 6-1816 (Cha pel Hill:
university of North Carolina Pr ess , 193 1), p. 16.

12H·t
· .£2.· .£2:......•,
"t
1 t1,
p. ·712·
· .. •
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to placate the piratical states; consequently, France and
::nr.land, the only nations C?-pable ·of dealing q. death blow ·to
~ i racy

on the shores of North Africa; preferred ·to play the

3a rbary states against the smaller nations of Europe--and, on
occasion, against each _other.
I
As far back as the sixteenth century, rivalry betw·een

Ch ristian powers played into the hands of the Muslim countries.

Charles V of Spain invit _ed Francis I of France to

j oin in

a

concerted attack against the corsairs, but the

latter, instead of allying himself with his Christian counterpart, betrayed the Spanish plans to the Barbary powers.l3

So

important did the North African states become in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the great powers of
Europe recognized them as nations and sent accredited diplomatic representatives to their capitals.

Even though the Dey

of Algiers made the statement in 1641 to the British Consul,

sides used every possible means to enlist the help of the
"barbarian pirates."

Even during peacetime, the foreign

consuls of each country schemed to induce the Deys to break

13currey, .££• cit., p. 144.
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~ rr relations with t h eir European rival.l4

When treaties, tributes, or g ifts failed to halt the
~e? redations

of the corsairs, the major Eurapean nations

:-csort ed to the use of f ore e.

Charles V v-ras the first imp or-

ta nt entry into th8 wars aga inst the pirates , but even his
~ en ius

for organ ization and warfare proved valueless as a
·,

!eterrent to piracy.
cen~ h

A British naval officer in the eight-

century said that bombarding pirate tm·ms ';ias like

breaking windows with guineas -- a relatively expensive and
comparatively ineffective method.l5

To show how little

effe ct bombardment had on the Barbary corsairs as a permanent
rem edy for tteir pil laging , t he v'rords of the Dey of AlgieTs
in power during the reign of Louis XIV will be illuminating.
~h en

he was told of the expense incurred by the French forces

in the attack a gainst his. city, he said that he would have
been glad to burn the tovm himself for half the amount.l6
It was obvious to most observers at the end of the eighteenth
century tha.t the Barbary povrers wer e exerting influence and
. :J\-rer over Europe far above t h e actual potential they possessed , but appare ntly riothing was e oing to be done by the maritL'T! e pm·fe rs of Chr istendom to alter the situat ion.
It was in this area of uneasy pea ce
t

altern a ~ing

14PJ..ayfair, £!2.· cit., p . 5·
151 yman, oo.

•t
.£1:.__.,

p . 3 43.

16rbid •.
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pi ratical outbreaks that t h e new nation of the United States
fo und itself when Americ an s hi pping began plying the sea

f
t

r outes to the I.I editerran ean .

- ----

A n ew element now intruded

i nto the pattern of Europea n trade, and British shipping
i nterests were more than happy to see American commerce fall
prey to the corsairs.

Until the Rev olution, the colonists

had been protect-e d by the British Navy or by English tribute,
but \'Tith the emergence of the new nation and the sighting of
a ne\v flag in the Mediterranean, the piratical states of
North Africa had a source of revenue \·rhich they proceeded to
develop to the utmosto

J

11~..-.

.

CHAPTER III
MOROCCO AND THE CO NTI NENTAL CONGRESS
During the years immediately followin g the Revolution,

~

the newly independent United States found itself in a situa-

ti on which was

precariou~

indeed.

The threat of the Barbary

nowers combined with the British commercial restrictions
against her one-time colonies and the inefficient and dangerously weak Continental Congress to create a serious economic
crisis for the new nation.

I

The Mediterranean trade had

account .e d for a sizeable percentag e of our wheat and fish
exports and vras carried by some t"Vventy-thousand tons of shipping.l

Jefferson estimated that over twelve hundred American

seamen serving ih nearly one hundredAmerican ships had been
employed in the commerce with the Mediterranean states prior
to independence.2

After 1776, theBritish naturally withdrew

their protection from American shipping, and the United

l
i
I

lJohn Bassett Moore, A Di gest of International Law .
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1906),
Vol. V, p. 3 91.
2 Naval Docum ents Relate!) to the Uni:ted States' \vars
with the Barbary Powers (hereaft er referr.ed to as NDUS)
(Washir:gton: United States Government Printing Office, 1939),
Vol. I, p. 22. Pre.cise fi gures concerning trade statistics
are unavailable because many customs house records vJere
destroyed during the war ~~th Great Britain. Theodore Lyroan
· The Diflomacy o.f the .United States (B_o ston: Wells &
L1lly, 1828 , Vol. II, p. 339 •

J::.,
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States was hard pressed to find a way to insure the safe
passag e of its merchant vessels.
I.

EARLY DIPLOIVIAT IC RELATIONS

1776-1785

Benjamin Fr..1nklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams,
the Peace Commissioners from the Continental Congress, asked
the French to intervene in their behalfwith the Barbary
powers and referred to Article Ei ght of the Treaty of Commerce of 1778 between the two countries as the basis for this
request.3

The French For€ign Minister said that the Barbary

powers would never respect the flag of the United States for
any

leng~h

of time and that any permission they might grant

to sail the Mediterranean unmolested would be "illusory,

I

temporary and precarious.n4

Actually, France was in little

better straits than the United States in this regard, for .
only by . paying one hundred thousand dollars a year were the
French able to maintain some manner of freedom for their
commerce,5 and they could have exerted little positive

l
t

t

3The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States · of
America, from the si P.." ninP of the Definitive Treaty of Peace,
September 10 , 1783..,.-Adoption of Constitution, I'.tfarch 4, 1789
{\','ashington: Francis Preston Blair, 1833 ), Vol. II, p. 291.
(hereafter referred to as DCUS)
4Francis Wharton ( ed.), The Diplomatic Correspcmdence
of the Unjt:. ed States (Washington: United States Goverrttnent
Printing Office, 1889), Vol. II, p. 731.
5Lyman, ££• .c it., Vol. II, p. 341.
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in fluence on the states of North Africa for the freedom of
Am erican shipping.
Holland, too, had a treaty obligation to extend her
w ~ ood

offices" in the explosive situation that was building

uo in the Mediterranean, but the Dutch had even less prestige
than the French and '\'Tere powerless to aid the United

States~

It was at this critical point in 1778 that the Empe:('or
of Morocco, Mohammed ben Abdullah, offered the friendship of
his country to the United States .6
mented his gesture of
!

~ oodwill

Two years later he imple-

by issuing an injunction to

all of his port officials:

f

That in the future all vessels which carry • • •
American flags may freely enter into the ports of his
dominions • • • , take refreshments, and enjoy in them
the same privileges and inlmunities with those of the
other nations with \'lrhom his Imperial majesty maintains ·
peace.? ·.
.
·
.
Even though an English traveler wrote in 1729, "The.
only natural want this country labours under, (and happy for
Europe that Providence has allotted it so) is want of
harbours •

. .' nB Morocco was

in an ideal position to harass

6Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic ·Relations of the United
States with the Barbary Powers 1776-1816 ( C_hapel Hill: · The
University of North Carolina Press, 1931), p. 25.
f

?wharton,

QE·

cit., Vol. IV, p. 173o

Bcaptain Braithvraite, The History · of the Revolutions
the Empire of Morocco upon the Death of the late Emperor
Muley Ishmael; • • • • ·(London: J. Darby & T. Browne, 1729), ·
p. 3 43.
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s hipping of the United

t he

~ a ba t

t

~.:t d

States~

The neighboring cities of

and Sale (the latter made f amous by the "Sallee Rovers")

for centuries supplemented their economy by piratical

ac ti vities off t h eir coast, and not until
l a h , in 1757, stopped this

~omiTi erce

Mo~~ed

ben Abdul-

altogether ttby declaring

himself at peace with all Europe" did their depredations
cease • a.,
The Moroccan leader was sincere in his efforts to

wh ich was to plague ourrelationships with the Shereefian
Em pire for many years, hampered early contacts and more than
~ nee

pUshed the two countries to the brink of war.
The first semi-official communication that Congress

· received from the court of the Moroccan emperor was a report
f rom Franklin in May of 1779o

Writing to the Committee of

Fo rei gn Affairs in Philadelphia, he quoted an unnamed Frenchman living in Ivlorocco who said,
His imperial ma j esty wondered that we had never sent
to thank him for bei ng t h e f irst power on t his side of
the Atlantic that had acknowledg ed our independence and
opened ports to us.

9vJil ;L i am Lempriere, A Tour f r om Gibralt a r to Ta n&ier,
Mop;adore, Sant a Cr uz, Taruda nt and t r.enc e over Mount
At l as to Mor occo (London: J. Walter, 1791), p. 56.

~a ll ee,

c

.,
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f rank lin, reflecting a natural suspicion of a representative

0 ~ a new nation · in an unsympathetic if not hostile Europe,
! nediately went t o the African Department of the French

ro reign Office to find ou.t j ust who his corres nondent was,
and on beine; told

~hat

the :::ran was not to be trusted, did not

answer the letter.lO
The French may have sincerely had the best interests
of the United States in mind when they counseled against
accepting the help of Frankl'in's contact, or they themselves
ma y

have wished to act as an intermediary bet\'reen Morocco and

if

t he United States.

l

Franklin_was forced to ignore their advice, for the Frenc-hman

f

i n Morocco, probably realizing the reason for his lack of sue- .

'

cess with the Americans in Europe, wrote directly to the Con-

J.

Whatever their reasons may have been,

ress, enclosing a translation of his · appointment which read .
in

part:

"Stephen Audibert Caille, consul for all thos-e

nations who have no consuls in our dominions·, and who are the
States of America •

. ."

Caille stated that the Moroccan

em peror wanted peace with the United States and that -since
this country had no representative in the court of Mohammed
ben Abdullah, he would be glad to look after the affairs of
th e Americans thereoll

lC\'lharton, QE.· cit., Vol. III, pp. 192-3.
llibid., Vol. IV, pp. 172-3•

31
The President of Congress, SamueJ_ Huntington, was
om evrhat more willing than Franklin to · take Caille at face
value and sent the f ollowing letter to the Commissioners iri
:' ranc e:
November 28, 178o ·
We have received a letter from Stephen D'Audibert
Caille, · at Sale, of wh ich t he enclosedis a copy, wherein
he styles himself corisul for unrepresented nat ions at the
court of the emperor of IVIoror::co. If you see no objection
to the contrary, you vrill correspond with him and assure
him in the name of . Congress and in terms most respectful
to the Emperor that we entert a in a sincere disposition to
cultivate- the most perf"ect frieno sni.p with him; and ar-e
desirous to enter into a" treaty of corrimerce with . him; . and
that we shall embrace a favorable opportunity to announce
our wishes in form.l2
Probably more aware of the vagaries of communication
in this · period than either Congress or Mohanuned ben Abdullah,
Caille made sure that some American representative would
receive the wishes of the Moroccan leader by writing in the
spring of 1780 11o John Jay, the United States agent in Spain.
He told Jay that the Emperor of Morocco had ordered him to

·J

write to Congress "to assure them of the pacific. intentions
of that sovereign.''

Caille was anxious to receive an answer '

to his letter$ because he wanted the Emperor to know that he

t

had carried out t he orders that had been g iven to .him.

Jay

was informed that the citizens of the United States were free
t.

•

f

J

12secret Journals of the Acts and Eroceedin ~ s of
Thomas
Conrrress (hereafter referred to as SJAPC)
~. \'i ait, 182l), Vol. II, p . 351.
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enter the ports of I'-loro cco " • • • in the · like manner as

:. ·:e y formerly did under the Ene;lish flag. nlJ
~r

This l a st piece

informa tion was of gr ea t importance and interest to the

)...oo:1e ri can

repres ent2.ti ves in Europe, for they had been trying

vainly to induce the Christ ian powers to extend their good
~ ffi ces
~

to procure such an off er as was now being freely -

offe red by Morocco.

Natural ly, it must not be supposed

t hat this offer was made out of pure :_Jhilanthropy, for the
~ oroc can

leader was also

int~r~sted

i n receiving something in

re turn:

l

In case Cong r ess should be equally well pleased to be
at peace with his majesty the Emperor of h orocco, it
wil l be proper to instruct the captains of American armed
ships to - le~ freel y pass all sh ip~ sailing under t h e flag
of his majesty the Emper or.l 4
Although Jay had not received any instructi ons from
::;ongress concerning ne gotiations with T-Iorocco, h e immediat ely
sav1 the importance of CailleT s overtures and hastened to

answer • . He t hanked the Emperor for his ltliberality and w-i sdom" and said t hat he wa s sure t hat Congress would treat
;: oro ccan subjects 1·rith the same fairness and g enerosity that ·
~< oha.."!Lrned ben Abdullah had ext ended to America.l5

lJLett er from Stephen Cai l le to John Jay, Aranjues,
April 21, 1780 , in ·wharton, QEo cit., Vol. I V, p. 17lo
14rbid.
<•

'
l

l5Letter from Jay to Ca ille , n o d., i n ibido
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Within a few days after notifying their representative
J.

t n Euro pe that the United States ha d received overtures from

J.

:::c Emperor, Congres s penned the following letter which is
;: rob ably the first · official corres pondence from this country
to

:orocco:
The Congress of the 13 United States of North America
to the high, potent and most n o bl~ Prince, the King and
Emperor of Morocco.

I
f

If

I

Most Noble and Puissant Prince,
We the Congress of the 13 United States of North
America, have been informed of your majesty's favourable
re gard to the interests of t h e p eople we represent, which
has been communicated by Monsieur Etienne d'Audibert
Caille of Sale, consul fo~ forei gn nat~ons unrepres~nted
in your majesty's states. v·:e assure y ou of our earnest
desire to cultivate a sincere and firm peace and friend~hip with your majesty and to make it lasting to all
posterity. • • • Should any of the subjects of our
states come vlithin the ports of your majesty's territories, we flatter ourselves t h ey will receive the benefit of your protection and benevolence. Youmay assure
yourself of every protection and assistance to your
subjects from the people of these states whenever . and
wherever they may have it in t h eir power. We pray your
majesty may enjoy long life and uninterrupted prosperity.
December [crate deleted from text7 1780 and our
independence 5.16
.
.
Unfortunately, the tremendous pressure of internal development and lack of a clear forei gn policy or the means to
implement forei gn relations militated against a consistent
United States-Moroccan relationship which had such au·s picious
beginnings.

The Continental Congress failed to pursue

l6SJAPC, QE• cit., Vol. III, pp. 543-4.
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.:or-oc ean friendshi p with the· 'zeal ~t.nat ·should have characteri zed t h eir action s , and it remained for Mohammed ben Abdul l ah
~0

l
!·

-

r esume di plomatic intercourse.
After a lapse of riearly three years in wh ich there

'ro· e r-e no official . :i,p,t erchang es . between t h e two g overnments, it
lia s a gain a private individual wh o initiated correspondence
be t ween Morocco and the United States.

The first intimation

Fr-anklin had that there was any additional American interest
i n lands south of Gibraltar was when he received information
t hat Robert Montgomery, an American merchant in Spain, had
s tarted proceeding s 'V'rith Morocco f0r a treaty of friendship
and co~merce.l7

Evidently becoming tired of waiting for

official action ori· the part of the Commissioners in France,
.!ontgomery had communicated with the Moroccan court to the
effect that this country vras anxious to negotiate a closer
tie beneficial to both parties.

Actually, it is doubtful

whether Montgomery's motives stemmed from altruism or pure
patriotism; _it is probable that he \vas stimulated b_y an
understandable desire to profit from what would prove _to be
ve ry valuable commerce.
\•lhen Frankl·i n heard of the actions of the American

merchant, he was quite disturbed and requested some advice

i

l7Letter from Benjamin F ranklin to the Presid.ent of
Congress, Passy, S eptemb er 13, 1783, in DCUS, ob. cit.,
Vol. II, p. 113 • - ·
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Congress to assist him in dealing with this new develop-

. --;~ -

'!t ent.

He later wrote that "Mont g omery of Ali cant acted

~- p rudently"

in contacting the Em p eror of Morocco -without

a· t horization from the American ministers in Europe or from
:::ongr ess, but he added, "It mig ht be v1ell, hov1ever, to treat
. vit h that Prince.nl8
While v'raiting for dispa tches outlining what action he
! .. hould

take, Fra nklin received a letter from Giac omo

Fran~

c isco Crocco in \'lh ich it was stated that the writer bore tne
answer from the Emperor to l/Ir. Mont g omery's proposal for a
t reaty of friendship and commerce.

In part, the letter

continued:
His Imperial Majesty was graciously pleased at my
solicitation to a gree at the request of Congress,
to g rant them a treaty of pe a ce, (which other pov1ers
of Europe could not obtain but after many years) and
my return without the f u ll execution of his commands, ·
I apprehend may forever indispbse him against the
United Provinces •
.. -- .. .
After this not too veiled threat, Crocco requested fift .e en
.

-~-- -' ~

hundred "hard dollars" to pay the expenses that would be
incurred by a trip to Paris to si gn the proposed treaty.l9
Although Thomas Jefferson wrote jubilantly to a friend

________

- •:-.

-·- -

-·· .

18Letter from Franklin to John
1784, in Charles Franc is Ad ams ( ed.) ,
Adams, Sec ond President o f t h e Uni t ed
Brown & Co:npany, -1853), Vo l :-vii i , p .

Adams, Passy, July 4,
Th e Works of John
States ( Boston: Little,
20 7 o

l<Jr.etter from Giacomo Crocco to Franklin, Cadi.z ,
.--_ November 25, 17~o·•·tn DCUS, QE· cit .. , Vol. II, pp. 14-15~

.

J1""(.-~'
'""'"~
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of Morocco is so . friendly with the United
..a t the emperor
-

~ ta tes

that he had issued orders that none of his vessels

.. ~ 0 u ld

molest American craft and that he

~ c :-s on

to Paris to attend any person delegated from us to his

0

11 • • •

has sent a

urt,n20 his colleague Franklin was not at all pleased with

t he prospect of the "persontt sent by the Emperor.

Franklin

wa s even more suspicious of Crocco than he had been of Caille
~h ree

years before and was more than reluctant to encourage

any presumptions on his part.

He told Crocco that he had no

knovrledge of any proposais made by Montgomery to the court of
~.:orocco

and that the latter had undoubtedly acted without the

consent or instructions of Congress; he added that the United
States would not·have put the Emperor to the trouble of sending a representative to Paris

~

• • • since they have ships

• • • and could easily land him fOur representativiT in
~·! orocco."

Probably remembering that Congress had been willing

to use Caille as . a·n intermediary in 1780, . even though Frank-

lin had been highly skeptical of the Frenchman's worth, he
did not close the door completely but added that the United

States would be willing to enter into a treaty with the ·

-

Emperor of Morocco, implying that such negotiations would be
on a more personal basis and could not be carried out by a

20Letter from Thomas Jeff erson to Benjamin Harrison,
December 17, 1783, in Julian P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers of .
Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
r952), Vol. VI, p. 13 9.
.
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;

: ·>-: ! rd party. 21

Franklin's in quiring mind, that made

r
l

r ~

hi~

a scientist

ahead of hls time and a penetratin8 analyst of political

~ r e nds,

refused to let him take Giacomo Crocco's story at its

il:' parent value without making a careful check; in this con-

t

ne ction, he wrote to Carmichael, the American representative
i n .·:adrid., to find out what he mig ht knovT about Crocco:
• • • you may possibly know more of him than I can and
judg e whether he is really a person in credit with the
Emperor, and sent as he pretends to be, or not rather an
Escroc, as the French call cheats and imposterso

,

The careful Franklin went on to say that as he

V~ranted

to keep

th e Emperor in g ood humor tm-rard the United States, he would
write to Crocco on the off chance that he was telling the
truth, but he adds "V'Tith his customary frankness, "• • ·• I am
loth

[Sii]

to commit myself . in correspondence with a

Frinon.n 2 2

21Letter from Franklin to Crocco, Passy, December 15,
l?S), in DCUS, .2£• cit., Vol. II, pp. 15-16.

;·

22Letter from Franklin to \'Jilliam Carmichael, Passy,
December 15, 1783, in ibid., pp. 17-18. Evidently other
Europeans \-!ere interestin g themselves in the relationships
between the United States and fli orocco because Thomas Barclay,
consul for Congress at L'Orient; F rance, wrote to John Adams
that he had met a man from l\Iequinez Lsi~] wh o had testimonials
from the Emperor of Morocco attesting to the qualit y of his
.
character. · This unnamed individual was willing to g o alone or
to accompany an A.rne r ican to the court of Morocco to neg otiate
a treaty wit h t h e Emperor. He off ered to do the job for two
thousand pounds sterling , but Barclay r e commended to Adai11S
that the applicant s h ould not be hired but only Americans be
used as princi pals in suc h neg otiationso Letter from Barclay
to Adams, L'Orient, November 14, 1783, in DCUS, .2.£• cit.,
Volo I, p. 9 45.

'

.

r
r

•

It was fortunate for Franklin that he had left open
the possibility of further communication with Crocco because
Cone;ress heard that Mont gomery had written to · I>Iorocco, and
they wished the ministers in Europe to find out on "what
grounds" he had done so.

They also were to follow up any

leads that may have opened as the result . of Montgomery's
unofficial correspondence and to take any measures that might

t

be to the interest of the United States.23

This, of course,

meant that Franklin should maintain some kind of contact with
Crocco, unpleasant though that may have been for him.

How-

ever, there is no indication that Franklin succeeded in
making any more contacts with Crocco if, indeed, he tried.
Probably when Crocco realized that the· fifteen hundred "hard
dollars" were not forthcoming, he abandoned the United States
as a source of income andturned his attentions to "unrepresented" countries with less suspicious ministers than
Benjamin Franklin.
This series of letters seems to have been the last
negotiations in which other than Americans or Moroccans took
any direct part.

The representatives from the United "States

in Europe began urging Congress to authorize them to institute proceed.ings with all the Barbary powers, and in this

23Letter from Congress to Frankfin, March 16, 1784, in
SJAPC, £E• cit., Vol. III, p. 542.
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connection John Adams wrote, :'There are other powers with
vhom it is more necessary to have treaties than it ought to
e ; I mean Morocco, Alg iers, Tunis, and Tripoli.»24
ti nued by

sug g estin ~ tha~

He con-

t he American ministers in France

and Spain should be appointed to deal with Barbary as they
•are best situated.n25
Congress had been approached by Caille and Crocco and
ask ed to deal with them in their negotiations with Morocco,
but never had America been enthusiastic about accepting any
outside help in this mattere

Therefore it was with some

alacrity that they authorized the American ministers to
· initiate meetings with the

~1 oroccans.

The following resolu-

tion from the Secret Journals of Congress dated May 7, 1784
indicated the real interest that the United States had in the
Moroccan proceedings:
Resolved, That treaties of amity or of a1·nity and
comrnerce.be entered into with Morocco • • • •
That our ministers • • • make known to the Emperor of
Morocco the great satisfaction which Congress feel from .
the amicable disposition he has shown towards these
States, and his readiness to enter inbo alliance with
them.
That the occupation of war, and distance of our
2 4Letter
178)' in Moore,
2 5Letter
1783' in Adams,

from Adams to Cone;ress, Paris, September 10,
cit., Vol. V, p. 392.

QE•

from Adams to Congress, Paris, September 10,
on. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 150.

'il"'
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40
situation, have prevented our meeting his friendship so
early as we vlished. But the pmvers are nmv delegated to
them for enteri ng into a treaty with him, in the execution of which they are ready to pro ceed, ahd as to the
expense of his minister, they do therein \'Jhat is for the
honor and int erest of the United States. 26
Th is last reference to the Moroccan nminister" illustrated
.,.. th e problems caused by the slow communication existing ·
• .J.:6w:.,;~ ...

between Europe and the United States, f o~ · c6ngress was still

·~

thinking in terms of Giacomo Crocco and his plan to meet with
the United States ministers in France, not yet having been
informed that he had passed out of the picture, at least as

....
·.;.·-

·.
.

; : i~.i.

•.•

· : .. ·

far as Franklin and his colleagues were concerned.

·~

The step from a Congressional resolution to its imple. _.,~;~;..
_ ......
·:.

mentation

is never an easy one even at the best of times, and

"~o~':f-"'-"':

during the early years of our history, the general impotence
·.: ·-· 1:'. ~~·~-.-.:

-::.;,;. .of the Continental Congress coupled with communication diffi- .
culties multiplied the problem so that the foregoing state·~ -'

·· ment made in Philadelphia had little effect on the status of

-~ ·_ .. ·.'j~ ---.~-

,.,:

~.::c

American-Moroccan cooperation and understanding.

This prob-

lem was amply illustrated by the capture of the American brig
Betsy on a trip from the United States to Teneriff.e by a

__ ,,:··::.'

~ oorish

raider.

The Moroccan emperor, evidently tiring of

. ; ·, ~ .; - ,.:f.?

the apparent equivocation by the American ministers and lack
... . .... . ...
~

of Congressional response to his overtures of peace and

2 6sJAPC, QE· cit., Vol. III, p. 489.

t · ··•'l"' '" •.·
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f riendship, directed one of his warships to bring an American
erchant vessel to Tang ier.

However, in sharp contrast to

his other North African neighbors, the Emperor did not vent ure into hostilities for the purpose of increasing his personal treasury at the expense of foreign merchantmen nor for
making slaves of the sailors; the crew and the brig were held
for six months in Tangier v·r here the Americans were well
treated and then released and their vessel restored to them.27

If the Emperor's purpose was to stir the Americans into some
kind of action, he succeeded, but since Corrununication was
slow and distances great, some time elapsed before the lesson
he gave them could be learned or its result manifested.
The first indicationthat the Americans had of the
capture of the Betsy was in a letter from our consul in
l·Iadrid to Franklin .in which the request was made. that the
French interpose in the matter " • • • to induce the Emperor
to suspend further hostilities until Congress has time to
take such measures as they might judge proper; to pro<l:,uce a
good understanding between the tvm countries .n 2 8

The French

did little or nothing to relieve the situation, and the

. 27Gardner \1. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbarv Corsairs
(CambridGe, Mass.: Houghton, i\'I ifflin and Company, 190 5),
p. 13.
28carmichael to Franklin, Madrid, February 27, 1784,
in DCUS, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 2S4o
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.. r occans pursued their own plans pay ing little attention to
ny

half-hearted European attempts at intervention.
Because the Morocc an situation was rapidly deteriorat-

t ng and there was no successful di plomatic intercourse with

th e other Barbary powers, t h e American ministers in France

began making urgent represent ati ons to t heir gov ernment a nd
to France for assistance and advice. John Lamb, t h e American
envoy to Algiers , re ported that t he Bey had nineteen galleys
each mounting nearly forty guns and- that Morocco's navy cons i sted of twenty vessels of twenty guns or larger.29

Regard-

l ess of the fact that Lamb's information concerning the
s tatus of the Moroccan navy was unreliable and grossly exagr- erated, it stirred Adams to call a meeting with Jefferson
and Franklin to analyze the United States' position and to
map out propo.:;:;als for

Con,g-r~ ss

to .. foJ_low, to remedy the dart-

gerous condition materializing in the Mediterranean.
Adams wrote to Jefferson that some means had to be
found to bring peace to the Mediterranean b~cause (l) maritime insuranc·e ·· rates were climbing; .so ra pidly. that American
merchants could no longer afford t o compete in that area,
( 2) · that we were faced \·.ri t h t h e loss of one-half of our trade
with Spain and Portugal, and (3)

t~a.t

.·..... ....v~ ... ·

the entire business
·-.;...~~#- · .::; ?,

carried on between the United States, the 'M editerranean and

2 9Irwin, ££• cit.,

p. 7o
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~t

Levant _was in dang er of being completely eliminated.
mated that the financial los s to t h e

Unit~d

He

States

!:: ' Cause of t h e uncertaint y and unrest -wa s -nearly three million dollars per year plus nearly · that much again needed to
~ut f it and maintain a navy.JO

The ministers first discussed the system of placing a
ta r i ff on American exports that would be used to ransom
r r i soners.

It was suggested that fixed sums be agreed upon

with the Barbary powers as a redern pt--ion price for captured
sai lors and passengers.

This method was soon seen to be

nothing more than a formalized bounty in which a premium
would be paid for every
states could captureoJl

ft~erican

sailor that the piratical

It was finally agreed that the

cheapest possible solution _to the dilenuna was the payment of
-annual tribute which would actually cost less in the long run
t han equipping and maintaining two American frigates.

The

ministers ended their report to the United States with this
·statement, "It rests with Congress to decide between war,
tribute, and ransom as the .means of establishing our Ivlediter-

JOAdams, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 400. At this time,
the United Stateshad only one naval vessel, the Alliance, · in
the Mediterranean, and it was in the process of being sold.
Lyman, oo. cit., Vol. II, Po 339. ·· ··-"··
31Lyman, QE• cit., Vol. II, p. 34.

t.
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:- nean cornmerce.tt32
That the situation with Morocco was bec.oming more
ri t ·ica,l was ooown in a let t er fr om Adams to Secretary of
State
John Jay in which he reported that the Emperor of
. ~·

~

t

'

. .ts . ..

I

b~ild

s om e warships, " • • • and as none of the great maritime
o~~rs

..

t

ro cco had sertt to Holland for material with which t o

t

have the courag e or the will to refuse such requisi-

io ns, had obtained them. r.·

' nit~-d States · was in

no

He went on to point out that the

position to fi ght in the Iviediterran-

ean, for America had very valuable trade that could be easily
d isrupted but that Morocco had none _that could be touched.
Adams felt that it was very probable that the ships that the
Em peror was to obtain from Holland vJOuld be used against the
U nit~::c! States ·:tn the event of hostilities and that, theref~r·e-;

we should " • • • thirik -of nothing· else but treating ·

with them.33
At this
received

l

1
"

word·~

j ~ncture,

t h e American consul in Spain

from Sale that the Horoccans had captured

anotrr~-r .Americafn vessel but had · clothed and fed the crew and

had taken them to Tangier where they were then releas .e d.
Carmichael's informant volunteered his opinion that the

32Freeman Snow, Treaties and Topics in American DiplomacY: (Boston: The i3 oston Book -Co., 1 894) ,. p ~ - 154, n .1.
33Letter from Adams to Jay, Auteuil, December 15) 1784,
in Adams, ££• cit., Vol. VIII, p. 217.
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~

g

!r. !'eror had released the cre\v to shov.r that he was as human
u .d polished as any European and that he wish ed to show his

~c nerosity to the Uni~e~ States.J4

It must not be supposed

t l:a t Mohammed ben Abdullah deliberately planned to capture
nnd release American ships to demonstrate his good will or

f

even his power.

The fact is, as shown by subsequent events,

that , for the most part, the Emperor had little direct control over the various ports from vJhich marauders could be
launchedo
~ ubjects

If he and his army were in the vicinity, then his
were amenable to his regulations, but, as was often

th.e case, when events dictated an extended stay in other
parts of his kingdom, local officials often took matters into
t heir own hands and initiated acts for which the Moroccan
government was not directly res ponsible. ·
Because they had not yet received any definite instructions from Congress on the method to be used to reach an
understanding with Morocco, the ministers turned to the French
Foreign Mi nister, the Count de

Vergenne~

for advice.

Their

primary concern v.ras to find out the reason why the Emperor or ·

3 4Letter from Lo~is Goublet to Carmichael, Sallee {_Si£1
J une 25, 1785, in DCUS, ~· cit., Vol. II, p. J 80. The Secretary of State ina r eport to Congress relative to the l11Iediterranean trade referred to this capture and gave credit for .
the release of the ship t .o the "good offices" of Spain.
Letter fro;il Jefferson to Congr ess , December 30 , 1790 , in
Amer ic an St ate Paners, Documents, Legislative and Executive
£.£ the Con?:r ess of the United ·States (Washington: Gales and
Seaton,-ys33), "Foreign R.elations,n Volo I, p. 104.
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t

r occo seemed to wax hot and then cold concerning h is rela-

~ ~ on s

with the United States and what co u l d be done to c-ement

nod fe eling s between him a nd this country .

De Verg ennes

old the Americans tha t his informati on was that
~'!n

Abdullah was

l~~ ohammed

piqued with Cong ress for t h eir ap parent

a ck of interest and res p ect toward him as · s h mm by their not

f

:.a ving corres p onded \'lith h im nor having sent an . envoy to his
: urt.35

The French minister's estimate was correct u p to

:. his point because undoubtedly t h e Moroccan Emperor had a
ri ~ ht

to expect that his recognition and off ers of friends h ip

to a relatively s mall and unim p ortant nation would be met
wi th a gratitude and quick res ponse; ho'\<'Tever, he did not

realize fully the communication dif f iculties or t h e tremen.,..
dous internal problems facing

Congress.

De Vergennes' advice .. as · how the ministers should proc eed was not as g ood as h is previous estimate had been.

He

. ov eremphasized the imp ortance of. rich g ifts and monetary · pay:t ents for which he said the Emperor n. • • was the most
in terested man in the world, and the most gre~dy for money~n36
Th is evaluation was patently unfair and inaccurate, as subs eo_uent events proved to the Americans, but it ·did make Adams

35Letter from John Adams to Franklin and. Jefferson,
Anteuil, March 20, 1785, iri Adams, op • . cit., Vol. VIII; p. 230.

3~etter fro~ Adams to Fra nkl in and Jefferson,
Auteuil, Marc h 20, 1785, in DCUS, .£E.• ·c it. ·;·..,''Vol. II, p. 286.
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J

a'k ·ust h ow muc h t h e French had paid to the Moroccan court-~
"- qu estion for wh ic h he r e ceived n o answer.
~

The sugg estion

America s h ould send -a re prese ntative to Jv1orocco rather

.1 t

:,~;n n

receive its envoy in Pa ris was a sound one that the

~ n~ t ed

States foll owed carefully, for t h e latter policy would

..rt ve been very e xp ensive a nd would have allowed outside pres-

eures to influence the course of t h e deliberati ons.

A few days fol l owi ng this conference with the Fren ch
ni ni ster, the American commissioners drafted a letter to
de Vergennes, t h is time telling -him,
;.~ o rocco

n.

• • the Emperor of

had commepced hostiliti es a g ainst

~he

United States,

by the capture of a vessel belong i ng to Philadelphia,

by one

o f his frigates" and as k ing for assistance from the French.

7h ei r exasperation with the Barbary · powers was shown when, at

: he

con~lusion

of their letter, they o f fered to join France

l n any war it .mig ht be contemplating with the North African
states .3 7

Although the French rejected the American offer,

the proposal did - indicate the c onfused state of mind which
~he

Americans displayed over the

~·1 editerranean

problem--first

desi ring to develop friendl y rel a t i ons with Morocc-o and then
ff ering to join F:rance in a war a g ainst all of the Barbary
~a t i

ons.

37Letter from the Commissi oners, Franklin, Adams ; and
to de Verg ennes, Passy, Marc h 28, 1785 in ibid.,
•o l . II, p. 289.
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In the midst of the f.Ioroccan dilemma facin g the Amer-

:. nns in France, the Continental Congress finally made up its
n. ~ J to follow u p vigorously the neg otiations with the

t

r.apc ror of l"':orocco that had started over five years before.
1~ e r
.1

a long debate in Congress concerning the importance of

co ntinuing relations hip with

~o u t h ern

l~'i orocco,

in which three

states opposed any treaty or payments (probably

· cca use they had no commerce at the time in the Mediterranean
r ea), a resolution was passed that authorized the ministers
i;1 Europe to form a treaty with Morocco) 8

They \Afere to be

a' .l owed up to eighty thousand dol lars to accomplish this end
--a fi gure which must have made them a little pessimistic of
~ u ccess

when they compared it with the tremendous sums that

? ranee and England had been accustomed to spending ·on the
~

rbary states • .. .The final sentence of the resolution must.

r.a ve had an ironic flavor for Franklin who had been trying to
~ ersuade

Con gress to treat with z·.rorocco;. it was a statement·

t.o tf:e effect that the Secretary of State should write a
. etter to the ministers impressing upon them . the importance
of these negotiations .39
Although Adams told Jay that he thought it n

• • dan-

3f\'lharton, .2.£• cit., Vol. III, p. 62.
.
39A ConP"ressional resolution by R. R. Livingston,
fe bruary 14, 1785, in SJAPG, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 528o
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saying a word to Morocco before

are ready to treat

vre

v~ ·. t. all, n40 the commissioners decided to send a Mr. Short
:. :- j

a Dr.

:t. ~n te r

Bancroft--the l a tter described as "the greatest

of the French language"--to determine what products

~ ~ r o cco

oroduced that would be of use in the United States

r.d a lso to see if there were any of our exports that would

I

'!.r.d a ready market in the Emperor's country.

-

Although the

ercial aspects of our interest in Morocco proved to be

!n oortant, the ministers gave up the idea of using either
S:'\o rt or Bancroft as the American envoy; instead they turned

·., a diplomat v1ho had been in Europe nearly as long as them· :~e l ves

and of whom Adams said, "If lVIr. Barclay \·d ll undertake

: he voyage, I am for looking no farther.

We cannot find a

r, tead ier or more prudent man.n41
II.

THE TREATY OF 1786

Thomas J. Barclay, · who subs eque:htly more than vindiat ed the trust placed in him, for several years had been the
l:terican commercial representative in France from the Cantin~~ tal

Congress.

~u r o p eans

He had had many opportunities to contact

who were familiar with Morocco and thereby gleaned

4°Letter from Adarns · to Jay, Auteuil, March 9, 1785, in

l a~ s, QE• cito, Vol. VIII, p. 227.

41 Letter from Adams to Jefferson, London, August 23,
-78 5, in ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 302.
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many bits of information that stood him in good stead during
the negotiations ·Nith Mohammed ben Abdullah.

No other Amer-

-- - ---ican had ever been reauired to present himself in such a
~ court

with so little of intrinsic value to offer in exchange

for goodwill, and it was due in large part to his good sense
and innate courtesy that success crovmed his mission.

The

complete failure of his counterpart at the court of Algiers,
John Lamb, was not due only to the Bey's reluctance to halt
his profitable piracy, put also to Lamb's ineptness and
arrogance--the absolute antithesis of Barclay 1 s manner.
The American ministers, having agreed that Barclay was
the right man to undertake the important responsibility in
Morocco, instructed him to enter into a treaty of amity and
-- ...

commerce vlith the Emperor for which he was authorized to
~

spend a maximum of twenty thousand dollars for gifts and
expenses.42

Our envoy was to tell the R~peror that the

United States had just completed a very costly war with the
most powerful nation in Europe and was not in a position to
dispense expensive presents.43

Adams and Jefferson decided

421J.Jhy there was the obvious discrepancy between the
sum authorized by Con ~; ress for these negotiations--eighty
thousand dollars--and the amount permitted Barclay is not
clear. Possibly t h e ministers in - France wished to save some
for their contemplated mission to Algiers, or theymay have
planned to allow Barclay more money if the negotiations
required it.
43Letter of instructions from the ministers to Barclay,
October 6, 1785, in DCUS, .QE• cit., Vol. II, p. 415 ff.
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on a course of action that Barclay should follow in which he
was to point out to Mohammed ben Abdullah that at the present
time there -·were no American ships in the Mediterranean and
that there would not be until the United States had received
some sort of a guarantee frum Morocco for safety of passageo
Barclay was g iven the dif fi cult task of trying to demonstrate
that Morocco was losing more money by the cessation of American trade than it could possibly gain through the capture of
a few vessels.
-- Since the United States and Morocco had not been
engaging in much trade up to that time, Barclay's position ,;as
Gertainly not an enviable one for any diplomat to occupy.
Evidently realizing the weakness of the American position,
Adams appended the· folloi'Ting note to his' portion of Barclay's
instructions, in an effort to strengthen it, "The common argument is the bombardments and depredations with which their
enemies threaten them."

The implication was that the United.

States \'WUld emulate the European countries in this regard ·
and punish Morocco vrith force if that state refused to cooperate with America--Barclay was to be instructed that he should
"be· very naked in this respect. n44

Fortunately for the suc-

cess of our negotiations and for all subsequent relations -

44Letter from Adams to Jefferson, Londo~, September 16,
1785, in Adams, QEo cit., Vol. VIII, p. 314.
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with Morocco, our representative was well aware that the
saber-rattling technique advocated by Adams would be fool-

.
••

f

hardy, as it was unlikely that the Emperor did not fully know
that the Americ an navy in the Mediterranean consisted of one
small warship which by that time was on its way back to

~he

J;

j

United States.
In a ddition to the fore going g eneral instructions
given by the American ministers in Europe, Congress requested
Barclay to f i nd out the fo l lowing specific items from the
Emperor.45

Understandably enough, the most important piece

of intelligence wanted by the Continental Congress was economic
information:

vrhat does the country export and import, what

American articles might find a market there, and what rate of
duties would our products be charged on entry into Moroccan
ports.

Next, Barclay was to make inquiries into the status

of the various ports with special emphasis on their defenses.
In this connection, he was to make a survey of the Emperor's
naval strength: how many and what type of ships, the effici ency of their crevlS, what was tbeir cruising grounds, · and
during what seasons mi ght they be a threat to the commerce of
the ·united Stateso
He was also asked to find out how prisoners of war
were treated by their Moroccan captors, what was the price of

45ncus, QE· cit., Vol. II, pp. 418-19.
t
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redemption, and whether or not the Moroccans respected t h eir
t reat y obligations.
.

Just how Barclay was to pose t his last
-

- .

question to t h e Emperor wi th out di splaying a lac k of tact and
trust, t her eby s poiling any chances of making a satisfactory
t reaty, v·ras not exolained to him.

The complete paucity of

information about I·:Iorocco that Congress possessed v1as demonstrated by their re quest to be informed as to what languag e
the Moroccans spok e and how they were governed by- the Ottoman
"Porte. n

This last it em showed the confusion of thought that

was shared by the United States with many European powers wh o
thought that Morocco c ould be classed with Al giers, Tunis,
-

~

-

-

~

and Tripoli--not realizina that Morocco. had never been completely subject to outside control since its inception as a

~uslim

state in the eighth century.
The final bit of information that Congress wanted was

in connection wit h

~he

religion practiced by the Moroccans·.

The Americans were es pecially concerned with findin g out "by
what princi ple of their religion is it that they consider all
Christian povrers as their enemies, until the y become friends
by treaties."

Th is last 6o~cept had been fostered by the

actions of Morocco's neighbors who used the pretext of· a lack
of treaties to

excu~e

their piratical depredations on the

commerce of Europe and the United States, but it was not the
general practice of the l\'l oroccan authorities.

(The important

54

t

information in Barclay's report to Congress is recorded
below .46)

t

4~arclay stated t hat l~ 'I orocco exported the follovling
things: " gum arabic, beeswax , copper in blocks, morocco ,
leather, almonds, dates, fi gs, walnuts, lemons and orang es
if there was wood to make packing b oxes, olive oil, mules.
Elephant teet h , g old dust, and ostrich feathers • • • " from
.the southern port nf M o g ador~
Morocco's usual imports -v.rere silk, linen, woolens,
tools, iron, ship equipment ., and wi ne for the use of
Christians "duty free." He stated that the following things
___might be purchased from the United States: rice, fish oil,
· ·'-'· tar, ship-timber that the Emperor would only want at tthis
own pri cett and ready-built ships. Import duties were fixed
. ....at one~t ~nth of the value of the goods. He observed that in
..... chis opinion the only thing that the United State.s would want
from Morocco was their leather goods.
Barclay made a careful survey of the defense facilities
of the ports from the south at Santa Cruz northward to Tetuan.
He also found that the naval force consisted of ten frigates
carryirt-g< -a total of 170 guns, and tha-t the Emperor was negotiating with European nations for the purpose of getting
their seamen to train the ~!Ioroccan navy.
Concerning prisoners, our envoy v..ras able to report,
--- --~ "There .afe not any nrisoners or Christian slaves in the Empire
of Mo:roc co~ n He ad~led that the Emperor had voluntarily
released all prisoners and that the only captives in the
country were h eld in the Sus which was not completely under
the control of the g overnment.
Barclay said that the treaties in force with Morocco
would remain so, but, "'Vlhen this Emperor dies, there will
probably be g reat c ontentions, and I suppose treaties will _
avail little, either at sea or land, until these contentions
are ad justed." His estimate of the situation was borne ou~,
.-.for -Q!iJ.:V: a fevT year s later ~ I ohamrned ben Abdullah's death dld
create a state of confusion in Horocco and uncertainty as to
the status of our treaty with that country.
The army of I•·! orocco 1vas reported by our representative
to have descended from the negro troops brout;ht into the
country by I··'I ohammed ben Abdullah's grandfather. Although the

l
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The American ministers we re fearful that Barclay's
,

mi ssion would be futile because he would probably arrive so

t
standing army numbe red only 14,767 (according to Barclay), he
stated that all the sub jects of the Emperor were go od soldiers
an d were obliged to follow him into battle in case of need.
Barclay est imated the annual income of the . g overnment
as four million dollars !.Iexican vJh ich was r a ised in a variety ·
of ways: ten percent import duties, a similar rate of tax on
urain, taxes on the cities according to their wealthi fines,
sea prizes, and the profit from the cochineal trade.
He reported that a Moorish dialect of Arabic was
spoken by part of the people and that various Berber tongues
were common in the mountains. Spanish v.ras the best known of
all the European languages.
Their reli gion was des cribed by Barclay as "Hahometan,"
and he explained that the people obey the Koran. He thought
that apparently the Emperor was permitted to make some modification in the reli gious practices of the people, but he ·did
not think that piracy had any reli gious orig in. Rather, he
felt tha t it stemmed from a feeling of revenge fo r the ·
expulsion of seven hundred thousand Moors from Spain in 1492
and the elimination of the remainder in lCD9 under the rul ·e
of Philip III. He added the note that many European pov·rers
were to be held partly res ponsible for piracy since they
encouraged the Barbary povmrs to join them in raiding other
Christian nations with whom they were at waro
The American envoy explained to Congress that the
Ottoman "Port en had no control over the destiny . of Morocco;
and the only ties between the t1vo countries v1ere that . they
were fellow Muslims. He vrent on to say t hat t h e Em peror was
an absolute monarch who united all spiritual and temporal .
power in his person~
·
Barclay concluded his amazingly complete report with
the following warning c oncernin;; t h e Emperor, "He had
ordered five frigates to be fitted for sea, and I think it
more than orobable that they were intended to cruise a gai nst
the Americans." Ibid., Vol. V, pp. 179-99.
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.at e that the Rmperor would be " • • • out of patience and
send out his fri gates.n47
what tardily for the

This concern was expressed some-

American re presentatives had been avvare

f the wish of the Moroccans and the necessity for sending

envoys to the Em per or ever since 1778 when he had first

'

reouested some type of relat ionshiP with the

Uni~ed

States.

Adams wrote to John Jay that he had been meeting with
the Tripolitan ambassador in London endeavoring to formulate
som e-kind of ·an agreement .with that

country~

During the

course of the meeting s, the ambassador was __·a dvised of the
fact that :Morocco was int-erested in reaching an _understanding
with the United States.

The Tripolitan "· ••. rejoiced to

hear it and doubted not that. the a g.ent ffiarclay] would sueceed;· as the Emperor 1.1as a man of extensi V'? views and much
disposed to promote the commerce of his subjects .tt48

This

encqp.raging information, from a source which Adams believed
to be well informed ab.out Moroccan affairs, stimulated hope
in the minds of the ministers for a short time that their
envoy would be successful.

However, when they left the realm

oi' g eneralities · and began to discuss concrete articles for a

treaty with Tripoli, they soon realized that the assurances

47Letter from Adams to Jay, London, February 16, 1786,
OP. cit., Vol. IV, p. 487.
48Lette.r from Adam s to Jay, London, February 20, 17$6,
in Adams, .2.£• cit., Vol. VIri, -p . 375.
in
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made by that state's representative were based on no certain
i nformati on.

The Tripolitan ambassador laid down some very

costly prerequisites for peace with his country--thirty
thousand guineas as a dovm payment and three th ousand pounds
in perpetuity.

As if this shock was not severe enough to the

1

•

hopes of the Americans, he then added that he was not at all
s ure whether Morocco would be willing to settle for such a
sum.

In fact, he then admitted that he c ould not really

answer for the lVloroccan em peror's sentiments in such a matter
and that since the United

States 'It-las not even in a .position

to pay Tripoli's demands, they should entertain little hope
of ~uccess in Morocco.49
After hearing from Barclay that the Spanish representative to the court of l!Jorocco, the Marauis de Vialli, sugg ested
that the United States would have to pay eighteen thousand
dollars per year to the Emperor to maintain peace once it had
been achieved, the American ministers were more discouraged
than ever.50

Adams must have reflected the general gloom

that hovered over the American representatives when he wrote

f

to the Secretary of State, "l\1r. Barclay

[f.y

armed only with

innocence and the olive branch, and there is some reason to

49Letter from the Commissioners to Jay, Grosvenor
Square LLondo!Y, l\1~rch 28, 1786, in DCUS, .2£· cit., Vol. II,
p. 3 41.
~

{
t

50Letter from Barclay to Jefferson and Adams, Cadiz,
May 23, 1786, in ibid., Vol. III, p. SO.

expect that the Emperor will feel t heir dignity hurt by
the

~ppearance

.-

Con~ress.n51

of a deputy not. i mme diately appointed
by
.

This latter obs~rvation referred to the fact

that the Continental Congress had not commissi oned Barclay
directly to deal with the Emperor but had ori ginally expected
one or all of their commissioners personally to carry out
their mission.
Fortunately f or Barclay's peace of mind and for the
success of his venture, he was _unavmre of the pessimism that
gripped his colleagues irt France and England and went ahead
laying plans to achieve his goal.
contest with somewhat more than the

He was able to enter the
"innocence and the olive

branch" of v-rhich Adams spoke, for he records in an undated
note ...-.the ...partial
list
of
presents
. . . ... · _:··-''": /' .
....
...
... that he was bring ing to the
Emperor: two silver, one pinchbeck, and a woman's g old cased
-·:-

;~

_

;,.~\·

_-_

.,

watch, plus vJhat he described as an "elegant gold watch with
gold chain and key."
~ old"

and "one gold box with diamonds in the lid with a
. :" \ , ........... ; ~~- c,. .

I

"An elegaht sword, handle inlaid with
~ ·. :. ; '

musical instrument in it" completed the list.52

,

Although

Nr.. Barciay
displayed a fondness for watches, he did not sup-:;- -...,....
pose that his gifts alone were enough to tip the balance of

51Letter from Adams to -J ay, London, February 16, 1786,
in ibid., Vol.IV, p. 487o
52ASP, op. cit., "Claim.s," p. 354.
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.'ohamrned ben Abdullah's f a vor toward the United States; he
r ealized that t he assistance of

European powers that had

relationshi ps with Morocco would materially- advance his
mission.
Adams had thought of asking Holland, which was obligated by treaty to support the ca use of t h e United St ates in
the Mediterranean area, to interpose her " good offices" in
the IVIorcccan af f air, but after c onsidering all the ramifications of this possibility , he wrote to Jefferson that if
they ask the Dutch to hel p in this matter, . they ". • • would
publish to all the world lVrr . Barclay's mission.tt53

However,

Barcla y felt that it was imperative that this country get
some support from Europe; so he approached the Spanish court
through Count Florida Blanca who stated that t h e King was
willing to write a letter to the Emperor of Morocco ort behalf
of the United States and .Lvlr. Barclay's mission.54

\!J illiam

Carmichael, the American consul in Madrid, was also asked to
procure some letters from the Spanish authorities to be sent
with Barclay and his party , and he added his re ouest to that
of Count Blanca in the hope that the success of the United
Sta~es'

mis s ion would be enhanced.

53Letter from Adams to Jefferson, London, September 16,
17$5, in Adams, 2E.• cit ., Vol. VIII, p. 314.
54r.ett e r from Barclay to Jeff erson, Madrid, March 23,
17$6, in DCUS, op. cit., Vol . III, p. 126.

..
l

-tiJ Barclay's belief that help from Spain was im portant
l'! as borne out by t h e letter that Mohammed ben Abdullah sent
to the Consul General of Spain only a fe w months after that
country had promised to help the United States' neg otiations.
Carmichael quoted part of the letter in which the Emperor of
~~ orocco

said:

We have read thy letter • • • concerning the Americans.
They have pres ented themselves, bearing a letter fro~
King Charles, f or whose sake we have granted their
requests and si gned the treatyo55
Just how much weight the Spanis h influence would have had
with the Emperor if the latter -had not been predisposed to
'

-

treat with the Americans is hard to estimate, but it is
doubtful that Mohammed ben Abdullah did anything in this
regard that he ·had not already decided upon.
Spanish-Moroccan relations had not been too cordial
for many years ahd possibly the Emperor thought that by leav- il1.g the impression that he had negotiated withthe Americans
as a gesture of friendship to Spain, that country would feel
constrained to return the favor in the future.

Hov;ever,

whatever the motives behind either the Spanish or the Moroccan
moves, the Continental Congress was convinced that Spai-n had
played a large part in getting the United States' treaty

55cflrmichael to Jefferson, St. Idelfonso, August 17,
1786, in ibid., Vol. III, p. 147.
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accepted by the Emperor.56
. As

import~_nt

as the few gifts brought by Barclay and

the help of the Spanish court were to the success of t(le
American mission, it was the good will of the Moroccan
emperor that really made the overtures from Congress effective.

Although ihe ministers sent a short letter to Morocco

in which they commended Barclay to his majesty and assured
·him of the friendship of the Unit;ed States and of its continued cooperationin the future, it was the very warm greetings directly from the Continental Congress that probably
induced Moha.m.'Tied ben Abdullah to agree to all of the major
treaty article .asked for by the Americans.

Congress' letter

addressed to the "Great, Noble and Imperial Sovereign" apolo-:gized for not

h~ving

kept up the. contacts · that they had

promised in their.... letter of 1780 and explained the limita;

:

tions of time and · money that had fac..ed them.

Then·. they

continued:
Hence • • • it was not in our power to cultivate . your
majesty's friendship by such leg ations and other meas~~es
·as might fully manifest the hi gh serise we. entertain . of
that magnanimity which induced your majesty to open your
ports and to sh ovf kindness to us at a period when . our ·
affairs wore the l~ast promising aspect.
All that we then could do was to read and admire your
majesty's liberal manif~stos and declarations of the .
ffiate deleted7 day of December and to assure you by our ·
letter of the [clate delete£! day · of December, 1780 of our

56SJAPC,
.
'
£1?.•
cit., Vol. IV, pp. 3 67 fo
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earnest desire to cul tivate a sincere peace and friendship with y our ma j esty, and that pro p ~r steps for that
purpose would be taken on our part • • • •
We .are now blessed with leisure and opportunity to
show our r esp ect f or s uch of the princes and nations of
the world that gave proof of their good will to us when .
encompassed wit h hostile armies and a great variety of
difficulties.
While many other nations. yet viewed our _fate as doubtful, you, most noble prince, extended your friendly
regards from an empire on the eastern side of the world,
across an amazing length of ocean, to us who dwell under
the beams of the setting sun. For these generous marks
of your· friendshi p accept our sincere and cordial thanks;
.and be assured of our desire so to establish peace and
regulate commerce between us as that your empire may
derive advantag es ffom the v~rious production~ of our
different countries. · In time, when the waste of war
. shail be repaired, they will be great and useful, and we
will teach our people to be kind to yQUrs.
Impelled by these considerations, we . have appointed
!rom our \'fell beloved and most distinguished subjects
• • • to establish on our part with your ma j esty the most
liberal and permanent treaties of peac.e and amity, viz •
•
•
o fthen follows a long paragraph g iving . the qualifications of the ministers in Europe2 . ·
·. ·
We recommend them to your majesty's especial favour
and confiden~e, and we promise to ratify, . confirm, and
fuifill whatever they shall on our part conclude and
agree to.57
·
Armed with this very gracious letter, emphasizing in
cordial

terms the respect held for the Emperor by Congress,

Barclay sailed from Cadiz to Mogador on I-.i orocco' s south
. coast.

Evidently, Mohammed ben Abdullah was on his way to

his southern capital of Marrakesh, for the American envoy

.r

57Lett er from Congress to Mohaffimed ben Abdullah, May
11, 1785, in ibid., Vol. III, p. 540o

. I'
I
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wrote to Jefferson that he would wait in Mogador until . he was
as ked to come to meet with the Emp eror.

One can imagine the

s tate of mind that Barclay and his companion, a man identifi ed only as Colonel Franks,

wer~

in as ihey

wait~d

for a

summ ons to a court and city that vrere completely unfamiliar
to Americans.

They

could not have been blamed if they enter-

ta.ined some qualms concerning the wisdom of their mission with
a few token presents and a pittance of gold to a state tha.t,
as far as they knew, was indistinguishable from piratical
nations to the eastward.

They knew the fate of many of the

European emissaries to Algiers aDd Tunis, and they probably
wondered if their chances of success were any better than
their prede6es s ors'.
After afew weeks of waiting in Mogador, Barclay arid
.···

Franks made their way overland to the southern capital

situ~

a ted on the edge of the Atlas Mountains. · \1li thin a few days
of their arrival, Barclay was able t 'o write in an optimistic
note that negotiations were proceeding well.

Beside the

usual public audience that was customary for envoys of
forei gn countries, Barclay was gr anted a hitherto unprecedented private meeting with the Emperor which boded well for
the success of his deliberations.

He added that at the pri-

vate audience the final draft of the treaty was outlined and

. ':"
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all but one minor article was includ ed.5 8
The treaty that was si gned by Barclay and the Emperor
of Morocco began wit h these simple yet sincere words:
In the name of the Almighty God; this is a Treaty of
Peace and Frien~ sh i p est2blis hed between us and the
United St at es of Am erica ~rhic h is confi rmed, and v·r hich
we have ord ered t o be written in t his Book and sea led
with our Royal Seal at . our court of Morocco ffiarrakesh7
on the 25th day of the Month of Shab an, of the year
One thousand tvro hundred, trusting in God it v.rill remain
permanent.5 9
As would be expected, the treaty was primarily of a
maritime· and a military nature.

It ,began by stating that

neither country w.o uld join the enemies of the other in case
of war and that the subjects of both countries v.rould be . freed
if captured on an enemy vessel.

In wartime, the word of the .

captain of a warship of either party would. be

consider~d

suf-

ficient proof that there were no enemy personnel or articles
of contraband on board.

The treaty guaranteed that if a ·

citizen of either the United States. or Morocco was captured
.
58Letter from ·Barclay to Jeff erson and Adams, I~:orocco
ffiarrakeshl, June 26, 1786, in DCUS, QE• cit., Vol. III,
p. 128.
59Hunter Miller (ed.l, Trea ties and other Inter national
Acts of the United State s of Amer i ca (Wash i ngton: United ·
StatesGoverilf.1ent Printi ngOff ice, 1931), Vol. II, p. 212.
That this clause was more than a mere pious platitude is
shoY.rn by the sine ere effort made by both the United States ·
and Morocco to preserve the spirit of the treaty, even though
it was beset by da ng erous pr es s ur es of a nature that nullified many other internati onal pac t s. This treaty, which is
valid to the present day, has remained in force long er than
any other pact made by the Unite d States •.
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Christian powers.

This clause meant nothing to the citizen

of Morocco, for it was hardly probable that he would ever be
brought to the shores of North America by a nation at war
with his country, but this safeguard might mean a noticeable
improvement in the condition of Americans sailing into the
Mediterranean.
~

Other articles allowed ships of one country to utilize
the harbors of the other in case of need--again an article
that had little significance to Moroccan shipping but

c~uld

·

mean the difference between shipwreck and slcivery on the one
hand or freedom of American merchantmen on the other •.
Article Fourteen gave the United States an equal footing with
Spain in commercial matters and added the proviso that in the
future this country wo uld always have "most favored nation'' ·
status.

This clause was of more far-reaching importance tpan .

Barclay could have possibly foreseen, as it was the cornerstone in this country's efforts to maintain freedom of trade
and equality of commercial privileg e inthe face of twentieth
century French attempts to usurp a unique place in Morocco's
economy.

t--

I
t

~
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In case of disputes bet'ltleen Americans in Morocco, the
consuls of the Uni_ted States were given the ri g ht to make

--·- - --

j udg ements, but if t he trouble -was be6·1een-a .Moroccan citizen
and an American, then a Moroccan official was to settle the
case.

It is evident from this article tha t the United States

had no wish at t ha t time to impose the unfair practice of
imposing forei gn adjudication on all cases involving their
nationals, which became t h e rule in the nineteenth century .
Article Twenty-four is one clause of the treaty that
seems incredible today in a world vrh ere V.rars can start,

"V~thole

populations be decimated, and hostilities cease in a fevr
short months.

It stipulated that in event of war the citi-

zens of either country not only were allowed to leave the
other, but they were given nine month$ in which to dispose of
their property or . to take it with them.

The final section of

the treaty, Article Twenty-five, stipulated that the pact
would last for a period of fifty years and could be renewed
at that time. 60
Only one article of the proposed treaty caused any
hesitation on the part of the conferees.

Article Sixteen as

proposed by Barclay ca1led for the exchang e of prisoners in
case of capture during a war, and it further stipulated that

•
60Ibid., pp. 21 2-15. For the entire text of the
Treaty of-r'i86, see Appendix A.

.
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no prisoners should be enslaved under any circumstances.
~I hen

it is remembered that the dan g er of slavery for captured

!::urop-eans was one of the main deterrents that- kept many of
the smaller nations from declaring war on the Barbary states,
it is not surprising that Mohammed ben Abdullah refused, at
first, to accede to these demands.

He was vrell aware how the

Christian po1t1ers feared the enslavement of their citizens,
and he was understandably loath to relinquish what he considered a very powerful argument toward the maintenance of peace.
Barclay would have been hard pressed to justify this article
in the eyes of the Emperor had it not been for the intervention of what he called the "king' s preacher. Tt

.

When this

official saw the treaty negotiations were in danger of com-plete collapse over this . point, he made this comment to the
Emperor:
These people de~erve more indul g ence from you than
many others with whom you are in alliance. They are
nearer our reli gion, and our Prophet mentions those
who possess their manner of religion with respect.
Barclay continued his letter with the remark that when the
Emperor heard these words, he said, "Let this article be
admitted. tt 61
The "king' s preacher" also \'las instrumental in adding
a very important clause to Article Ten of the treaty which

61Letter from Barclay to Jefferson, September lJ, 1786,
in DCUS, -op._._ -cit.,
Vol. V, p. 209.
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said in part th at if any vessel belonging to the United States
was within Moroccan territory or in gunshot of their forts,
t

-t

It

- they woul dr be protected as much as possibl e.

Also it was

guaranteed that no foreig n vesse.l whose nation might be at
war- with the United States would be permitted
low or engage" ·any American ship because, "·
the citizens of America our good friends _,;62
,- ...

~

n.

• • to fol-

. . we

novl

deem

This good

. __,

friend of the United States, Taher ben Abdelhack Fennish,
wrote to Jeffers on and Adams .to tell them that he was now in
charge of his country's relations with the Americans, and he
assured them th9-t he would do all that was in his power to
promote a continuanc-e of the friend·ly contacts that had
already begun.63

Our ministers in Europe were well enough

acquainted 1trith the customs of Musliiil countries to realize
the importance of a friend such as Fennish in the Moroccan
court, . especially as he evidently had the Emperor's co-n fidence in religious matters as well as in political and
diplomatic ones.
Our commissioners addressed a letter in very respectful terms to "Sidi Hadji ben Abdelhack Fennish" in which they
sincerely thanked him for his

~reat

help and credited him

62Addition to Treaty of 1786, July 18, 1786, in SJAPC,
F .

.£2o cit., Vol . IV, p. 3&L
63Letter from Fennish to Jef f erson and Adams, Morocco ·

LMarrak~sh7, July 19, 1786, in DCUS, .Q.E• cit., Vol. V, p. 178.
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with being the influence that made Barclay's mission a suecess in that the latter received "two

-r-------and unparalleled audiences • • • "

honorabl~,

favorable,

They cont·±nued their·--

i

letter by asking Fennish to convey to the Emperor the friendt

ship they and their country felt for him.64
At the conclusion of the treaty negotiations, the
Emperor sent the following letter to Congress which presaged
an era of friendship between his country and the United
States.

The Navy Department archives preserve the letter

which was sent by the Continental Congress on August 16, 1786:
Most Illustrious Congress of America,
· \'/e have received your letter ffiay 11, 1782.] by the
hands of your ambassador, and perused its content with
all due attentiono We have remarked therein the inclination you eipress of concluding with us a treaty ~f
peace. To this we willingly have assented, and even
ratified the plans, such ·as you have proposed, by setting there unto our im perial seal. Wherefore, we ·have,
from that very moment,• given strict c ommands to the
captains of our ports, to protect and assist all ships
under American colours, and in short to show them every
favour due tO the most friendly powers; being fully
determined to do much, Y.Ihen an opportunity offers.
Vie write this in full tes'timony of our sincere
friendshiP, and of the peaee which we offer on Our
part.65 The Emperor also sent to Congress this short letter explain-

i

64Letter from Jefferson and Ada~s to Fennish, London,
January .27, 1787, in Adams, ..9.£• cit., Vol. VIII, p. 427.

6 5Letter fr om Tiiohammed ben Abdullah to Congress,
~.ugust
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!

r
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16, 1786, in NDUS, 2£• cit., Vol. I, · p.lJ.
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70
ing some of the benefits t hat t h e s h ipping of the United
States would receive because of t h e treaty

t h a~

had just been

si gned:
We have ordered all our servants, ~,. . h o c ommand at our
sea port s , t o r eceive yo ur vessel s and cit izens who s hall
come to our domi nions , and treat them as we do the Spanis h na ti on, and al l our oor ts f r om Tetua n to Wa dnoon are
open to yo u , at any of which your vessels may anchor in
safety , an d y gvr peo ple tra nsact t heir business at t h eir
own pleasure. b
Barclay was very pleased a nd relieved to have cornpleted such a successful mission to .l'viorocco, and he can be
excused for his justifiable pride when he wrote some years
later:
As ag ent to the Emperor of Morocco, I made a better
treaty wit h him than any Euro pean . po,.rers ever made, and
for one-tenth of t h e ex pense at whic h some of the late
ones. have been concluded. 67
·
However, Barclay did not delude h imself into believing that
it had been the force of his pers onality or charm that had
made his mission gain its desired result, for he mentions to
Adams that he believed that the United States possessed as

much of the Emperor's reg ard and respect as any other
nation.68

A fe\'-T days later he wrote to Jay, " • • • I am

66r.etter fr om Mohammed ben Abdullah to Congress, June
28, 1786, in DCUS, QE• cit., Vol. V, pp. 175-6.
6 7Letter from Barclay to the New York Board of Treas- ·
ury, New York, Ma rc h 1, 1790, in ASP, .QE.• cit., "Claims,''
p. 352.
681ett er from Barc l ay to Adams and Jefferson, Morocco ·
LMarrakesQ/, July 16, 1786, in DCUS, op . cit., Vol. III, p.l4lo

71
persuaded there is no Christian nation on earth who now
stands higher in the esteem of his majesty.n69
Another reason for the

unpreC"'~'dented

success of the

American mission was sugg ested by Barclay to t h e Commissioners.

Evidently, Anglo-Moroccan relations had deteriorated

since the days of Elizabeth ,I, and the Emperor com plained to
our representative about the treatment his country had
received from t h e British.

Wh en he was given a copy of the

Constitution of the United States and a letter explaining the
reason for the revolt of the American colonies, he

expre~sed

great interest and wished an immediate translation of those
two documents.

Mohammed ben Abdull ah was anxious to hear all

about the actions of the Br i tish in their contacts with America and just hovr they conducted their war against the Americans.

Evidently, he was looking for information to reinforce

his own dislike, for he told Barclay that Great Britain had
acted in a similar way in its dealings with l\·10 rocco, stating
that they minded neither t h eir treaties nor their promiseso70
Although the statement made by a recent American
writer that fvl ohammedben Abdullah recognized the United

69Letter from Barclay to John Jay, Mogador, July 30,
17e6, in ibid., Vol. V,. Po 434o
70Letter from Barclay to Jefferson and Adams, Tangier,
September 13, 1786, in ibid., Vol. V, p. 20lo

72
States because of his intense dislike for the British71 is

1-

undoubtedly an unv-rarranted conclusion based on insufficient
information, this antipathy was a factor in the conferences
between Mo rocco and the United States.

Further evidence of

the position Britain occupied in r.·roroccan sentiments 1vas
•

•

•

•:

~: .· .

•

-( ... ··

.

-

'

~ ":;:f-~. ~~- -

lndJ.cat ed 1n a d1spat'eh , from '·~ . consul in Spain which stated:
. The Emperor wanted all Europeans to insert in their
"Gazettes" t hat the chests of cocoa s_ent by Spain vJere
worth more than all the British presents, that the
English nation was false and perfidiou~ and entirely
devoid of all principles of reli g ion. This is no bad
omen for the sue cess -of :r.·Ir. Barclay's mission. 72
It would be impossible and unfair to attempt to assign
any one reason for Barclay's successful neg otiations with
Morocco, forf undoubtedly, Carm:i.chael was also partially correct in his estimation of

the~,ituation,

and Jefferson also

was right vmen he said that the court of Spain played an
important part on behalf of the United States.73

But from a

careful reading of the records and letters exchanged between
Congress and the Emperor, one -is forcibly s.truck by the
evident sincerity of friendship expressed on both sides.

71Louis B. Wri ght arid Julia H. McCleod, The F irst
Americans ..-Ln~ North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 19451, p. 22.
72Lett er from 1,•Jilliam Cc:.rmichael to Jeffers on, Arenjuez,
Nay 17, 1786, in DCUS, .2£• cit., Vol. VI, p. 309.
. •
73Letter from Jefferson to Jay, Paris, December 31,
1786, in ibid .. , Vol. III, p .• 1<;0.
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- _____ 73 - - In the whole affair from Barclay's appointment to his
s uccessfully concluding the treaty, he

acquitte~

hi mself in

such a way as to ga in the respect of thB Moroccan court, the
Sommission e rs in Europe, and the C8ng ress of the United
St ates.

Lafayette reported to John Jay that Bar clay 's refusal

to take the cust-omary presents following the conc l usion o.f
tr eaty negotiations not only favor a bly impressed the Moroccans
but was

a matter of ·VJonder to every African.t~ 74

11 • • •

A Con-

g ressional committee in 1790 reported that Barclay had served
his country 1·1ell by ne g otiating the Treaty of 1786 and for
\·Jh ich,

"0 ••

he had received no salary. n75

Upon the recom-

mendation of the finance committee, a grateful Congress voted
3arclay the su'TI of two thous~and dollars as part compensation
for his efforts and time .76
So successful had b e .e n our envoy's negotiations that
the treaty agreed u pon vias made a model for t h is country's
further a ttempts to treat vlith the remaining Barbary powers.
Jefferson vrrot e to Admiral John Paul Jones in 1792 in connec tion with his efforts to reach a peaceful conc l usion with the
pir ati c al states, "As t o the articles and form of the treaty

;-._..·-- --.....,...---,.. ,....!"-'

...

74Letter from Lafayette to Jay, Paris, Februa ry 7, 1787, -in ibid., Vol. I, p . 449.
75 p
- . .
AS ' QE.· Clt., "Claims," p. 347.
7 6 Ibid., p. 24.

74
in general, our treaty with Morocco was so well digested that
I enclose you a copy of that, to be the model with Alg~ers.n77
After Admns and Jefferson ha d approved the treaty,
they dispatched it to

Congres~

with the various letters and

reports that had accompanied it from t heir representative in
· ·· -

~ --·~

. ... .

.'::,;~~¢

• 'oJ• . :•

·:·

~......

· . · Moro cco.

.

This· ~reaty, the last one that the Contine~tal Con-

gre~s . ever made,?$ was ratifi~d o~ July 18, 1787 in New York
and returned with a letter of thanks from George Washington
to Mohammed ben Abdullah.

Washington thanked the Emperor for

his letter to Congress and for the very generous treaty that
·.... .. ---:~:

had been agreed to by both countries.

He stated that commerce

77Lette; from Jefferson to John Paul Jones, Philadelphia, June 1, 1792, in ASP, . op. cit., "Foreign Relations,"
Vol. I, p. 291. All of the rearitions to the treaty were not
unreservedly. favorable. John Adams was reported to have complained bitterly of the cost of the treaty because he was yet
unaware of .the great bargain made in comparison with the
prices paid to other :Mediterranean · pov.rers . Adams remained
very skept:lcal of Barclay's treaty and told Jefferson, "At
present, I believe we are taken in, and that we shall be
plagued with demands for annual presents . 11 Letter from Adams
to Jefferson, London, September 11, 1786, in Adams, QE• cit.,
Vol. VIII, p. 414.
.
Recent government op1n1on stated that the provisions
of the Treaty of 1786 ~-vere "almost ltfhcHly in favor of · the
United States • 11 "United States. Department of State Press
Release," Dece.wt>er 12, 1931 , pp. 517-34, in \'lilson Leon
Godshall, Americ an Forei r:r.n Policv Formulation and Practice
(Ann Arbor, r.Iichigan; Ed1.-1 ards Brothers, Inc., 1937), p. 33.
78carlton Savage, Polic of the United States t .oward
Maritime Com.'T!erc e in ~-. ; a.r VT ashingt on: United States Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 10.
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between the two countries would rapidl y improve -t o their
mutual advantag e"· •• especially after our navigation shall
cease to be interrupted by hostilities of the neighboring
states in Africa.n79
As this hindrance to trade in the Mediterranean was
causing great financial loss and hardship for American commercial interests, VTashing ton asked the Emperor to induce
Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli to make peace with the United
States, and added:
Should your maj esty's mediation be · the means of putting
the United States. a t peace v:i th their only remaining
enemies, it l··rould b e an event so ~lorious and mem orable
that your majes t v 1 s re:l'iri ,,: oul d thence derive addit ional
luster, and ~io.ur " name not only become more and more dear
to our citizens but !I! ore and mor.e celebrated in our
histqries •. We your majesty's friends pray God to ble~s
you.80
·
In sympathy v.ri th America and wishing to help alleviate
its probrem with his African nei ghbors, Tt,:ohammed ben Abdullah
wrote the following let t er to the Bashaws of Tripoli and
Tunis:
\'le vdsh , that you mak e an undisturbed and Perfect
peace vJith the Americans , and th at you may do- sood to the
same and to their vessels because they behave with
friendship.
.

! . .. ·.- ... ...

?9Letter from I:Jash int:;ton to Iv'I ohammed ben Abdullah,
July 23, 1787, in SJAPC, .2.2· cit., Vol. IV, pp. 365-6.
80Ibid.

This let te r and the ratified treaty were
erso n from .J a y to be sent in turn to the
newly ap noi nted Ar:1 eric a n a g ent in Iiarrakes h , Fra ncisco ~ ~i~_ppe ,
Hho vTc=J s to handle American affairs in that southern cap1:ca.L .
~' op . cit., Vol. III, pp . 234-5.
fon·:arded~J eff
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He continued wit h t he further explanation that if peace
reigned through out t h e Mediterra nean, t h en American ships
could facilitate communic-atio n-and transportation betv-reen
Morocco and its ~astern neighbors. Sl
After writing the letter t hat Washington had requested,
the Emperor v-rrot e t he foll ov'ling:
To the great One of the Am erican States, the .P resident.
Peace be on those who f ol lo\'-r t h e ri ght guidance!
To come to the ooint: Your letter ha s reached us and
also have reac h ed us t he ?rtic l es of the Treaty of Peace
v-rhich you have sent us, and we are with you on terms of
complete truce and peace. We have now written what you
wanted us to ·Nrit.e to Tunis a nd Tri poli, · and all that
you have ~sked from us shall be fulfilled, if God
pleases. 8
The Moroccan emperor's re quest se e"'l ed to have - had some influence on the bashaws of the states to wh:j.ch he wrote, and for
about

tv-ro

years A..rnerican commerce, alth ough not entirely free

of harassment, was able to make profitable .ventures into the
Mediterranean and to the Levant.

However, s i nce the personal

influence of a leader usually lasted only as long as he was
alive or in power, Mohammed ben Abdullah's good wishes and
control over his neighbors' maritime policy was of limited
duration.

His death in 1790 initiated a struggle for pmver

in his country that greatly lessened Morocco's influence in

BlJared Sparks (ed.), The Writings of George Washington
(New York: Harper & Brot he rs, Pub ., 1847), Vol. X, p . 6lno
82Miller, QE• cit., Vol. II, pp . 226-7o
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Mediterranean affairs.

It is safe to conjecture that if the

Emperor's reign had lasted a fev1 more years, the United
States' wars '\vith the Barbary powers would - nGt have been as
long nor as costly.
As serious as America's v-rars wi·t h Tripoli and Algiers
were, the situation vrould have been impossible had it not
been for the heritag e of good will that Barc l ay and .f\·lohammed
ben Abdullah had passed on to their successors.

Even during

the following decade when a serious rift threatened to develop
between the United States and Morocco, both parties had .
occasion to remember that their countries \'lere tied together
by many evidences of mutual understanding and friendship • . It
is a tribute to the endur i ng natur e of Barclay's work that
the thousands of miles of oceari and month s of travel time
that separated the two nations during very precariqus moments
in their contacts did not serve to break down completely communication and understanding between them.

The misunderstand-

ings an<;l threatening situationswhich ·did develop, and in
other countries · and _at other times would have led to an
absolute breach of diplomatic relations, could not break the
.link of friendship that held Morocco and the United States
together.

CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES, I··iOROCCO AND THE BARBARY ' WARS
The feelin g of mutual good will and friendship that
had been produced by the negotiations of Thomas Barclay at
the court of the ·Emperor of Morocco ended succes s fully in an
exchange of letters and in the signing of a treaty of amity.
The American com.'Tiissioners in Europe, Jefferson and Adams,
expressed their great satisfaction wit h the work of their
representative to Mohammed ben Abdullah and congratulated
each other on a mission well done.

Apparently relations

bet\'leen their small and relatively weak country and the
important kingdom of . I•-'Iorocco were on a very sound basis. of.
cooperation and respect·; with this kind of a friend, arid ally
in North Africa, _the position . of the United States and its
cornr1erce in the Mediterranean certainly should have been
assured a place equal to that of the. major European powers.
However, within a year after Barclay had left Morocco
t ·o complete his work wit h the other Barbary powers, the situation between his country and that of the Emper.o r began to
evidence elements of :tension that
previous dec.adeo

w~re

reminiscent ofthe

It is the purpose of this chapter to . explore

the reasons for this breakdown and to trace. t h e pattern that
finally restored the original friendship between the . two
countries tha t had been displayed in 1786.

79
I.

CRISES DEVELOP

1787-1795

Thomas Barclay realized the importance of maintaining
close contact with Morocco, and, although he would have been
the American best

suit~~

to carry
.... ..:. out a continuing relation-

ship with the Emperor, he was recalied by the American ministers who had giveri him his original assignment.

Probably

they would hav..e preferred to use Barclay in the Moroccan
diplomatic interchanges, but circumstances as manifested by
the pirates of Algiers changed their plans.

·when Barclay had

been sent to the court of Morocco originally, his colleague,
John Lamb, was on his way to the Bey of Algiers with instructions that closely corresponded to those given to the American
envoy to the Emperor.

However, here the similarity betw.e en

the men ended.; where J2a.,:rclay
succeeded far beyond all expec. :·:-.

tations, Lamb made a

- miserabl~e

failure of his assignment.

Consequently, Jeffers.t»l and Adams were forced to assign the
problem of Algiers to Barclay .in an attempt to remedy what
appeared to be a very dangerous situation.
Barclay's last off icial act in

J'.~o'rocco

was to appoint

men to represent the United States in three important cities,
in the hope that this would serve to solidify the ties that
held the two countries together.

·He was well aware that the

tenuous link, stretching over thousands of miles of. ocean
water between North Africa and North America, would not be

80
''\

able to withstand the buffeting of circumstances unless some- one· were to look after t h e interests of this country in the
- ~....~~-~

-_ ., ~•.-fi

·-

lands of the Emperor; Barclay felt t hat the log ical ch oice

oi'·•·a

representative was Francisco Chiappe, vlho had been very

hel.pful in"l :he early stag es of the neg otiations with Morocco.
Thi..s man s1.1gg ested that to properly represent the United
.;:

St~tes

in· a country as larg e as Morocco in which

co~uunica-

tion· was dif.f icult and often times dang erous, he would need
·some assistance in either parts of the empire.

-·-

'

j;,...-~

, - -.

Barclay a greed,

and Congress subs eouently approved his appointment of . J os.eph
Chiappe as ·a g ent in .fVIog ador and Giralamo Chiappe to fill that
.-- ~· -

p_os~tion ;in Tangier.l

The ,. Chiappe family did not make any significant contributions
to I'-'l oroccan-American solidarity, but they did
.
.·

· · :•_ .:;,~

.

-~

.

. . report irli:l-a.'Emts that might affect the United States.
..

~

•. - .

.......·:,·-: _,.

Pas-

. .-··

::f'~ .-

S.ibly no one could expect more than this from men wh,o were,
after all, merely hired to look after the affairs of a country in which they had no special interest and viho paid them
little.

However, it was from Joseph Chiappe that ~he United

States received the first hint that the Emperor of l\1orocco
. .W9.9

becoming r estive because of the poor response other

'"t' rations ~rere . making to his offering s of peace and friendship.

· ~-~~ ,-~.1-~ec~ret , Journals of the Act -s and Proceedin ~ s of Con- ..f~~ss • . ( Boston: Thomas B:"" \J a it~2U, Val. I V; p •. Jb9-.her-eafter referred to as SJAPCJ.
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The Netherlands was threatened with attack by five
Moroccan fri gates unless they would quickly res,pond to·
Mohammed ben Abdullah's overtures.

Th e Emperor wanted a

reply to his request for a clarifi cation of t h e status of
affairs between the t\'V o countries, and . if the Dutch did not .
soon state their peaceful intentions, he planned tomake
prizes of all their ships tha t he could capture.

What was of

special interest to our representatives in Europe was the
report that the Emperor planned to take advantage of the
treaty with the United States, which gave both sides access
to the other's ports, to . transport the Dutch Prizes to
America.

Jefferson wryly told John Jay, · \'Tho was Secretary of

State at the t ·ime, "It seems to depend on the Dutch, whether
..-...,..-·

the Barbary powers shall learn the way to our coast • • • •"

2

Although the Emperor did not imply in this pronouncement that
he had designs on American coastal shipping , the Secretary of
State undoubtedly smv the dangerous . pos s ibilities . inherent in
the statement.

He rriay have wondered at the wisdom of some of

the articles of the treaty which at first had looked as if
they were all to the advantage of the United States •
.2Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, Paris, _May
4, 1888, in The Dipl oma t ic C o r ~espo ndence of t h e United
States f r om th e si r.-n i nr: of t h e De f i nitiv e Tr eaty of Pea ce
Septemb er 10, 1783 - Ad ontion of Constitution Lar ch--x, 1789 .
(Washin8ton: Fr an cis Pr eston Bl ai r, 183 3), Vol. III, p. 387.
(Hereafter ref er r ed t o as DCUS).
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If the American authorities wondered about the possibility of finding

M oroc~an

raiders cruising off the Atlantic

coast of the United States, the open letter to all European
consuls in Tang ier from Francisco Chiappe must have cleared
up any doubts.

Chiappe, who had a position that was unusual

if not unique in political circles, served the United States
as our representative in the southern capital of Morocco and,
at the sarne time, acted gs the Secretary of the Foreign
Department for the Emperor.

If h e planned to fulfill the

obligations of the first position in the way that Barclay had
intended, then his selection 1r.ras particularly fortuitous, but
the feeling persists that Chiappe was donsiderably more

inter~

ested in serving Mohammed ben Abdullah and himself than . a
republic across the Atlantic that had little direct control
over him.

His letter written for the Emperor stated that

Morocco \I'Tished to be at peace with all nations but that this
condition would .l ast only until 1789.

After this date,

Morocco would consider as an enemy any country that had not
signified by letter that they vi ished . peace; their shipping
would be harassed at every opportunity and not until terms
of peace were a greed unon cruld their commerce be secure in
the Mediterranean)

· 3Letter from the Emperor of lViorocco to all Foreign
Consuls, Tap.gier, · May 7, 1788, in Naval Documents Rel~ted t~
the United St ates t "l; ~a rs 1...,rith the Barb a ry Powers {Washlngton.

---

---- ---- ---

.

Chiappe f ol l owed up this g eneral proclamation with a
more specific announcement that although Morocco did not want
war, it was prepared to send "ten galliots and ei ght galleys"
into the Strait of Gibraltar, effectively blocking that strategic watenray for any nation that showed evidence of hostility to the Emperor.

Since the Moroccan raiders were to be

stationed at Algeciras, Ta ngier, and Tettian, it would have
been difficult, if not impossible, for any ships to pass
unmolested if the Emperor wished to stop them.

To make the

position of Mohammed ben Abdullah perfectly clear, Francisco
Chiappe emphasized that t h e ships of the nations not friendly
wquld be burned and the crews chained and put into prison.
He did not mention whether or not the Moroccans planned to
sell the captives as slaves--probably preferring to let the
Europeans worry about that eventuality.

The Moroccan inten-

tion to make use of the ports _and the cooperation of the
United States was reiterated at the conclusion of the _letter
to the consuls:
His imperial ma j esty will also send his fri gates to
America, provided vrith European pilots, and i f t h ey 1_11ak e
any prizes, they s hall be dealt with as ahove mentioned
L'burne£7, as his i mperial ma j esty stands in no want _of
money, or any wor l dly 'effects; and _he trusts that God
will make him conqueror.4

United States Government Printing Of f ice, 1939), Vol. I,
p. 17. (Hereafter referred to _as NDUS.)
- 4Let.ter fron Francisco Chiappe to all Foreign Cons uls,
Tangier, May 9 , 1788, in NDUS, Vol. III _, p . lSo

Mohammed ben Abdullah did -not send these letters to
the representatives of the forei gn powers because he was
looking for an excuse to resume raids on their
because he was anxious to provoke a war.

s h ip~ing

or

Actually, he was

under considerable pressure from the powerful governors of
his various ports to break off peaceful relations with all
foreign nations so that lJioroccan privateers could once again
bring prizes and booty to Sale, Rabat, or Tangier.

However,

it had been the Emperor's permanent policy to . eliminate
piracy and to encourage the formation of treaties of peace
and . corrunerce with as many forei gn powers as possible, and it
was to this end that he sent proclamations presenting his
desires to them.

Because he was continually pressed by many

of his subordinates to declare war against Europe and had
become quite unpopular with many of his subjects who still
wanted revenge against Christian nations · for their expulsion
from. Spain, the Emperor had to exert all of his power and
influence to maintain peaceo5

He needed some tangible results

5:f',Iany Horoccans still possessed the keys of their
ancestral homes in Snain and were only waitin ~ for an opportunity· to revenge themselves on their oppressors to the north.
The key to the great mosque at Cordova vras preserved in Rabat.
as a reminder of t h eir lost heritag e and as a continual stimulus for act ion aga inst the Europea n powers whom they blamed .
for their Pxpulsion from Andalusia. An En ~lish officer
wrote in 1788 that the Emperor's treaties with Christian
povTers had made him very unpopular with his subjects. Ray W.

to show for his policy in order to quiet the unrest that
always lay close to the surface of Moroccan politics; theref ore, he hoped that a display of European cooperation in the
form of gifts, envoys, and beneficial trade agreements would
strengthen h:ts posit ion \'lith the people.

~
r

The communications from t he Chiappes containing the
strong implication that the United States itself ,.;as not
altogether immune to Moroccan raiders made a strong impression
on our delegates in Europe, who, in turn, transmitted their
concern to the Department of State.

This country had fully

intended to maintain a close liaison with the Moroccans and
for that purpose had authorized the Chiappe family to repre- sent us, but the very circuitous routes of communication which
led from Mo-r occo through Spain and France and then to England
and finally by ship to the United States did not make for th.e
feeling of unity that the Emperor -desired.

During this per.:.

iod, the whole governmental system of the Confederation had
beeh abandoned and the Continental _Congress dissolved, making
it impos s ible for a continuous correspondence to he maintained
between this country and the Emperor.
After the inauguration of George Ylashington as President

Inlin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the
BarbaryPO-v;e rs 1776-1 81 6 ( Chapel Hil l: The University of
North Carolina Press, 193 1), Po$, citing Letters from Barbary,
p. 153.
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of the new republic, the tension between the two countries
-------..

.

continued to heighten, and he realized that only a very warm
letter would mend the breach that threatened to materialize.
· This letter, which opened and closed with the phrase, "Great
and Magnanimous Friend," explained the governmental crisis
the United States had just been through and pointed out that
it had not been a lack of· friendship t hat had hampered our
contacts with Morocco; rather, this bad been t h e result of
the combination of distance and political ndisarrangements."
\'lashington thanked Mohammed ben Abdullah for his assistance
in our dealings with the other Barbary powers and hoped that
harmony and amity would always be maintained between the
United States and Morocco.6
Washington was ·cognizant of the many hazards that
beset him in his relations with t h e Emperor of Morocco--time,
distance, lack of American representative9, and an almost
non-existent navy'--and he too):c these problems into consideration when carrying on his correspondence with Morocco.

How-

ever, he failed to antici pate the one unforeseeable element
. in the diplomatic interchange--the death of Mohainined ben

----------

... ·-

. .

6Letter from George Washington to t he Emperor of
.Morocco, New York, December 1, 1789 , in John C. F itzpatrick,
- The Writings of George 1,'.fashin .t on fr om t h e Or i g inal r.:fanu'S"'C'ript Sourcesl 745-11.2.2. \'i a sh i ngt on: ·Un i ted St a te s Govern-.
ment Pr i nting Of f ice, 193 9), Vol. XXX, pp. 474-6.. (T~e entJ.re
text of this i mportant . letter w,ill be found in AppendlX B.)

~ ~d ullah.

The Moroccan emperor, vlho had been on the throne

cl nce 1757 and
~ ni ted

t

h~d

initiated friendly relations with the

States when other nations considered this country a

:n porary:.. ;hnstitution at best, died in April, 1790, possibly
.~.~. -

ne ver having received the as~urances of the friendship and
r es pect that Washington had sent to him.
Although Barclay had intimated in his lengthy report
to the American ministers in Europe that in the event of the
Einp eror's death, t he internal situation in IVIorocco would be
upset, Congress and the President did not fully appreciate
t he extent to which disorder would sweep the country. · When
!·:ohammed ben Abdullah died, an immediate struggle for authority sprang up in which the sons of the late emperor played

major roles.

Al-Yazid emerged victorious in the battle for

pov1er and for twenty-two months ruled Iv!orocco in a despotic
fashion that in previous years would· have
of his father oh his head.

brou~ht

the wrath

Hovrever, Congress and \'J ashington

had little information concerning the situation within I·IJ:orocco ·
and were only able to assume that ·al-Yazid wa$ the one in
whom final authority rested; consequently, when the United
States was informed that their friend r.1ohammed ben Abdullah
had died, it began to lay plans to renew our agreements with
his successor.
The Secretary of State, after informing Congress of
the death of the Emperor, pointed Out to them that measures
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had to be taken to retain the good will of Morocco and of the
ne-v1 Emperor,

declaring , tt The friendship of this Power is

important, because our Atlantic as well as Mediterranean
trade is open t o his annoyance, and because we carry on a
useful c ommerce with his nation."?

Congress demonstrated a

normal reluct a nce to move rapidly and it remained for Washington to stimulate them -into action.

In a personal message,

the President explained t he problem caused by the death of
the Emperor of Morocco and what must be done by this country
to remain in the good graces of the new power that held the
future of our shipping in his hands.

"lfiashington told the

legislature that an appropriation was needed in advance to
pave the -v.my for a reaffirmation of the American-Moroccan ·
treaty by al-Yazid, · stressing the gravity of the situation by
these wo.r ds, Wfhe importance of this last ffihe appropriatiog7
to t he libe rty and property of our citizens induces me to
urge it on your eariiest convenience."$

The !'resident's words

impressed the necessity for action on Congress, and to . protect
their shipping in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, they

?Letter f r om t h e Secretary of State ffhomas J efferson7
to Congress, Hashington, December 28, 1790 , in NDUS, Vol. I,
p. 23.

-8:t-fessage from Georg e \tJashington to the Senate, Wash-

ington, February 22, 1791, in State Paoers and Publick f.Siy
Docliments of tte United States . (sec ond edition; Boston: T. B.
¥/ait& Sons, 1817), Vol. 10, p. 101. (Hereafter referred to
as STPDUS.)
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provided the sum of twenty thousand dollars that would be
used to treat with the new emperor.9
Because of the important place that Morocco held in
American international policy, it was ne.cessary to insure
the continued friendship of that North African state.

To

further this, it v.ras decided that Thomas Barclay s h ould
attempt to repeat his diplomatic triumph of five years before,
and Congress authorized a salary of $166.66 for him as consul
that was to repay him for his time and expenses.lO

At the

same time they instructed him to give presents to Francisco
Chiappe in excess of the money that he had spent in behalf of

9The money to be used in these negotiations was to ·be
, raised "from duties imposed upon spirits distilled within the
United States and from stills •• ~" It is interesting to ·
note that alcohol · was to pay the bill for the -treaty with a
country that forbade its use by Moroccans. United States
· Statutes at Large, lst Congress, Jrd Session, March 3, 1791,
in~' Vol.· I, p. 27.
1 0when Jefferson d.e cided to send Barclay back . to
Eorocco, he planned to send him 11 without any defined character," followin g the pattern that the American ministers in
Europe had pursued in 1786. Barclay was not too pleased v-fith
his unofficial status; probably wishing to insure his safety
as well as the success of his mission and not being too hopeful that his g ood fortune would duplicate itself a · second - ·
time, he suggested that if he had no official rank, the new
Emperor would assume t hat h e was an ambassador and would
expect presents re presenting that office~ Jefferson then
received from \'i ashinp; ton a commission making Barclay a consul
representing t h e United States, but since this ap pointment
was never a pproved by the Senate, our envoy was acting without official status in Morocco. Henry Ivi erri tt Wriston,
Executive Ap;ents in Aln erican Forei gn Rela t i ons (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929 ), p. 621.
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the United States, but that Barclay should now replace him as
our chief representative to the court of OCorocco.ll
When \r/ashington discovered that Mohammed ben Abdullah
had died

an~

that a new

l~ader

was in control in Morocco, he

iinmediately wrote a letter .which Barclay was to deliver along
with the presents that had been purchased.
expressed the President's

res~ect

This letter

for al-Yazid's father and

the sorrov1 that the United States felt at his death; the nev-;
emperor was assured that America wished to demonstrate the
same friendship it had shovm to

r.~ohammed

ben Abdullah and

that it was hoped al-Yazid vmuld reciprocate in kind.12
Again, however, another one of VJashington' s beautifully composed letters never reached its addressee.

As in the case

of his letter to Mohammed ben Abdullah, this letter was undeliverable because the one to whom it was to be given was in
n.o. posi~i<?.,~to receive mail; Barclay reported that . when he
had purchased the presents for al-Yazid and had started across
the Straits of Gibraltar, he discovered that the insurrection,
11Letter from jefferson to Thomas Barclay, Philadelphia,
J'.·Iay 13, 1791, in Am erican State P a ner~, Documents, Le ,islative
and Executive of t he Con~ ress of the United States Washing__ ton: Gales andSeaton, lS33), VoC'"I, p. 288. (Hereafter
referred to as ASP.)
l2Letter from \1ashington to the Em peror of ~1 orocco,
Philadelphia, l' Iarch 31, 1791, in .Jared Sparks, The \'l ritinp:s
of · Geor~e Washington (New York: Harpers and Brothers,
PUblishers, H31+7) ., Vol. X, pp. 144-6. (The entire text of
this letter will be found in Appendix C.)
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that had been gaining strength, had finally claimed the life
of the Emperor.

He was unable to determine who had been

named the nevr king of the count r y , if, in _ fact, anyone had
been able to emerge '\-rith enough followers to force a settlement of the political situation.l3
With the political situation in Morocco in such a
state of flux, Barclay had no alternative but to return to
Spain to await . further developments.

This breakdown of the

diplomatic timetable set up by Jefferson and Washington 1tras
serious, not only because of the anomalous position in which
~t placed the United States in its relations with Morocco,

but also because it necessitated a delay in c:iur treating vrith
Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.

It had been the plan of the

Department of State of dispatch Barclay to the Barbary states
after he had finished what had orig inally promised to be an
----e asy assig~ent in f.I orocco, but with those negotiations
.::..~·,,, ~. ': •

' :":- ~.,.:.·.~; '!"

brought to · a

halt ·~ ahd

no end tc:i internal strife in sight,

Barclay was ·forced to mark time waiting for a _break in the
diplomatic haze.

However, the time spent in Lisbon, Cadiz,

and Gibraltar by our envoy was not entirely wasted, · for -he
continued to dispatc h · intelligence .reports to America on the
?·~ oroccari

situatiotr-'and to collect data on the Barbary povTers

and their depredations which would prove helpful in future

13rrwin, 22· cit., p. 82.
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~ eetings

with them.

Before Barclay could continue his v·. ork with .!1-T orocco or
.,; i th Al g iers, his career was halted by his death in Lisbon in

January, 1793, .a nd a selfless decade of yeoman service for
t he United States ended with :ittle or no stir in diplomatic
circles.l4

Jefferson and Washingt on, although realizing the

gap left in t h eir country' s diplomatic defenses, could console themselves by the fact that

th~

very element which had

hindered Barclay's work in Morocco was serving in an indirect
way to further the

in~e~ests

of the United States.

The Secre- ·

tary of State reported that the internal war in Morocco )'las
continuine apace, and, cons.equently, the shi ps of its navy
were in a state of decay and general disrepair that did not
permit their use in the Atlantic . or the l\·1 editerranean.

Jef-

ferson was able further to assure Congress that because of
this state of affairs, the commerce of the United States was
in no immediate danger, even though there was no assurance
that the Treaty of 1786 would be res pected by the Moroccans;
nevertheless, both he and \•lashington emphasized the need for
a valid treaty in any relations 1-.rith that state and that
negotiations would have to be resumed as soon as conditions
stabilized enough to permit our representative to d.etermine
who was the responsible leader of Moroccoo15 ·

14·-Asp'
0D
·- --

0

-c it
.-. • ' p • 2 93 •

l5rbid., p. 295.
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II.

THE REAFFIRJ·IATIO N OF MOROCCAN-AMERICA N AMITY

The inter nal v i olenc e that led t o th e death of al-Yazid
f lared throughout Morocco wh i l e t he r emaining son s of Mohammed
• •.1<· l'f: .. ~ ::...:4-

ben Abdullah struggled f or pov1er; f or t hr ee years , t h e brothers swe pt over t h e c ount r ysid e--f irst one ga ining t h e a dvantage only to be suppl a nted by anot her.

During this periOd,

t he American obs ervers at Gibralt a r and in Spain were ha rd
nut to d etermine \liTho s h ould be approached by the United
States as the legitimate ruler of I·:Iorocco, and it ':"as only in

1795 that our consul at Gibraltar could advise the Department of State with any degree of accuracy.

James Simpson,

who was the consul for the United States in Spain, realized
that, alth ough t h ere were several claimants to the throne of
!viorocco, the only one tha t really concerned t h e United States
was the man who controlled the fleet. and the se a ports of his
country.

In a letter to the

Secret~ry

of State, Simpson

indicated that it v1as in the person of Sulayman ben Mohammed
ben Abdullah t hat the power of Iviorocco rested, particularly
as it was he who governed the ma j or ports of Tang ier, Tetuan,
and Rabat.l6
Simpson further reported th a t the c ommerce of the
United States, wh ich had been free of interference because of

l~etter f rom James Simpson to Secretary of State
Thomas Pickerinr: , Gi br al tar, September 14, 1795, in ASP,
££· cit., p. 526o
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th e internal disorder that had prevailed in Morocco,
again in danger.

vras

once

It was pointed out that unles s the United

St ates would soon send an of ficial representative to Sulayrnan,
t he position of our s hips and cre\'.rs would be :perilous .17

No

s ooner had our re presentatives become aware of the new power
that had arisen in Morocco and began advising that America
treat with h im, than the Emperor himself demanded a ne'\v
treaty.

viJh en Wash ington hear d _of thi s , he instructed t h e

Secretary of State to send an envoy to Morocco, and for

thi~

position Simpson was chosen since he had been the closest to
the situation.

Our envoy was allotted the same amount to make

a ' treaty with the Emperor as Barclay had been permitted in
1791, but he was given a little more
to the evident · urg ency with which . the
matter (he

\'TaS

~eeway

as a concession

Preside~nt

viewed the

permitted to spend twenty-five thousand

dollars in c a se of dire necessity.)
In addition to the monetary consideration, Simpson
collected presents for Sulayman that were somewhat more
practic a l than t h ose received by his father from Thomas
Barclay.

Just as the pri'c e of treaties had risen in . ten

years, also the type of gift chang ed from the pea ceful pres_ents of gold watc h es and music-boxes to artillery pieces,

17Letter f rom James Simpson to Thomas Pickering ,
Gibraltar, Februa ry 17, 1795, in NDUS, QE• c i t., p. 92.
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s::tall arms, and black pov1der .18

Such gifts may not have

a?pealed to the esthetic tastes of the Emperor, but since he
was still engaged in a war to suppress the reb el elements led
by his brothers, nothing could have been more welcome.

Simpson's ini-t ial reports to his superiors ; indicated
that he would probably be -successful in his und ert 2.king , and
Washingt'on ·expressed l"lis gratification that things were progressing so well, but within a few days after he had the
occasion to write these sentiments to the Secretary of Sta.te,
he .sent a note labeled nprivate and confidential" to Alexander
Hamil ton in v'lhich he showed his anxiety that he had heard
nothing for several weeks as to the progress of the negotiations.l9

Apparently the President h~d not le~rned the

lesson demonstrated to him on previous occasions, that communication between his country and Morocco was, at best,
erratic arid certairtJ..y

undeperiaab~e,
.

espec.i.ally when unrest

~

and insurrection were the order of the day in the North
African kingdom.
While Washington and the Department of State were
·-.
worrying ·-a.bout the status of negotiations with Morocco,
.. ._., ,_

' -

Simpson :was preparing to .meet Sulayman in Rabat~ the Atlantic

18Irwin, 2£· cit., p. '82.
"J'< ..... \o-

19Letter from George \\f a~hington to Alexander Hamilton,
Philadelphia, October 29, 1795, in Fitzpatrick! .2.'2.· cit.,
Vol. XXXIV, P• 3 51.
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coast capital of the latter's country.

After Simpson had

presented his g ifts to the Emperor, the latter asked just what ·
treaty arrangements the Americans were

~fillin g

to make;

Simpson thought that the terms of the treaty were in ques- tion, and ·he detailed. the proposed articles which were identi cal with those contained in the Treaty of 1786.

A~ter

this

discussionhad reached a concl'lision, Sulayman got to the
heart of the matter as far as he \vas concerned when he asked,
"1'/hat sum would be a greeable to the United States to pay
annually" to maintain friendly relations with Morocco.

This

ouestion was what the Emperor had in mind when the discussion
began, and it was . a·'·d.istinct shock when our envoy told him as
tactfully as possible that America did not olan to make any
yearly commitments to buy peace or friendship.

The only

answer to this evident disappointment was the _order from
Sulayroan _that since the American was not prepared to pay tribute, hemight just as well "return from whence he came.n 20
It is not recorded '\llrhether or not a friendly voic .e at
the Moroccan court intervened, as had b.een done in the case
of the stalemate . in Barclay' s- neg otiations, but the force of
circumstances in the :shape of rebel forces in southern

~1orocco

made Sulayman realize that it would be much better to have
...... ... .

--

......

20 This conversation was reported in a letter from James
Sim pson to Secretary of State Thomas Pickering , Gibraltar,
July 25, 1795, in Irvtin, .2.£· cit., p. SJ.

--
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~ eace

with the United States than to have a potential threat

t o his seacoast in the form of the American navy in addition
t o an insurrecti on within his mm borders.

Simps on probably

was not reluctant to insert the dissident element

matt~r

into

the conversation, and the Sultan found the way to a graceful
a cquiescence to t h e American's re quest.

f

Our envoy recorded

that Sulayman told him in a public audience th.at culm:i.,nated
the negotiations:
The Arnericans, I find, are the Christian nation my ·
father, who is in glory, most esteemed. I at11 the same
with them as rriy father was; a nd I trust they will be so
with me • • • • I am on the same footing \-lith them as my
father was.21
. ·
Following this statement, -which was very gracious even
though not entirely voluntary, Su1ayman concluded the negotiations with Simpson.

The conclusion of the deliberations was -

essentially nothing more than a complete acceptance on the
part of the Sultan of the terms of the treaty settled between
Thomas Barclay . and Mohammed ben Abdullah.

Washington vias

very happy to announce to Congress that peace with Morocco

I

was assured for the future and that he had received the
following letter fran the Emperor:
Soliman ben Mahomet ben Abdullah, to whom God be
- merciful, to the President of America, a Prince, and
to all the States.

21This statement was quoted in a letter from Simpson
to Pickering , Rhabat LR.abay,- August 18, 1795, in ASP, Vol. I,
p. 526.

In the name of the Almighty God. There is ~o Power
but that proceeding from God, the Great God.
Your care to preserve our friendship is very agreeable to us; and you will experi ence the like from us,
or more, because you wer e faithful to our fathei, who
is in glory. Continue writing leti;.ers to us that our
present friendship may be made more secureo22
In spite of t he friendly ex chang e of letters .bet,..reen
the United States and Eorocco and the reaffirmation of the
treaty, our representatives in the Mediterranean area were
distinctly uneasy about the future of the relations between
the two countries.

David Humphreys, the United States

minister to Lisbon, was particularly c oncerned about American
trade in the Mediterranean and in South Europe and the ease
with which it could be "ruined at any moment" by Moroccan
naval interference.23

Joel Barlow, who was at that time

negotiating with Algiers, submitted an estimate of the cost
of peace and testified to the transcendent importance of
Morocco irr the trade picture of American commerce with these
.

-.

·~.-~

22tetter from Emperor of Morocco to George Washington,
.£5• Sept. 1795, in ASP, Vol. I, pp. 526-7. Another source
records the same letter vJith the follo\·ri ng additions, " • • •
we are at peace, tranquillity and friendship with you, in the·
same manner · as you were vli th our father, \vho is in glory."
. John Bassett lvJ:oore, A - Di ~ est of Int ernational Law . (VJashington:
United States Government Printing Office, 1906~Vol. VIII,
p. 3 93.
23Letter fran David Humphreys to Secretary of .S tate
Pickering, Lisbon, April 26, 1796, in IIDUS, oo. cito, Vol. I,
p. 153.
~
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words:
Morocco is not brought into this calculation because
we must be at pea ce there i f we would use th e Atlantic,
whether we use the r:~ editerranean or noto24
These disturbing bits of information by themselves
would not have perturbed the Department of State unduly, but
the report submitted by Humphreys a few months later brought
consternation with it.

Apparently the internal upset in

Morocco had not subsided to the extent that our envoy to
Sulayman ben Mohammed had estimated when they both had agreed
to the terms of the earlier treaty.

Sulayman had complete

control of the northern portion of his country but had been
unable to subdue the area around Marrakesh, the southern
capital, where his brother Hisham had laid claim to the title
of Emperor of Morocco.

Ordinarily, this purely domestic

problem would not have concerned the United States in any way
but for the fact that some American merchants were supplying
..

the southern ports of

I~Tazagan

termed today, "strategic

and Safi with what would be

mat~rials."

Since these ports were

the principal towns through which forei gn .. commerce entered _
Marrakesh, Sulayman was understandably disturbed that vessels
of the United States, a country V.J'i th which he had jus,t rearfinned friendship and mutual cooperation, were supplying his

24Letter from Joel Barlmv to Secretary of State Pickering, Algiers, April 20, 1796, in ibid., p. 148.
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brother with the means for continuing his rebellious
a ctiviti es.
The Em peror, havin8 heard of the actions of the American shi ps, stated t hat h is count r y would declare war on the
United States if such illegal trade were not halted.25
Humphreys passed t hi s v;arning on to his s up eriors a nd was
i nstructed to explain. his country 's position with regard to
private commercial interes t s.

Sulayman was not .impressed

with the explanation that the government of the United States
could not order its citizens to refrain from trading with
1Iazagan or Safi without the consent of Congress as expressed
in a law to that effect.

Serious consequences would have

resulted from our inability to halt the trade if the rebel
leader and his sympathizers had not been defeated and the.
defecting towns had remained in their hands.

'd i th the con-

soli.d ation of t he country under Sulayman ben Mohammed, tension
between the United State& and M0 rocco lessened, peace was
assured, and not until

H~Ol,

when the other Barbary states

became restive, did our relations begin · to d.e teriorate.
III.

WAR THREATS I N NORTH AFRICA

American contacts with the other Barbary powers had

25Letter from David Humphreys to Secretary of ~tate
Pickering , Li sbon, Decemb er 16, 1796, in ibid., P o 148o
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never been too cordial, for we either were forced to pay
tribute or to go to war with one or the other of the North
African states.

As early as 1785, the Dey of Al giers had

opened hostilities against the United States and had captured American ships.

This country had been paying ransom

and tribute to the Dey in one form or another to maintain an
illusory peace with him, much to the dis gust of George Washington who exclaimed in a moment of particular frustratiol!,
"Would to heaven we had a navy able to reform those enemies
to mankind, or crush them into non-existence.n26

Ten years

after writing this, Washington was still obliged to . placate
Algiers with gifts--a procedure which he described as being ·
very disagreeable but ruefully added that . the alternative was
worse.
Washington's gift of an American frigate to the Dey of
Algiers provoked Qaramanli, the ruler of Tripoli, to demand,
in 1801, an increase .in the yearly tribute that the United
States had been paying since 1796.

The goverrunent ·refused to

accede to this pressure, stating that the eighty-three thousand dollars that it had been paying was more thanenough.27
2 ctetter from Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, Mt.
Vernon, August 15, 1786, in Fitzpatrick, .2.£• cit.,.
Vol. XXVIII, p. 521.
27Philip K~ Hitti, History of the Arabs (London:
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1956), p. 712.
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When their dema nds were summarily refused, it was not a sur-

I
f

prise to -anyone that the Tripolitans immediately declared war.
However, the Dey had not counted on the rapid growth of the
American navy since 1796 when h e had first coerced this coun- try into paying blackmail.

Undoubtedly , the United States

was just as glad t hat the Dey had demanded increased tribute
and had declared war, for the leaders of this country had
been rankling under t heir degrading position in relation to
Barbary and were only waiting for the opportune moment and a
grm·ling navy to punish the piratical states.
The consternat ion of the corsairs of Tripoli can be
easily imagined as theypoured out of their harbors bent on
an easy repetition of their earlier victories over American
merch antmen, only to find that the lambs had changed _to
wolves, burning with a desire for revenge that had been stimulated and fed for the previous twenty-five years.

The

pirates who were unfortunate enough to be caught on the open
sea were captured and their bri gs sunk, while their luckier
brethren beat a hasty retreat for any port that was available.
If the Tripolitans had been able to regain their own harbors
or even those of

Algie~s,

the war would have

b~en

confined ·to

skirmishes betwe en the America·n s and those pirates bold
enough to venture into the Mediterranean.;

Unfortunately for

our relations with Morocco, several large Tripolitanian vessels
managed to slip into Tangier where they became a bone of
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cont ention that seriously disrupted American friendship with
· Sulayman, for the latter, naturally feelin g some measure of
responsibility for his co-reliGionists in t h eir plight, proposed to buy t heir s hi ps and to permit them to sail under
his protection.
The United States first had word of this situation
when Commodore Richard Dale of the American navy notified his
superiors that he had refused to allow a Tripolitanian cruiser
to leave Tangier even though it had been purchased by Morocco.
He informed James Simpson, t_he. United States consul at . Tangier, that the Navy would capture any such vessel that tried
to use Moroccan registry as · a safeguard agai nst the actions
of the American fri gates.

Simpson :vias further told to make

every effort to keep .the peace--a somewhat gratuitous admonition that was far easier to make than to implement. 2 8
For centuries

Iv~ orocco

had been the granary of North

Africa, and the other Barbar-y pmvers had come to depend in
part on the supply of wheat obtainable in Morocco for their
subsistence.

vih en, for the first time in many years, a for-

eign pm'ler began to blockade the ports of Tripoli and Algiers,
the reserves of food in those areas were seriously taxed and
soon melted away to almost nothing.

Appeals to Sulayman for

28Louis B. \'I ri ght and Julia H. McCleod., The First
Americans in North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, l945f,-p:-98.
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i d were useless unless the United States Navy would permit
t hat ruler to shi p food from his - ports--- tO·· those of his . neighbors.

The Emperor exerted pressure on Simpson for this per-

t'1i ~sion,

and he in turn carried on extensive correspondence

wi th Captain Richard V. Morris; commander-in-chief of the
Am erican forces in the Mediterranean, seeking some way out .of
hi s precarious position.

Our c onsul,,._ in Tangier_finally

decided that if _Norris would riot permit the shipping of food
to Tripoli, possibly it could -be sent to Tunis, which at the
time ¥-ras not at war with the United States; accordingly,
Simpson issued passports to allow grain to be sent to Tunis;
but neither the American navy nor the Moroccan authorities
appreciated his solution to the dilemma.

liforris refused to

allmv such a subterfug e because he ri ghtly decided that any
.aid sent to Tunis in the form of wheat would soon find its

-

way to Tripoli, and the governor of Tangier informed Simpson
that he was going to send his ships directly to Tripoli without the formality of going first to neutral Tunis.29
The American refusal to permit Morocco to ship its
wheat to Tripoli so angered the authorities that Simpson was toid to leave Tangier for Gibraltar.

To make

su~e

that there

was no misunderstanding of the state of affairs between the
t'Vro

countries, the_ consul added in his letter concerning the

29Letters betv-1e en James Simpson and Richard V-. Morris,
June 17-25, 1802, in NDUS, £:2· cit., Vol. II, P-P• 1 81-3.
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s i tuation that the expulsion .o rders were "accompanied with
r.h e advice of his fthe Emperor? having declared r,riar against
:. ·r. e

United States.n30

S·i mpson added that the Emperor had

declared war as of June 19, 1802 · and had used the words

11

in

a state of war" as describing the relationship between his
country and the United States.
The governor of Tang ier, who

wa~

to prove to be an

implacable enemy of the United States, · had moved too hastily
in expelling Simpson; the Emperor ordered him to permit the ·
consul to return to Tangier for a period of six months so
that there \'rould be time for communications to come from the
United States to settle the differences that had arisen.
Simpson was reluctant to . step into the lionts mouth a gain as
he had considered himself fortunate to havebeen permitted
to leave the country that had declared . war against his.

How ...

ever, as he was keenly aware of the importance of intellig ence .
information from Tangier, the consul returned to his post from ·
which he reported that a Moroccan frigate v.fas beirig readied
for immediate action a gainst American commerce.Jl
Upon Simpson's return to

!l~ orocco,

he recei yed a letter

from the United States agreeing to his request for presents

3°tetter from Simpson to Secretary of State James
Madison, Gibraltar, June 26, 1 80 2, in ibid., p. 185.

3 1Letter from Simoson . to Secretary of State Jam·es
Madison, Tanr;ier, J uly 2? , 1802, in AS P, _QQ. cit., "Foreign
Relations, m Vol. II, p. 466.
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t o be sent to the Emperor in the form of gun carriages for
th e Mo:coccan navy.

As soon as this communication arrived,

Simpson dispatched a letter to the Emperor couched in most
res pectful terms and opening wit h t his ornate salutation,
"duley [Siy Solayrt~ an Ben ~khomet Ben Abdullah Ben Ismael,
Sheriff, Emperor of Fez, &c. '' · in which he hoped that the
Emper9r.. would...... annul
his declaration of war and that peace
_;:
~~--·----: -~. '

_....

'

would be restored.32

The fact that one hundred badly needed

gun carriages were on their way from the United States some\'!hat altered the diplomatic

climate~

and the vizier of

Sulayman assured ·Simpson of the Emperor's go od intentions in
this ·letter:
In the name of the most merciful God--there is no
pOi'ler or force but that proceeding from the great and
most high God.
To James Simpson, consul of America.
Your letter reached th~ high presence of our master,
and he was thereby informed of the orders you· had
received from the Arner ican ·nation.
Our r~. raster' s pleasure is that you return to your
houses, and he ha s given his orders aricordingly, that
you may remain as you have hitherto done in t h e .e xercizing of y our office, and herewith gives the order
for that effecto • • • so return to your house.

..... .....
·•

~

...

..............

[rhe letter goes on to say that .although the Emperor
would like presents each year, if the distance is too

I

3 2Letter fr orn Simpson to Em p~ror of I·.ilorocco, Tetuan,
July 31, 1802, in ibid., · p . 467. ·
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r: reat for this, he \vill settle for receiving them every
t \-ro years .:.

.7

Upon this t h e c onv ention wi t h your nati on was made
and t h e treati es sign ed. If y ou abide by t h is a greement
a nd f ul f ill it, y ou wil l be a s you we re a nd yo ur attentions will increase our friend ship; a nd if y ou will .not
. fulfill it, you will • • • set t le your matterso33
Alt hough Simps on was pleas ed th at Sulayman evidenced
r ~ i e ndship
. ;_.Ji
~ -.<

and a desire for peace, he was taken abac k by the

~ u . ~ estion that the United States provide biennial presents

to the court.

After checking into the exact terms of .t he

a P"reement between 1'-iohammed ben Abdullah and Barclay and its
r enewal in 1795 with Sulaymanhimself, our consul informed
th e Emperor th at at no time h~d t h ere been: ahy commitment by
: h e United States for a system of continual g ifts.34

It is

imp ossible to determine wh etl:er Sulayrna.n had not realized
t hat no such agreement had been included in .the . neg otiations
with his father and himself or whether he was

t~ing

the

op portunity to rectify what he considered an error on his
part in the negotiations of 1795.

In any case, he. apparently

s aw the futility of demanding what the United States was not
prepared to gr a nt and ho ped t hat the proffered gift of the
~

carriages p resaged further presents.

33Theodore Lyman Jr., Th e Di ~l orn acy of t h e United
States {Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1 28 ), Vol. II, p . 351.
34ASP, op . ·cit., "Foreign Relationstt Vol. II, p. 46$.
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Even though Simpson saw a letter on August 1, 1802
v ~ i ch _ aut~orized

the Governor of Tangier to send out raiders

a;-a inst American shi pping , h e granted

passports to two

;:'J ;occan vessels that would permit them . to sail the Mediterr a nean _without hindrance from the United States Navy.
·--: .._dently,
...-

'

-~~j~r

Evi-

consul felt that the letter of maraue that the

..

...:~-r·overnor - possessed was out of date and had been superseded by
the friendly correspondence that had supposedly cleared the
diplomatic atmosphere of any further tension or . ill-feeling •

..-...,_

With the Moroccan brigs Meshouda and Mirboka in the Mediterranean engaged in what Simpson supposed to be peaceful commerce, and all difficulties betv1een his office and the Emperor
apparently smoothed over, he wrote to a colleague at Gibraltar
that all misunderstandings between the t\•To countries had been .
."
-,

correc~e.<?-.

_ar:d "every matter is in the fairest train of perfect

~s_,accomoda~ion

• • . • until they think of something else to ask ·

for.n35
Even b·efore .Simpson's optimistic letter had reached
its destination, the entire complexion of the situation had
- changed; ·· and all of his efforts for mainta;ining peace ·had come
to naught.

Internal events in !-·!:orocco, . which usually were of

unwitting assistance to American plans, conspired to put an

·:;5Letter fr9m Simpson to Gavino, . Tangier,· September 27,
1802, in ibido, p. 469.

t'~
-· ~~-·------------ ·

.o·.-:
.~.t
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enemy of the United States in a position to wreck the carefully nurtured friendship between the tvf.o countries and to
force the American navy to take an active p art in what would
have been better accomplished by diplomatic relations.

Tak-

ing advantage of the E.'Tiperor' s absence from the northern
section of Morocco, the g overnor of

~ang ier

issued orders to

the captains of the Meshouda and the Jvlirboka to capture any
American ships that they could find.36
At the time t h e Moroccan vessels left Tangier, the
United States frigate Philadelohia was carrying out its
normal pa trol duty along t h e coast of Morocco and Alg iers
looking for Tripolitan blockade runners; arid on the morning
of August 26, 1 80 2, Captain '\'Ji lliam Bainbridge, commander of·
the frigate, stopped a Iv1 oroccan vessel that was sailing in
company with an American brig.

The captain of the Iv!oroccan

ship presented a passport from the American consul at Tangier
and _protested that he should be allowed to continue his peaceful trading mission, but the suspicions of 'Bainbridge were
aroused by the sailing maneuvers of the American merchantman ·
which attempted to leave the vicinity \'lith undue hasteo

After

overhauli!fg the brig, the boarding party found that its captain and seven of his men were being held prisoner below
decks by a Moroccan prize crew; Bainbridge reported . in the

3q;Iright , £Eo cit., p. 134.
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f

l og that the "cruiser belong ing to the Emperor of Morocco"
had captured the brig Betsy and had attempted to take it to
Tan gier as a prize.
At his first interrogation, t he captain of the Mirboka,
Ib rahim Lubarez, said t ha t when h e had left port, war seemed
inevitable; so he proceeded to t h e capture of the Betsy as
hi s contribution to t h e Moroccan cause.

When Ca ptain Bain-

bridge told him that he and his crew were to be tried for
piracy, Lubarez quickly admitted that he had been instructed

by the governor of Tangier to enga g e in raids on American
shipping , arid to substantiate his story, the Moroccan produced the letter of authorization from . the governoro37
Philad~lphia

The

restored the Betsy to its rightful crew and sent

it on its way; the Mirboka was . taken to Gibraltar where it
was held until a decision could be

~ade

as to its disposal.

Bainbridge told Simpson that the captured lJioroccans were
treated with the utmost civility to "impress on their minds a
favorable opinion of the American character. n3 8

3 ?Letter from William Bainbridge to Simpson, USS Philadelnhia, August 26, 1 803, in Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and
lli Barbary Corsairs · (Cambridg e, Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin
and Company, 1 90 5), Po 14lo
3 Br.,etter from Bainbridg e to Sim pson, USS Philadelphia,
ten miles east of Halaga, Aue ust .29 , 1 803, in ASP, QP.· cit.,
"Foreign Relations, 11 Vol. II, p. 591 •

.
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IV.

FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO RESill1ED

For James Simpson; in his pos ition a s t he only repres ent ative of the United St3.tes in r<orocco, the month of September was one of

te~sely anti~ipating

t h e worst, especially

as he was forced to remain in Tang ier where the f, Overnor openly
displayed his animosity toward the United States.

While our

consul was avrai ting developments, tt e pni ted States Navy was
und ertaking to produce them by blockading ·all of the usable
ports of the Emperor from Mogador to Tetuan. · Under the leadership of Edward Preble, the nev.r Ame.rican .commander-in-chief
in the Mediterranean, the Navy was shovTing its strength to

the garrisons, forts, and naval establishments of the Maroccans in an effort to impress them wi th the futility of
a ggressive action a gainst the United Stateso

·writing from

his flagship; the USS Constitution, Preble informed the
Secretary of the'Navy, "I have no doubt but this quarrel will
eventually be for our advantage, as I do not believe his
Imperial :f\'I ajesty will be dispo$ed to War with us a gai n .n39
The blockade served its principal PU:r;'pose in that it
showed the Emperor that the United States v1as in earnest
about preserving its ri ght to free passage in the Hediter-

39-Letter from Edward Preble to Secretary of the Navy,
Gibraltar Bay, October 10, 180.3, in NDUS,_ .2£• cit., Vol.III,
p. 96 • .
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an and that some a g re ement must be made between the t"ro

, ..-;.:1 t r i es to insure this freedom.
-

~~

VJhen Sulayman was infonned

the Am eric a n navy had closed his ports and was waiting

· ~ ~ tr en g th

for h is return to Tang ier for neg otiations, he

· •. :". ~s h ed hts affairs in the interior and has:t ened with his
· ,·;~t to that city .

It was October siJ...'th wh en the Em peror

.: :--:-t ve d , and the Navy was there, prepared for either peace or
~~ =--;

Preble infonned Sim pson that t h e fleet would salute the

r"~ e ror

with t wenty-one guns, "· • • and if he is not dis-

~ '~ ed to be pacific,

!

wi l l salute him a g ain." {und erlining

..~n t he orig inal dispatcQ.740

Althoug h Sulayman arrived vl ith a

: "Lrge force of twenty thousand men and 105 cannon, he wished
~J r

peaceful negotiations and sent what the Americans con-

!~ d ered

magnificent g ifts, including ten bullocks, twenty

~ -~. eep, and forty-ei ght fowl.41
~J. l ted

This very welcome chang e from

beef and ship's . b;i..scuit created an atmosphere of friend-

. i ness among the assembled ships that went a long way towards
·~ re ducing

peaceful feelin g s between both sides.

On Qctober tenth, the Emperor, his court, and anny
~ :> rmed
..........

~.

themselves on the beach where they were met by Captain

?:-eble, his
senior officer, James Simpson, and a small honor .
.
~ua~d

of m~dshipmen; ahd a series of talks beg an that settled

40
"

. .
Ib1d., p. 102.

4lCharles Osc a r Paullin, Comm od ore J ohn Rodg ers, .1.111~ {Cleveland , Ohio: The Arthu r H. Clark Co., 1910), p . 112.
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a::1 icably the outstanding differences between the groups.

To

:Je;::in t h e neg otiations, Sulayman "'rrote a letter to his gover~o r

in Mogador instructing him to release the crew of the

~~ erican

ship Hannah, to restore t heir property to them, and

~o send t h em on t heir way. 42

Apparently the Americans \"lere

not even a'\>vare at that time that another of their merchant
vessels had been taken by the
~ 1 eir

~ oroccans,

but they concealed

surprise and thanked the Emperor for his friendly act.
Not to be outdone in

g es~ures

-of generosity, Captain

Preble informed the Emperor that he had given orders that
the Mirboka. a nd the Meshriuda were to be returned to the
Moroccans.43

He added that orders had been dispatched to the

42nTo Ben Abdel Sodak, Governor of Mogadore, October
11, 1803 o From Sulayman. Nov; k now ye th2.t the Almighty having
reconciled what had hap pened with the American nation because
of the .acts of t h e vessels, and that we are now, ~s we were
before, "Viith them in peace . and friendship, as settled with our
father, (to whom God be merciful!)"
"Take care--t~ k e care that none of you do anything
against them, or show them any disrespect or disregard, for
~hey are as they vJere, in friendship and in peace, and we have
increased our regard for them in conseouence of tb...e fri-endship
they have manifested to our person which God has exalted. And
we order that you be careful arid diligent in all their concerns,
and we order that you do well with t heir vessels and with
their merchantso Peace be with you all." ASP, on • . cit.,
"Foreign Relations, 11 Vol. II, p. 593.
·
··
43 At about the same time as the Philadel nhia had
boarded thP I1irboka, the Unit·ed States Frir,at e J o.hn Adams had
captured the I·1eshouda, bringi11g it int o Gibro.ltar Bay to await
developments
Sine e t he t wo 1-'Ioroccan ships were returned to
the Em~eror as a e ift, · the men of t h e Philadelphia ~nd the
~Adam s were de prived of t he prize ::noney tha t was cust omar0

114
: ~i ~ed

. lol-l
~ ,.

States Navy units in the Mediterranean henceforth to
all of Sulayman's vessels to pass on their way, unmo-

t ed .

~o t

The return of the .f':Ioroccan shi -os to their owners was

such an unselfish evidence of friendship as the Americans

. :"ete nded; Preble indicated the 'Vvorthless nature of the
"If'·

Y! :"boka in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy in which he
5 a:d

that

~e cture"

the ship was such a "poor niece of naval archithat no United States naval officer wanted to sail

i t across the Atlantic to be s .old in America.

He further

confided that since it was almost valueless, he would give it
ba ck to the Emperor as proof of his friendly dis position
toward Morocco.44

Another correspondent . in the area confirmed

this evaluation of the Moroccan ships and said that . they and
their crews .w ere "an expense and burthen {Sic7" which should
be given back to Sulayman to rid the United States of the
cost of maintaining themo45

vlhatever the Americans may have
1

thought of the prizes they had captured, the Emperor was ·
gratified to have them returned and took the gifts . as additional evidence of the renewed amity shown .by the United States.

ily shared by all hands (the shi ps had been valued · at a total
of $27,189). To rectify this matter, Congress authorized · payment in lieu of prize money to be given to t h e captors - of the
!·:oroccan vessels. ASP' op. cit~' . ''Naval Aff airs' II Vol. I,
p. 115.

44Letter from Preble to Secretary of the Navy, USS
Constitution, Gibraltar Bay, October 1, · 1803, in NDUS, 2.£·
~., Vol. TIT, p . 96.
45Tobias Lear as quoted in Irwin, QE• cit., p. 132.
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An eyewitness to the
~a n

meeti~g

quoted the latter as saying,

between Preble and Sulay-

n •••

he was sorry that his

vernor had behaved so muc h a.nis s and said that he should
--u ni sh him 'more than to our sa tis f a ction' • n46
~x ~ ressed

The Am ericans

their satisfaction with the proposed punishment

nd, after receiving another bountiful supply of fresh meat
l ~d

fovrl, returned to their ships, j ustly proud of having

s ettled a dangerous situation in a relatively peaceful mannero
0ne must add, however, that if it had not been for the
f riendly attitude of Sulayman ben Moha.m...'Ued toward the United
States, t h e peaceful arbitrat:i,on of t h eir differences would
ha ve been impossible.

As proof of his attitude, the Emperor

sent a letter to Preble i.n v.r hich he pledged the reaffirmation
of the Treaty of 1786 and a continued cooperation with the
United State9 that would nu1st forevero'\47
Sulayman sent a proclamation to all of his subordinates who might be in a position to make contact with the
Americans, in which he said in part:
Know all those who shall see this noble "Writing • • •
that the American nat ion are still as they were in peace
and friendship with our person exalted by God.

46Letter from Midshipman Ralph Izard to Mrs. Ralph
Izard, Sr., Tangier Bay, October. 11, 1803, in NDUS, 2£· cit.,
Vol. III, p. 126.
47Letter from Preble to Simpson, USS Constitution,
Tangier Bay, Oct ober 12, 1803, in AsP, .££• cit., " Naval
Affairs," Vol. I, p. 116.
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What has happened with their and our vessels has been
an affair between the vess.els but the said Nation con- .
tinues respected, as they were with us, and under all
security and equally so their vessels.
Their vessels are safe both at sea and in port • • • •
Those 1;..rho shall contravene it ffihe orde£7 vlili be
ounished with a severe ounishrnent. At l ast v..re are at
pea ce with the Americannation as our Father was according to the treaty made t h e first day of Ramadan in the
year 1200.48
Preble, having received a copy of this letter, was
convinced of the Emperor's sincerity and wrote to Simpson
that he was issuing orders for his flotilla to leave Tangier
3ay and would return to the United States--"peace

h~ving

been

established.n49
At the time when the Americans in the I'1ledi terranean
were

congra~ulating

each other on the successful settling of

the tension betv-:een their country and Morocco, the United
States Government at home \vas making hasty preparations to
declare war on Sulayman.

Early in November, 1802, Jefferson

had received the disturbing notice that an American ship, the
Betsy, had been captured by a vessel of the Moroccan navy, and
he presented the problem to the Senate and the House of Representatives, re questing that those bodies take immediate

step~

4SASP, op. cit., "Foreign Relations," Vol. II, p. 592.
There is a variant of this in I-JDUS, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 118.
49Letter from Preble to Simpson, uss· Constitution,
Tangier Bay, October 12, 1803, in ASP, .2.£• cit., "Naval
Affairs," Vol. I, p. 116.
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t o halt any further depredationso~O

By November eighteenth,

t he Senate was in t he midst of debate on the question of war
with Sulayman, and if it had not been for the reluctance of

Jo hn Quincy Adams, war would have been declared at that time.
To hurry the declaration t hr ough , s ome Senate rules had to be
shelved, but since this reauired a unanimous vote and Adams
refused to accede to the wishes of the majority, the war bill
was held up.

He recorded in the Diary of Happening s in the

United States Senate the reason for refusing to be stampeded
into hasty action, "~1y . principle was, that a declaration of
war was the last thing in t he world to be made with unusual
Lsi£7 precipitation.u51
Fortunately, befor e the Senate could override Adams'
action, letters from Preble and Sulayman ben Iiohamm.ed arrived
for Thomas Jefferson that relieved the tension and obviated
the need for war.52

Jefferson informed Congress on December

50Ibid., ''Foreign Affairs," Vol. II, p. 591.
5lcharles Francis Adams (eeL), :Memoirs of John quincy
Adams (Philadelph ia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.; 1875)~ l[ol . I,
p. 273.
. 52~To the President of the Americas, a Prince and to
all the Senate--Health.n
"Know y e tha t between some of our vessels • • • and
yours some enmity has happened at sea, . and the af f air became
so serious, as t hat some vessels of each party were taken."
"So soon as

w~

heard of this we felt concerned at it,
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fi fth that ttall differences vlith l·Jlorocco had been amicably
a djusted," the attack on the Ainerican ship had been disavowed,
a nd the Treaty of 1786 had been recog nized and confirmed by
the I:Ioroccans.53
R epr~sentatives

After hearing his report, the House of
officially ended t h e matter with the following

resolution:
Resolved, that it is inexp edient for the United States
to pursue further hostilities a ga inst t h e Em p eror of
I~I orocco unless they should be rendered necessary by
fut~re agg ressions.54
For about ei ght months, relations between Morocco and
the United States resum·ed their normal routine, but in August
of 1804, the governor of Tangier, still smarting from the
public rebuke administered by his Emperor, attempted to promote discord.

The governor, Abd al-Rahman Hashash, had the

Mirboka loaded vrith sixteen hundred bushels of wheat ostensibly as "a gift for the poor of Tripoly [Sii}," but when
Simpson heard of . this strategem to circumvent the American
blockade, he protested that this was . a hostile act and would
not be countenanced by the United .States.

He further pointed

as we were still at peace arid friendship. And know Ye that
all treaties entered into between the two nations, remain as
they were, and tha t they s h all not be altered or changed."
Letter from the Emperor of I1Iorocc o to Jeff erson, n .d., in
~' op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 124-5.
$ .
53 Annals of t h e Conr r ·ess o f the Urii ted States .. The
· ·-~ates and Proceedin'iis in t h e Conp:ress of t h e Unit~d States.
8th Con rrress . (Wa shi ng ton: Gales and Seaton, 1852), p. 642. ·

5 4Ibid., p. 787.
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, ".lt.

to the governor that t h is attempt was similar to the

~ ·tious ones hh-1802 t_hat had come so perilously close to
:~ ·1olv ing
,.~~p son

the two countries in a serious v.rar; consequently,

demanded that the Mirboka be instructed to have no

jea li ngs with Tripoli or \...rith any other country at war with
,bt erica.

The governor immediately declared that his affec-

t_on for the United States and for the consul was eternal
nd that the propbsed shipment was a misunderstanding that
~~~ld

be quickly set to right; he concluded his letter with

this statement:
' . .""4

If you find any person who shall say anything a gainst
your Nation regarding our peace, my Lieutenant Governor
will cut off his head; for we will always maintain the
confirmation of Peace with your Republic.55
William Eaton, the United States agent in Algiers, had ·
heard of the attempts to send wheat to Tripoli through the
blockade and recorded in his journal that Noroc.c o was planning hostile actions against America. 56

To check on the

actions of the Moroccan navy, elements of the United States
~1editerranean

fleet began making reconnaissance runs as far

south as Sale on the Atlantic, and the USS Congress and Essex
were dispatched to the Strait of Gibraltar with orders to

55Letter from Simpson to Secretary of State Madison,
Tangier, August 13, lSOl"' inNDUS, .Q.£• cit., Veil. IV, p. 410.

5 ~xtract of VJillia111 Eaton's journal, Gibraltar,
August 13-15, 1804, in ibid., p. 413

~
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re?ort any suspicious actions on the part of the Moroccans
and to prevent any of their ships from supplying Tripoli with
~ ood.

After making a close survey of Moroccan ports and con-

ferring with our consul at Tangier as to the state of affairs
th ere, the commander of the fleet sent a circular letter to
all American consuls in the area stating nthat our suspicions

[Of the Moroccans7 are without foundation.n57
James Simpson was probably pleased to rec .e ive this·
assurance, but being much closer to the source of any future
trouble he was not at all sure that our relations with 1>1orocco
would remain tranquil as · long as Has hash remained governor of
'T'. ang1..
• e r.

Simpson's suspicious _concerning the governor's

attitude toward the United States were daily becom:i.ng stronger,
and he recorded additional .eve-nts that bore out his contentions.
The business of the consulate was continually being hampered
by petty annoyanc.es_ emanating from Moroccan officialdom--all, .

of course, with the connivance and encouragement of Hashash • .
His continual hectoring of the Americans was not the Principal.
fault that this governor pos:3essed, at least in the eyes of
the Emperor; much more serious was his continued disobedience
and usurpation of authority.

Finally,. Sulayman had enough of

this plotting and insubordination, and Simpson gleefully
reported to the Secretary of State that Ab'd al-Rahman Hashash

57rbid., p. 421.
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• .as be en deprived of all c omrn and,
~ :-cd

put in chains and deli v-

to the care of the Black Troops."

Our consul added that

·:; is c hane; e removed from all influence vrith the Emperor an
~-

lac a ble enemy of the United States and that the new

-:-•' t':" es entati ve in Tang ier was a man who had "uniformly mani!'es ted a dispositi on useful" to the United States and who
wo· l d be of g reat help in maintaining friendl y relations
etween the two countries.58
FollmoJ"ing this chang e in aQ.ministration in Tang ier and
th e ending of piratical raids by the other Barbary povvers on
kn e~ican

shipping , ah era of g ood feeling and friendly rela-

t _ons operied between the United States and the Shereefian
· ::.":'lpire.

Regardless of t h e many disagreements and difficul-

t ies that arose during the reign of Sula'Yman ben Mohammed
t hat could have seriously breac h ed t h e friendship between his

c ountry and the United, States, the underlying sentiment of
t rust and sincere respect, one for the other, did not permit
a breakdo:wn of the mutual understanding which has characte-ri zed American-Moroccan cooperation.

58Letter fr om Simpson to Secret a ry of State Hadison,
Tangier, September 27 , 1807, in ibid., Vol. VI, p. 560.
-

·-

CHAPTER V
UNITED STATES AND MOROCCO IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
With the defeat of Tripoli by -the United States in

•~5

• ;;)J

American interest in North Africa in general and in

•

Y, ) rocco in particular lost the momentum that it had accumulat~

during the final decades of the eighteenth century.

~~ ving

Peace

been restored, the commerce of the United States had

!'ree access to the Mediterranean and to the profitable mart ets of southern Europe and the Middle East, but only those

bericans especially concerned with such trade cared much
ab out the relations that this country maintained with
)torocco and its neighbors.

One writer dismis·sed the period

following the Barbary wars .by saying:
Friendly if somewhat irregular contacts between the
United States and the Sherifian Ls.i£7 government continued throughout the nineteenth century, when ~orocco
managed to preserve a . precarious independence.
· .
It will be the function- of ' this chapter to investigate these ·
•somewhat irregular contacts" up to the peri·od of the Conference of _l8SO, when the United States · partially abandoned its
traditional policy of isolation and joined. European powers .
. .. ...

~

..

- -.·.-. -~ 1..' ~- <:.:{-'Milt

in an international meeting to settle · a Moroqc~!l, ..Pr9,_!?J. ~ .·
· For the first two decade.s of the nineteenth c·e ntury,

!Edmund Stevens, North African Powder ~ (New York:
Coward McCann; Inc., 1955), Po S9o
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: .'-'=c s Simpson, the Americ a n consul in r.~orocco, continued to

. n

r outine dispatc h es to t h e State Department concerning

.. e ope r a tions of h is c onsul a te, but the amic a ble and
·: ne ve r.tful interc ourse bet ween .his country and the eMpire of
~ · : ~ay::1 an

ben E ohanuned necessitated few instructions from

\'J s hi n g ton~
~~ e

The only occurrence o f note took place in 1820,

y ear when the c onsul d ied an d t wo years before the death

:o f Sulayman.

To

shO\•T

his respect and friendship for the

·:n it ed States 'i'Jhich had l a sted for more than t wenty-five
::cars, the Emp eror r:1ade a present to this country of a fine
· ::oa:--ish b'.lilding in Tanr; ier to be used as a n official resi1ence and consulate.2
~ nited

After giving the property to the

States, Sulayman reaff irmed his friendship in a royal

j ecree signed on r!ovember 9, 1822, in vrhich he stated:
Know all my Officers and my People that I dire6t and
order that all Am eric a ns are p ermitted to trade in any
port of my Empire. Th e k~ericans are more to me tha n any
other nation, and ,,rhatever f ooting t h e most favored nation
is on, they are favored more thah any other •
. With the help of Gcd I si g n this, God help me • .
Lstgne£7 Sidi r-~ oulay Soliman b en Mohamet ben Abdullah)

2 This was t h e first real property ovmed by the United
States abroad and. "..'Jas c onsi d ered Americ an territory until the
~w entieth century.
Ibid.
.
.
"'· . .

3 Quoted in Free r!Ioroc.co ( Ne\·T York: ·Ist:i,.qlal ~arty,
1953-1955): T;lay 25, 1 9 53, p . 2.
Joh n Quinc y Adams, in h i s memoirs, tells of the good
relations ex isting betwe en the 1-:oroc c .J.n em'p erors and · the
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I.

LIONS FOR THE "SULTAN" OF AMERICA

When the United States accepted Sulayman's fine gift,
i t did not reqlize that the precedent established would,
~ithin a few years,

cause a g~eat deal of embarrassment and

e ntail voluminous correspondence between Tangier and Washing~

ton.

During the 1830's, the American consuls were plagued

vith the problem of what to do with presents given to them by
the new sultan, Abd al-Rahman.

James R. Lieb, who was this

country's representative in Morocco from 1832 to 1837, first
informed his superiors of the dilemma in a letter which
mentioned the following!
The Emperor has presented me with an enormous lion
and two fine horses. The .Department is aware that . any
such present cannot be declined .without the 'g rossest
insult to an Eastern Sovereign.4
Lieb knew that it had always been American policy to

refuse presents t,hat wer.e given to its representatives in

'·•·

:

United States during the 1"820' s. He records his effort to
repay the kj.ndness of Abd al-Rahman, Sula)rman' s successor, 'bY
returning a slave who proved to be a Moroccan ~mb ject . The
consul at Tangier had informed the State Department. that a.
~~oroccan was in slavery in Georgia and requested ·his purchas.J~
and return "as a complimentary donation to the E:Jnperor."
Cha:les Fran.cis Adams ~ ed ~), Ivlemoirs of J obn ~uincy .A,dams
(Philadelphla: J. B. LJ.pp:tncott and Co.,--r87'5· , Vol. VII,
p. 307 • .
4united States Congress, House of Representatives.
Hessage : from the President, "Presents From the ·Emperor of
l!.orocco," January 6, 1834, in Executive Documents, 23rd ·
Congress, lst Session,. 1834. Serial Set 254, Document 28,
p. 1.

..., ...

~

,,
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:'oreign countries, but his major problem was what to do with
~h e

•

animals until the United States had made a decision in

~~ is

particular case.

~ rable

He plaintively wrote that the "consid-·.

expense" of one dollar a day to feed and care for the

1nimals was being borne by himself, and he hoped that the
t

S:.ate Department would soon .make up its mind as to what pro-

t

cedure he should follolt/4..~

The consul hopefully suggested

t hat maybe Congress would . like to have the lion "to form c.
na tional menagerie," but when that body heard of the Sultan's
;
J

~ i ft,

it was not the least interested in becoming the care-

taker of any animals; least of all one as difficult to manage
as North African lion of doubtful temper.
President Andrew Jackson suggested to Congress that
i

the mere formality of pr-esenting the animals to this country
would allow theii .. return 'f.~& 'the original recipient, James
Lieh., arid that their symbolic acceptance by this country would
satisfy the protocol involved.6

Fortunately for Lieb's peace

of mind and budget, Congress was reluctant to establish such
a ruling that might lead to all sorts of abuses later on.

.. ·

The

5James Lieb presented a . bilL to the Treasury Department
for $528 to pay the expenses of caring for the lion. and the
horses. United States Congress, House of Representatives.
Report of the Treasury Department, ·ttPayments,;.;.Consuls--Barbary," in House Documents, 25th Congress, 2nd SessiQn,. Serial
Set 327, Document 149, p. 2.
·

6nrresents From the Emperor of 1\'lorocco," .2.1?.· cit., p. 1.
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:t

~

C-

i ttee of Foreign Affairs sugg ested that the horses be

~! p ~ed

to the United States and sold there to defray the

~ :- 1 :-- sportation

expenses involved, but it completely side-

':.e~p ed the lion problem. 7

After nearly a year . of discuss.ion,

-!·.1ring which time the Committee on Agriculture flatly refused

to take charge of the animals, Congress finally authorized
the sale of the horses in this country and instructed Presi- ·

..t

dent Jackson to dispose ·Of the lion as he sa\v fit.8

l
!

perfect example of tardily locking the barn, Jackson wrote

~
!

letters to all American consuls that they should not accept

f:

any presents under any circumstances unl.ess previous_ly · author- .
tzed by

•
I

<·
!
· f.

···-

"
~

In a

· -!·

Congr~ss-~a som~what

difficu.l t order to follow when

the donor might be insulted by a two or three month wait
before instructions from the . United States could arrive.
If the President thought that · his execu.ti v:e · o.rder to
his consuls had solved the. problem;

he

was doomed to disap- . .

?united States Congress, House of Representatives • .
•Presents from the Emperor of Morocco, n March 4, 1834, in ·
Reports of Committees; 23rd :Congress, · 1st ·session, 1834. :
Serial Set 261, Rep6rt 302~ p. 2.
·
··
8
.. .
Register of Debates. in Congress, 23)d Cong ress, 2nd
Sess1on (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1835 , Vol. XI, p. 218.
There were many sugg estions from Congressmen ~oncerning ways
of ·disposing of the animals, ·inch,1r,ling motions to sell them,
give them to the states of New York, New Jersey, or Louisiana,
make a present of them to "Louis Phillippe of France," and
finally, give them to the captain of the ship tha·t brbught
the animals from Tangier. Unfortunately, official records ~ .
shed no ligh4 on . 1vhat finally happened to the unwanted lion.
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pointment, for before mahy years had

passed, Lieb's succes-

sor in Tangier was faced -with the difficulty of what to do
with not one, but two full-grovm lions.

In a long letter to

the Secretary of State, th·e new consul in Tangier, Thomas N.
Carr, related his efforts to avoid receiving the present of
a lion and a lioness which had been captured and trans-ported
to the port city at considerable expense and effort on the
part of the Shereefian government. 9

Carr, well a"i.rare ·of his

instructions to refuse all such presents, made strong representations to the Governor of Tangier protesting the gifts,
but that official claimed that he was po"ilerless to interfere
with the wishes of his sovereign.

Upon his return to the

consulate, Carr found that a band of soldiers had - arrived
with the animals and. were waiting patiently to turn them over

_" .,

"t!.o the Americ_an representative o
The consul explained to the captain in charge _that he
was unable to accept the fine gift, but ca·r r was informed that
they -were not for him but for the President.

When the l':'Ioroc_:-

can was told that the President was unable to take presents
from foreign powers, the soldier said that ·the Sultan was

9J-~h~ " H. Hay, the son of the British consul in Tangier,
relat-ed hm'l he met a caravan coming from southern Morocco in ·
the fall of 183 9, bringing a lion arid lioness to _Tangier to .
be presented as an imperial gift to the "Sultan of the United
States." John H. Drurrunand Hay, Western Bal"'.b ary: - Itsj\Til.d Tribes and Savage Animals (London: John rJiurray, 1:844), P. 33 ~
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·~trc
~

of tha t; the lions really were for Cong ress.

~ ~~n~ in ~
.

to

to run out of excuses but finally explained tha t

' onst itution f orbad e Congress to accept presents.

~ ;"J C can

·. • :

~s

meant by a co nstituti on, asked ·who the author of

oc ument was.

-: ~ :cd

The

c aptain, who und oubtedly had only t he vaguest idea

:· -.: ~a t v1as

:

Carr was

Upon being in f ormed t hat t he peo ple of t h e

States were r es p onsible , th e a stute sold i er told the
, who by t h is time had reac hed t he end of his ingenious

!",. ¥us es, that ttt h e Emperor desires them to be presented to
~~e people, as a maik of his fes p ect and esteem for t h e

•::·· -t a ns' of Ar.lerica.nlO
After exhausting all of his reasons for refusal, the
,. . assed consul finally- re fu sed t o take the animals under any : ~ =- ~ ·mstances.
~~~ t

Hmv- ever, the .i·Ioroccan e xplained that it would

him his head if h e failed in hi s mission, and he pro-

-J ted to block off the street in front of the consulate and
':. ') tu rn the lions loose in that enclosure.
':~ es e

·vrhen Carr saw

preparations being made, he vras "compelled t o surrender

:) th is novel form of a ttack, and to open one of Lhis7 rooms
~:> :- th e receution of the animals, v:here they are nm..;.nll

lOunited St a t .es Congress, House of R e p~esentatives.
"? :-- <:: sents from I-!uscat,n Sept ember 3, 1 839, in Executive.Do cu~r.t.s , 26th Congress, 1st Session, 183 9 .
Serial Set 368, ·
· ~1C U..'1e ht 221, p . 6 .
llrbid.

•

--- l-29

Ja rr closed h is dispatch on this plaintive note:
I shal l most anxiously wait instruction s ~ as t hey are
t o me a g r eat ex pense a nd inc onvenience . I hope I · shall
have th e honor a~d pl eas ure of hearing u non t h ls subject from the Department ~s soon as p~s s lble. l2
Several mont hs later, . the c onsul recei ved an ans wer
f rom the State Department ins truct inc hi!n to send t he a n imals
~

to the United States by a merchant ship or by an American
naval vessel if one were ava ilable.

~

He was also told that

t h.e President understood t he predi cament that r! e

\1\laS

in but

that t h e c onsul shou ld do all in his power to refuse such
~ ifts in the future.l3

The r~co rd of the corres pondence

betv-reen Tang ie r and v: ashington does not s h ow t hat any further
diplomatic crises wer e caused by presen.ts of emb a rrassing
zoological s pecimens ; evidently, tte American consuls were
s uccessful in headinr; off any r:1ore animals from the Sult a n.

!I.

TEE TREATY OF 1$3 6

As interesti ng as •rJere t he probl ems res ulting . from t h e
[; ifts of lions and horses, t h e major event i n Ame rican~

Foroccan rel a tions in the first · half of the . nineteenth century

12 Ibid.
1 3Let ter fr om Acting Secr etary of State Vail to Thomas

-!<- '

Carr, \'~as hin e;ton , Novemb er 12, 1839, in National Archives,
aecords of tl e De partment o f State , Dinl omat ic Instructi ons ) .
Barb a r y Powers , I.: icr ofilm ~ 1 o. 77, qoll 1 8 (V: as hi ngton: Th e
r atio na l Archi v es, 1946) , Vol. XI V, p . 19. ( Her eafter
referred to a s DIBP ).

---.

130
was the renewal of the Treaty of 1786.

It was on the

shoulders of James Lieb that the State Department laid the

-- .-- ---

responsibility for convincing the Makhzen that it was to the
advantage of Morocco to- reaffirm the good relations betwe-en

i

the two countries.

Lieb was notifie~ that he had been empow-

ered by Congress to begin negotiations and that the USS Constitution was on its way to Tangier with presents to be
given to Abd al-Rahman to facilitate the consul's mission.l4
The State Department informed its representative that
he· was to try to get the F.lnperor' s agreement to place the
ships of both nations on equal footing i-n so far as rights of
entry and protection in Moroccan ports were concerned.

How-

ever, Lieb was cautioned that this requirement wasnot consider:ea- ~crucial _

and that if the Emperor were not so disposed, it

would be sufficient to reestablish the Treaty of 1786 with
the addition .of a "permanent'" clause that would obviate the
need for a renewal of the pact every fifty years.l5

The

American consul carried out his instructions effic.ientl.y but
''-(ffcf1i·6 t confer directly with the Emperor nor go to thE:J Moree-

can court.

Rather, Lieb conducted all the negotiations by
-,

_ 14nispatch from Secretary of State John Forsyth to
James Lieb, Washington, August 10, 1835, in DIB?, E.E• cit.,
Vol. nv, p. 5. ,ff ·

.. ...,..

15Hunter Miller, (ed.), Treaties and Other International
Acts of the United States of America (Washington: United
.$.ta"tesGovernment PriritingDffice, 1934), Vol. IV, p. 65 •

•

-
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c r respondence and oply in the final stages did he send an

c ting vice-consul to Meknes to complete the arrangements.
~~ e b was not able to get the Emperor's agreement to placing

-- t he--s h ips of the two nations on the same level, for Abd al.. nhm an did not see the neces3ity for · changing the many
~ a rantees

possessed by American commerce that were inherent

i-n -the . previous treaty.

Consequently, Lieb did not try to

force the issue, but was happy tci settle .for a change in
Articles One and Twenty-five.l6

1 6.rhe major differences bet1-Teen the two tr-e aties are
found in the Preamble, Article One, and Article Twenty-five,
·..mtch are recorded .here.
"In the name of God ,., the l\1erciful and Clement!
be to Godl

Praise

"This is a copy of the Treaty of peace which we. have
made with the Americans; and written in this book; affixing
thereto our blessed Seal, that, with - the help of God, it may
remain firm forever.
·
·
"Written at M.e ccanez, the City of Olives, . on the 3d day
of the month Jumad el Lobhar, in the year of ·t he Hegira 1252
~eptember 16, lS) 67,.
"Article 1. \ve declare that both parties have agreed
that this Treaty, consisting of Twenty five Articles, shall
be inserted in this Book, and delivered to James R. Lieb,
. Ag ent of the United States and now their resident consul .at
Tangier, with whose a pprobation it has -been made, and who is
duly authorized on their part, to treat with us, concerning
all the matters contained ther ein. ·

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .- .
.

~

"Article 25. · This Treaty shall continue to be binding
on both parties, until the · one shall give twelve moriths
notic.e to the intention to abandon it; in which case its
operations shall cease at .t he· end of twelve months." .
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The introduction to the treaty and fifteen of the
articles were identical to those in the Treaty of 1786, and,
except for the major changes in the first and last articles,
t he other differences were merely orthographic.

The American

consul was very pleased to have been able to secure the assent
of the Emperor to the final article which provided that the
treaty, which was signed on September 16, . 1836, would continue in perpetuity barring a year's notification by either
party that it should be discontinued.

J

He was especially

proud that he had negotiated the treaty without giving any
presents beforehand or even telling the Emperor that he would
receive any--although three thousand dollars worth of gifts
were later sent to Abd al-'ftahman.

L:ieb reniarked that the

signing of a treaty without the exchange of gifts was "a cir-

.f

cumstance hitherto unknown in the history of Moracco.ttl7
· III.

;

A PIPLOMATIC CRISIS

As a direct result of the actions of the American con-

•

!!.

J

sul, Thomas Carr, the amicable relations between the Shereefian Empire and the United States were endangered to such an
extent that an American admiral was forced to intervene.
Just a few. days after Carr's replacement had been notified
that he would not be given gifts to present to the Emperor

17Miiler, 21?.· cit., Vol. IV, Po 66.
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bec ause they were no longer needed to cement the friendship
of the two countries,l8 the former consul sent an angry lette r to Washington in which he complained of the treatment

that he had received while trying to leave Tangier.

In a letter to the . Emperor, with whom he had been on
the best of terms, Carr complained that the guard at the
dock had seized him by the throat, and when he attempted to
defend himself, the captain o.f the port arrested him. 1 9

The

whole difficulty had arisen because the consul had not
informed the Governor of Tangier that he was planning to
leave the city, and unless foreigners made their intentions
known in advance, the guards were not permitted to allow
their exit.

In a fit of anger, the- retiring .consul rushed

back to the consulate and struck the American flag, declaring _
that he was severing diplomatic relations with Morocco.
Whether he had the legal right to make such a serious move is debatable, but the act was sufficient to initiate a series of
letters and conferences that, for a time, threatened . the
friendship of the two countries.

1BorBP,
f

.9.£· cit., Vol.

nv,

p. 25.

l9Letter from Thomas Carr to Abd al-Rahman, Tangier,
March 25, ·1842, in United States Congress, House of Represent~ - .
ati ves. "Correspondence--Consul of the United States ·at · Tan- •
gier," in Executive Documents, 27th Congress; 3rd Session,
1843. Serial Set 422, Document 165, p. 4.
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The nel'r consul, John F. Mullowny, was instructed by
~~ ni el

Webster, the Secretary of State, to investigate the

ra rticulars of the incident and to do what he could to settle
th e difficulties. 20 · Arriving in Gibraltar, the consul sent a

: ctter to the commander of the American Mediterranean fleet
requesting transportation to Tangier for the purpose of car~ying

out the Department's orders, but he was told very

brusquely by Admiral Morgan thatno such action would be
taken until a letter from the Emperor explaining the ·"insult
to the United States" had been received~21

Because of the communication difficulties of the
period and the normal reluctance to share informati.on dis~ layed

by different branches of government, Mullowny had not
)

been made fully aware of the seriousness of the situation and
therefore was somewhat irked by the attitude displayed by the
Ad.n:Iiral.

After a wait of several months, the Emperor's 1 ett er

to Morgan arrived, but the answer was · not sat.: l.sfactory; the

Admiral had demanded the dismissal of the. offending soldiel:',

the port captain, and the vice-governor of Tangier as payment

20Dispatch from Daniel Webster to John F. Mullowny,
Washington, August 3, 1842, in DIBP,. .2.£· cit., Vol. XIV, ·
p. 28.
21united · States ·congress, House of Representatives.
"Correspondence--Consulof the United States at Tangier with
the Government of Morocco, n in Executive Documents, · 27t.h Con•
gress, Jrd Session. Serial , Set 422, DO:cument 165, p. 6.

1.3 5
! or the alleged insult to the United States.

The Emperor had

stated in his letter that this could - not be done because all
Moroccans involved had merely been following orders, and it
ts

Vcl S

the American consul I'Tho had been guilty of abusive

actions by drawing his sword and attempting to kill his captors.

Abd al-Rahman dismissed Morgan's demand that the

Treaty of 183 6 be reaffirmed, for nothing had been done to
disturb its

validity~

Furthermore, he told Morgan that he

had "enlargedthe affair which, in itself, was small" and
•embroiled it, though it was ·c lear.n22 _
Rather than see the ending of friendly relations
bet~

._. _,. . ......

his country and the United States, the Emperor agre.ed

. to .~miss

the vice-governor of Tangier, and this information

vas transmitted to Admiral Morgan by the consul of Norway and
Sweden, who stated that "nothing remains to ke-ep the United
States consul out of Tangier.tt 23 Just when the Admiral
thought that the situation was sett~ed, the .Emperor ~€nt a
note to him that chided the Americans with bad faith·; the·
~1oroccans

had found out that Carr had not been removed frooi

22tetter from the Emperor of Morocco, Abd al-Rahman,
to Admiral Charles Morgan,.· September 4, 1842, in United
States Congress, House of Representatives. "Differences
with Morocco," in Executive Docurrients,- .27th Congress, Jrd
Session. Serial Set 419, Document 22, p. 3 •.
·
·23Letter from J. Ehrenhoff, Consul General of Sweden
and Norway to Admiral Charles Morgan, Tangier, September 18,
1842, in ibid., p. 5.

.

·,
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office as Morgan had promised but had merely been transferred
to another post.

This development had occurred without the

kn owledge of the Admiral and his complaints to the Secretary
of the Navy were long and louct.24

After being put into this

embarrassing position in which he was in t .he wrong even
though unintentionally, Admiral Morgan could do little but
allow Mullowny, who by this time had been waiting in Gibraltar for ten months, · to go to Tangier to investigate. conditions
there.

Even then, the Admiral insisted that a certain

involved protocol be followed, and the impatient consul was
obliged to go to Tangier to get ·a signed statement that the
vice-governor had been dismissed, raise the flag over the
consulate which was then saluted by twenty-one guns, · and ·
return to Gibraltar.

After this form had been followed,

J<lorgan provided a naval vessel aboard which the consul
returned to Tangier to receive the customary salute given to
officials of his diplomatic rank.25

Mullowny' s return to.

Tangier was welcomed by the Moroccan authorities, who were
sincerely interested in maintaining . good relations with .t he

24Let ter from Morgan to Secretary of Navy A. P. Upshur;
USS Columbus, in the Mediterranean, October 26, 1842, in
"Differences with Morocco," .£2• cit., Serial. Set 419,
Document 22, p. 3.
2 5Dispatch from Johh Mullmvny to Daniel Webster,
Tangier, December 12, 1842, iri "Correspondence--Consul of the
United States at Tang ier wit·h the Government of Morocco," .2.£•
ill.,. Serial Set 422, Document 165, p. ·7·

"'.,
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United States, but the consul had to exert all of the tact
and diplomacy at his disposal to overcome the heritage of
suspicion and ill-will that Carr had left behind him.
Mullowny had just reestablished friendly feelings with
the Tangier government and with the rllakhzen when the Whig
administration was replaced by a Democratic one in Washington,
and the new president reappointed Thomas Carr to the consular
post in Morocco. 2 6

The returning consul did some good work

during the Mexican War of 1846 in preventing privateers from
using Moroccan ports .for obtain:ing supplies and disposing of
captured American vessels, and he made a J..ong trip to southern
Morocco to investigate reports that certain unide.n tified ships
in the port of Wadnoon were of Ameri~an registry. 2 7 However,
this was in the normal line of duty and did not permit him
the liberti¢s that he took with his instructions from·
·washington.
The reappointmen.t of Carr had been objecte.d to in ,three.
letters from Moroccan official.s , who, in strong but respectful .
tenns, objected to his return because the vic·e:-governor of
Tangier had beeri removed at the request · of the American govern-

2brJispatch from Secretary of State James Buchanan to
Thomas Carr, \IJashington, May JO, 1845, in DIBP, £B• cit •.,
Vol. XIV, p. 47.
27Letter from James Buchanan to Thomas Carr, Washing-·
.ton, June 26, 1847, in John Basset Moore, (edo), Tl:le WorKS of
James Buchanan (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 19]9),

Vol. VII, p~. 355-6.

-
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ment, who in turn had promised to dismiss Carr.

.•

In February,

IS46, the Emperor's letter arrived in Washington asking why
the consul had returned to Morocco and requesting his _
removal.

As any government has the right to ask for the

1

recall of a foreign representative to which .it objects, Presi-

~

dent Polk wrote a conciliatory note to Abd al-Rahman urging
that Carr be permitted to stay but agreeing to recall himif
the Moroccan emperor insisted.

The channels of diplomatic

communication being · what they were, all this correspondence
passed through the consul's hands, and. he abused his position
to the extent of neglecting to send Polk the _answer from
Emperor.

the

Morocco had reques-t ed that the United States ~ecall

Mr. Carr, but the consul kept the letter for over fourteen
1.
'

months, .all the t:i.me pretending that his position in Morocco
was · agreeable to the Moroccan government. 2 g Although, Carr· was
immediately recalled whE:m this information came to light, it
was some time before the American government regained the
confidence of the
IV.

Moroccans~

UNITED STATES REQUEST-ED TO ASSillrE A PROTECTORATE Until 1S55, relati-ons with Morocco were of the most

routine nature, but in _that year, the death of a French

-., ·
18,

2SLetter frorn Buchanan to Carr, \'lashington, November
1848, in Moore, .2£• cit., Vol. VIII, p. 245.
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d ti zen and France's demand for a large indemnity involved
United States in extensive diplomatic correspondence with
;. r. e '.{oroccan government.

In February; l$5 5, a Moroccan in a

! it of insane anger had killed a Frenchman, and the govern11e nt of France insisted upon the punishment of the murderer.

Hcniever, it was established that t h e Moroccan was not only
aad , and therefore held in a certain amount of awe and
res pect by his countrymen, but also was a Q.escendant of the
~ ro phet

Mohammed.

Consequently, this shereef was considered

. by the Moroccans as . possessing special sanctity and was thus

immune from punishment--esp€cially a.t the hands of infid.e lso
The American consul,

s.

P • . Collings, agreed in part ·with . the

Moroccans and thought that · the French demands were "impudent,.
unreasonable, and in violation of the principles of comity
and justice. "29 .
Apparently the sentiments of the · Ameri'can consul were
well -known in official circles, and the Moroccans- may have
interpreted his feelings as reflecting the position of the
United States in the matter.

In any- case, the

MakJ:+ z~_n_

:requested

Collings to ask his government to arbitrate in the Franco•
Moroccan · dispute in the hope that the good offices . o:f the
United States would serve to end the crisis that was d-e velop2 9Francis Rosebro Flournoy, British Pol icy Towards .

M oro~co in the Ag e

of Palmerston (Baltimore: The Johns
Bopk~ns ISress, 1935), p. 149 o

...... .......
-.)·
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At the same time as the l\:!:oroccans made this s p ecific

:.: .,.J •

~ e ~uest,
:~~ te s

they dec id ed that it would be useful for the United
-to serve §~ - a sort of permanent medi a t or between for-

, £:-n c ountries a nd the ~-Iakhzen "to arbitrate or use its good

, : ··i. ces in all affairs " tha t might arise in I•.1orocco's foreign
:- d ations .
This reouest came as a

surpr~se

to Drummond Hay, the

? ritish c onsu+ in Tan g ier, because he had long served as au
~ nofficial advise-r and intermediary for the sultans of r·. :orocv~.

He protested to the

~~~ lied

Makh~en

that the request wh ich it made

a lac k of c onfidence - in Great Britain and express ed

!-.is amazement that the r-1 oroccans felt ob lig ed to ask the Americans to help in a situation in which his country was ready
to assist.

For<t-uAately for Hay 's peace of mind and for

?:ance's future aspirations in I1:o rocco, the United States
? olitely dec lined the _Iviakhzents request, stating that to ·
CO!!tply v.rit h it v-: ould not be in accordance with American
traditional policy in the "eastern . hemispher~.~t3°

3°Ibid o In 1555, Hay- obtained information from
::: ome app are nt ly unr el iable source that t h e United Stat~s was
pl anning to . ileg ot·iate with Norocco f or a port on its Mediterr a nean coast-- either Parsely Island in the Straits of Gibr.a ltar or 1-1elilla at t h e eastern end of the Riff Coast. Although
this sche~e evidently existed -only in the minds of Hay and his
infomants , he prot est ed t'J the I-:akhzen that Great Britain
·.·.'-Jt.;.ld nev er perr.:it t h e p ermi:ment or tempora ry oc cu pation of
any I.:oroccan territory by a forei c; n power . None of the published Amer ic a n documents of the pe riod nor the archives of

~- ,··.
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V.

MOROCCO AND THE CIVIL WAR

The long history of cooperation between Morocco and
the United States ·paid dividends during the Civil War when
the Federal government was hard pressed by the Confederate
states.

The Moroccan authorities showed that their friend-

ship for America was sincere when the Sumter, a Federal
steamer captured by the South, took refuge in Gibraltar Bay.
Early in 1862, the Sumter had entered the Mediterranean bent
on destroying as much Federal shipping as it could find, but
in February, its coal reserves almost depleted, the cruiser
was forced to enter a neutral port to refuel.

Although the

British were inclined to favor the Southern cause in the war
betwee.n ·the States, they declined to. give such overt support
as the supplying .of coal would have meant.

~herefore,

two

officers of the Sumter took passage on a .Frenc.h vessel for
Tangier in search of the needed supp.l ies •
. As soon as the American consul, James DeLong, was
informed of the presence of Confederate agent.~ in Tangier, he
applied to the Gcivernor · of the port city for
apprehending the rebels

I>

~ssistance

in

\'lith the aid of "some Moroccan sol-

diers, .t he consul arrested the two men and placed them in

----------------the Tangier legation gives any hint that the United States
was e.ven remotely interested in obtaining territory in
Morocco. Flbiimoy, ££• cit., pp. 151.-2.
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irons under guard in the United States consulate.

The two

prisoners, one identified as the ex-United States consul at
Cadiz, and the other as a lieutenant in the Confederate navy,
applied fruitlessly to the French consul for help and learned
from the British consul that Great Britain had charged its
representatives to follow a policy of "no interference" in
the American Civil War.

DeLong was pleased that the European

consuls did not interfere and was very gratified that the.
Moroccans displayed a sincere .desire to cooperate, reporting
to the Secretary of State:

"I must add that the Moorish
.

.

authorities ar.e entitled to great credit for their prompt
assistance in aiding in the arrest of these two men.~31
T.h e prisoners, evidently resourceful men, attempted to
bribe the guards with . a watch and one hundred gold dollars
plus the

promi~e

of a reward of five thousand dollars when

they achieved their freedom.

This attempt was a failure, but

one of the prisoners managed to saw off the rlvets of his leg
irons with a "case knifett and jump from a second story window:
to · the yard below where he was recaptured immediately.
Realizing that the consulate was not a very secure prison and
hearing rumors that various groups in Tangier were preparing

. 31Dispatch from James DeLong to William H. Seward,
Tangier, February 20, 1862·, in Papers Relating to Foreign .
Affairs (Washington: United States Government Printin.g Office,
1864-1957), Vol. 1$62, _p. BCO. (Hereafter referred to as
PRFA.)
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f orce the release of .the prisoners, the consul sent a dis-

~a t c h

to the captain of an American naval vessel saying,

nr

vant the presence of a Federal man-of-war in this bay. n32
;~

.

The Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed ·
3a r gash, requested that DeLong release the prisoners because
!'! e

supposed that the _whole matter was merely a political

affair, and he wanted to treat all nations equitably.

The

Am erican consul replied that the two men were traitors and
pirates and were not members of any recognized state; furthermore, he asked, "Shall seventy-six years of uninterrupted
f riendship • • • be brought to an end. ib r the sake of pirates ?tt33
The Moroccan minister, on being informed of the true situation,
agreed not to -interfere and to assist the consul in guarding
his prisoners until such time as they could be sent to the
United States.
DeLong's fears that certain groups in the port were in
sympathy with the rebels were amply substantiated when, in
response to an appeal by the captain of the Sumter, a large
mob of some four hundred Europeans collected in front -of the
consulate demanding the release of the Southerners.

'l.'he situ-

3 2Letter from James DeLong to J. August C:raven, Captain
of the USS Tuscarora, Tangier, February 24, 1862, in ibid.,
. Vol. 1862·, p. 86).
·
33Letter from DeLong to Mohammed Bargash, Tangier, n. d. ·,
(probably February 25 or 26, 1862), in ibid., Vol~ 1862,
p. 864.

,. ·.

-· < : ••.

144
at ion was extremely critical, and the consul was reconciled ·

t o losing his prisoners, when, in the best tradition of Holl ywo od, a large contingent of Moroccan soldiers arrived at
th e cruc1al moment to disperse the crov1d.

Within a few hours,

a squad of United States Marines arrived, presented themselves before the consulate, and escorted the prisoners to
the USS I no • .3 4
··

· A~though

relieved that his prisoners were safely away,

DeLong was very angry with his fellm1-consuls for permitting
their nationals . to participate in the mob scene in front of
the United States consulate.
diplomatic

commun~ty,

In a circular letter to the

the American consul stated that he had

heard of barbarian mobs in barbarian countries but never
before had the Christian p:o pulat ion of a semi-barbarous nation
joined t .ogether to interfere with the duties of a fellovrChristian • .3 5

.

l

,_ After the affair had been 9._g .ccessfully completed, and
the furor had died away, DeL_ong thanked ."Prince Muiey Abbas"
for the immediate and unsolicited aid that his soldiers had

.34nispatch from DeLong to Seward, Tangier, February 27,
1862, in ibid., Vol. 1862, . p. $60.
·
35nispatch from DeL·ong to Seward, Tangier, March 5.,
1862, in ibid., Vol. 1862~ p. 865. The forei gn consuls
answered DeLong's .rebuke by stat ing that they had ord.e red
their nationals to stay away from any disturbance at the
American cons ulate and had instructed their . consular .guards
to enforce -t his directive.
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rendered during the threatened riot.

The American Secretary

of State added his thanks to that of the consul, especially
thanking the Moroccan for his wishes that the Federal government might win over the rebels in the Civil War.3 6 The Governor of Tangier in turn replied that he had "but followed
the same line of fr-iendly conduct hitherto exercised toward"
the United States) 7
An important side issue of the Confederate prisoner
affair came as a result of debate in the State Department as
to whether - the Moroccans should· have assisted the American
consul, since this country did not permit interference with
its citizens by the Makhzen.

Although the problem was a

purely theoretical one since the deed had been done, · Seward
notified the consul in Tangier that President Linc-oln was disturbed by the fact that the United States apparently had beer:t

.
'

usurping authority in r.-rorocco that was _obviously detrimental .
to the latter's sovereignty.

Referring to the fact that the

Moroccans were not permitted to exercise any legal

juri~dic-

tion -o ver American citizens even though one of them may have
broken a Moroccan law, the Secretary of State remarked that
Lincoln was prepared to place r.forocco on the same treaty

3 6nispa:tch from Seward to Jesse Md1ath, Washington,
July 1, 1862, in DIBP, QE• cit., Vol. XIV, p. 258.
3 7Letter from El Abbas, Son of the Prince of the
Believers ffiic7, to DeLong:, Tetuan, May 14, 1862, in PRFA,
2£• cit., Vol. 1862, p. 879o
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rooting that any other nation enjoyed.3 8

If the press of war

had not interfered with his plans, · it is very

p~ssible

that

Lincoln would have initiated such a step and have led the way
to a world-wide reevaluation of Moroccan sovereignty and the
elimination of extra-territorial rights.
The Moroccan _authorities continued to express their
support of the Federal government in oppos:l,tion to the Confederacy, and the Foreign Minister stated that his country's
sympathies had always been with the "American nation" and that
he would not allow his people to do anything that would aid

the Moroccans implemented their statement of friendship by.
·issuing an . order from the Sultan to tne governors of the various ports stating that no Confederate ship, especially the
raiders Alabama and Florida, would be allowed. entrance into
Moroccan waters and that all officials should give as much
help to the American vice-consuls as

possible)~

3 Bois patch from Seward to McMath, Washington, April 28.,
1862., in DIBP, .2£• cit., Vol. XIV, p. 248.
3 9rlispatch from McMath to Seward, Tangier, April 12,
1863, in PRF.A, 2.£• cit., Vol. 1863, part II, p. 1126.
40"Royal Order from the Sultan to the Bashaws in the
Ports of Morocco," September 23 , 1863, in ibid., Vol. 1863,
part II, p. 1133.
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VI.

THE CAPE SPARTEL LIGHTHOUSE AGREEMENT

As reluctant as the United States was to become entangled in

intern~tional

affairs, especially in Europe and North

Africa, a problem that had been plaguing the marl.time nations
of the world finally obliged it to modify its stand on such
matters.

For centuries, Cape Spartel, eight miles west of

Tangier, had been claiming victims from the ranks of passing
ships of all nations--with fine fmpartiai'fty.

Consequently;

W1 en the Moroccan goyernment began construction of a lighthouse on the Gape, the. United States and nine other nations .
offered to assist in the endeavor.

Jesse McMath, DeLong's

replacement as consul in Tangier, reported that he had received
a letter from the M.a khzen in which it was pointed out that
Morocco had little ne.e d for a light on . its northern shore,
but the shipping of other nations would certainlybe aided by
the maintenance of a beacon there. • Therefore, the Emperor
thought it only fair that those countries whose ships ti_"ansport goods through the Straits of Gibraltar should share in
the .cost of maintaining the light that would serve to protect
their

commerce.41
Although Spain objected to the provision that the

41Dispatch from IvicMath to Seward, Tangier, March 26, ·
1864, in United States Congress, House of Representatives.
"Morocco," in Executive Documents, 38th Congress, 2nd Session,
1864-5. Part 4, P• 42So
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r thouse should always belong to ;·:Iorocco "as it conflicts

. i t :1 her dreams of conc:uest on t h is coast, "42 it finally
~ ..

1 :J ·

ned

~. : orocco,

the United States, and eight ot her nati ons on

11

~.

~:

-~

J .,rcement provided for internationa l sup_port and supervision

y Jl, 1865, . in sig ning t h e Cap e Spartel Convention.

J f vhe lie htho use,

The

a nd t h e Un it e d St a tes began paying ~ 268

:: ea rly as its share of the exp ens e s. 43
Between the end of t h e Civil

~ ar

in the United States

.:md the Conference of 1 880 f or t h e purpose of settling the

..!

? roblem of extra-territorial ri c;hts in I', iorocco, t h e onl y mat ter of note tha t
lt71 .

Mathe'~:rs ,

occurred yras r e !)orted b y Felix I··Iathevrs in
who had been appointed consul in 1 8 70, v:rote

of his private audienc e \"lith Lulai Hassan in which the Emperor
:>f :.Iorocco asked the United States to assume a: protectorate
over his country ffin view of possible encroachments u pon his
territory by forei g n Pov1 ers .u
Europe

viaS

He said that he realized that

planning to dismember

r..orocco and therefore hoped

that America would act not only as an arbiter in future

.t.
<·

dis~

putes between Europe and t h e Ma g hreb, but would also serve
notice that t h e Shereefian Empire 1das under American su p er-

•
1
4 2 rbid.
•.

1

..

~

4.3nispatch fr oP.J Se11Jard to I-IcHath, ':JashinE;ton, .
February 1.3, 1 8 6 8 , in DIBP, on . c it o, Vol. X:V, p . 25tL
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·:is i on and prote ction.44

After revievJ ing Lathev..r's re po rt,

:::e State Departnent instructed its consul to g ive I':Iulai
::a s s an the fo1lm:inE; messag e:
This Government "t;WUld regret any attempt , on the part
of forei gn povre rs, at a. d iE memb erment -of t he Emp ire of
;.:orocco, and '.- ·ou. ld consent t o use its f riendl y o f f ices
to preve nt such an act; it woul d neiertheless de cline
to acce pt any offer: from His l'-iajest y to confer u ~io n t h e
United St ates a prot e ctora te over his domain .45
Again, as in 1855, t l:e Un:it ed States missed an op port unity to do a g r eat service to the I,:oroccans by insuring
th eir future fr eed om and sovereignty • . Conceivably, if thi$
country had seen f it to a cced-e to

~· 1ulai

Hassan ' s -..·rish, the

/ adrid Conference to settle the protege nroblem and the
Conference of

Algecira~

mi ght both have proved unnecessary.

;.:ore import ant, an American protectorate over l'::orocco , · v:hi c h
\>las organized in the same w2y as that exercised in the
Philippines, would probab ly have gone a long way to0 ard
stabilizing the government of the Ha ghreb and insurinG its
ultimate inde p end en ce lon,z before itmanaged to wrest it
from Fra nce in 1956.

44Dispatch fr om Actine; Secretary of St at e ,J. C. B .
Da vis to Fel:ix ~I;:'lthevm , V! as l-"inc ton, .r.Iay 22 , 1571 , in ibid.,
Vol. :r:v, ? · 290 .
45-b'd
l 1 •

CHAPTER VI
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION AND THE CONFERENCE·OF 1880
As previous chapters have indicated, the United States
ade it very clear on -several occasions that :i.t did not wish
to assume any responsibility in Moroccan matters apart from
nornal diplomatic -intercourse.

Twice the State Department

informed the Emperor of rJiorocco that this country c.ould not
institute a protectorate over the Maghreb -because such action
would constitute a deviation from established tradition.
Certainly, of all the many laws, both written and unwritten,
that direct_ed t .h e . conduct of American foreign relations in
the -first century of this -country 1 s independence, few were
considered more important than thepolicy of -non-intervention
in matters not directly related to th-e western hemisphere. ·
However, it is the purpose of this chapter to t .race the begin~-

nings of a radical change in American policy necessitat.e d by

I

the extra-territorial rights that the United States -claim-ed
in Morocco.

I.

THE BEGINNING OF PROTECTIONS 1

Since the fourteenth century, when the citizens o.f

lProtectio~ is one important feature of extraterrit_o .... ·
· rial jurisdiction. It is ·defined as a juridicial bond which
attaches -a subject of one state to another, entitling him to

>'
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Pisa were granted special legal rights in Morocco,2 European
nations had increasingly received privileges that permitted
-

their consuls to settle all disputes arising among their own
citizens, those of other European nations, and, finally, even
cases in which Moroccans were involved.

The basis for such a

system of justice in Muslim countries was that under Koranic
law only the followers of Islam had recourse to the courts.
Therefore, Christian nations felt compelled to protect their
citizens by insuring that they ·be provided with legal protection in consular courts.

As long as cases between foreigners

were to be decided, Muslim co'l,lntries ciid not object., but when
this practice began to include jurisdict.ion over natives
involved with foreigners in legal matters, then abuses and
injustices· arose that occasioned many protests by Muslim
governments.
When foreign powers began using Moroccan subjects as
vice-consuls or employees in legations and consulates, it
',!$- , "

became the practice to provide them with protection in order
to free them from possible interference by the Moroc.c an authorities.

The first treaty granting the right .o f protecti.on to

claim certain rights and . privileges enjoyed by the nationals
of the second, without, however; actually changing his
nationality. Earl . F. Cruickshank, J'.lorocca at the Parting of .
the Ways. {Philadelphia~ University of Pennsylvania, l9J2),
p. 1.

2Budgett Meakin, The l\'Ioorish Empire ·(London: .Swan
Sonnenschein and Co., 1899), p. JSl.
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na tives in Morocco was the Franco-Moroccan treaty of

1767~

and, since most nations which had intercourse with the
Sh ereefian Empire had "most favored nation" status, the practice of native

protection was followed by them as well.3

Although this first treaty merely freed servants of French
citizens from the oblieation of paying Moroccan taxes, the
system of protection soon

eA~anded

to give these proteges the

same privileges accorded to any foreigner in Morocco.
If the practice of protecting Moroccan citizens had
been restricted to giving this privil-ege to the few employees
of the consuls., there might have been some justification for
the system.

However-, marty irregularities developed which

infringed upon the authority of the Moroccan government and
actually led to · the perpetration or many frauds.

Protection

began to be used as a shield for. corrupt practices, to pe.r mit
unwarranted interference with native courts, and to encourage
irregular exemption from taxation--all of which combined to
weaken the Emperor's sovereignty .and to hamper the efforts . of
his government to carry out its duty through fear of infringing on the. rights of foreign .powers. 4 . Because so many
·wealthy Moroccans were being enrolled inthe ranks of foreign

3Graham H. Stuart, The International City of Tangier
(second edition; Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1955), p. 15.
4rbid. , p. 3 3 •
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proteges to escape their tax responsibilities, the Makhzen's
revenues were seriously affected, . and the most influential
citizens of Morocco were no longer under the control of the
government.
To regularize the protege system, the British signed
an agreement with Morocco in 1856, but Drummond Hay, the
British consul in Tangier, admitted that even this agreement
had not eliminated the major abuses inherent in the systemo5
By 1859, the tremendous inc-rease in the number of protected

Moroccans so enraged .A:bd al-Rahman that he threatened to ·closeall of the Atlantic ports to foreign trade and was quoted as
saying that "He would rather be a sovereign over· a country
without trade than a chtef without the power of governing
the subjects of his own Empir.e •·" 6
Another attempt to alleviate the crisis caused by the
over-extension of protections to undeservingMoroccans was
undertaken by the French and the Spanish . in 1863, when they
signed a treaty with Morocco that was subsequently adhered to ·
by the United States and by several other countri~s.

This

agreement provided that -protection should be individual and

5Cruickshank, ££· · cit., p. 7.
6nispatch -from John Drummond Hay to Lord Malrnesbury, .
Tangier, August 16, 1g59, in Frantis Rosebro Flournoy! British
Policy Toward,s Morocco· in the Age of Palmers ton ( Bal tl.IIlore: ·
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), p. 233.
.
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- t· em po:tary~ that it should be extended to include only the
!amily of the protege living under the same roof, and that
onl y Moroccans employed by consuls and vice-consuls or "by
f oreign merchants could be protected.

The treaty further

or ovided that the names of all proteges must be submitted to
the Makhzen, and only those on the list would be recognized
by the Moroccan

gove~nment

as being under the protection of

foreign powers.?
Not only did the protection system exacerbate relations
between the government of Morocco and foreign powers, but it also was the source of much friction among the consuls in
Tangier.

Hay spent considerable time accusing the French of.

eXtending protection to any Moroccan who might be of use to
France in the future or who possessed some .political influence that could further French aims in North Africa.

The

Spanish consul was accused of providing protection to any

·-

native who .became
a convert
to Catholicism, and Hay was in
.
·-.···· .

turn faced with the charge that he . made proteges of whole
villages in the area wher-e he was wont -to spend long hours
hunting boar.s
Felix Mathews was recalled from his post as American
consl,ll in Tangier as a result of _Hay's charge that the

?cruickshank, ££• cit., p. 17.

~lournoy, ££• cit., p. 227-.
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t:erican had sold protections to over one hundred wealthr
Jr{ oors even though the United States had no tra.d e with Morocco
--- t t hat time- and there was only one Americ.an citizen living

~here.9

After an investigation by the American consul at

Gi braltar, the United States exonerated Mathews and restored
him to his post where he replied to the charges against him

as being a "malicious invention • • • utt erly devoid of
truth. nlC Although the United States seemed to be satisfied
with Mathews' conduct, his British colleague was convinced
that the State Department had been deluded by its representative and continued to m.a intain that the American made a,. prac- .
tice of granting irregularprotections.
The State Department, although clearing Mathews · or any
. charges. of fraud in connection with the protection sys·tem, was
concerned that the Moroccans were using their association with
the United States to escape their responsibilities to the
Moroccan government.

Because many Moroccanswho had been

appointed . vire--consuls· by the United States were claiming
immunity from Shereefian l,awon the grounds that they were
American citizens, Mathews was im;;tructed to inform . the
Makhzen that this country did not consid,.e r such employees as

9cruickshank, .2E• cit., p. 42.
lOnispatch from Felix Mathews to Secretary of State
Seward, Tangier, July 30, 1677, Archives of the United States
Consulate, Tang ier, inCruick.::;hank., .2:2· cit., p. 47.
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.t.merican citizens and would not stand bet'\'reen them and
~~o roccan

justice.

The State Department told Mathews that the

United States would not support its proteges in private matters that had nothing to do with their official capacity.ll
Even though this country made it quite clear that there were
definite limitations to the privileges bestowed on proteges,
:.!oroccans with American protection still took advantage of
the fact that the Moroccan goverm1ent would permit them to
escape their responsibilities rather than involve the Makhzen
in protracted litigation with a foreign power.
After J'.1ulai Hassan · became Sultan of .Morocco in 1873,
he beg·a n pressing the representatives of the Powers t _o reorganize and reform the protection system.

By this t ·ime,

even ~- "

the United States had abandoned its previous · policy of . pro~
i

tecting only American .c itizens and those Moroccans employed

-

by this country, and began to gi.ve protection to employees of
American merchants in Jl.1orocco.l2

Consequently, the Makhzen

initiated a series of meetings in 'rangier with the foreign

. llLetter from Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to
Mathews, vfashington, April 16, 1872, in National Archives,
Records of the Department of State, Di lomatic Instructions,
Barbary Powers. Microfilm No. 77, Roll 18 Wamirigton: . Th·e
National Archives, 1946), Vol. XV, pp • . JOJ-4. (Hereafter
·
referred to as DIBP.)
·
1

~etter from Secretary of State William M. Evarts to
Felix Mathews, Washington, May 27, 1878, in John Bassett Moo~e,
A Digest of International Law (\vashington: Government Printing
Office, 1SQ6), Vol. II, .p. 748.

.

' : ~·- · ~
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co nsuls in an attempt to regularize the protege system and to
r estore the sovereignty of . the government.

Aft~r twelve

f ruitless meetings during which the consuls were unV"rilling to
modify their protection system, the Moroccan Foreign Minister,
. ~ ohammed

Bargash., stated: .

We will be within our right to prohibj,_t commerce; our
first duty is to maintain the authority and the tranquillity of t h e Empire. Peace will maintain itself without
commerce, it will not maintain itself wit hout authority.l3
Mathews informed the· Secretary ·of State that he was
{

having a great deal of difflculty protecting Moroccans who

(

had. become citizens of the United St.ates because the Sultan
maintained th~t according to_,_Koranic iaw, no Muslim could
withdraw himself from the jUrisdiction of an Islamic state.l4
This statement was support·ed
by the order of the Emperor to
.
. :. · · '

his governors that henceforth Moroccans- who had becom-e citizens of a foreign country would not be considered as foreign
f'

,-·

1 Jcharles-Andre . Julien, n1a Conference de Madrid de
1880," Maroc, · No. 6 (Octobre, Novembre, Decembre, 1957), p. 30 •.
Mathews had attended all of the Tangier meetings in
1879, but for some reason he had negiected to notify t h e State
Department that he had done so, nor had he reported the many
discussions in which he had participated gnd had pre!:{ented the
opinion of the Urt1ted States on the matter of prot,ections >
Dispat-ch from Evarts to Math e~Is, \'Jashington, 1-iarch 22, 1880,
in ~, .QE· cit., Vol. XVI, p • . 8. · ·
14nispatch . .from Mathews to Ev~rts, . Tang ier, February
28, 1880, in Papers ReL?.ting .·1 £ Foreig n Affaj.rs· (Washington:
United States Gov ~rrunent · Printing Off ice, ·<H364-1957), Vol.
1880, p. 791. (Hereaft.~_£J_eferred-~;-to as PRFA.)

.~·

subjects but would revert to their original citizenship and
come under the jurisdiction of Moroccan law.l5

With this

ch allenge to the protege system, all -the consuls realized
that some major reformation must be effected if protections
were to be continued.
II.

THE CONFERENCE OF 18$0

Because of the Moroccan government's growing resistance to the protection system, the British Consul

stiggest~d

t"o the Spanish government that it invite the Powers to hold a
conference in Madrid for the purpose of regulating protections
--, - :,~~-

.

-

- -

-. and rec;iching a compromise · satisfactory to the Makhzen.l6
Although France and Italy were not :favorable to such a conference because they felt that protections were vital to their interests, the two countries finally agr eed to attend
when it was evident that the other powers concerned were wil- l±ng- to meet to discuss the matter.l7

It was decided to

entrust the discussion to the various ambassadors in Spain,
and . Mathews, the American consul in Tangier, began ·s.ending

dispatche-s to Lucius Fairchfld., _the

American amb;:t"ssador in

Spain, to convince him that the protection system was vital

_~5Julien, loco cit.

l6s tuart,
-

~.

c 1.· t • -, p • 17- .•

l7Ion Perdicaris, . "Consular Protection · in Morocco,"
Fortnightly Review, Vol. XLIII (new series), (Iviay 1, 1888) , _

p. 729.

.

159
to the interests of the United States and that there was
really no need to modify existing practices.l8
Fairchild, who had little experience with the protege
problem, could see no justification for its continuance
along the lines that were being followed.

He was disturbed

especially by the practice of protecting Moroccans who were
not in any way connected with the United States but who
received protege status as the result of bribes or becaus.e
of certain services that they had rendered.

Fairchild told

the Secretary of State a m.o nth before the conference · convened:
If Morocco is to be considered and treated as an
independent nation, I nm.; fail to see why foreign
representatives should have the right of protecting in
any way Moorish subjects who are ne.i th.er in their
employ nor in the service of foreign merchants as
agents or brokers.l9
·
·
The conference at Madrid consisted of a series of proposals by the r.1oroccan government for a revision of the treaty
rights concerning protect.ions--proposals which were countered
by France's insistence that the meetings could not nullify any

previous international agreements.

Spain, England, and the

United States were agreeable to ending the abuses entailed in
the protege system, even to. the extent of readjusting treaties,

lgPRFA, £E• cit., Vol. 18eo, p. 79e.
19Letter from Lucius Fairchild to Secretary of State
7, 1eso, in Cruickshank, .2£• cit.,

W~ M. Evarts, Madrid, April
p. l02o
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·-- ~>Jt ea ch time such a proposal was entertained by 'the con-

(t r ees , the French delegate ref used to discuss the matter.20
~~

Brit i sh representative to the conference presented a pro-

:..ram t hat would have gone a long way toward eliminating the
~. ag r a nt

abuses of the protege system, but even though the

n j ority of the delegates .supported the plan, the French
representative insisted that he could not consent to any
change in the Treaty of 1863.

Consequently, the British

wi thdrew their proposal , in . order to permit the conference to
co ntinue~ 2 1

Finally, it r~ained for the American delegate

t o persuade the Jliioroccans to consent to the French demands
t hat previous treaties be retainec ; Mohanuned Bargash a greed
i n th~'-·
end . to a~~~Pt the provisions of the Treaty of 1863-- . . :---·
having been forc .e d to allow a French victory on this point .22
'

:

' , .- z .. •

The Convention of 18$0 was finally signed on July 3,
lSeo, but the Moroccan hope that the abuses of the protege

system would be eliminated met with disappointment.

Not only

was the French point of view adopted and all previous protege
classes retained, but, in addition, the special class of
.·..~

t hose natives who had performed some "signal service'-' was

20samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United
States (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1 950), p •. 5"85':
·
21cruickshank, ££• cito, p.l52.

--

22rbid., p. 161 ..

r

·-
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Although Fairchild had been opposed to this

:.as s of protege as being unfair to the Moroccan government,
~

was forced to agree--managing , however, to limit this

c ilteg ory to a maximum of t ·wel ve for each country .24
~

Some

t ions wished to include a demand that the Moroccans for-

nally recognize the right of relig ious freedom for all residents of the country, but Bargash was unwilling to see this
or ovision adopted because, he maintained, everyone was peri tted to worship as he pl,eased in l-1orocco.

As a compromise,

a letter was signed by the delegates requesting that the
Em peror continue to guarantee the freedom of worship in his
country.25
Rather than ending the abuses .in the- protection system,
the Conventfo.ri 6"r 1880 seemed to have stimulated comp,e tition .
among the various foreign consuls in Morocco, who were determined that no other country should gain any advantage over
-· th-e-i-!--,'-'O\¥n nationals.

Each consul was- zealous to maintain his

country's "most favored nationtt status and endeavored to pro.,;

.

!'

teet as many natives as his colleagues did.

Although the Con-

vention had stated that forei g ners we:,r-e to pay

~a.xes,

Hay ·

reported that by 1884, none had done -so and that the . c.onvention

2Jstuart, on. ci t o, p. 18. For the full text of the
Convention of l880see App endix E.

..

24cruickshank, .2£• cit., p. 167 •

25rbid., p. 170.
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_ _of_Madrid had become a "dead letter in every respect."26
The complaints made by Hay prior to 1880 about Mat hew's
irregular use of the protection privilege -began to recur with
alarming persistence after the conference in Spain.

Mathew's

colleagues had virtually ostracized him after they came to
the conclusion that he was receiving pay for extending the
protection of the United States of America to unqualified
Moroccans.

When the consul was accused by an American living

in Tangier of protecting over eight hundred and fifty .f.'Ioroccans., the resulting investigation ended in his . dismissal from
office.

His success or., Reed Lewis, reported that he had to.

release thirty-one Moroccans who '"~ere imprisoned for alleged
debts to .American protege.s , . for when these accusations were
investigat_ed, they were fol¥.:d___:tc:_b~ baseless._27
__ -- " About the only thing of _. value that was accomplished by .
the__Convention of 1880. _w as .the official recognition .that there
was a "Moroccan Problem" which .. "lould have to be solved by the
nations interested in the Shereefian Empir€.

lt- became evi-

d,en.t that no nation would be able to pursue aunilatera1
policy without running the risk . of being challenged by another ·
_-

26rbid., p. 180.
2 'libid., p. 197. Mathew's successor, after investigating as thoroughly as possible, stated tha:t the consul · was
morally innocent of any crime but that he had been very careless and had allowed dishonest subordinates to take advantage
of their position.

·:
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~ --~------- ~ ower, 28 but except for these somewhat intangible results,
the situation in Morocco, as far as the protege problem was
--··
concerned, was not improved. The abuses in the system ·continued through the nineteenth century and into the present
one, until one country aft·e r another finally relinquished
their extra-territorial rights---thus eliminating their pro--tections altogether.
die out

complete~y

Ho\'iever, · the -pr-otege sys·t em · did not

until the United States; in

1956, agreed

to give up its capitulatory rights in theMaghreb and -toput
~

its citizens in t -he .c .o untcy under the jurisdiction of

Moroccan law•
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CHAPTER VII
THE UNITED STATES AT ALGECIRAS
Whatever interest had been stirred in the United
States..."".. over the Moroccan question by the Madrid confer-ence of
~

H~OO, .

it had long since died away when Theodore Roosevelt

began . ~9

feel the call to solve t h e tensions of t h e world.

He offered his
confl~ct,

s~rvices

as a mediator in the

Russo-Ja~anese

and his success in this endeavor convinced him of

his duty to don the cloak of peacemaker in any area that
i

"'

could conceivably 'threaten the peace and security of the
· world • . The step from the Far East to the Straits of Gibraltar may have seemed a long one to his contemporaries, but
Roosevelt evidently saw many parallels in the . situations
that were building up--situations that he felt needed his
particJJ..lar genius in diplomatic maneuverings, ·backed with
just enough hint of force to ~ffecti vely implement his wishes •.
..."'"'" ·-·

I.

EUROPEAN

INTE~EST

I N MOROCCO

~ .,·::~

. .,. .

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the origin of
the trffft ed States' interest ·in the Moroccan quest.ion in · the
j

i

early·~ays of the twentieth .century and to evaluate the effec-

.-·!''1;f:~

· tive~~s of its
....·_. .,. .~·-.

J

intervention~

The dawn of this century fm.lild ·

·.

-. the .,.~or

powers of Europe competing in various portions of

the _ .g~'?be for colonies, spheres of influence, and commercial
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privileges.

To facilitate these gambits, various countries

formed or tried to form alliances and pacts that would give
them some measure of security and would provide diplomatic
allies in the event they wer:-e challenged by another po,.Ier
jealous of their colonial or diplomatic success.
If in 1899 or 1901, the German chancellor, Von Bulow,
had been a little more rece ptive to British overtures for a
mutual understanding over the future of .Morocco, subsequent
events would certainly have been more advantageous to the
Kaiser's plans ol

Germany asserted at the time that its only

interest in the area was corrunercial and all it wanted was a
fair chance to trade and to carry out economic ventures that
had been already started.

Although the German Foreign Office

proved reluctant t9 discuss Morocco as an area for European
exploitation, other powers showed no such qualms; as early as

1900, France and Italy had reached a decision in which they
agreed that Tripoli was the legitimate zone of Italian ambitions and that the French had the interests of Morocco at
heart.

The two countries reasoned that France should be

allowed freeaorn o.f action in a country which bordered on its
Algerian frontier.
The fact that Italy abandoned its claims to any special

lHenry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt--A Bio ~raphy
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931), p. 389.
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. Q

interest in Morocco was of little significance as it never
had shown more than a min.Dnal economic concern in the future

of the Shereefian Empire; however, when the French Foreign
Office managed to persuade the British that the best interests
o~

all would best be served if England would relinquish any

aims it had to more than a commercial bond with Morocco,

t~is

:;. · #.-

was~.

a major step toward the goal that the Quai d'Orsay had set

fo:f- itself ever since Tunisia and Algeria had been taken under
French control.
. , ,..Y

Playing onthe keen British desire to control

the Suez Canal and the destiny of Egypt, the French negotiated
;

an _agreement in which the two countries pledged to respect .
... -

; ·~ -

each other's rights in the area in which they claimed greatest
interest.
- ···· - - ·->..J .'

In exchange for a free· hand in Egypt, the British

.

abandoned their historical policy of keeping the south shore
of the Straits ·o f Gibraltar in the hands of a weak, non-Euro- ·
pean . power, and permitted France to assume the unofficial
.:. ~

rol:e of protector and advisor of .Abdul Aziz, the sultan of
~1orocco.

The Anglo.,..French declaration _concerning Egypt and
Morocco, signed irt April., 1904,
stated in ·part:
~- ~ -

. ·.•<i"'·- -

The .government of the French Republic declare that
· they have no intention of altering the political status
, _ --:··"'·~; of Morocco.
His Britannic Majesty's Government; for their part,
that it pertains to France • • • to preserve
order in that country and to provide assistance _for the
purpose or all administrative, econom.ic, financial, and

recogni~e
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military reforms which it may require.2
.The publis_h ed text of the treaty left little room for come_~_:ept

. plaint,

perhaps by th'e Moroccans, but since this

debtor nation had no international prestige, little attention
was

pai~

to any evidence of their discontent.

However, the

Spanish should have objected strenuously to the disposal of
an area tha~ was but a few l1li1es from their country, espe,·

...~ . cially when. . it was France who assumed the leading role in ·
that part··,'"o f Africa, thereby isolating the Iber ian peninsula
from both the north and the south.

Any suspicions that the ·

rest of the world may have had over Spaints apparent acqui. . .. .

·· .

escence in this matter were well justified, for the northern
section of the Shereefian .Empire was separated from the
remaind·e:r as a result ·of a

t

secret .agreerrtent that created the

Spanish Zone and gave Spain control of that area for fifty
. 'years.J
"'England., who after warning the sultans of Morocco
against thee machinations of the unscrupulous French.· for many
years, withdrew, leaving the field opento .its one-time rival.
With Spain placated and the Italians busy trying to make s.o me-

2.(};:·-~en, Ha,yw~od, and Jiackworth, Digest of Internat ional
Law (Washi ngton: United States Government Printing Office,
1940), Vol~ I, pp . 85-6. ·
3Walter B. Harri·s , France, Spain and the Rif (London:
Edward Arnold and Company, .1927), p. 5o

;
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thi ng of their ...opportunity in Tripoli, it was only Germany
wh o stood between France and its dreams of a united French
: orth Africa.

Belatedly, . the

German Foreign Office began

protesting, to any who would listen, that France was seeking
to close Morocco to all· trade but its mom and ultimately the
country would be absorbed i -n to the French economic and political structure.

The rapid moves of the French to consolidate

their
in Morocco took the Germans almost completely by
-... . ... ...hold
-_,.
~

·; ~,

surprise, for they had for many years been on the best of
terms with the

Sultan, who had insisted on several occasions

that the only tr~e· fri~nd his country had was the Kaiser.4
II.

ROOSEVELT'S REACTION TO THE MOROCCAN PROBLEM

.•

When Germany realized the gravity of the French moves
in Morocco, Chancellor Von Bulow anhounced to the world that
his c.o untry stood behind the principle -of status guo in
Morocco and that Germany demanded a retention of- the "open
door" · of economic equality in the Sultan's kingdom.

As a

part of the German campaign to halt . French · designs, Speck von
Sternburg, the German minister in Washington, relayed to
Roosevelt the personal wishes of vlilhelm II that the United
States and Germany join . in a declaration proclaiming th_e ir
...

~

opposition to foreign d.omination of Iv1orocco and for preserva-

'0} . ... . .

. ; . · - - . ... .

4Pringle, .QE· cit., p. 3 89.
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:ion of economic freedom.5

In res po nse to the request of the

-: e rman ambassador, the President answered that . h,. e did not
'

:--:el that the Un ited States had enou_sh inter-ests in -Fi:oroc co
~

t)

~

down by Geore;e Hashington that forbade Ameri c a's entry into

permit him to deviate from the traditional policy laid

:-.atters that '. iere principally European in nature.

He added,

·.. o\ ·ever, that alth ough he could not intervene directly in the
::~3 tter ,

he did ap preciate Germany's concern and stated t hat

: e was convinced that the Kaiser was sincerely interested in
naintaining peace .6
On the day follm-vine; this interviev,r , Sternburg forma lly
asked Roosevelt to join with Germany in re questing the Sultan
of l·Iorocco to call a c onference to re gulate and formalize
European interests in his country.?

The

German ambassador,

f

.

~

who was on a friendl_y footing with Roosevelt , ,,:as too optimis-:tic in estimat ing his influence with the President and vras
somewhat disconcerted when the proposal was not enthusias-

:

tically received .

Admittedly, Roosevelt's penchant for

5convers ati on b et0 e en Theodore Roosevelt and Speck von
Sternburg, ~!ash ington , Ma rc~ 6, 1905, in Joseph B ~ Bi~hop ,
Theodore Ho )sevelt c.nd His Time-- Sh m-m in His Ovm Letters (Ke'Vl
York: Charle s Scribner ' s Sbns,-1 920 }, Vol . I , p . 468.

6

Ibid.

?Lett er in State Dep2.rtment Arc hives, Vol . 34, I':Iarch 5,
190 5, in Alfred L . F . D erinis, Adve ntures in /uner ic a n Di nl oma cy ,
·1S96-1906 fr o;: Un r.ubl. is h ed Doc uJJcnts · (I1e'.;J York : E . P . Dutton
and Company, 1 92 8) , p . 514 •.

-·
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mediation in world affairs gave Sternburg good grounds for
hope, but the President still was not convinced that the
interests of the world were at stake, and he. did not for a
~-

moment think that the American people or Congress were at all
interested in meddling in Morocco.
Von Biilovr was apparently disappointed with Sternburg' s
report of Roosevelt's reluctance to jump into the Moroccan
---

situation, but he had other means with which to attempt to
reach his goal.

His first inove was to encourage the Kaiser

to visit Tangier as a demonstration o.f German interest in
Morocco; although the German chancellor was convinc.ed that
the visit would be ·a n important move in the complicated diplomatic chess game he was playing; his principal pawn was not-.
so sure.
When the Kaiser arrived in Tangier Bay, the water- was
so rough that

he_.was

unable to go a·s hore and so informed

Berlin that the proposed maneuver was off.

Under strong

·urging from Von Biilow, the Kaiser went ashore the following
day and delivered a speech which startled Europe with its

1
J

evident challenge to France's Moroccan policy.

Wilhelm II

informed the Sultan's personal envoy that he was visiting the
· land of'· an independent sover_e ign .and that Germany was prepared
to guarantee the maintenance of the Sultan as the sole ruler
of 1'<1orocco.

He went on ·to say that he })oped that the country

would remain "open to · the peaceful rivalry o.f all nations
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'liithout monopoly or annexation on the basis of absolute
equality .n 8
Von Bulow exerted other forms of pressure on France
through a series of inflammatory speeches condemning French

f

l!laneuvering that was aimed at eliminating German interest in
~!orocco

by buying off British and Italian claims.

He fulmin-

a ted i .n the German press to such an extent that French public
opinion became concerned over the possibility of war with
Germany.

This reaction caused grave misgivings in the French

Parliament, which resulted in the violently anti-Gennart

.,

Delcasse being replaced by a foreign minister who was much
more willing to placate his

counterp~rt

at the Wilhelmstrasse.

After having eliminated a dangerous French opponent,

Von Biilow began insisting openly on a conference of the powers
to reassess the position · of Morocco in world affairs.

At the

outset, Germany was sure that France would get little if any '
support from England since the British had always tried to
maintain some sort of control in the Gibraltar area arid surely
would not look with favor on · France's ambitions there.

Hm'l-

ever, the Germans did not fully realize the extent of the

SHackworth, .2.£• cit.~ Vol. I, p. 86. The ~aiser was
not impressed .with his mission and wrot·e to Von BUlow aft.erward in a petul~nt .vein, "It was to please you, for the sake
of the Fatherland, that I landed, mountect · a strange horse ••
- ~ and might have come within a hair of losing my life."
Pringle, .Q.E. cit., p. 390.

-J..72-Anglo-French Entente, and therefore underestimated French
power in European affairs.

The Germans were also misled by

the Italians,who neglected to inform their ally that FrancoItalian secret agreements would preclude more than a token
support of Germany in a Moroccan conference.9
Throughout the spring of

1905~

the German foreign

office was applying pressure in diplomatic circles in an
effort to force ah international conference and · to embarrass.
France.

The German ambassador in Washington began renewing

his urgings that Roosevelt commit himself to the proposal,
but the President, who was in Colorado on a hUnting trip, was
not particularly impressed with the nec·essity for such a
meeting and said as much to Acting Secretary of State
William Taft:
The Kaiser's pipe-dream this week takes the form of
Morocco. • • • I do ·not fe~l .that as a G6vez:-nme.n t we
should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other
fish to fry and we have no real interest- in Morocco •.
I do not wish to suggest anything 1-vhatever as to
England's attitude in lVIoroc·co, but .if -we can find out
that attitude with propriety and inform the ·Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so. . If we find that it ·will
make the English susp icious--that is, will make them
think we are acting as decoy duck for Germany, why, we
shall have to drop the pusiness.lO

9Bishop, · op~ cit., . Vol. I, p. 468.
.
10Eltirig E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodo~e
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univers i ty Press, 1951),
· Vol. IV, p. 1161-2; lett~r from Roosevelt to Taft;

-·--· .
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Regardless of how Roosevelt thought of his position in
the matter, Von BUlow told Sternburg that. the entire question

of the conference rested with the American president;ll the.
~-

~

German ambassador was further instructed to step up his
efforts to enlist American support for the plan, for the prestige of Germany was at stake.

In one of his many conversations

with Sternburg, Roosevelt reiterated his position that since
t~~
__ .. -

interests of the United

..,..·~-:-

Sta_t~::s

in
Morocco
were slight and
.
.
.

since he was convinced the American people would not sanction
his interference, he would not take the initial move because
~

he

~as

not at all sure that he would be able to carry out his
/

April 20, 1905.

I

Our agen:t at Tangier, Samuel Gummere, reported that the
GJ?r.man min~ster in that city was se€king· to establish friendly
relations w!th the American representative to draw him out ·c oncerning the position of · the United States in the matter of . a ..
Moroccan G..Q.n:ference. Gummere told the. State. Department that.
the kaiser was interested in supportingthe "open door" policy
in the Shereefian Enipire, and our agent had gone on record as ·
stat-ing "that is just exactly what we also want." Dennis, .2£.•
cit • , p • 48 8
0

!

:•
~·

.

This . statement was a li.ttle too pro-German for the
State Department, who then cautJoned Gummere to listen care- .
fully but not to become too friendly with the German minister~
When Roosevelt heard of the contacts with the German representative, he said, " • • • tell our Minister to Morocco not
·to commit us in any way but to be fJ;:i,endly "tlith both French ·
and Germans." Letter from Roosevelt to Francis B. Loomis~ ·.
Glenwood sf)fings, Colorado, April ~0, .1905, in · Morison~ .21?.•
cit., . Vol~ ·< · 'Iv, p. 1165.
·

- ~905,_

llLetter from Von BuloW to Sternburg, Berlin, May 25,
2£• cit., p. 490.

in ,~nis,

~-~~~~~~-----------------
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plans. 12
Germany tried to link the Moroccan question With
Roosevelt's interest in maintaining the "open --door" in China
by implying that unless tne Germans were strengthened in

Europe, France and U.reat Bri:.ain would force a partition of
the disputed Chinese territory and a weakened Germany would
b~

powerless to th,-vart the land-grab.

Although Roosevelt

was not very impressed with this argument, he
that the Kaiser had put himself into

a

beg~n

.:to _·see·

position where it

would be difficult to keep his pride intact and from which
he _could not honorably withdraw and still retain a semblance
of prestige in the eyes of the world-.
To increase pressure on Roo.sevelt for a conference.,
c

i.

the Gern1an foreign office had convinced · Abdul Aziz_ that the
best interests of his country would be · served if an inter-.
national mee.t ing were held to . insure Moroccan independenc::e.
At the urging of Germany, the Sultan notified Roosevelt that
he was proposing a meeting at which much needed reforms in

. 12 Pringle, .2.E• cit., p. 391. Roosevelt told Sternburg, "I never take _a step in . foreign policy unless I am
assured I shall be able eventually to carry out my i"lill oy
force.tt Dennis, .2E.• cit., p. 488.

-

The President further assured Sternburg: "America had
no interest in the matter, and it has· only been by strong .
feeling fo~ the Em p eror -and my anxiety for _peace that. h ave .
enabled me hitherto to act as t h e Emperor· has sug g este·d~"
. Ibid., p. 496.
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his empire would be discussed and implemented.l3

This

notice, coupled with Rbosevelt's fears that the Moroccan dispute would hinder his peace efforts in the Far East and
actually precipitate a war in Europe which would be a tt·calamity
civilization," induced him to urge the British and the
. ,. . to
.
~-

: ~

... .-- . "'":··:

Fr~gc.P

to accept a German proposal to confer about the Sul-

tan's empire and its place in world events .

At the same

time, Roosevelt assured France that he would "take very
.......

strong _groundsn against any attitude that Germany might display at the conference that was unfairto French interests.l4

.!

Although Great Britain was opposed. to the meeting on _
the grounds that it might embarrass France and possibly drag
into an open discussion her own special interests in Egypt,
France began to see that Germany w<;1s becoming insistent and
was displaying disturbing belligerency.

.

"'

Consequently, the-

Quai· d'Orsayreversed its previous antipathy toward a conference and, aware of the seriousness of European tension, noti-

.

fied its representative in the United States that only:
.-..p-~: .. .

Mr. Roosevelt can avert the danger [Or armed conflicy •
• •• The insistence with which the Emperor has appealed
to him, has left the way open .t;'or the President to take

l3Letter from Mohammed ben Arby Tores to Samuel R.
Gununere, Fez, May 29, 1905, in Papers Relat.ing to Foreign
Affairs (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1864-1957), Vol. 1905~ part l, p. 66e.·
1

~isbop,

££.• cit •., _p. 477.

I
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the initiative that we expect from his friendship.l5
With French opposition to a conference waning, the
3r i tish proved amenable to Roosevelt's plans, and Germa·n y's
re action to this change was jubilant as her representative
t old the President, ttYour activity with regard to France, the
'··.....

Em peror says, has been the greatest blessing to the peace of
t.he world-. nl6

The German Foreign Office was still convinced

that the American president .w ould support the Kaiser's policy
in Morocco against the French because of the optimistic
reports it received from Sternburg.

Roosev·e lt inadvertently

encouraged this attitude by . such messages as the ·one he sent
the Kaiser congratulating him on the "genuine triumph" of
.-- .

German diplomacy.l7

l5Letter from the French Foreign Minister to Jules
Jusserand, June 23, 1505, in ibid., p. 478-9.
Frances wish to include the United States in the Moree- .·
· can question in 1905 was a far cry from their sentiments in ·
1902 when they asked England to join 'i'lith them to police
..
Morocco. Vlhen England asked who else was to join t .hem in this
endeavor, France replied that it was very "solicitous of
excluding the United States, and, above all Germany from the
group." Eug ene N. Anderson, Th e Firs t M.o roc can Crisis, 19061..2Q.Q (Chicago: The UniversityOf Chicagb Press, 1930), p. 5 -.
1 6r.etter from Sternburg to Roosevelt, \'Iashington,
·J une 1$, 1905, in Bishop, QE• cite., p. 4_8 1.
l?Letter from Roosevelt to Sternburg~ Washington,
June 23, 1905, in Morison, QE• cit., p. 1251~

. ,_~Slll
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III.

THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

Although France and Germany both had agreed in principle to a conference, \'Then it came to settling the program
for discussion; both .parties had diverg ent views.

The French

wanted certain items · on the agenda that would guarantee their
favored position in North Africa, but Germany naturally was
. more than

reluctant . to ~ set

sions along such lines.

the tone of the projected discus-

In this apparent impasse, Roosevelt

was again to play his favorite role: the international mediator.

When Jusserand, the French

ambe~.ssador

in Washington,

and Sternburgtoid him that they had been ~ unable to reach a
satisfactory solution to the agenda problem, the President,
with characteristic vigor and forthrightness, quickly penciled
the following memorandum:
The two Governments consent to go to the conference
with no program, and to discuss there all questions in
regard ~o Horocco, save. of course where either is bound.
by prev1.ous agreement ~ w1.th another power.l8 . ~
If either the President or the German representative
had been fully aware of the

~ secret

agreements that France and

Spain had entered into concerning their · interests ·in Morocco,
probably Roosevelt would not have been so quick to propose
his solution, and certainly the Kaiser \vould have refused to
tie himself to the final prohibition contained in the American •
compromise.

However, the Germans were still· convinced that

18Bishop,

QE·

cit., p.- 485.

17$
if it came to a question of who would get American support in
a showdovm, they would be the ones who would profit from the
President's evident friendship with the Kaiser.
After settling the matter of the agenda, the President
~

was obliged to cable frequent messages to the Kaiser to persuade him to agree to the French representative to the

c . onfer~

ence and to accede to France's demand that the meeting be held
outside of Morocco.-

As a result of Roosevelt's urging,

Wilhelm II finally submitted to the French insistenc-e that
the discussions be held in the little Spanish coastal town of
i

Algeciras.

The President then was able to report, "After this,

trouble ceased as far as I was concerned until the Conference
met·

I
i

i

I

at Algeciras. nl9
When the United States received the information from

its representative in Tangier that all the signatories of the
Treaty. of Madrid of 1880 except Norway had accepted the invitation to Algeairas,20 the State Department replied that this
country would join the conference but would not announce the
American representative until the exact time of the meeting
was settled.

Although Secretary of State Elihu Root thought

that our interest in the JI.•Ioroccan question was tenuous at best

19Ibid., p. 4$$.•
20Letter from Gumrnere to Acting Secretary of State
Pierce, Tangier, July 22, 1905, in PRFA, op. cit., p. 670.

-
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since none of our citizens residing in Morocco were of native
American birth, 21 he told Jusserand that the United Stat~s
was ready to meet at Algeciras "for the purpose of consid- .

ering measures looking forward to an improvement of the
present conditions in the Empire of the Shereef.n22
To represent the United States at Algeciras," Roosevelt picked the veteran American diplomat Henry

v~hite,

who

was at the time ambassador to Italy; to supply White with

information about the Moroccan situation from first hand
experience, the President appointed Samuel
agent .in

Tangier~

Gummere~

our

After receiving a detailed · agenda from

~

J

the French prime minister that had b_een agreed to by the
Germans, 23 Root sent instructions to White and G:Ummere as to

21Phillip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, Mead
and Company, 193 8), Vol. I;f, p. 59-.-22Letter "from Root to. Jusserand, Washington, November 2,
1905, in PRFA, .2.£• cit., p. 675.
23Letter from Rouvier to Root, October 3., 1905, in
fE[!, QE• cit., pp. 673-4. The principal items of the ag~nda
consisted of four main divisions:
I. (1) The organization ofthe police force in Morocco
in other areas beside the border regions.
(2) The surveillance of boundaries with special
emphasis ori the suppression of arms smuggling. (This was to
be the sole responsibility of France and Morocco.)
.
II. Financial reform including a state banl< controlled by the signatory powers, with the povrer to issue and coin
money. The establishment of funds to pay and equip the poli.c e
and to improve harbors, roads.; and sanitation.
III.

A reorganization of the customs regulatio'ns and
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the role this nation wished to plai at the

confer~nce

what issues he felt were vital to our interests.24

control.
revenue.

.f

and

Root

An investigation to uncover additional sources of

IV. A guarantee that all public works undertaken as a
result of the Algeciras reforms be granted through public bid
in which no national group would have an -unfair advantage.
24Letter of instruction from Root to \Jhite and Gummere,
Washington, November 28, 1905, in PRFA, op. cit., pp. 678-$0.
Root informed White that the United States wished to
maintain its right~ to all p~ivileges of residence, trade,
and protection that were -enjoyed in Morocco by any other nati.:ono
He defined his position by stating that· the United _
p tates had
little to do, "beyond e:x-pression of its wish that 'equality
and stability be s-ecured,'! with the special problems that
other nations had in their associations. with the Moroccan
empire.
Concerning Item I, the Unit:ed States went on record . as
being in favor or' reorganizing the I,Ioroc can police fore e to
secure ( 1.) life and property, . ( 2) equality of trade, · (3) amelioration of those domestic conditions of religion and class
which now weigh heavily on rion-Nluslims, ( 4) improvement of ·
conditions .among the people to enable them to profit from
foreign relations, ( 5) impartial justice, (6) ex:emption from
erratic ta_xes for foreign and native cornrilerce, and - finally
( 7) the insuring of an ;, open door" that was more than a name ·
only and would actually "lead to somethin,2;." Root added that
as important as arms smuggling may have been, he wished to
include the prohibition of all types of · contraband traffic as
a corollary t'o agenda Item I, part 2 • . ·
·

."

About Item II, Root wrote, "The second subject, financial reform, appears not to contemplate any discrimination in
regard to the influence of foreign states." . He added that in .
that case and since no single power seemed to want financial
_control of Iviorocco, the United States would be glad to agree
to this item •
In the matter of tax and custom reform, Root stated _
· that these would concern the United States 6nly if they pro~ed
to discriminate against this country. Except for this reser-
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concluded his instructions with a · general aimonition which
s erved to set the keynote for our delegates:
It is expected that your attitude • • • will display
the impartial benevolence wh ich the United States feels
toward Morocco and the cordial and unbiased friendship
we have for all the treaty powers. · Fair play is what the
United States asks for Morocco • • • and it confidently
expects that outcome.25
·
White was continually being barraged with bits of
advice and counsel from th .e State Department, but it \'las by
~oosevelt

cated.

that the true role of our representatives was indi--

Months before the conference had begun, the President

had told White that he '\-.ranted to keep on good terms with Germany but admitted that his sympathies had always been with
France and would continue to be so, adding, "Still I shall try
to hold on even keel." 2 6 · This confidential dispatch was supplemented by formal instr:uctions that allowed no intimation

'

.

vation, the American delegates to the conf.e rence were instructed to cooperate in any changes needed in the regulationso ·

:·

Because our -primary interest in Morocco was an ec·onomic
one, ·secretary Root '"'as . wholeheartedly in support of any
assurance that would give the United States equal opportunity
to engage in competitive bidding on contemplated public works
in Morocco. He instructed our representatives to be vigilant
to insure the best interests of American business in the
Shereefian Empire.
25rbict., p. 679.
26r.etter from Roosevelt to \'lhite (confidential), Oyster •
Bay, New York, · August 23, 1905, in Allan N-evins, Henry White-.Thirty Years o~ American Diplomact (New York: ·Harper and
Brothers, Publ1.shers, 1930),- p. 2 7.
.
·
-
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of the President's sentiments concerning France to be revealed
but merely reiterated his insistence that the United States
l'lanted equal rights, the "open door," and internal security
in Morocco.
Not on_ly did the President instruct White to support
France as much as was possible, but Root as well passed on
such counsel when he wrote:
Help . France get what she · ought to have but don't take
.her fight on your shoulders. Help limit France wher·e
she ought to be limited but don't take that fight on
. your shoulders .27 ·
·
To this somewhat
conflicting advice was added the words of
·.. ......
~

!

Henry Cabot Lodge who said that the American delegate "must
keep on the . best terms with the German delegate, and yet when

it comes to actions, support France to the extent of his
power. n28

It was the polic·y of the United States to be- as

friendly as possible to all at the c oriference and t .o give the
appearance that it was not t .h e American policy to support any
special national interests.
Even though the -Stat:e Department's sanguine expectations may have seemed realistic to our diplomats in Washington,
\'/hite had been in contact with European dipl.omacy for too many
years to expect Germany and France to swallow the idea that

27Jessup, ££.•

£1!.'

Po 58.

28nennis, .212.• cit ... , P•

497.

. "'
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t !le United States was supporting them both with equal impar~!a lity.

However, our representative was probably more c;ap-

•-i)l-e-t.han._.any .American..in Europe at the time to att-empt ·w hat ·

nay have seemed to him as the impossible, · and his efforts to
ke ep peace at a conference that was filled with rivalries and
deadlocks were surprisingly successful.29
As the conference began, it was obvious that Germany
and France were t.he main competitors and that the remaining ·
conferees were at the meeting .only as potential supporters of
the principal cont.e stants.

White had been given definite

instructions that sin:c e the interests of the United States

were . not sufficient to - "Justify us taking part,." he was not.
_to-· take sides - in any controversy but to "keep the peace and
-make it as . difficult as possible for anyone to pick a quarrel.nJO

ls the conferenceprogressed, it became a common sight to see
either the French, the German, or sometimes the British delegate talking seriously and at length wit.h White .in almost any
spot in the rambling hotel that - served as the conference headquarters.

Sl,nce neither the German nor the French delegate

could publicly agree to proposals made by his opponent, . it
became the practice for one · side to contact the American ·
representative to seek his med;iation .with the other.

In this .

29Nevins, .Q.E.• cit., p. 261.
3°Foster Rhea Dulles~ The Imper-ial Years (.New York:
Thomas Y. Crmvell Co.; 1956J, p. 294.

52 anner,

- Vlhite was able to smooth out many minor crises that ·

c ould have ended the conference prematurely.
After the conference wa ~ _ ~~ 11 s ~arted, it became
_apparent that · two issue.s were points of contention and that
if these could be solved,

t ~ 1e

success of the meeting was

assured--t hat is, at least it would not break up without some
type of agreement having been reached .• · After some contentious
wrangling over the first problem--namely, 'that of establishing
an internati6hal bank in Morocc·o, the Germans agreed to allow
the Fr.e nch SOli1e _s light preference in its organization and

a

few more shares in the bank than would be offered to other
-Rations.
- ""_.:. _However, when the matter ·of how the police system of
,J

__

-

•

-

-- -~pe _ major

.

l'vioroccan ports was to be organized · and who was to

supervise its operation, it was
{

apparent _to White that the

___ ~onference was hopelessly deadlocked.

It was· the contention

_!'~ the French that since they had some seventy million francs
invested in Morocco in comparison · to Gerii1any' s five million, .
it was only fair that France should exercise the main control.
Our delegat .e informed Root that he was . convinced that France
would rather wreck the conference than submit on a point
which it considered vital to its ec'onornic life.31
After conferring with the French representative :i,.rt a

31Nevins, QE• cit., Po 271.

----1S5
l ong private .session and after , receiving a lengthymemorandum
.

f rom the

G~rman

delegate, White sent a

list . o~

proposals to

·- :roosevelt which ·he felt would- offer the only- solution to the .
stalemate that was facing the conference.

It was his idea that

(1) the police should be organized by the Sultan with Moorish
rank and file, that ( 2) the officers should be either Spanish,
French, or both, and that (3) the senior French and Spanish
officers should make annual reports ort the operation of the
·-

" -

force to the Sultan and, as a sop to Germany, to the Italian
.government • . White urged the President to take personal action
by contacting the Kaiser in an effort to pressure the German

delegation into accepting the American compromise)2

Obvi-

ously, _the Gennans did not feel that White's ideas in any way
constituted a _compromise,

as

France would still dominate the

police force by using Spanish officers as mere puppets.

Con-

sequently, the expected · instructions from the Kaiser were not
forthcoming, and \'lhit·e was forced to spe.nd two we-eks trying
to resolve an apparently hopeless deadlock.
The Austrian delegate presented a counter-proposal to
that by White in which it was suggested that the control of
the ports of Morocco be split between France, Spain, and
Switzerland, for any other solution would destroy the equality ·

3 2 Letter from \1/hite to Roosevelt, · Algeciras, February
13, 1906, in Nevins, .2£o cit., P• 273 •

~------

of international trade. in the country.33 · That Root was dish~s

turbed by this idea was apparent by

note to Sternburg in

washington, for he could foresee a virtual partitioning of
the Shereefian Empire by

Euro~ean

nations that would use

their police powers as an entering wedge to political domination.

After objecting to the proposal_ in strong terms, he

somewhat weakened his protest· by saying, ''If we had -sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we
should seriously object on our account to the adoption of any
such arrangement.n34
Although Roosevelt had said concerning. his role in thei'

Algeciras conference, "I do not know that · I can do anything
if the circumstances become strained

..

...'

.

and of course. I

want to keep out of it if I _possibly can, n3 5 he urged the
German government to accept the compromise suggested by

i

r;

White.

He insisted that Germany agree to Spain's and France's

role in policing Moroccan port·s and. flatly rejected the counter-proposal submitted by Austria.

Finally, Ro.osevelt admin- .

istered the coup de grace to German hopes for equal rights in

331etter from White and Gummere to Root, Algeciras,
March 27, 1906, in PRFA, .Q£• cit., Vol. 1905, part 2; pp. 1483-4.

i

34-Letter from Root to Sternburg, Washington, Marc.h 11,
1906, in ibid., p. 1481.
35H~ward K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of ·
America to World Power · (Baltimore: The· .J ohns Ho.p kins · Press-,19 56) J p-.3 73 •
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himself.

by exerting strong personal pressure on the Kaiser

·- -

In a strongly worded note to Wilhelm II, Roosevelt
reminded him of Speck von Sternburg's letter of June 28, 1905,
in which the German ambassador had stated that if the United
States supported Germany's wish for an international conference, Von Bulow would "be ready to back up the decision which
you ffioosevely consider to be the most fair and most practi-

cable.36

This note from the President caused a tremendous

furor in the Wilhelmstrasse, for Sternburg had either mistinderstood his instructions concerning the German assurance or
had assumed that since Roosevelt was, in .his .opinion, devoted
to the Kaiser· and to Germany's cause, _any .demands the President might .· make would naturally be to Germany 1 s advantage.
Actually, subsequent. investigation brought out that Von Bulow's
words had been

~eported

only in part to the President, and

that they had r-eferred to the setting up of .an

agend~

the place at which the conference was to be· held..

and tQ

He had not

intended to give a blanket assurance to Roosevelt ·that Germany
would be obliged to follow the lead of the United States in
the decisions reached at the conference itself.
However, the impression that Roosevelt had been given

3 6r.etter from Rooseveit to Wilhelm II, Washington,
March 7, 1906, in Nevins, .QE• cit., P•. 274. ·

.
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was that if he wished anything to be done by the Germans at
the conference, they would be happy to oblige.

The

~ilemma

that now faced Von Bulow \'las that he . ei ther had to repudiate
Sternburg's original letter and thereby anger the President
or to make the best of a bad bargain and support Roosevelt's
ideas concerning the Moroccan police force)?
Following his instructions from Roosevelt, White
showed copies of the President's telegram rejecting the
Austrian proposal for Swiss police commanders in some Moroccan ports •

This· .obvious support of the French posi tl.on sti;f-

ferie<:l the opposition to any of Germany's demands and at t ·h e
same time served ':to weaken the latter's prestige in the eyes
of the conferees; Roosevelt told Sternhurg that the world
would hold Germany directly responsible for· the failure of
the conference and that he would "feel obliged to publish the
entire

correspo~dence"

if Germany did not

will of the majority.38

ce~e

opposing the

These threat.s , joined with the final

realization by the German Foreign Office that Roosevelt fully ·
intended to back the French and the British position, forced
the German delegation to accept a solution that would save
their pr,ide .but actually would give them little of what they
.

..

..· --~~ -

·

'h ad originally demanded.

37Beale, .2E• cit •., p. 378.
38Bishop, .2£• cit., · p. 500.
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___ [or____the most part-, the United States · had merely been
- ~~-~ -.

-~

doing the bidding of the French delegates in

op~osition

to

the German position, but there was one specific item presented that was entirely an American idea.

This country had

been approached by Jewish interests in an attempt to alleviate the trouble that their co-religionists _were facing in
Czarist Russia, but the State Department had been able to
accomplish little in this connection.

Therefore, in an

effort to redeem its position in the eyes of the Jewish
community in the United States, it '\"'as de.c ided that our
Algeciras delegation would press for assurances that Jews in
~orocco

wo.uld be given compr'ete economic, social, and reli-

gious freedom.

Root .told White that he had reports of the

many restrictions · imposed on Jewry in Morocco, and it was the
wish of the United States to see that these impositions be
aband.o ned .3 9
. · Following the instructions sent by Root, our delegation
dispatched its secr·etary, Lewis Einstein, to Tangier to make ·
a first harid survey of the c.o ndi tions in which the Moorish
Jews were living.

Einstein consulted such authorities on

Morocco as Budgett Meakin and \'!alter Harris--the former was
an author of several comprehinsive works on the country, and
:'

3 9Letter from Root to White, Washington,

1905, in PRFA,

.QE•

'

•

•

l

l\1ovember 28,

cit.·, Vol •. 1905, part 1, - p. 680.

the latter had been the London Times correspondent in the
Maghreb for the previous sixteen years.

Einstein also con-

tacted the French vice-consul in Fez and received much valuable information from the leader of the Hebrew Junta and
Alliance - Israelite Universelle who had made a lifelong study
of the Jewish situation in the Shereefian Empire.
The secretary found that the mellah (the Jewish quarter) was rapidly being abandoned in most cities and. that the
Jews themselves opposed its forcible elimination.

Such

restrictions as special garb, · travel permits; and discriminatory property ownership regulations had long since been ·
eliminated by Abdul Aziz, and, although some

iiljustic~

was ·

still to be found in isolated areas, the Sultan had no power
there c;nd new laws that the government might pass to prot.e ct
the Jewish population would have little effect.40

White

summed up the report of his· secretary by saying that the
Moroccan Jews appreciated the concern of the United States but
requested that this country do nothing more than acknowledge
the Sultan's humane and liberal policy toward his Jewish :citizens and express the hope that this would be continued. 41
Our delegates also transmitted a letter written by the
4DLe,-ds Einstein's report, Algeciras, J~nuary 30, 1906,
i _n PRFA, QE• . cit., Vol. 1905, ·part 2, PPo 1472-}.
41Letter from White to Root, Algeciras, January 30,
1906, in ibid.,
-. p. 1470-1.
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ch ie-f rabbi of Morocco to Einstein in which he said in part:
--..--

Apparently the American Government is und er the
impress ion that i,.oroc can J ey.rs are bad,ly treated and
. oppressed, but t h is is not t he case at all • • • •
In justice to the .!Vwroccan gov ernment, I declare that
the Jews in Morocco are well treated s ince the beginning
of the reign of Hi s late Majesty Mouley Hassan, and we
have absolutely no reason of complaint.42
.
White was convinced by the report of his secretary, which had
been seconded by Gummere from his o\m observation as American
agent in Tangier, that the Jewish problem as presented by the
Secretary of State was largely non-existent.

This sentiment

he relayed to Root, who, although having complete fai th in
the opinion of his representative, was obliged by pressure in
the United States to ·insist that the American delegation at
Algeciras introduce a resolution putting the conference on
record in favor of equality of treatment of the Jewish commu·.n~

in Morocco.
White drew up a statement that was presented to the

conference in which the "hope" was expressed that the Sultan
would treat equitably all non-Muslimso
~

.

The delegates of the

eleven European nations wholeheartedly approved of the proposal since it not only guaranteed equality for Jews, but it
also strengthened the position of European merchants and
tourists in i-1orocco.

The l'w1oorish delegate, Mohanuned

Torre~,

42Letter from Grand Rabbi B'engio to Einstein, Tangier,
January 31, 1906, in ibid., p .• 1476.
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vas somewhat reluctant at the .outset to give even tacit admission that his country had in any way been guilty of mistreating its non-Muslim population, but he finally said that the
Sultan was impressed by the unanimous stand taken by his
colleagues but would have in any case continued the policy
that his . father had begun in the nineteenth c;_entury. 43 .

IV.

CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE
The only direct interest that the United States had in

the conference was the foregoing ·proposal, and it was understandable that several members of the United States Senate
were somewhat dubious as to our legal and. m_oral position connected with intervention in what was evidently a European
matter.

When Roosevelt first decided to send a delegation to

A,lgecir~,

the Senate adopted a resolution requesting a copy

of all instructions that were to be given to our representatives,44 but the Congressional Record reports little in this
.c onnection except the insistence of Senator Bacon of Georgia
to kno"r more about the c.onference and about what responsi.... ::.

--- - -

.,.:.......bility this country was expected to shoulder as a result of

43'Letter from White to Root, Alge-ciras, April 10, 1906,
1n ibid • , p • 1493 •
44J ~es Wilford . Garner, American Foreign Politics {New
·York: New York University Press, 1928), p. 65o _
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_ _ its_ <!_eliberations .45
Root was not much help in convincing the Senate of the
-- ---pr opriety of our-a-ct ions as h e privately admitted t hat -"our
----inter ~ests

part.n46

are not sufficien-t to justify us- taking a leading
However, the administration had a loyal supporter

in Henry Cabot Lodg e, who was able to bury debate in the
Foreign Relations Committee, \flich he controlled, when B~acori
began to stir the Senate with the charge that the Monroe Doctrine forbade the United States to take part in a European
problem •
.When the Democratic opposition continued to affirm the

·,

1
i

doubtful legalityc of our par.tic.ipation, :Ln an effort to embar. rass the Roosevelt administration,- Lodge . pointed out that
- there were at least two historical precedents that .would seem
to indicate that we shoUld continue our interest in any ques_:!:.i9!1 concerning Morocco.47

t-

He maintained that it was the

- responsibility of the United Stat-e~s to exert our "moral
influence • • ~ . to prevent war," and that this country w-ould

~

~

'

- 45Arthur Bullard, The Diplomacy .of the Great War (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), p. 99 .
46Jessup,
·

·££·

cit., p. 57.

·< ·~ ··

47Henry Cabot Lodg e, A Frontier Town and Oth e r Essays
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, . l 90~p. 2 66..

Lodge probably referre d · to the partici pa tion of the
United States in the Cape Spartel L i ghth(ni'se a r;r e ernent of 1S64
and in the formation of the Madrid Treaty of 1880.

..

~

__._
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"drawn into no alliances • • • and into no wars by connec-

t1on~ ith any European Power.n4$
Once the conference was an accomplished fact and our
delegates were not only participating -but carrying a large
measure of the work, it was the job of the administration to
c6nvince the Senate that the Act of Algeciras should be ratified.

Realizing that the traditional reluctance of the

Senate to become involved in European politics would militate
against its ratificatl.on of the treaty; Root instructed Whit_e
to sign the · articles of the Act

"'"~ith

the understanding that

the United States assumes no respons.ibility or obligation for
their enforcement."

The American dele gate .was also instruc-

ted to add the statement that since this country had no poli~
tical interests in Morocco, we were. agreeing to th_e Act. only
to insure that Morocco was fairly treated and that the economic
rights of all c0untries were maintained. 49
The docuinent was signed by thirteen countries, and the
United States was the only country that added any reservations
to its signature; before White would affix -his name, he
insisted that the statement be added -that the United States
had:

- 4Ss eal e,

££. cit • , p •

370 •

49Letter from Root to White, Washington, April 5,

1906, in PRFA, · .QEo . cit., p. 1492.
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• • • no . political interest in Morocco, and no desire
or purpose • • • animated it to take part in this conference other than to secure for all people the widest
equality of trade and privileg e ~ith Morocco and to
.:-=facilitate the institution of reforms in that country-.5.0
- After the Act of Algeciras was signed on April 7,
~

1906, the task of the State Department was not completed.

It

now became the task of Root and Roosevelt to persuade the
Senate that the Act was not a deviation from traditional

Amer~

ican policy and that if it was not ratified, the United States
would be humiliated in the

~yes

of the world.

The President

took .it upon · himself personally to advise the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee by a letter in which he said that if the
A.ct of Algeciras was not approved "it would mean that for the
first time since the adoption of the Constitution l£he United
States7 will be without a treaty with Morocco.~51 · Root added
his advice by saying that the Act "mer.ely modifies and

ext~n<;ts

the provisions of the Treaty of l$$0 in accordance with t ·he .

If

requirements o:f the present day."

He gave the same warning

that Roosevelt had made by stating -t hat without the Act of
Algeciras, the United States would be for the first time in

I

f
;

!..

i

one hundred and twenty years "without any treaty relations

50Hackworth, QE• cit., Vol. I, p. $7 •
51Letter from Roosevelt to Senator Shelby .Cullom,
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington,
June 26, 1906, in I!J:orison, op. cit., Vol. V; p. 317o·
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with Morocco whatever.n52
Even though the United States-1-'Ioroccan treaty of 183 6
actually was in no way affected by either our acceptance or
rejection of the Act, the Senate took the Administration's
warning seriously and made preparations to ratify the work of
the ·conference.

It was not until the last of 1906 that the

Senate finally agreed to approve the Act, but, still being
suspicious of entangling alliances, the Senators added a
further reservation to that already appended to the signature
of Henry White.

The Senate's reservation said in part that

the only reason the United States had participated in the
~-,

conference was that this country had been a party to the
Treaty of 1880, signed in Madrid, and therefore felt obliged
. ·--- t~bontinue the work begun there.53

Obviously, this. bit of

rationalization was little more than window-dressing to
placate the isolationist elements in America, for it was quite
apparent from Roos·e velt 's correspondence that he had thought
little about that treaty when he entered into negotiations .
with Sternburg, the Kaiser, and Jusserand.

Completing their

ratification, the· Senate added this paragraph:
Resolved further: That the Senate, • o • understands
that the participation of the United States in the Alge-

5 2Letter from Root to Cullom, v·l ashington, June 25,
1906,_ in Jessup, QE• cit., p. &J.
53nennis, QE• cit., p. 509.

127.___
ciras conference • • • was with the sole purpose of pre- serving and increasing its commerce in r. .Iorocco, . the
protection as to life, liberty, and property of its
citizens; • • • and without purpose to de part frbm the
---·--:-traditional American forei gn policy which forbids
participation by the United States in the settlement
of political questions which are entirely European in
their scope.54
V.

ROOSEVELT'S ROLE IN THE MOROCCAN PROBLEM

With the final ratification of the Act of Algeciras
and its becoming a portion of the United States' legal system,
an

assessm~nt

of Roosevelt's role in the Moroccan question

will serve to fill out the picture of America's place iii this
.
f

st.ag.e of affairs in the Shereefian Empire.

The President was ·

-conv:inced that he had played a leading role in the organization and successful culmination of the conference, and it is
evident by his correspondence that he was not wholly unjustified in this conclusion.

It may have been true, as charged .. ·

by . disgruntled elements in the United States and in. Europe,
..

that Roosevelt was not entirely aware of the full ramifications of the conference and what it might mean to the balance
of power in Europe and . to the future of Morocco, but his
influenc. e. was felt in all stages of the conference planning
. and deliberationo

The President told Lodge as early as July,

1905, that "I consider it rather extraordinary _that ·my ·s ug5~ackworth, ££• cit., Vol. V, p. 131.
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gestions should apparently have gratefully been received by
both sides a~ well as acted on.n55

As the conference pro-

gressed, Roosevelt received even more indication that his
words were having an important effect on the course of events
at Algeciras. · White congratulated Roosevelt on the fact that
the

o~tcome·

of the meeting was, with a minor

exce~tion,

exactly as he ·had wished and that the proposals the President
had made were written into the Act.56
There were many indications that Roosevelt continued
to believe that -his had been the key _role in the conference;
he wrote to Andrew Carnegie that "the earliest and most
important parts of the Algeciras business were all worked out
by me persohally.n57

The mC?st important indication of how he

felt ·-about hfs role in. t}le conference wa$ his very long letter to -\>Jhitelaw' Reid, the. American ambassador in Great Brit~- .

. ~·~ :-.· ~...- - .. ;..;,...:.. ,.

.

.•

· ·l :'f'.'.· .

ain, in which_he gave verbatim accounts of many of the letters .
that passed between
ments.

him~elf

and the French and German govern-

Beside leaving this account of letters and documents_,

the President ·recorded the secret discussions that he had
with Jusserand and Sternb:urg, many of which showed just hciw

55Letter from Roosevelt to Lodge, Oyster Bay, New York,
July 11, 1905, in Morison, .Q.E• cit., Vol. ·IV, p. 1273.
5h_ . -"'tleale, .££• cit_., p. 3.87.
57tetter from Roosevelt to Andrew Carnegie,. Washington,
February 26-;-1909, in Morison, .££• cit., Vol. VI, p. 1538.
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Roosevelt played o.n e man against the other in orqer to
achieve his purpose.58
..

The value of Roosevelt's account of his role is not
only that it is possible to see how Germany and France felt
·~

about many issues, but also the President's biases are clearly
brought out..

It is apparent that the President, while keep-

i ng up a friendly correspondence with the German Foreign
Office, was . fullyin sympathy with France's interests _in
~1 orocco.

He .f elt that the Kaiser . had delusions of grandeur

and would go to any lengths -to'secure additional empire for

5Stetter from Roosev-elt to Whitelaw Reid, Washington,
April 28, 1906, in Bishop, op. cit., pp. 467 ff.
There have been many divergent opinions among historians concerning the value of Roosevelt's "monograph" as ·ap
objective document. Those closer to the actual event in ·
·time, discounted its reliability and · implied that . the President ·wrote it to serve his own political ends. One writer
accused Roosevelt of not having follov1ed the procedure . of the
conference . carefully, using, as an .e xample of the President's
alleged misinformation, tpe fact that the name of the British
representative was misspelled in the lettero However, t h e
critic (Pringle, on. cit.) himself was guilty of negligence
in that he apparently did not realiz.e that the spelling . error
was not Roosevelt's but was found in a letter written by
Sternburg to the President.
Writers of more -recent timeq with access to ·more complete . records, both American _and European, have g iven Theo- .
dore Roosevelt much more credit for his part in the Al,g eciras
Conference than had previously been done • . One English Writer,
using all European sources for his account of Algecir.a s, .
credits Roosevelt with mor-e influence there than any Arner~can
writer of th e first three decades of t h e t went ieth century
had done. Beale, ££.• cit.,· p .. 3S9 n. "a."
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Germany.

Roosevelt was very proud that .he had thwarted "that

autoc.~~tic zigzagn59 and that he had "stood him on his head
llith great decision."6o

..'

It is -apparent - that Roosevelt did

subscribe to the formula "for Germany the conference, . for
France, Morocco; for Germany prestige imperialism, for France
and her fri.ends real . imperialism,"61 but he sincerely wished
for a unified Morocco with no spheres of influence that would
lead to its dismemberment in future years. 62

To accomplish

this end, he felt that by allm'ling France a major portion of
the responsibility· for Morocco's sovereignty, the pressure of
public attention that had been .focused on Algeciras would
serve to guarantee the

ho~esty

with which the French Republic

would carry out its trust.
Not. only was Roosevelt quite pleased with his contribution "to world peace, · but European circles also ·joined in
praising his efforts • . It is not surprising that France- e.x pres- ·
sed high appreciation for the "signal aid" rendered by the
President, 63 but even Von Bi.ilow eulogized the American :for

59rhomas A. Bailey, -~ American Pageant--A History of .
Republic (Boston: Little; Brown and Company, 1956), p. "644~
60Dulies; .££• cit., p. 300.

61Beale, .£E .• . cit
. • , p. 5 61, n. 23 8.
62Nevins,

QE•

cit., p. 278.

63Bishop, ££• cit., p. 202.
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"a great service to the peace of the world."64
However, in evaluating America's role at Algeciras,
-· care mu·s t be taken not to overe·s t·i mate the value of such

sentiments as the foregoing that were expressed in the flush
of accomplishment. · It may have been that the United States
did help to avert a war in 1906, and Roosevelt probably did
postpone the diplomatic conquest of Jviorocco for six years,
but subsequent events demonstrated that Algeciras did little
to prevent the eventual dismemberment of Morocco and that
the conference merely served to strengthen France's diplomatic position with England and to giveit tacit permission
to subject the Moroccans to its <:ontrol.

All of Roosevelt's

maneuverihgs to guarantee the "open door" in the Maghreb
impressed the French authorities little, and the spirit of
economic equality and freedom of trade was honored only when
individual nations GOuld compel France to give them their
rights.
The pattern o.f American-Moroccan relations was not
particularly enhanced by the Algeciras Conference.

It is

extraordinary that a conference ostensibly aimed at the
improvement of Morocco was organized, conducted, and concluded with little if any consideration of Moroccan wishes
or ideas.

Roosevelt was apparently not much concerned with
.,

.

64Garner, .£I?.. cit., p. 66.

--;..--

.
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Abdul Aziz's feelings about the way his country was to be
reorganized~-an

attitude which suffered by comparison with

---the courtesy and friendliness displayed by George Washington
to Morocco in the eighteenth

i:
oS

~

.
.:
~

c~ntury.

•

CHAPTER VIII
UNITED STATES AND THE PROTECTOHATE:

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The Senate of the United States had ratified the Act
of Algeciras in the hope that the economic rights of this
country would be safeguarded in JViorocco for many years to
come.

Theodore Roosevelt had planned vlell and had exerted

all of his very considerable skill and influence to organize
the conference and to assure the final adoption of the international agreement.
States that

It was the sincere hope of the United

"the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty

the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and economic liberty without any inequality" would b-e guaranteed by the work
of the thirteen nations that met at Algeciras in 1906. 1
This chapter will review some of the incidents that
indicated just how the United States wa$ compelled to protest
continually and to be constantly on guard to preserve a sem•.
!

blance of the economic freedom of action that it had striven

'<
~

to protect at Algeciras.

This struggle ·began even before the

ratification of the Act, continued through two world wars,
was brought to the International Court of Justice, and was
.-

.F
?

•

'

not resolved until Morocco finally declared its

complet~

lwilliaril Ivi . Malloy, (ed.), Treaties, Conventions, · .
International Acts, Protocols and Agreements 1776-1.2Q.2 ·('W ashington: United States Government Printing Office, 1910),
Vol. II, p. 2159.
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independence from French domination.

I.

FRENCH ECONOMIC CONTROL IN MOROCCO

In 18$0, an attempt was made to reorganize the Moraecan tariff system and to establish a general rate that . would
be applied to all countries without discrimination.
per cent import duty was imposed on products from all

This ten
coun~

tries until 1892 when the French were able to persuade the
Moroccan government to lower duties on items that were char}

'

acteristically French.

This special dispensation cut in

half the tax paid by the French in .comparison to the duty
that other countries were forced to pay and gave France a
substanti.a l trade advantage in the 1-ioroccan .market.
By 1902, France had increased its commercial advan- ·
tage by negotiating a special tariff rate for all goods
entering Morocco by land. 2 Ostensibly, this new tax was to
be applied to all nations--a provision aimed. at protecting
the French from criticism for taking unfair advantage over
thetr competitors.

Ho'\"fever,- since almost the only ·way any .

product could enter Morocco by land at that time .was through
French territory--Algeria and French West Africa--it was
obvious to the rest of the world that France had once again

2Melvin Ivi . Knight, Morocco as ~ Fre.nch Economic Venture
(New York: D. Appleton--Century Co., 1-937),. P• 20. ·
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garnered special privileges for its own commerce.
-Although the United States did not

hav~

major economic

interests in the Shereefian Empire, it was cognizant of the
French maneuvers aimed at excluding the commerce of other
nations from Morocco.

To preserve the "open door" of trade

that was being threatened had been Roosevelt's excuse for our
intervention in the_ Moroccan problem in 1906, and with the
apparently successful Conclusion of the conference which
guaranteed

co~mercial

equality for all, the United States

felt it had accomplished its mission.
meaning of the

However, the true

"open doorn so0n became apparent as the

nations of Europe began dumping their surplus goods into the
Moroccan market with no thought or consideration of the
effect that these actions would have on the interrra'l economy
of the country.

Moro.cco had no . power to impose ·quota restric-

tions or to increase tariffs to protect what native industry
it had, but, .nevertheless, Europe held the Moroccan government responsible for the economic disorder that resulted)
Moroccan economy, which had been in a precarious condition for many years, was unable .t o withstand the buffetings
it received at the hands of th.e economic imperialists of
Europe.

Poverty and unemployment mounted in the years

~edi ...

ately foll .o wing the confere.nce at Algeciras, and the only
,
I

Jrbid., p.

6.
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s olution that Abdul Aziz could find was actually no solution
at all--at least not for Morocco.

In an attempt to balance

the Noroccan economy, the Sultan was forced to resort to·
i nternational borro·:Ting--which, instead of ameliorating the
situation, deepened the economic morass until the Moroccan
government was hopelessly bankrupt and in the tender mercies
of Fre·nch creditors.

Using the unrest occasioned by high

taxes coupled with increasing economic misery among the ·
people, France convinced the other nations of Europe that the
only sol·u tion to the Moroccan chaos was for the French to
supervise the Sultan's governmento
In 1907, an incident in Marrakesh, the southern capital, gave the French an excuse to occupy the Moroccan town of
Oujda on the Algerian border.

A few months later, a riot in

Casablanca over a railway concession provided reason enough

1

for the French to shell the city and to occupy it and the
large . and rich Shawiya hinterland.

After taking control of

the strategic doors to Morocco, Oujda and Casq,.blanca, and
gaining control of the best farmland, the Shawiya district,
the French proceeded to consolidate their illegal occupation.
In 1911, using an. artifically induced "crisis" as an excuse,
the French sent their troops from Algeria to occupy Fez, the
':;

traditional center of Moroccan power and authority.

After

having placed a foot in the door, this int.ernational salesman
forced · the ov-mer of the hous·e to acc.ept his offer of protection
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and, on lfmrch 30, 1912, imposed the Treaty of

Fez.

By guar-

anteeing to carry out conscientiously all treaty obligations
that Morocco had previously agreed to, the French were able
j

to persuade Europe to accept the new status of Morocco as a

~

French protectorate, but they were not so successful with the
United· States.
In 1911, when France began surveying the international
sentiment about its proposed move, it sought. American
approval for its " pacification and reorganization" of Morocco.
The French ambassador assured Philander Knox, · the American
Secretary of State, that France would not "connive to any
inequality" in custom duties, tariffs, or railroad rates that .
-·
.
would be detrimental to the ·interests of American commerce •
. The ambassador concluded- his presentation by paraphrasing · the

.

Senate's reservation to the Algeciras agreement in these

j;

.
~

:.. ·_ :::- ::.:. . . Knowing that the Goverinnent of the United States seeks
nothing more. in. Morocco than the development of the
_:- economic · interests of its citizens, . as has always been
proclaimed • • • , my Government fondly cherishes hope • • •
that the United States would agree to the French program of
control iri Morocco.4

When the United States informed the·

4Letter from the French ambassador to Myron T. · Herrick,
.·secretary of State, V/ashington, November 3,. ~911, in Papers
Relating to Forei g n Af f airs (\lJashington: Un1.ted States
Government Pr:inting Office, 186 4-195?), Vol. 1911, p. 621.
(Hereafter referred to as PRF A.) .
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French that it was impossible for this country to approve any
such chang e without a ma j or revision in treaty committments,

---th e French ambassador re quested at least "unoff icialn approval
· of their move in the Sultan's k ing dom.

This sub

~

agree-

m€nt was firmly rejected by the State Department which
pointed out t h at the interests of the United States were not
directly involved since our commerce was adequately protected
already by several treaty agreements with the Shereefian
Empire.5
- - - -- ~- From 1912 until World War I, the French government con:tinually tried to get off icial Ame r ican recognition of the

·-

. T~eaty

of Fez and the . Protectorate reg ime in Morocco. · In

-l-91.7, after much diplomatic correspondence and many Fr-ench
·~ptreaties,

the United States · agreed . to recogni.z e the fact

that a protectorate existed in Morocco, as a . Ufri.e nd.ly _gesture" to an ally engaged in a struggle for survival.6 . How-

..

,.!

ever, this statement was carefully worded by the State
Department so that American commercial rights · in Morocco were
not at all affected, and the Secretary of State was careful
to point out that the recog nition did not mean approval of
any special privilege for France in Ivlorocco nor did it include

5Letter from Herrick to the French ambassador, Wash-

· J ngt~n, December 15, 1 911, in ibi d., p. 622.

6xnight, QE· cit., p.

-•

97.
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official recognition of the Treaty --o-f Fez-.
International preoccupation \'lith the war arrl the
events surrounding the peace settlements, pushed Moroccan
events far into the background, and it was not until 1922
that the United States again became concerned with its
economic interests in the Shereefian Empire.
gone ahead rapidly

wi~h

France had

its plans to tie Morocco closely to

French economy and, in the course of this maneuver, had begun
to reveal its true sentiments concerning the ''open door"
policy so important in American business philosophy ·.
METHODS USED TO

I~.

HN~ER

AMERICAN BUSINESS

................

The first indication that the United States had of
France's intention not to live up to its committments to
maintain economic freedom in its protec.torate came when an
exclusive concession for construction and

op~ration

of new

port facilities in Tangier was given to a French concern.
The State Departmentprotested through its ambassador in
France that this procedure was a dire.c t violation of the
Treaty of Algeciras which guaranteed to all signatories equal
. rights to open, competitive bidding for all public works in
Morocco. 7

Poincare~ the French 1'-Hnister . of Foreign Affairs,

quickly answered. the protest of the American ambassador with

7PRFA,

QEo

cit., Vol. 1922, p. 720.
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a pology for the over s i ght involv ed in not nublicizing the

~ 1 ct

-

that bids were t o be acce pted; he further a ss ured the

3: 1te De partment t hat new b ids wou l d b e rec e ived by t h e
::-:>roccan g overnment and that the United States I'WUld have
e cual opportunity t o c ompete for t h e Tangier port contract.$
/

All the protest a ti ons of Poincare a nd the French
s-:> vernment as to

t~eir

good intentions, notwithstanding, it

was soon evident that France was continuing to give exclusive
bidding ri ghts to its own citizens.

Secretary of State

Charles Evans Hughes objected to this practice and clearly
ir.dicated that he was aware of the game the French were play~

ing with Noroccan economics and freedom when he stated that
the Tangier port ttconcession gives the Shereefian Government,
i.e., the French government--entire control of the port of
Tangier. u9

':~hen Hughes rebuked t h e French for violating the

Act of Algeciras, they replied tha t the Franco- German a g reenent of 1 911 stipulated tha t the granting of concessions did
not require ·open bidding but could be given by the Horoccan
government to any company that seemed best able to do the
work.

Furtherm ore, t l1 e Frenc h ccintinued, since the United

States had adhered to the Protectorate Treaty of 1912, this
implied its acce ptance of any previous French agreements
concerninr.; the status of I.forocco o

8rbid.

9PRFA,

QQo

cito, Vol. 1922, p. 723.
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In answe r to Fr a nce's claims that this country was
bound by the restrictions of the Treaty of Fez, the State
Department denied that

vle

had subscribed to the treaty;

rather, the fact wa s th at t h e Unit ed States had merely
agreed to accept the Protectorate a s a fait accomoli.10
Concerning America's position in relation to the Treaty of
Fez, much confusi on was to arise throughout the span of
French cbntrol in Norocco.

Whenever the United States pre-

tested a violation of our treaty with Morocco or of the Algeciras agreement, ·the Frenc h imrnediat ely wouid hark back to
Secretary of State Lansing 's acknov'll edgement that the Protectorate existed, as evidence that this country
the Franco-Noroccan accord.

V"·Tas

bound by

Even though America spent many

dollars on cable costs to its representatives in Morocco and
France in an effort to settle the matter of the Tangier contracts, the American protest wa.:;; practically ignored by the
French

V"lho

were su:re they could count on the good will of .the

United States and on its reluctance to apply pressure in a
t

situation VJhere no American businessmen had indicated any

j

interest.
During the 1920's, France continued to chip away at
the

"open doorn structur e in I'-:orocco in an effort to give its

commerce a favored position.

Never did the French assault
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th e free trade concept in a frontal attack but rather per--etrated a great number of tiny violations and a few medium
s ized ones similar to the Tangier port contract.

Whenever

another nation protested too vigorously to be ignored, the
French would make some concession or would drop the offending
practice until the matter had been forgotten or the violation
reinstituted in another .guise.

One writer described this

French practice by saying that they "judiciously pruned and
dwarfed the open door treaties by interpretation and expert
neglect until they were very little in the way •• • • nll
One method used by -the Protectorate was to impose a
tax on a certain import without notifying any of the countries ·
concerned in that -type of trade until the duty was alre-ady _
bE:dng collected~
1

This sytem was particularly aggravating to

the United States because i _t was this couritry'.s policy to
agree to changes -in -th.e Protectorate- tax structure as it
affected .American trade only if the State Department had been
previously inforrnect.l2

Because the French authorities invari-

ably neglected to notify tne U:p.ited States in advance, there
was a c-ontinual round of correspondence and discussion to
settlethe matter of payments

~hat

had been illegally collec-

ted or fines levied on an American merchant who had violated

llKnight, .QE. cit • , p. 13 4.
12Letter from United States .Consul Maxwell Blake to
Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg , Tangier, January 18,
1928, in PRFA, .2.£· cit., Vol. 1928, p. 34L.
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a new regulation.

This constant bickering on an international

scale was aimed at forcing the United States to give up its
special status, under which American businessmen were responsible bnly to their consul in Tangier and not to the French
Resident General and his staff.
In an effort to consolidate its economic position in
J.lorocco and especially in Tangier, France invited Spain and
England to a conference for the ostensible purpose of improving business and financial conditions ·in the international
zone.

When this country heard of the proposed conference, it

dispatched a message to _France stating that the United States
would not countenance any change in the status guo of American
rights in ~1orocco.l3

Therefore, the signatories_ of the TanI

gier Convention of 1928 assured the United States that there
had been no changes in the "open door" policy.

However, the .

I

violations of freedom -of trade continued as if the assurances ·
had been written upon the waters of Tangier

Bay~

One result of the 1928 convention was to raise the
I

.

berthing rates for foreign shipping in the port of Tangier.
Another was the imposition of a "padlock law" which was
designedto permit the Frenchauthorities to raise import
duties without informing the merchants in advance.

This was

..
13Letter from Acting Secretary of State Olds to United
States ambassador in France I>1yron ·T • . Herrick, \vashington,
March 15, 1928, in ibid., p. 371.
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to. thwart the stockpiling of large quantities of merchandise
before the new regulation could be put into effect.l4

The

United States did not object to these regulations except for
·- ' .•. .

- - . ~.;·

';,$< '

the fact that they were instituted again without informing
the State Department.

Bec.a use the United States was forced

by treaty obligations to protest such procedures,

our diplo-

matic agent was put into. the position of trying to settle
violations of these laws charged to American citizens and to
recover duties which had been illegally collected.

It is not

surprising that many Americans _gave up the struggle to com-.
pete in Morocco when new restrictions were -constantly being
applied that would hold up business transactions until lengthy
litigation settled the argument between the State Department
and the Protectorate authorities.
~" -~-;..~·

_The decade prior to World War II was a trying . on.e for
American merchants in Morocco • . Following the pattern set by
his predecessors, Lucien Saint, . the French Resident General,
connived with a Franco-Spanish power company that had been
supplying electricity to northern Morocco to give it new concessions without the legal formality of permitting open bidding.

Our diplomatic agent in Tangier, William Blake, had

received intimations that such a maneuver was in the · offing,
·and therefcre he notified the French that the United States

14pRFA, 2£· cit., Vol. 1929 1 pp. 505 ff.
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would not permit such gross violation of the Act of Algeciras.
The Tangier Committee of Control, to which the United States
did not belong, was threatened by the company that if the
concessions were rfot granted, it would not fulfill its present three-year contract to supply electricity for the 'rangier
Zone.

Under this pressure, the French granted the

conc~ssion

in spite of the continued but futile protests of the United
States .15
Blake, who was very alert to any indication of French
discrimination against foreign bu.s iness, .. sent his evaluation
of the situation to the State Department in the · following
message~

Evidence is not lacking • • • that the Protectorate
Government's leg islation which purports to be of a
general order is not infrequently framed to the
det:imenf of the trade ·Of some particular nation or
nat1ons. 6
.

..

To support his .allegation, our diplomatic agent reported that

~

American farmers in Morocco were not allowed to join the
French agricultural cooperative that received a large rebate
on its gasoline purchases o

Theoretically, all national

groups could become members, .but when a non-French farmer

. l5Letter from Maxwell Blake to Secretary of State Henry
L~-st· imson, Tangier, August 29, 1930, in PRFA, .Q.E· cit.,
· Vol. 193 0, p ~ 591.
1 ctetter from Blake to Stimson, Tang ier, December 30,
19J-Cl.,.~ .. in PRFA, .212• cit., Vol. 1 931, part II, P• 745 •
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applied, the cooperative put obstacles in his path or found
technicalities that prevented his joining the group.l7
Blake continued his careful analysis of the economic
handicaps under which not only American but all non-French
businessmen labored by reporting the imposition of a new
import tax aimed particularly at the British and the American
traders in Morocco.

A so-called "gate tax" was to be imposed

over and above the legal duty authorized by previous agreements, as a measure to increase the Protectorate's revenue,
but the tax was not to be applied to Fr·e nch imports at the_
same rate as to foreign products.

Blake notified the State

Department of the danger of this precedent in these words:
The necessity of opposing this series of arbitrary
measures -on the part of the French Protectorate Government assumes the gravest importance at th:i,.s juncture,
when the French authorities are attempting by every
irregular means to break down the regime of economic
liberty in fiiorocco as laid down by the treaties .18
The United States was becoming more and more concerned
:with the French efforts to circumvent the concept of .fre-e
trade and commercial equality in Morocco.

The

leaders of

the State Department received reports that indicated that the
French

~ntended

t6 alter the status of Morocco from that of

17

.
Ibid.,
pp.
745-6.
-.

18Letter from Ma)..'Well Blake to Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, Tangier, June 7, 1934, in PRFA, .21?.• cit.,
Vol. 1934, - part II, PPo 841-3 o
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a quasi-independent, protected country to that of a French
colony.

The American representatives in .Morocco sent the .

D~partment

a large number of documents that clearly showed the

repeated Frericfi violations of the spirit and the letter of
the Act of Alg eciras and intiicated that the French authorities had ign6red by one means or another all protests registered by foreign powers.

It was stated that the French

policy was to break down interna-ciorial trade and economic
liberty:
• • • to promote the interests of certain French
financial groups wh ich seek, and have to a large
extent obtained, exclusive control overthe basic and
vital industrial and commercU!.l enterprises of the
protectorate.l9
·
Foreign commercial int.erests were not the only . groups
that were unhappy with the economic situation in Morocco.
French businessmen with comn:ercial ties in the Protectorate.
protested also, but for a far different reason than had our
representati-y:es in Tangier; the French were distressed that
Morocco was engaging in so much trade with non..-French com· panies that France was beginning :to lose ·some of its market
in the Maghreb.

Paris financ i ers began demanding that

Morocco reorganize its import duties to give French products
preferential,- ·~:reatment

in order to restore the large amount

19Letter from Hugh G. Grant to Under Secretary of
State Phillips, Washington, October 31, 1934, i.n ibid., p. 850.
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of business previously enjoyed by French merchants.20
Although there

wa~

strong opposition to this move both by the

United States and by the Moroccans themselves, such practices
were being put into effect as the imposition of an arbitrary
fifty per cent duty on all American products and the elimina~

..·.. '•"'·

tiori of American rur;s and carpets from the Moroccan market.21
While these manifes.tly unjust restrictions were usually
. revoked;

tne

effect was to discourage foreign business from

risking its capital in the Moroccan trade.
Not content with t h eir efforts to harass American
trade, the French began pressing the State Department to
abandon the extra-territorial rights--capitulations--that
citizens of this country had enjoyed in Morocco since the
eighteenth- century. · Because American merchants were not
liable to prosecution or restraint unless the United States
consul was in charge of proceedings, the French were continually · hampS'r.~d by their

inabi1:1:~y

whenever they wished.

Of course, as has been indicat.ed, the

to restrict · American trade-

Protectorate officials did hamper the course of American
business in .i'-Iorocco, but they were always faced with the

20Letter from George p. Hopper, United States Consul
at Casablanca to Hull, Casablanca, March 25, 1 935, in PRFA,
. QE. cit • , 1 93 5 , part I, pp • 97 4-7 •
21Letter from Philii ps t o Blake, Washington, November
16, i934, in PRFA, QE· cit., Vol. 1 934, part II, p •. 86o.

~~a---------~
· --~·~-------------------------

219
inevitable protest·s from the diplomatic agent in Tangier.
When the British agreed to give u p their capitulations in
Norocco in 193 8, the French renevred vigorously their campaign
to persuade the United States--the only remaining country to
maintain such rights--to relinquish its extra-territorial
privileges.
For many years, Blake had supported the concept of
capitulations, stating on one occasion c oncerning this
matter:
American traders and concerns would find no protection
against arbitrary measures wit h out this safeguard. . .
LUnited States' interests.! • • • would inevitably suffer
extinction under the cumulative force of at.trition of
ingenious and procedural devices, in -which the French
adrninistrati ve mind is so peculiarly fertile. 22
Secretary of State Hull supported Blake's position \"i'hen the·
French suggested strongly that capitulations were unnecessary
and that the United States was clinging to an outdated device
to gain unfair advantage for its commerce.

Hull expressed

the conviction that the only th i ng that had preserved our
rights in the past under the French Protectorate was the fact .
that capitulations had been retained, and, he continued,
"they have therefore become of primary importance to the
protection of our trade. n23

Although the French realized

22Letter from Blake to Hull, Tangier, December 14,
193 4, ibid.,. p. 870.
23Letter from Hull to United States Ambassador in

220

that the United States was adamant on this point, they continued to insist on its abandonment until the advent of World
War II turned their interest s to more--v ital matters.

III.

AMERICAN BUSI NE3S AND WORLD WAR II

During 1939, when the war in Europe was little more
than a stal.emate and the French considered themselves secure
behind the Maginot Line, the Protectorate authorities capitalized on the "emergency" by imposing new import restrictions
in Morocco.

It was alleg ed by the Frencb that conditions

involving their internal security forced them to reorganize
customs
'i
~

regul~d:.ions

in the Shereefian Empire; the American

State Department, however, protested· that these so-called war
measures were actually aimed toward improving French business
rather than at strengthening the Allieso

Hull pointed out in

a letter to our representative in Tangier that this country
was aware that only foreign imports were being controlled
while products from France an.d Algeria were freely admitted
to the Moroccan market with no .r egulatory handicaps. 2 4
The crushing attack of· Hitler's forces through the .Low:..
lands and into France had the immediate effect of changing

.

France Bullitt, Washington, April 13, 1937, in PRFA, .QE.•
cit., Vol. 1937, part II, p. S59.

f.

24Letter from Hull to Blake, Washington, September 15,
1939, in PRFA, .2£• cit.; Vol. 1939, part IV, p. 686.-
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When the French ne eded markets

r ather than supplies, they ·were very independent about Ameri can demands for trade ri ght s, but -- when the Vichy g overnment
realized that its country was in no position to lJlaintain its
hoped-for monopoly in

M o~occan

trade, it began negotiating

for close economic ties between the United States and Morocco.
Emmanue:),. Monick, the French Secretary General,25 realized
that unless foreign supplies began pourin§ into North Africa,
he would be unable to maintain French control there.

Conse-

quently, he opened a series of talks- with the American representati ve in Vichy aimed at increasing the flml of goods from
the United States.26
Although the United States was more than willing to .
take advantage of the changed French attitude and began
arranging to supply -Morocco '\"lith its nee·ds, a new ele.'1lent
intruded i .t se1f into the picture • . Great Britain, which by
this time was tightening the blockade on the continent of
. ·' -!l"~· ....

.·: ·~·

Europe, was becomi-ng--very particular about what material it
would permit _to be sent to French North Africa.. The British
.. . . . .

25The Secretary General in Morocco served as the head
of the "t~nical services" wh ic h included such departments
as finance, post and teleg raph, education, and health. Rom
Landau, Moroccan -Drama - 1...2QQ.-lill. (San Francisco: Tb.e Amer. ican Acad-emy of Asian Studies, 1 956), p. 105. _
26Letter from American Charg e in Vichy, France, to
Hull, Vichy, · November 6, 1940, in PRFA, .£E.• cit., Vol. 1940,
part II, pp. 612 f.
·
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---very- rightly· supposed that strategic war material such as
~ asoline

and mechanical equipment imported by the French Pro-

tectorate would ultimately find its way into France and thus
serve to defeat the purpose of the British naval cordon.

The

French ask ed the Americans to intervene wit h the British
government for the purpose of loosening trade restrictions
with -Morocco, even implying that they would explore the
possibility of setting up safeguards to prevent reshipment of
supplies to Europe.27

Although GreatBritain's policy in such

matters was the "principal enemy deficiencies should be
avoided," they did modify

thei~

regulations to allow the

United States. to send such Moroccan necessities as sugar; tea,
and cotton goods to Casablanca and Tangier,.28

IV.

BUSINESS IN POST-WAR MOROCCO

After the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942, the
French restriction on imports .was set aside and United States
military and civil administrators had the final. say as to the
products brought into Morocco.

During -the two years iminedi-

ately following the war, the French were far too interested
in rebuilding their own country and restoring their economic

27Letter from Consul Generall~Jhite to Hull, Tangier,
Septemb er'- ·6, 19 40, in ibid., p. 581 .•
28 Ibid., p. 600.
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status to be particular about forei gn merchants and t h eir
activities in Morocco.

Since France's ability to export had

dwindled to almost nothi ng , they were no t in a position to
i nsist that they receive prefe:-:-ential treatment in Moroccan
trade.

Consequently , many Am erican businessmen saw a g olden

opportunity to cash in on the desperate need for consumer
goods that had arisen in the Ma ghreb as a result of th_e
deprivations caused by the war.

The American troops stationed

in Morocco had unwittingly become excellent salesmen for all
types of American products ranging from Coca-Cola to the
pride of a Detroit production line, and the Moroccans began
to realize the value of such goods and to trust the brand
names that had long been household words in the

Unit~d

·states.

Many servicemen saw the ·possibilities in North Africa
and, when they left the armed forces, began buying up surplus
it~s

for ridicul·ously low prices and reselling them on the -

Moroccan market.

Many Moroccans joined the Americans and

supplied the capital and knowledge of the local situation to
make a combination that no other foreign merchant could match.
Americans formed large farm cooperatives to take advantage of
the new irrigation schemes that were ra pidly developing, and
they imported American farm machinery that multiplied the
yield of the countryside.

Some _enterprising ex--A ir Force

pilots purchased surplus airplanes with which they scouted
the coastal waters of southern Morocco for the sardines t hat
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had been slowly moving southward from their former habitat
along the Portuguese coast.

These men joined forces with

other Americans who introduced more efficient canning methods
i nto the port town such as Agadir and Safi where thousands of
t ons of fish were being processed every month.
One group of Americans, with the help of local c·a pital,
bought large numbers of sur plus Army trucks and started an
extensive frei ght business into the interior of the country.
Other men with more technical ·knowledge and greater resources
began importing the oil processing machinery and mining equipment that were so badly needed by the budding industry of
.l<Iorocco.

Many American concerns such as Westinghouse, General

J.-Iottrrs, and va:rious

·<:H:~ companies

provided these ex-soldiers

with valuable sales franchises that insured a grow·ing business
for them in such cosmopolitan areas as Tangier, Casablanca,
and Rabat.29
Not only were the Americans fortunate in business
because of their surplus purchases and their good connections
with firms in the United States, but more important, they
enjoyed a special privilege which no other foreign merchant
had: namely, extra-territorial rights which freed them from
any ' economic restriction to '\'lhich the United States had not
2 9Edward Toledano, "Young Man, Go To Casablanca,"
Harper's Magazine, Vol. 197 (September, 1 948), p. 111.
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a 0 r eed.

French

merchant~

1-rer e ham pered by tteir own gov ern-

r:J ent 's monetary restrictions vJhich kept them from using
~ r a ncs

to purchase American e oods .

How ever, the Americans

were not hindered by these handi ca ps and could use dollars
1irectly or could use the convenient facilities of the Tangier
mo ney market to exchange francs for dollars.JO

This evasion

of French ex change controls soon br ought a ngu ished crys of
ain from local me rchants 1f.Jho had not been fortunate or
astute enough to have obt a ined an

P~ erica n

partner; these

complaints, which reac hed a p eak at about the same t i.rne as
French i nd ustri al r ec over y necessitated a g ood market for
r

French goods, ca used drastic stiffening of import regulations
in the Protect or ate .
Starting in December, 1948, t h e French im pos ed discriminatory regulations th at were so worded ·as to affect
.American importers while allowing French concerns to operate
as they always had done.

American g oods 1vere taxed exces-

sively and \t'Tere held u p at t t e r::oroccan ports on any pretext
until the products had deteriorated or had dropped in value.
In any event, _t h e American merc hant usually to ok a loss in
the transaction 1.\rhile his French competitor blithely flooded
the market

~ ith

Fre nch products.

The State Department made

ineffectual protests but was persuaded to permit these
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_ _ practices for a "temporary" period on t he pretext that they
were vital to the economic recovery of France.3 1

To restrict

-·.

f urther the freed om of American busines s interests, the
French government t ook advantage of the fact that they had
i llegally pegged the Moroccan franc to t h e French monetary
system.

This meant that the erratic fluctuation of the franc

coupled with t he currency restrictions enforced in france
joined to reduce many American businesses to bankruptcy,
since they could not convert their francs to dollars to
replenish their stocks.32
Apparently the State Department did not want to offend
the French government, for it was very lax in making eff ective protests about the Protectorate's treatment of American
businessm en.

Although our representatives in Morocco were

continually informing their superiors in Washington of the
mistreatment and discrimination affecting our commerce in the
. ar-ea, the policy-making level- in the department preferred to
ignore the plight of a few Americans rather than alienate the
French.

It remained for agencies not connected with the

State Department to assume the role that it should have performed.

~-: ·.

The director of the Economic Cooperation Administra;..

·31Editorial, The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 22_2
(January 28, 1950), p:-10 .
3 2Edmund Stevens, North Af rican Powder Keg (New York:·
Coward McCann, Inc., 195?), P• 90 .
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t ion was very concerned with the unfair restrictions imposed
by France on American business, because it was his responsibility to assist the economic recovery of Europe, and he felt
that no progress could be made in this task when artificial
and discriminatory regulations hampered the natural growth of
trade.

He stated that Americans \'lere being forced to abandon

their businesses in Morocco

b~cause

of:

..,.._...

Inequitable administration of certain exchange control
regulations, discriminatory valuation of imports for
custom purposes, and the application to Americans of a
number of laws and regulations to which this Government
. has not given its ass~nt.3J
When Americans began complaining directly to Congress
about the French actions in Morocco, more positive results were ·
effected than re retofore.

The complaints of forty independent

American businessmen carried a great deal of weight in Washington, and Congress added the Hickenlooper Amendment to . the
appropriation _scl!-eduled to implement the European Recovery
Program.

This addition instructed the PresiQ.ent to

~ithh,old

all funds from "any nation of which a dependent area fails

• • • to comply with any treaty to which the United States
and such dependent

area are partieson34

This restriction was

obviously aimed at France's violation of the Moroccan-Ameriean

~.,

-J3Paul Hoffman, quoted in The Saturday Evening . Post,
p. 10.

34John A. l\!Iarcum, "The United States and Morocco,"
Middle Eastern _Affairs, Vol. 8 \'J!t'rruar"-y' 1-957), p. 3 •
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_treaty of l8J6 that prohibited any discrimination against
Americans and provided that we would always be .accorded "most
favored nation» status in the

Shereefian Empire.

Congress' efforts to -halt the tactics of the
torate officials were hindered by ttie attitude of

Prot~c

th~ · State

·

Department which, instead of insisting that the treaty ri ghts

of ~ t·he·

United States be recogni zed·,

~egan

negotiating with

France for the purpose of waiving American commercial
judicial privileges altog ether.

and --

A group of Ame-ricans who

called themselves th .e American Trade Association of .r.'i orocco
obtained a Federal injunction restraining Secretary of ·state
-Acheson from setting as-ide without the consent · of the Seriate
any treaty regulations which "pertained" to economic rriat t ·ers. -.
-__,_:State Department lawyers were a_b le to have this order vacated, .
-but by the time the Americans . in Morocco . were able to start
'appeal proceeding,s , France ·brou ght the whole matter--o f

.t h e

-s:-p ecial rights of United States citizens before the i riter-· ~
= -

national Gourt of Justice at the Hague.J5
V.

~ -- -

FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES AT THE HAGUE

When the Hickenlooper Amendment began to threaten the
_e.c onomic aid to France, the French presented the whole problem
..
.

--

- ;.___..
- .... :: -

.

3 5Robert Emmet Rodes, "-Treaty Ri ghts in Morocco,"
Export Trade and Shipper, {October 4., 1954), p. 9.

-
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of trade restrictions in Morocco to the Hague.

In a long

petition presented to the fifteen black-robed judges, France
maintained that since the United States had recognized the
French Protectorate in 1917, it was now the American responsibility to allmv !''ranee to conduct the internal affairs of
Morocco in whatever way it saw fit.

The French lawyers

brought up the matter of Article Twenty-four of the Treaty of

1836 that gave the United States a "most favored nation"
status,.

Th.e....French stated that since no other nation was

availing itself of any special privileges in· .fviorocco, obviously the United States had no more claim to a unique position
there.

Continuing in this vein,

France asserted that the

"open door" guarantees written into the

A~t

of Algeciras had

been superseded by the ·a greements initiated during World War II ·
•

covering commerce in Morocc6.3 6

!

I

The defense of the . United States began with ·the denial
that this country had ever forma~ly recognized the :Treaty of
Fez, which was the legal basis for the French Protectorate.
The records. were revie-vJed for the court, and it was -apparent
that since this country had merely recognized the existence

'

'i

of the Prot.e ctora:te, it could not be assumed that we were- .in
any way bound by the Franco-Moroccan treaty.

Furthermore,

3 6"Fr~nce to Petition Internationa:L. Court of Justice
on Moroccan Treaty Ri ghts," The Department of State -Bulletin,
Vol. 23 (December 11, 1950), p. 951.
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the United States contended that since it had never agreed to
any special import controls concerning i•Ioroccan trade during
World War II, that this country could not conceivably be under
any obligation to give up the guarantees provided by the Act
·~

of Algeciras)?

As far as France's allegation was concerned

that the United States was clinging to trmost favored nation"
status when all other countries had renounced this special
privilege, it was soon demonstrated that while most of Europe
had done so, the Republic of France had continually asstuned
special economic privileges i ·n the Shereefian Empire which
it was unwilling to share with the ~-rorld) 8
When it became obvious to the French that their legal
grounds for

protest were very "Vleak, they resorted to angry

words about American "passport merchants" who hid . behind
·~

..•

their citizenship to evade French monetary controls .3 9

They

complained about the anachronistic attitude of the United
States toward Moroccan trade regulations--a complaint whicl'l .
sounded a little ironic when presented by representatives of
an out-dated · colonial system.

The French lawyers charged the

Americans with trying to make a ttquasi-protectorate" out of

3 ?"Watch Morocco," Fortune, (September, 1951), p~ 198.
3BJoseph Mo Sweeney, "Treaty Rights . of the United
States in Moroccot n Department of State .Bulletin, Vol. 27
(October 20, 1952J, p. 620o

3 9nwatch Morocco," loc. · cit.
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Morocco, and the United States countered with the more
realistic charge that France was trying to weld Morocco to
their economy.40

However interesting these accusations and

counter-charges may have been, they did not alter the facts
of the case; therefore, the judges of the court directed the
litigants ·to compl-e..t ,.e their legal arguments and to await the
decision.
The final ruling of the International Court, presented
on August 27, 1952,

stat~d

that the ftopen doorh policy

l~id

down at Algeciras was not merely an empty phrase that had
lost its vitality, and that France was not to have a privileged status in Moroccan trade.41

The court add-ed that:

• • • in economic affairs, France is accorded no
privileged position in Morocco • • • • The United States
can claim to be treated as favorably as France as · far as
econond.c matters in Morocco are coricerned.42 ·
While upholding the economic position of the Uriit$d
States in Moroccan matters, the Hague denied the American
contention that the prior assent of this country was required
before its citizens were obliged to obey Moroccan laws.43
This meant that Americans would be subject to any taxes laid
do\vn by the Protectorate authorities,. but i _f these exactions

40"1v1orocco," Time, Vol. &J (September 8, 1952), . p. 46.
4lsweeney, loc~ cit.
42Rodes, ££• cit., p. 9.
43sweeney,

QEo

cit., p. 621.
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were .c onnected with import duties or other trade regulations,
the French would also be subject to them.

The jurisdiction

of the United States consular courts was upheld in certain
instances involving Americans only, but in all other cases,
Moroccan--that. is, French--courts were given the responsibility to dispense justice.
Although t h e final judgement of the Hague did not completely satisfy either side in the controversy, t he United
States was vindicated in its basic contention that France had
been

d~scriminating

against American interests in Morocco and

that the French decree of 1948, which imposed special import
duties and restrictions on the products of all countries but
France, was

illegal~

However, while France acted quickly to

enforce the court's ruling about the. jur.isdiction of · American
consular courts, it proved unable, for some not-so-obscure
reason, to rectify the inequities practiced against· American
business.44
The only attempt t he French made to ab.ide by the
economic ruling of

the International Court was to· stop the

embargo on American imports, but the effect of this important
step was nullified by a new currency restriction which
blocked the exchange of funds derived from the sale of American products.

This maneuver effectively curta.i led A:rn.e rican

44st evens, .2.E. cit • , pp. 90 f •

233
business because there '\'las no legal way that our importers
could replenish their stock.45

Because the State Department

did not take an active part in protestinE these violations of
the Hague decision, it remained for the American Trade Association of Morocco, headed by Robert E. Rodes, to carry the
fight to the attention of Congress and to the American people •.
The trade group presented evidence to the Senate Foreign

Rela~

tions Committee shovving · that continued violations of American
trade rights by French authorities made it economically impossible for Americans to compete in lv.iorocco.

Although Congress

repeatedly ordered th.e State Department to remedy the situation,
the Department claimed that it was negotiating to that .· end but
could not proceed too fast for fear of irritating the French
into cancelling all American-Moroccan agreements.
Rodes' spirited defense of American trade rights in
Morocco impressed everyone but the French Protectorat-e officials, who took the a pparent acquiescence of the State Department to their actions as license to continue their violations·
of our treaty rights.

Without the act.ive support of our

official representatives in Morocco, Rodes and his group of
American businessmen were forced to go out of business or to
comply with the illegal restrictions inflicted on them, while

45Robert Emmet Rodes, "Morocco," (paper .read at the
Junior World Trade Club, New York Com~erce and Industry Assoc.,
September 21, 1 954), p. 10. (I~ imeographedo)
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the United States carried on "conversations" with the French
t o solve the problem.

Since the Frerich governm.ent could pro-

trac.t its discussions for a far greater time than our businessmen could let their operations stagnate, it was obvious to
Rodes that his battle was lost for the present.
__ Presumably, Mr. Achesori was trying to persuade the
-~~ - ,. ;.,;-~·

.

French to comply with the

H~gue's

ruling, but it was evident

~ :~o:."' -·

that he was not trying very hard.
~

The Department continually

-

maintained that if France was pressed too hard, _i t would not
join ·• he European Defense Community, and when it refused to
joiJl_,..for a totally different reason, t h en it was the German
~-

-~

""=''"'

:"~

.

rea~ent agreement which was supposed to be in the balance.46

•

' ... •i: .... •. ".<;>

•• - - ~

- - . - ::·- """'

With the collapse of American Trade Association in Morocco,
controversy over trade rights lost its impetus, and the Protecto-rate officials were able to continue to give preferential
treatment to French businesses and imports •
.......__'The history of the efforts o.f the United States_ to
maintain the concept of economic freedom in Morocco under the
Protectorate presents a record of French obstructionism and
lack -of regard f or either the sovereignty of Morocco, concern
for its economic well-being, or the ri ghts of other nations.
With independence gained by Morocco, in 1956, and th-e abandonment of extra-territorial right.s by the United _States, the

-·
46stevens, QE• cit., p. 9lo
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problem of French restrictions on American trade obviously
was solved; it remained for the next few years .t o show just
what American business could expect in a free Morocco •

..

·'

CHAPTER IX
UNITED STATES AND THE PROTECTORATE: DIPLOMATIC RELATIO NS
The major point of contention between the United States
and French Protectorate authorities during the period between
the Treaty of Fez in 1912 and f.'l oroccan independence in 1 956
was the matter of American rights in the Shereefian Em pire.
In 1880, this country had departed from its traditional
policy of non-interference in foreign matters when it joined
the

majo~

powers of Europe t 'o regularize capitulations and

extra-territorial rights in IVIorocco.

The United States was

very particular about what it considered the obligations of
the Sultan and the Fren.ch to recognize these privileges and
to do all in their pO'\·rer to guarantee that the special rights
of United States citizens be maintained.
States thought that these rights

Why the United

were so important and what

meth.ods its diplomats used to preserve them will be discuss.ed
in this section of the survey covering · the first four decades
of the twentieth century.
I.

THE PERDICARIS AFFAIR

Even before the French asstuned control of the Sultan's
.country, the United States was involved in d{plomatic intercourse aimed at the preservation of the capitulation privileges gained by the treatie.s of 1 83 6 and 1880.

Our first
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skirmish o ver this matter in the present . century was the
gre_a tly overrated Perdicaris af f air--one of the reasons that
Theodore Roosevelt became aware of the existence of Tviorocco
and its possible importance to American forei gn policy.

On

l>Iay 18, 1904, the Moroccan tribal leader Mohammed Raisuli
~

kidnapped Ion

Perdica~is

and his stepson from their villa on

the' outskirts of Tangier, and t h e immediate demands for their
release niade by Samuel Gummere, the United States consul, were
completely i gnored. 1

'

-..

~

Raisuli's interest in Perdicaris was

not primarily the amount of ransom he could extort._

Hewas ·

more interested in seriously embarrassing Abdul Aziz in an
effort to force the Sul.t an . to g ive him an important post in
the government.

"

i

That Perdicaris happened to be a naturalized

American was merely an accident of fate in so far as · Raisuli' s
plai].S we'r e . concerned, but that fact did . play a decisive role

..,., . .
(
~

in American interest in the matter •
When it became obvious that the Sultan 1tias pow~rless to

'

•

cope with the situation, both Great Britain and the United
States sent elements of their naval units to Tangier to give.
their representatives some support and . to reemphasize their
extra-territorial rights in the Maghreb.

This act was merely

a gesture, for Raisuli, who was r eported to have seen the

lpaper.s Relat:i.ng to For e i g n Af f airs (Washington: United
States Governm ent P rinting Off ice, 1864-1 957), · Vol. 1904,
p. 496. · (Hereafter referred to as P RFA.)
~

'

=-

battleships, was not overly impressed by their ability to
effect any change in the plans that he was carrying out. ·
After five weeks of negotiations, during which time the bandit took very good care of his prisoners even to the extent
of sending to their home fo't' blankets and clean clothes,
arrangements were made to return the men in exchange for a
seventy thousand dollar ransom.2
Roosevelt and Hay, althot!gh knowing that the release
of the prisoners was practically accomplished, used the incident to stir up the Republican convention with the famous
phrase, '"We want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead•"

The

statement elicited resounding applause for Roosevelt and
helped to carry the day for his party, but it is

no\'T

evident

that the State Department had good reason to suppose that
Perdicaris was not an American citizen and that Roosevelt was
also aware of this when he presented Hay's ultimatum to his
audience ..J
Two days aft.e r this phrase

\'TaS

composed-~but

certainly

not as adirect result of it--Gummere cabled that he expected
to hc:we Perdicaris back by nightfall.

The following day,

June 25, Perdicaris himself wired his thanks to the Presid.e nt

2 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt--! Biography .(New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931), p. 389.
.
3rhomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of ·the American
People (New York: F. S. Crafts and Company, l947T, p. 560.
.
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and to the State Department for their part in his safe
return.

Ultimately, the l'-1oroccans were required to reimburse

the United States for its exp ense in the Perdicaris affair,
and the whole incident served to weaken further the prestige
of the Sultan and to convince the world that Moroccan affairs
needed drastic reorganization.
II.

EVENTS LEADI NG TO THE PROTECTORATE

·After the Act of Algeciras was ratified by all participants at the conference, the United States decided that it
-~

.. needed an "envoy
in Morocco to
adequately.

-.~:>.."traordinary

r. E:::p~esent__"'~~ e

and minister plenipotentiary"

interests · of this country more

Secretary of State John Hay complained that

European powers had ministE;!rs at the court of the Sultan and
were able to bring their grievances directly to Abdul Aziz,
but

t4..e . ~ Uniteg.

States

CC?l'!~ul

was required to · remain iri Tan-

gier and to carry on his business with the Makhzen (th~
Moroccal! government) through intermediaries or by correspond- ·
:-- ....

,_-:·-~ -

ence.4 ' The United States Senate agreed with Hay, and Gummere
was forthwith invested

~~th

the rank of minister.

Our new

minister had a long audience with the Sultan and reported at

4united States Congress, Hous e of Representatives,
Letter from J ohn Hay to 1. M. Shaw, December 19, 1904, in
House Docum ent s, 58t h Congress, )rd Session, · 1904-05, .Serials
Set 4830, Docum ent 1 86, p. 2.
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length concerning his reception.

During the meeting , Gummere

presented a personal letter from President Ro0sevelt to

~he

Sultan which expressed interest in Horocco and its future
prosperity and stability.

In turn, Abdul Aziz replied that

he was happy to welcome the representative of the "celebrated,
great, and exalted nation, with whom there h_a s been much pure
friendship and supreme confidence in times past .and now
renewed."5
For nearly a year after this audience_, relations
between the Sultan's government and that of the United States
were marked by :no.. discord?,nt events.• · In fact, Morocco went
out of its way to. .. permit
the extradition of a Chicago crimi.
··. ··: :·
.

;,

nal, who was being detained in the United States legation in
.

-~ -- f ·• · ~·

. ·~· ,.._

Tangier, even though this country had no treaty with the
Shereefian .Empire covering such an eventuality.6
1907

brougnt_ .w~4.

it

r~~;!, ings

However,

of discontent from the Moroc-

can population over increased European interference in their
affairs; Abdul Az.;i.z

hq.d,,;..~~-en force~

ment's budget by borrowing from

to balance his govern-

French financiers and was

therefore obliged to introduce some very unpopular taxes to

5Letter from Samuel Gummere to Secretary of State Hay,
Fez; September 29, 19067 in PRFA, .2.£• cit., Vol. 1906,
part 2, pp. 1170 f. ·
·
ctetter from Gummer e to Hay, Tangier, September 6,
1906, in ibid., p. 1163.
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repay the mounting debt.
In August 1907, the unrest came to a head in the suburbs of Casablanca where the French were in the process of
constructing a narro\>T gauge railroad inland from the sea.
Either through ignorance or thoughtlessness, the surveyors of
the road had laid out its route through a Muslim cemetery,
and when the construction crew began to work there,
riot ensued

in which nine Europeans were killed.

a

serious

The French

immediately took it upon themselves to pti.nish the riati ves by .
landing .m arines in Casablanca; and when this illegal inva~.

·

sion ~·was·

resisted by the populace, the French navy bombarded

the native section of the city.

French diplomats illl1'1tediately

tried
explain this action and to obtain \vorld approval;
•• • M
-to
·
<

-::. ~

the French ambassador in the United States gave his side of
the incident and just·ified the move by referring to "the
manifest inab..ility of the :Moorish Government to provide for
safety" of the city and to control the natives. 7

The United

State.s was noncommittal concerning its opinion of France's
a ·c tions, only insisting that the ri ghts arid property of
Americans be guaranteed by both Horocco and Franceo
When the !vioroccans were not able to give assurances
· that were satisfactory to France of their ability to restore
order and to protect foreign lives and property,

Spain and

7PRFA, QE• cit., Vol • . l907, part 2, pp. 889 f.
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France joined units of their armies to provide a police
force.8

Rabat and Casablanca were occupied, and exhorbitant

bills were presented to the Makhzen for damages and expenses
incurred by the occupying forces--a total of over seventythree million francs.

This . tremendous debt could not be met,

but even to begin to pay it, the Sultan again was forced to
impose prohibitive new taxes that met with such opposition
that eventually he was forced from his throne.9

Our repre-

sentative in Tangier reported that Mulai Hafid, a brother of
Abdul Aziz, had succeeded in gaining the allegiance of
southern Morocco,lO and on January J, 190.8, Hafid formally
declared himself the new sultan of I'-1orocco.
In connection with this event, the Spanish informed
the United States that the situation was so confused that
Spain was going to take forceful measures to help the French
to restore order, and they were particularly anxious to deter:mine just what the reaction of the State Department would ·be
to their intervention.ll

The Secretary of State informed the

8rb id., p. 895 • .
. 9Rom Landau, Mor?ccan D:r:-~a l2QQ-1.222
. (San Francisco: .
Amer1can Academy of As1an Stum. es, 1956), p. 63.
lOLetter from Gummere to Elihu Root, Tangier, August
24, 1907, in PRFA, .2£• cit., Vol. 1907, part 2, p. 894.
1

~

~vremorandum from the Spanish Legation to Root, \~lashington, January 17, . 1908, in PRFA, .2£• cit~, Vol. 1908, p. 642.

,.,

243
Spanish minister that:
/Jhe United States would oppose ni/ action as may .
prove necessary to pr otect life and property, to secure .
for all peo ples the widest e quality of trade and privi- ·
lege wit h Morocco, and to f a ci lit a te t he institution of
reforms in that country tend i ng to insure complete
cordiality of intercourse wit hout and stability oi
administration within .for t h e conunon good.12
With an

app~oval

such as the foreg oing that could be stretched

to cover almost any actions that the French and Spanish might
take, these two nations continued to consolidate their position in Morocco.
The next move that France made to impose its control
was to call a conference of the Powers in Casablanca for the
purpose of settling the damag€ claims ·made in connection with
the bombard:nent of that city.

The United States demanded a

representative at any meeting that was to be held to consider
these claims even though its ovm finq.ncial interests were
very minor, and our . representative in Tangier informed the
French that the United States \'.rould not abide , by any decision
of the Claims Conmission unless this country had a direct
part in the negotiations.l3 . Before the c6nference . was really
under\vay, Roosevelt strengthened the hand of the French for
their future ambitions in North Africa when, in a fit of

12Letter from Root to Spanish Minister in Washington;
·washington, January 20, 1908, in ibido, p . 643.
1

•

13Letter from Act i ng Secretary of State Robert Bacon
to Gummere, Washington, Juiy 2, 1 90 8, in l.bid o, P• 636 •

.. .

.
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pique, he exclaimed to the French ambassador:
As for the Moorish business, I wish to Heaven, not
in your interests but in the interest of civil~zed mankind, that France could take all Morocco under he~
exclusive charge.l4
The French must have been gratified to be assured even so
i nformally that the United States would not be averse to a
French regime in Morocco if the rights of American citizens
were guaranteed.
The proceedings of . the Casablanca Claims Commission
dragged on for months while thousands of claims--both spurious
and legitimate--were analyzed and debated.

The only contribu-

tion to its operation made by the United States was an agree..;
ment not to present the claims of any "doubtful" citizens,
and that provision should be made for future cancellation of
~

any claims by iridividuals .who later pro·y ed to hav-e falsified

.

their citizenship declarations.l5

'",

.

Aft..er having organized and operated the Casablanca
meeting to suit their interests, the next move the French made

,,

was to secure the recognition of MulaiHafid by the United
States.

Coupled with the req1,1est for recognition; the French

added a list of items that they were preparing to demand from

14Elting E. ·Morison, (ed.), The Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Un{versity Press, 1951),
.Vol. VI, p. ll48.
•

l5Dispatch from .Bacon to Gummere, Washington, July 2,
190$, in PRF A, .2.£. cit • , Vol • 190 8, p. 63 6.
..

-

-
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245 -the new Sultan as the price of their support.l6

Since these

demands were primarily aimed at reinforcing the. provisions of
the Act of Algeciras, the United States, ·-although not enthusiastic about fUrther meddling in European affairs, agreed in
~-

.

princip-a l to the French request.

The State Department, how-

--

ever, objected to the specific provisions which regulated the
rights of foreigners to own property in Morocco and insisted

itS.rhe . French demanded the following items

f~~ --;Iui~i

Hafid:
1. They insist.ed that the Sultan adhere to the Act of
Algeciras and should promise to honor any regulations that
might be proposed as a result of the Conference of 1906. Ftirthermore, the French added, "It should not be forgotten, in
fact, that if this act constitutes the international conse.;..
cration of the independence of the Shereefian Empire, it ·
assures:_at the same time the . s~afety of foreign interests in
Morocco."

-

2. The traffic in arms would still be considered
illegal and would be controlled by international agreement.

J. The new government -must assume the debts contracted
by Abdul Aziz.

4. '!'he Casablanca meetings must be continued to settle
the damage claims, and the Sultan must "assume responsibility
of the decisions of that comrnission whose decisions he will
confirm~"

5.

The Sultan must disavow and halt all calls for a
holy war against European powers.
6. None of the foregoing statements nor any subsequent
agreements with any country would be permitt~d - ~o.interfer~
with the rights of Spain and France to . deal lndlVlduC}lly Wlth ."Morocco on any future problems that may arise.
Memorandum fro_m the French Embassy in vlashington to
Root, September 14, . 1908, in PRFA, QE• cit., Vol. 1908, P· 644.

that the privileges of ·Americans in this regard not be abrogated in any way.

Furthermore, the United States

r~jected

the suggestion that incom1ng dipl om atic pouches by searched
by the French for contraband.l7

Roosevelt and Root agreed to recognize the new Sultan
of Morocco and sent him the following dispatch:
The Go-vernment of the United States • • • is now prepared to announce its readiness to assent to the recognition of l•Iulai Hafid irt general terms • • • · , but provided ·
that substantial guarantees s hall -be given by Mulai Hafid ·
of his purpdse and his ability to accept and discharge
all conventional obli gations incurred by. former sover:eigns of r•iorocco, as \"Tell as those of th~ Algeciras Actand of those growing out of treaty ri ghts and international law, so that t h e interests of the United States
.- _- a~d its citizens in Morace~ shfll rest on equal footing .
w1.th those of other countr1.es.
· .
. ·
,
- · --

- ..

Spain and France sent similar notes to the Sultan and _a copy

to Root in which they also insisted that H:afid assure them
that he would guarantee to carry out . the wishes arid demands
that the pO\'iers had set down in previous correspondence.

The

United States -approved the note that· the French sent the
I

Sultan and stated that if Mulai Hafid would grant the United
States "most favored nation" status _in Morocco, it would
recognize his regime. · When Hafid agreed to our terms, on

___ . _ . ~?PRFA, .Q.E• cit., Vol. 1909, p. 440.
..
18Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest . of: I nt ernational Law
(Washington: United States Gover nment Printi ng Office, 1940),
Vol. I, pp. 307-8.
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December 17, 1908, Root sent a note of formal recognition to
Gummere who passed it on to the Sultan's representative in
Tangier. 1 9
By the time France had moved into Fez in 1911 and precipitated a crisic with Germany which provoked the "Panthertt
. incident in Agadir, the United States had changed leaders and
foreign policy.

The dynamic and forceful Roosevelt had passed

on his mantle of .o ffic-e to William Howard Taft, who revealingly remarked about his predecessor, "Our ways are different
• • • n20

Nowhere was this judgement more evident than in

Taft's conduct of the forei gn policy of his country.

The

"Big Stickn that Roosevelt had wielded so effectively · gave
way to "Dollar Diplomacy" and to an era when the criteria for
deciding whether this country should interfere in foreign
matters depended upon the extent that Ame.r ican business
interests were involved.
France was able to placate an aroused Germany . by buying her agreement to the occupation of Morocco with some
territory in French Equatorial Africa.

In exchange for this,

Germany agreed not to interfere nor object to France's

mili~

tary occupation and its representation of I•loroccan q.omestic

19PRFA,

QE.•

cit., Vol. 1908, p. 648.

20Bailey, op.cit., _p. 577 • .

-- .-

-

--

~

.. ~·

.-~,:.

and foreign interests. 21

On November 4' 1911, the two Euro-

pean powers signed an agreement that "legalized!' the French
oos-±·t ion, and Germany showed tha t it had learned to play the
colonial game \'fell. 22 Even though the crises at Fez and at
Agadir were far more serious to world peace than the trouble
prior to 1906 had been, Taft decided that the United States
had fulfil l ed its responsibility to Morocco at the conference
at Algeciras and would have nothing to do with France's
app-eal to recognize its pact with Germanyo2J

Secretary of

State Philander C. Knox informed the French ambassador that:
In conformity with traditional American foreign policy ·
. which forbids participation by the United States in the
settlement of political questions . which ai"e entirely
-, European iri their scope, this GoverrLilent must refrain
from ariy expression of opinion for or against such • • •
French-German agreement in relation to Morocco as may
be- deemed of a political nature.24

:rrr.

..
THE PROTECTORATE ESTABLISHED

Taft's reluctance to participate in any further l\'Ioroccan affairs played directly into the hands of the French who
_w ere anxious to assert their power over the Sultan 1 s kingdom.•

.,;~

21Hackworth, .2.E• cit., Vol. I, p. 87.
22Landau, op. cit., p. 81.

23Foster Rhea Dulles, The Imnerial Years (New York:
·
Thomas Y. Crowell .Co., 1956),p. 301.
24Letter from Secretary of State Philander C. Knox to
the French Ambassador, Wash:i_ngton, December 11, 1915, in PRFA,
.QE• cit., Vol. 1911, pp. 622-J.
t..
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- ---k2 49-II1 1905, when European nations wanted the help of the United
States at Algeciras, , they used all of their wiles to encourage Roosevelt to participate
in European affairs, but when
.
· ·~ -

France decided to establish a protectorate over
~uickly

Mo~occo,

it.

remembered that the United States was a "purely Amer-

ican" power that had no business in European-African disputes.25

Therefore, France pressured the Makhzen into acced-

ing to the Treaty of Fez on March 30, 1912, and not until the
treaty was officially recognized by both parties and the protectorate was an accomplished fact did it inform the United
States of the proceedings.
Even though France had not received the approval of
the United Stat.es to its preemptory usurpation of Moroccan
sovereignty, its officials began interfering with the business
and daily lives of Americans and their proteges.

Within a .

few months after the Protectorate took control of Fez, the
State Department began receiving complaints about the way
American rights were being ignored, and the United States
consul protested that even though the French regime had not
been formally established nor accepted by . the Pmvers, . it was
already assillning right·; that conflicted with existing Maroc..,..
can .t reaty commitments.26

Therefore, when our consulate was

·
25Arthur Bullard, The Di~lotnacy of the Great War
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 191), p. 284.
26r.etter from Fred W. Carpenter to Knox, Tangier,
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i nformed that because of unrest in certain parts of

r~i orocco,

f oreigners could not be guaranteed safe passage outside of
metropolitan areas, the State Department insisted that the
French be responsible for the protection of any American in
t he country.

It was pointed out that since the French had

arrogated to themselves the task of governing Morocco and had
committed themselves to guarantee the treaty obligations . of
the Maghreb, the "establishment of the French Protectorate
would seem to imply that the responsibility for the protection of foreigners rests with Fra.n ce. n 2 7
· By 1913, all of the powers that had been involved in
the conference at Algeciras, with the exception of the United
States, had agreed

to France's protectorate in Morocco by

initialling the Franco-German accord of 1911.

The French took

a dim view of the American attitude, especially since this
country eJq)ected the Protectorate government to guarantee
American ri ghts but refused toapprove formally France's
assumption of power

~n

the Shereefian Empire.

The French

ambassador in Washington met on several occasions with .t he
Secretary of State in an effort to persuade the · United States
to accede to French wishes, but Knox stated that this countTy

~

May 29, 1912, in PRFA, £2• cit., Vol. 1912, p •. 9S9o

27Acting Secretary of State to Maxwell Blake, Washington, March 24, 1913, in PRFA, .2£· cit., ·Vol. 1912, p. 1011.;
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could not interfere politically in European affairs; however,
he added that since France had taken control of the Sultan's
government, the United States expected it to maintain the
treaty obligations that America had with Morocco.

It was

pointed out to the French ambassador that the Treaty of Fez
was "not sufficiently detailed and concrete in its provisions
to permit its submission to this

country's treaty making

power," but if France would guarantee the rl.g}1ts of the
United States, we would view with favor the contemplated
reforms. 2 8

IV.

THE FRENCH ATTACK ON

~lliRICAN

TREATY RIGHTS

The history of the relations bet\'Ieen the United States
and the Protectorate prior to World War I is a record of disputes and negotiations over the capitulatory ·rights of America in Morocco.

ltJhen the United States firmly reasserted

that it would "refrain from -expressing any opinion concerning
the Franco-Moroccan Protectorate treaty," the French government turned its attention toward eliminating American extraterritorial privileges in the Maghreb.Z9

To open the attack,

the French representative in Washington stated that his

·;

28Letter from Knox to the French Ambassador Jules
Jusserand, Washington, January 8, 1913, in PRFA, .2.£· cit.,
Vol. 1914, p. 905.
29Ibid., January 22, 1913, p. 906.
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government found it impossible to "accept the reserve [Of the
United State.§? relative to the right of foreign representatives to act in the last resort upon the decision of the
fr! aghzenLS\~.7" in regard to natives under foreign protection.

Our minister in Paris countered with the statement that the
rights of the United States were based on a sound foundation
of precedent including such items as Article Fifteen of the
Treaty of 1$36 (see Article Fifteen, Treaty of 1786, in
Appendix A) arid the Convention ·of 1880--the latter gave the
Powers the right to grant protection to whomever they wished ·.
and ·reserved to themselves all jurisdiction in cases involving proteges )0

The American representative further stated

that the British treaty of lE-56 and the Spanish treaty of
1861, both with 1-Iorocco, guaranteed their liberty to pick and
control their own proteges; therefore, under ·the "most
favored nation"

~lause

of our treaty with Morocco, the United ·

States had the ultimate authority to choose and supervise its
employees and proteges in that country.
Havirig gotten well started, our minister proceeded to
add several other complaints to his original criticism of the
Protectorate regimeo

It was pointed out that the main

30Dispatch from the Acting Secretary of State. to J. Bo
Moore, \t~ashington, february 13, 1914, in PRFA, .Q.E• .£ll..,
Vol. 1914, p. 907. See Appendix ·Efor the text of the
Convention of 1880.
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I

purpose of the United

State~

in participating in the

Alge~

ciras conference had been to protect its economic rights
and that:
• • • this government desires equal opportunities for
American commerci a l interests not only to maintain their
present standing but alsp to share inthe country's
co~~ercial development. J l _
Specifically, the State Department objected to -the French
practice of imposing arbitrary customs duties and unreasonable import fees on non-French merchandise.

Also the com-

plaint was raised, that would reappear on many future occa.sions, that the Protectorate was unf airly discriminating
against foreign construct-ion concerns in the matter of granting contracts for public works in Morocco; specifications for
contracts neglected to state the duty rate for machinery
that would be used in fulfilling the job--a

devi~e

which made

it hazardous, to say the least, for foreign companies to
enter bids.

To finish his long list of grievances, and

undoubtedly making the French wish that they had not started
the discussion, the American representative presented a
detailed list of claims totalling over one hundred and fifty
thousand dollars that United States citizens had against Morocco and the Protectorate-.
Using the confusion in diplomatic circles occasioned

--

••

-

I
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by the

outbr~ak

of World War I, the French began encroaching

more and more on the rights of other nations in Morocco, but
since the countries of Euro pe most directly concerned with
the Moroccan situation were engaged in a struggle for their
very existence, it remained for the United States to challenge
the Protectorate.

One of France's first moves td strengthen

its position was reported by the American consul in Tangier;
in order to weaken the authority of the consular courts, the
Protectorate decided that many of the cases over which the
consuls had had jurisdiction for nearly a century would be
withdrawn from t heir control.

To add an aura of legitimacy ·

to this operation by implying that wartime expediency necessitated the change, the French decided to give the military
courts the jurisdiction instead)2

Wheri the State Department

heard of this development, it instructed its represent-ative
in Paris to

·prot~st

any waiver of American rights as _a capit.-

ulatory power and to refuse to agree to any change . in

th~

jurisdictional authority of our consular courts.33 - Although
this action on the part of the State Department did not stop
French endeavors to end American treaty rights, it _d id put

3 2Dispatch from Naxweil Blake to Secretary of State
William Jennings Bryan, Tangier, December 8, :)..915, in_ PRFA,
QE.. cit., Vol. 1915, p. 1097.
·
33nispatch from Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk
to United States Ambassador Sharp in Paris, Washington,
December 29, 1 915, in ibid., p. 1098o
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the United States

on record in t he matt er--a precedent that

would stand this country in good stead in the future.
In line wit h the Fr ench policy of i solating Iviulai
Youssef, the brother and successor of Mulai Hafid, from any
"contaminating" democratic influences, the French announced
to Secretary of State Lansing that the American consuls in
Morocco could not henceforth have any direct contact with the
Moroccan government.

If the United States had any problem

or request to present to the Makhzen, it would have to contact
the French Resident General in Rabat who was to be the only
intermediary between forei gn powers and Mulai Youssef.

There

was little that the United States could do about this decision
as our consul in Tangier was obliged to follow the system
because the other members of the diplomatic community had
agreed to do so.
The French used this new device not only to strengthen
their diplomatic position in Moro.c co, but also to advance·
their commercial relations with that country as well.

By

again us:l.ng the excuse of military necessity, the Protectorate promulgated an edict which prohibited

~y

material from

foreign countries being shipped into either Morocco or
Tunisia.. The United States registered an immediate protest
'

;;

to .the effect .that this country was not prepared to accept
such unilateral negation of rights t hat had been granted and
maintained by existing treaties; the State Department supported

-- .......

~ ·~

..:.. ~

256 - - - - this contention by referring to a similar protest made by
France when Turkey had attempted to abrogate French rights a
few years before.

However, since

th~

United States could not

send its consul to deal directly with the Sultan, it was
forced to accept grudgingly the French assurance that the
trade restrictions represented merely a phase of martial law
that would not continue after the war was overo34
As the United States came closer to full partici:pation
in the war, the French stepped· up their efforts to . persuade
the

Stat~

Department to recognize the French Protectorate and

to adhere to the Treaty of Fez,

Using the emotional

argum~nt

that it. was only fair that potential allies in a war against
aggression should cooperate to the fullest extent, the. French
ambassador in Washington exerted all of the skill at his dis_posal to sway Lansing's judgment in the matter.

Lansing

finally replied that although he would much prefer .to wait
until the war had ended before making such an important. decision, the United States . would "out of its feeling of friend~

ship for the French" begin negotiations to end capitulations
and to recognize the fact of the French Protectorate.

The

feeling of satisfaction that .t he French may have experienced
by this statement was certainly tempered by the six stipulations that the Secretary of .State added as the price for

3 4Letter from Secretary of State Robert Lansing to the
French Ambassador, Washington, January 18, 1916, inPRFA,
E.E• cit., Vol. 1916, p. 8bo.

-·
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acceding to the wishes of France.J5
The French authorities in Morocco and in Paris were
not trre- least bit pleased with the conditions that the
Secretary of State attached to the American recognition · of
the Protectorate, but they agreed in principal although
reserving some specific items _for further discussion.

By the

time th_e French had made. this ~~cis~?n, Lansing informed
them that the press of business before the Senate precluded
.i,.ts -:: ~onsideration of the formal . agreement needed bef.o re the
.

United States could abandon any rights - secured by previous
treaties.
wa~

Therefore, all that the State Department could do

to recognize the establishment of the Protectorate

t _h.rough a formal note, but the matter of extra-territoriality

~~ :~~P.itulations would have to be postponed.36

On January 15,

3 5Lansirig insisted that in re-t urn for our recognition
of the Protector-ate, the French must gUarantee (1) that the
I."_ights of Americans and of American proteges · b:e fully prot-ected, (2) that equality of busines.s opportuni.t y be estaolished as a cornerstone of Protectorate policy, (3) that the
United States be assured that its status as a "most . favor-e d ·
nation" be maintained, ( 4) that claims made by the J.Jnited
States and its citizens against Horocco and France be paid .
immediately, (5) that Amer:i,.can ri ghts ln Tangier and Spanish
Morocco muEt not be jeopardized by American recognit-ion of
the French Protectorate, and finally ( 6) that the United .
States be made
member of the proposed international court
:i:11 Tangier.

a

Letter from Lansing to the French Ambassador, Washing- .
t-:o n-,- July :, 1916, in ibid-•., --p. so3.
·
·
- - - -- J-~etter from Lansing to the French Ambassador, Washington, January 2, 1917,
PRFA, QE• cit., Vol. 1917, .p • . 1093.
Since the United States recognized the fact of the French

in

-

-

1917, the formal note from Lansing reached the French ambassador; the French were still not satisfied with the American
viewpoint, for the note read in part that the United States
recognized "the es:tablishment of the French Protectorate over
the French Zone of the Sheriffian Lsi.£7 Empire. n3 7

The

French were very disturbed. over t his phrase because they
insisted that they had the responsibility to Supervise all of
Morocco, not just the French sector. . Therefore, to placate
French feelings, the Secretary of State added in an additional
memorandum that the United States further agreed that France
had a protectorate over all of Morocco, subject to the rights
of Spain in its section.38
This final acquiescence to French demands marked the
end of ou.r active participation in
war was over and the . .peace

~Ioroccan

. ~~t::tlements

~- ~ - ..,~..,..,.:

affairs until · the

had .all been made.

If

the State Department harbored any sanguine hopes that the ces- .
sation of hostilities and the eliminatio.n of Germany from the
North African scene would lessen ·France's determination · to
subject the Maghreb entirely to its control, · the United States

•

Protectorate, it became necessary to change the status of our
minister to the court .of the Sultan. . Now that Morocco was
being controlled by Frarice, th.e United States was no ·longer
able to deal t hrough a minister with the Sultan, but was
obliged to use t h e services of a Diplomatic Agent who would
be dealing with the Protec~orate officials.
37
.
Hackworth, 2£• cit., Vol. I, p. 89 •
3 gLetter from Lansing to French Ambassador, \'J ashington,
October 20, 1917, in~' .2.£• .£1,!., Vol. 1917, p. 1096.
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was doomed to disappointment.

France had been able, through

various diplomatic means, to abrogate the special rights of
her European allies and, by defeating the Central Powers, the French had eli.minated that threat to their designs;

ho"~J~r ev~r.,

the United States had not given up any of its privileges in
Morocco, even though formally recognizing the existence of
the Protectorate.

Consequently, the first order of business

for the French Foreign Office after peace had been restored
in Europe was to find ways of reducing the effectiveness of
American privileges in I'•Iorocco.
The French reopened their argument that the Treaty · of Fez had eliminated any special American rights in Morocco,
but the United · States continued to maintain that the -protectorate treaty did not alter the privileges of proteges in the
.......

~ .- ~- ·"

Maghreb.

Neither side was satisfied with the contentions of -

the other, -~r{d~ the whole matter of French jurisdiction over
Americannationals . and proteges was to remain a serious block ·
to our relations with the French in Morocco.3 9
V..

AMERICAN RIGHTS IN TANGIER

France was not only trying to abrogate the . rights of
Americans in Iviorocco, but it was also working toward the goal

3 9nispatch from Acting Secretary of State Norman . H.
.
Davis to United States Ambassador \v allace .in France, Washington,
January 3, 1921, in PRFA, .2.1?.· cit., · Vol. 1 922, part 2, p, 736.
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...
of absorbing Tangier into its orbit.

As early as 1919, the

British began urging that a conference be held to regularize
- - - -,tb.e--status of Tang ier; they--rea·l :rzelr that since the Sultan ·of
..

Morocco had t h e nominal rule in that city and since the
French controlleJ the actions of the Makhzen, the Protectorate
officials . were rapidly strengthening their position in

.

,.

very strateg ic port.
_a

th~t·

S pain . joined Great Britain in demanding

meeting with France to formulate a statute to guarantee the

-in,ternationalization of Tangier, and on December 18, 1923,
-the three nations signed an agreement in London that organized
the administ.r ation of the international zone and . delegated
~ ~~dicial

and legislative powers to various bodies enumerated

in . the statute .40

- -· ···-- -·

- - ::-=. - ,. - While the conference was stil·r in session, the United

States sent notes to· the three nations inv'o lved, remirtding ·.
~~them

I

that although this country was: not politically concerned ·

__in· the. Tangier .problem, it nevertheless insisted that its
rights as a participant in the Algeciras conference be
respected.

The "open door" principle was ·of particular . C.on- ·

cern to the State Department, and it expressed its apprehension that our economic rights might be jeopardized by the

40For a complet.e survey of the negotiations leading to
the-Statut e of 1923 and an explanation of its results, see
Graham Stuart, The Internation.a l City o.f Tangier (Stanford,
California: Stanford Univers ity Pr ess, ·1 9 5 5), Chap·t er 6o
- '" -
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actions of the conferees.

The French informed the United

States that "all commercial rights would be maintained in the
Zone and that capitulations would not be abolished -'-before all
si gnato.ri·~;·-~f the Act of Algeciras had been notified. 41

On May 29, 1924, the State Department received notes
from France, Spain,

and Great Britain asking this country to

adhere to the Tangier Statute of 1923.

The Secretary of"

State was . not satisfied vlith the provisions of the Statute-especially Articles Thirteen and Forty-eight·- -and info:nned
the signatories of the agreement that this country was
requested to adhere to an act that did not guarantee American
economic nor diplomatic rights.
objectedto the

Specifically, the Department

provisions of Article Thirteen that called

for the abrogation of capitulations in the Tangier Zone and
the elimination of the protege system.

Article Forty-eight

also brought protests in that it called for the establishment
of a Mixed Court composed of Spanish, British, and French
judges who would have the sole responsibility of adjudication
in all legal questions in Tangier.4 2 As these provisions, if
agreed to by the United States, would have cancelled .American
privileges secured by previous .t reaties, Secretary of State
/

Hughes refused to accede to the wishes of the three nations

41 rbid., p. 79.
.
42 Hackworth,
op. cit., . Vol. I, p. 93.
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unless certain

assur~nc~s

were made that would, in effect,

have nullified the major provisions of the Statute.
The signatories of the Statute answered the complaints
of Hughes in a conciliatory manner, but the State Department
believed that the assurances made by the Powers were not sufficient to protect American rights in Tangier.

Therefore, the

State Department informed our representative in Tangier

tha~

although this . country did not wish to object to provisions of
the Statute which "did not materially affect this Government,n
he was to scrutinize carefully all legislation and actions
authorized by the Zone offiCials in order to preserve American
rights.

The Diplomatic Agent was also to notify the authori-

ties that the United States did · not recognize the right of
the Statute of Tangier to modify its long established prerogatives in the area.

Furthermore, the United States made it

plain that it would not participate in the Legislat-ive Assembly that was to control Tangi·e r, because it feit that having
only one member out of a totai membership of · twenty~nine did
n·o t give this country a sufficient voice in decisions made by
the group. 43
On June 1, 1925, the new administration of the Tangier
Zone went into effect, although three pmvers including the.
t

43Graharn H. Stuart, "The Future -ofTangier," Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 23 (July, 1945) , · p. 677.
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U nif~d.

States abstained froin participation.

of the

~w

The first move

administration was to abolish the Sanitary

Coun~

-ctf; which had- --s-erved to regulate many aspects· of' Tangier's
l ife since 1840, and to incorporate its functions into those
of the international administration.

The United States

refused to recognize the legality of this action since it
vi&.l:-&ted the Act of Alg eciras, and _it continued the operations
of the Sanitary Council even after 1929 when it became the
sole member of the body.44 ·The American representative in
Tangier sent detailed accounts of the actions of the inter- ·
national administration and expressed the opinion that such
coercive measures would continue to occur to the detriment
of American interests in Tangier.45
The United States no sooner had gone , on record as
oppcfS"lng any infringement of its rights. in Tangier, when our
diplomatic agent reported that the Shereefian g overnment was
making motions . in the dir·e ction of taking over the Cape
Spartel lighthouse.

The State Department was informed that

the Sultan's representative in Tangier notified the a gents of
the Powers that to modernize and tomake the operation of the
lighthouse more efficient, it was thought necessary to -put it

44Ibid., P• 675o
45nispatch from Diplomatic Ag ent Murphy to Secretary of
State Charles E. Hughes, Tangi er, June 4, 1925, in PRFA,
££• cit., - Vol. 1925, part 2, Po 594o

..

~ ~--~~ 
'iff

264 .

into the hands of the Makhzen.

Morocco also made some allu-

sion to the fact that the lighthouse was on its soil and not
·-·----in an international zone and __co.nsequently should be under. the

control of Moroccan-... that is, French--authorities.

Our agent,

Maxwell Blake, stated that it was common knowledge among his
colleagues that this action was l'lholly inspired by the French
advisers of the Sultan who had long wished to denounce the
Cape Spartel Convention of 1865.

Blake further pointed out

that such action would contravene the agreement made by the ·
Convention which had placed the

lighthous~

in the harids

of

the "representatives of the Powers in Tangier.n46
Blake's dispatch continued by saying:
The collective authority of the Powers is the only
effective international ·c ontrol. which has hitherto survived impairment by the French process of attrition
upon international convention in Morocco.
He expressed the fears of the other diplomatic agents in Tangier when he said that French designs on the. Straits of
Gibraltar would be furthered by placing the control of the
very strategic lighthouse in the hands of the Moroccan government, which represented the interests of the Protectorate.
Blake even viewed with great suspicion .the Ivlakhzen's offer to
repair .and to maintain the lighthouse becaus .e he looked on

46nisp~tch from Maxwell Blake to Secretary of State
Frank B. Kellogg, Tangier, March 11, 1926, in PRFA, £E• cit.,
Vol. 1926, part 2, p. 743.

t

-

-

-·-

- - ·- - . - 2 6 5---

this as merely a wedge toward ultimate control.47

-

The United

States did not agreeto the plan reported by its agent and
instructed him to register its objections"in strong- terms -. - - - - - As a result of this country's protests, France did not pursue
the matter any further, and Congress continued to allot a
small sum as the American share in the upkeep and operation
of the Cape Spartel lighthouse.4S
In an effort to . strengthen its position in Morocco,
the French were forced to reorganize the T.angier Zone and its
administration.

Although France would have been perfectly

happy to continue the procedures set up in 1923, the Italians
were becoming increasingly bitter about their exclusion from
the original statute.

In 1928, because of this Italian pres-

sure, the three signatories of the Statute of 1923 agreed to
invite Mussolini's representative to .a conference in Paris
for the purpose of revising the original regulations.
The only participation that the . United States had in
the Paris conference was through a series of notes in which
it expressed interest iri the fact that . some plans were under
way to modify existing conditions in Tangier.

The memoranda

reminded the conferees that the United States had been c·oncerned, in 1923, with prot.ectirig the rights of all .signatories

47Ibid., p. 745.
48stuart, · "The Future of Tangier," QE• . cit., p. 675.
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of the Act of Algeciras.

.

The notes also reiterated the Jact ·

.

that this country "makes full reservations of its position on
any decision taken by the Conference which in any way affect
•• ·" its rights .h9

France replied to this note in the name

of the Conference by inviting an American observer to the
meetings and by assuring the State Department that the new
proposals would affect only the administration of the city
and would not alter the existing economic rights of the
United States.50

Notwithstanding the assurance and the invi-

tation of the French, the United States preferred to remain
al_o of from the deliberations at Paris, and when the revised
statute was approved by the conference in July, 1928, America
declined to adhere to it .•

VI.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SPANISH ZONE -

Taking their cue from their French mentors, the Spanish authorit.ies ·in the northern zone began pressing the
United States to abandon its special rights. · As far back as
1915, Spain had futilely requested that this country officially recognize its authority and relinquish our capitulatory rights in the Spanish zone; fi-n ally, in desperation,

49Hackworth, .2.£• cit., Vol. II, p .. 511.
50stuart, .The . International City of Tangier, .21?.• cit.,

?·
p. 103

,.

0
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in 1927, the Spanish authorities even went so far as to offer
to settle the many outstanding claims that this country had
against Spain in connection with its operation of the protectorate.

This move was dictated by the desire of Spain to

levy new taxes

in its zone, and unless the United . States

would agree to the taxes, none of the American proteges could
be forced to pay.51
~ecretary

of State Kellogg suggested that the claims

of the United States be settled in Tangier where Blake and
the Spanish Consul General would be able to meet with the
claimants to determine the validity of their cases.

T.o

assist in these negotiations, the State Department prepared
an extensive list that showed just how much was claimed and
under what circumstances t he claims had come about.
Spanish objected to a number of items that
t~e

\-Tere

The

included, on

grounds that. rebels in the Spanish zone had been respon-

sible · for the actions that led to .the claims.

Kellogg, . quot-

ing the precedent of .the Casablanca ·Claims Commission of

1907-8, stated that, since the Spanish claimed to represent
the Makhzen in the northern zone, they were responsible for
all that occurred there.

Neither side would agree that the

other had legitimate argume~ts to support its case, and Blake

51Letter from the Spanish Charge J.VIariano Amodeo to
Kellogg , \'l ashington, July 26, . 1927, in PRFA, QE• cit.,
Vol. 1927, part 3, p. 272·.
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~as

becoming increasingly disturbed at the delay.

He began

urging the State Department to reach some kind of a compromise so that American businessmen, who were very interested
at the time in engaging in construction projects in the
Spanish zone, would have an opportunity to enter bids.

How-

ever, neither the Americans nor the Spanish were disposed to
hurry, and seemingly endless discussions and exchange of
notes continued throughout 1928.5 2
The early 1930's were a repetition of the previous
decade as far as American-Spanish relations in the northern
zon~ we~e

concerned.

Blake carried on endless

correspond~nce

and engaged in lengthy conferences with his Spanish colleagues
that at first seemed to be bearing fruit, -but just when a
solution was about to .b e reached, the Spanish government repudiated nearly all of the claims that had been established as
authentic.

In a. dispatch to the State Department, Madrid

insisted that the United States renounce all of its extraterritorial rights, including capitulations, before talks
could be resumed toward settling even the few remaining
claims.

This move so angered Henry 1. Stimson, the new -

Secretary of State, that he directed our agent in Tangi-er to
break off further talks with the Spanish representative and
;

52PRFA,

.

1

QE• cit., Vol. 1928, part

J, pp. 344 ff •

.

-.:....

to ignore completely the Spanish note.53

The dispatches from

Tangier; continued to indicate to the State Department that
---the- chances of settling ""the --matter of American C"faims -were
steadily worsening, and it was not until 1936 that any
serious effort was made by either side to re·-negotiate
· -

problem.
·-

·~-:; - ~"'

.

--

-- --:---

--.~

the~

... ::

Tn the meantime, the Spanish had continued -to treat

American rights with complete disregard--refusing to pay any
attention to the . protests and complaints of our commercial
interests, and . ignoring the letters sent by American officials
.in Tangier.
.;c._"~~~x

In 1934, the

Spanish :L'l'lposed a discriminatory

.:. on foreign "\'-T heat and flour.

This import duty amounted to

-OI'!e hundred per cent of the .value of the shipments and, for
al.+. _practical purposes, virtually eliminated American compe- .
titian.

The Spanish customs officials used devices similar

. to those of their French c-o unterparts by -reYusTng to -a11ow ·
-sh-ipments of American goods ·to enter' their zone until --long
.

.

and unnecessary delayl:) hadspoiled the products or added prohibitive storage costs to the

prices~

Spain attempted· to .

solve another problem--that of inflation in their zone caused
by faulty fiscal policies--by fixinga maximum -selling price
on many objects that pr_o ved to be far belm'l the actual qost

53

-

rbid. _, Vol. 1929, part 3, pp. 492 f • ·

- - -

~
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of the commodity ..54
Undoubtedly these harassing techniques·were aimed at
coercing the United States into agreeing to abandon its
capitulations and to recognize the Protectorate.

In 1935,

our ambassador in Madrid reported that Spain was becoming
increas_ingly unhappy about the situation in Spanish Morocco
because the retention of special rights by the United States
constituted a shame and a disgrace to Spanish honor.

Spaj_n

insisted that it would be able to go.vern its territory more
efficien.t ly and
implied that any
commercial injustices would
'
.
be cleared u p when it was permitted a free hand in the
northern zone.

Ending on a plaintive note, the Spanish

informed the United States that the only reason they were in
Morocco was to keep the French from usurping control of the
entire Country; COilS equently, it '\'TaS suggested that America
should show some gratitude for the important job that Spain
was undertaking.55
After reopening the. discussion of the United States 1
recognition. of the

~rotectorate,

the Spanish stalled the

negotiations for m.ore than a year while they insisted that

54-oispatch from Blake to Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, Tangier, May 31, 1934, in PRFA, .QE.• cit., Vol. 1934,
part 2, p. $4().

55Dispatch from the United States Ambassador Bm·rers in
Spain to Hull; I•Iadrid, · January 10, 1935, in PRFA, .£E.• cit._,
Vol. 1935, part l, p. 999.
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271. our agreement must include the abandonment of any extrat erritoria~

zone.

ri ghts that this count ry

maintaine~

in their

Our representatives held that although we wished to

r ecognize the fact of the Spanish Protectorate, the United
States must retain its special ri ghts in order to protect
American business from the many discriminations that had been
inflicted in the past.

Alth ough our capitulatory rights in

the Spanish zone had not assured economic fair play previously, the State Department evidentl y hoped that the future
wouid bring about that desired result.
Long memoranda were exchang ed by both sides which
accomplished nothing but to provide clerks and translators
with employment; and even this very limited progress came to
a halt when the Spanish Civil \'lar broke out in July, 1936.
By the time the internal situation in Spain had clarified
sufficiently to permit international relations to be resumed,
!'

. war clouds were sweeping over Europe, and both the United
~·

States and Spain had more important problems than those of a
few businessmen and their rights in Spanish l'J(orocco.

The

problem of Spanish .Morocco and its relations 1-Tith the United
'~"
r.

States were of minor importance when co111pared to the main
performance in the French zone.

Whatever the Spani.sh may

have wanted, they were obliged to follow the lead of the
French, for it was that country's power and diplomacy that
sustained the whole Protectorate framevmrk.

1-
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VII.

MAINTAINING EXTRA-TERRITORIAL PRIVILEGES

American relations with the French Protectorate during
the decade preceding World War II were a repetition of those
with Spain for the same period.
~ith

The French opened the period

an attack on capitulations and American rights based on

the Act of Algeciras; France dragg ed out its old argument
that the Treaty of Fez of l912 . had nullified previous treaties
and that the United States was therefore required to obey
French regulations in Morocco.
tered as usual by

saying~

The State Department coun-.

"This Government has repeatedly

pointed out to the French Government both forinally and informally, that it never adhered to the Protectorate Treaty of
1912."56 · A few months later, our representative was told to
pass on the observation that the United States was becoming
aware of the nincreasing tendency of Protectorate authorities
to disregard the . regime of the Open Door and to encroach on ·
American rights," but, as usual, these complaints made no
lasting impression on the French and did not serve to alleviate the nroblems facing American businessmen.57

56nispatch from Kellogg to Herrick, United States
Ambassador in France, vlashington, February 29, 1929, in
PRFA, op. cit .. , Vol. 1929, part 3, p. 482.
57The French began using pressure on American business.;.
men t ·o persuade them to ask that capitulatory rights be abandoned.. The Protectorate author'ities told Americans that no .
business would be done with any firms that ·\-1ere protected by
extra-territorial rights; consequently, American business
concerns clamored to the State- Department to give up arty
special privileges enjoyed by citizens of the United States.
PRFA, QE• cit., Vol. 1930, part 3, pp. 602-3.
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In 193 4, Henri Ponsot, the French Resident General in
Morocco, reopened the drive against American capitulations by
informing the State Department that world .opinion was opposed
to the concept of special rights in the Maghreb.

He even·

stated that Maxwell Blake, .the American agent, had expressed
th-e sentiments that the United States should giveup its
capitulations without delay since they constituted an anachronism that served no valid purpose.

American officials,

knowing Blake's distrust of the French aims in Morocco and
his feelings concerning . the _importance of America's extraterritorial rights, very diplomatically
informed the French
.
.
amba.s sador that M. Ponsot must have somehow misunderstood
our age.nt.. 5~·- :-~"·
The Resident General was evidently· not discouraged by
this rebuff.

He informed ·Blake that sfnce the stipulated

thir:ty year term of the "entente cordiale 11 bet",reen Great
Britain and France had been completed, the French were now in

a position to dictate to other nations just how they should
cond.w:.e-t themselves in relation to Morocca.59

Blake's report

·..,:J ~-:....~f
·i~

of th,:hs frank statement of French aims stirred up a great
:.

~ ~ - ':"':-

..

5SMemorandum from Under Secretary of State William
Phillips to the French Ambassador, Washington, October 23,
1934 1 in PRF.A, 2£.• cito, Vol. 1934, part 2, p. 852.
5%ispatch from Blake to Hul1, Tangier, Novemb-er 23,
1934, . in ibid., PPo E63 ff.

-----,
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deal of concern in the State Department, resulting in much
high-level discussion and initiating a reevaluation of the
whole matter· of our relations with Morocco.

Since World

War I, the United States had unwillingly--and in some cases
almost unknowingly--been a victim of French colonial propaganda which tried to link Morocco politically apd economically with France in the eyes of the world.

On many occa-

sions, as has been indicated on preceding pages, the American
officials in 1·1orocco--and, to a lesser extent, .those in '11/ashington--had protested these French endeavors, but to little
avail.
Although the concern of the State Department c-ame a
little late to dislodge · entrenched colonialism, at least · our
officials were made aware of French aims a·nd of what position
the United States would. maintain in the 'future.

An official

dispatch from Washington made the feelings of the State .
Department clear, . by

stressi~g

the factors which it considered

as seif-evident proof .that the French were oversteppihg them.

.

selves by assuming political ties between the French Republic
and the Sultan's empire.

Ourrepresentatives were . given the

following list of reasons that the United States thought sufficient to repudiate the French contention:

1.
2.

-

The United· States maintains a legation in Tangier.
American consular officers receive their exequaturs
from the Moroccan government.
Morocco is classified as an individual country for
the purpose of immigration quotas.

-
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4.

The customs reg ulations of J.i.oroc c o are distinct from
those of Fra nce because t h e former are controlled
by the ~reaty o f Al g eciras.
The ~ United

States enj oys extra-territorial p rivileges
in i1oroc co.

6.

7.

The Fren c h Prote ct orat e authorities do not c ons ider
·-- - -- ~- ~oroc ca r: sub ject s as .?renc h citizens, for they are
docu;-nent e d for tra v el purposes by passpo rt s distinct
____ fr om. t _h e usual Frenc h passport .
There is no F ranc o-Amer ic an trE;aty ·v1hich includes
tlorocco as Frenc h territoryo~
·
Even ..t houg h the Fr ench vr ere mad e avrare of t h e fore-

g oing statements c oncerning their supposed legal ri g hts in
~ oroccan matters,

the Protect orate officials chose to i gnore

the reasoning of the State Department and to press for immedi..;
.

.

ate abro gration of American rights in the

~1agh reb.

vjhen the

French cont inued to insist that the United St a t es give U? its
special rights und er capitulati ons, the S e cretary of State
f -rankly told t h e F rench ambassador that it. was evident t hat
-F"rance was try ing to get a special position for its trade to
-tne -excTU.si on of all other nat ions and t hat the United St at es
was not willing to ab andon any of its ·t rade privileg es until
it vias demonstrated that American businessmen would be

protect~d. 61
The Protectorate officials t hen aban doned their usual

60 HackHorth, 22• cit., Vol. III, p. 304.
6lJohn A. I-:ar cum , ttThe United States and n orocco, n
Middle Eastern Af f airs , Vol . 8 (January, 1957), p. J.

}

.
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methods of operation and launched a frontal attack against
the position of the United States; it was sugg este~ to our
representativ2s that if the capitulatory privileges based on
the Treaty of 183 6 were not voluntarily given up by the
United States, then the Protectorate would take steps to have
the entire tr·e aty abrogated. 62

Since the final article of

the treaty stated that unilateral abrogation was possible
after a twelve months notice, it did. not take any great exercise of the imagination for the State Department to see that
France could nullify the l•Ioroccan-American accord and thus
end the matter of capitulations entirely.

Whether or not

France had the legal right to speak for the· Makhzen ·would
~

have made little difference, forthe Protectorate officials
were in a position to force the

~oroccan

to whatever move they wished to make.

government t .o

agre~

This French threat

hung over subsequent negotiations · concerning the American
position in-Iviorocco, and far from assisting to· facilitate
them, merely served to
l

incre~se

tension and to drive both

parties farther from any possible agreement.
.

_.

..

In spite of this handicap, negotiations proceeded: -i~
throughout 193 8 and into the followin·g year; deliberations
had proceeded so far by that time that the text of a lengthy
treaty setting forth the proposed changes in capitulations

..;'

62PRFA, .2.£• cit., Vol·. 1938, part 2, P• 153 ·•
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and trade regulations was prepared for ratification.

How-

ever, after the text of the treaty was analyzed by the State
Department a?d by the French Foreign Office, it was soon discovered that there was no real agreement on the points covered, and the proposed treaty remained in the record only as
another failure _in the twenty-five year history of FrancoAmerican capitulatory negotiations.63
When it became evident to the French authorities that
the United States was not going to give up its special position in Iv!oroccan commerce, France began to be even more
reluctant than before to settle any of the claims that the
State D'epar.tment had been pressing in support of American
economic interests.

Protracted correspondence and discussion

over even the most trivial problems became the order of the
day.

This state of affairs probably would have contirmed

indefinitely if the crisis in Europe had not given the French
Foreign Office the excuse of military expediency to set aside.
American protests and claims.

Using the war as an excuse to

reinforce their privileges in -Morocco,- the French informed
;

.-··.

the United States that all - discussions pertaining to the

'

economic privileges of American citizens would have to be
abandoned because of the emergency in France. - Although the
United States did agree -t ·o set aside the problem for the time

63Ibid., Vol. 1939, part 4, pp. 631-47.

being, the French were doomed to disappointment if they
thought that t his country would permit the Protectorate
authorities to force an abandonment of American treaty
rights in Morocco.
World

\~ ar

II artd the important role played by the

United States in Morocco insured a strong position for
this country in the future of the

~ aghreb,

and subsequent

events proved that France would have to continue her losing
battle to eliminate competition in North Africa •

..

•

>

, , - ~ ··:~ · ·-..-'·

..-,::; ...,.-

.

CHAPTER X
MOROCCO AfiiD WORLD WAR II

During the first two years of World War II, the French
Protectorate officials in Morocco used the emergency as an
excuse to eliminate as thoroughly as possible any forei-gn
commercial compet_ition.

The American diplomatic agent in

Tangier, Maxwell Blake, asked for instructions from Washington when the French informed him t ·pat, to assist the war
effort, they were about to requisition private property.
Although Blake was suspicious that this move was just another
attempt to cripple foreign business competition·, the State
Department took the view that t .he French were going to use
the sequestered property in their struggle against the Ger- ·
mans.

Since the United States was still officially neutral

at that time

(1939), Blake was instructed to resist the con-

fiscation of American possessions if they were to be used
against Gennany; however, if the private property was to be
used for the benefit of the

I~1 oroccans,

would ·pose no objections .1

Hindering American imports and

then the United States ·

!Dispatch from Secretary of State Hull to Maxwell
Blake, United States Diplomatic Agent in Tangier, \t'/ ashington,
September 16, 193 9, in Pa ers ·Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States Washingt on: United States Government Printing Of f ice, 1864-1957), V ol~ 1939, part IV, P• 686.
{Hereafter referred to as PRFA).
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controlling closely the activities of non-French businessmen
characterized the activities of the Protectorate until the
fall of France and establishment of the provisional government in Vichy •
. .

I.

.

AMERICAN PRELININARIES TO THE NORTH AFRICAN INVASION
With the division of the French Republic into an

occupied and an unoccupied zone and the assumption of power
officials controlled by the Vichy government, the United

by

States became concerned about the fate of its citizens and
their' businesses in French Morocco.

Secretary of State Hull

begari requesting detailed information from the American consUls in Morocco relating to _all developments affecting the
..

.

itt.~:

French Zone and its position with regard to the war in Europe.
The State Department was particularly concerned with the passibility that the Vichy government would allow the Germans to
occupy. North · Africa without a struggle, making the Western
Hemisphere open to possible aggression from the western shores
of Africa and giving the German submarines · free access to the
Atlantic.

Our representatives · in the area made careful sur-

veys of French sentiments in high places and report:ed to the
State Department that, in a word, the French were the "purest
conventionalists."

This judgement meant that French officials

would obey any orders -that they might receive from their
superiors in Vichy, even -to the extent of fighti.n g for

,•
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Hitler. 2

'I'his seemingly extreme estimate of French sentiments

was partially discounted by Americ an off icials, ·but proved to
be tragically cor rect wh en American troops landed in Morocco
two and a half years later.
The American consul at Cas ablanca reported that the
...J

French navy was extremely anti-British
and would v-1elcome a
,,
fight with them, whil e the army and the air force were

g~ner

ally friendly to the Allies and would look with favor on
British help backed wit h American supplies.

He hastened to

repeat the warning that even though the latter elements of
the armed forces were friendly, they would still obey orders
from their superiors in France--especially from Marshal
Petain)

The United States had been hoping that Morocco

would follow the example of Chad and French Equatorial Africa
and · join General De Gaull e and his Free-French movement;

ho'ltr-

. ever, Hull was disappointed in this hope, as his ag ents
informed him that there was no indication that such a move
was in the offing.
When the Germans began .s.ending thousands of "tourists
and scientists" to North Africa, t h e United States realized
that the small handful of Americans in.Morocco would be

2Telegram from Consul General Goold in Casablanca to
Hull, Casablanca, J une 26, 1940 , in PRFA, o p . cit., Vol. 1940,
part II, .p. 570 o
3rbid., August 12, 1940 , p. 577.
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righting a losing battle in an attempt to counteract the Nazi
influence. 4

One of the first moves that the State Department ·

Made to balance the scales in favor of the United States was
to send Robert Murphy to France to find out if Vichy would
consider establishing an autonomous regime in North Africa
with its own economic and political structure, insulated
against any possible German influence.

It was the hope of

the United States tm t such an entity would provide this
country with markets as well as depriving the Axis of a
source of . supply and a potential springboard for an
aimed at the Americas.

offensiv~

In spite of Murphy's optimistic

report that "maybe we have struck oil in that connection,"5
Vichywas too much under the control of the Germans and too
afraid that an even s ·e mi-independent Morocco would prefer to
remain so, to permit that country even partial freedom.
When it beca.'ne apparent that the foregoing scheme was

t

doomed, Murphy made an effort to weld North Africa to this
country with ties . of friendship.

f

{

In the spring of 1941, a

series of agreements were signed by Murphy and .the Vichy
government that were desi gned to facilitate the supplying of
badly need.e d go ods to Morocco and to Algeria.

Coal, petroleum

~om Landau, Moroccan Drama 1900-.1_222 (San Francisco:
American Academy of Asian Studies, ~}, p. 208.
~Di~patch from Robert Murphy to Hull, Vichy, December
11, 1940, in . PRFA, QI?.· cit., Vol • . l940, part II, p. 631.
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products, cotton g oods, sug ar, and tea were the principal
deficiencies that had to be made u p if the economy of North
__ Afri~a were not to break dmm com pletely and if the people of"
the area were to have even the minimum necessities '.
Not only did the United States wish to help the Moroccan people with food, but it also wished to impress them with
the friendship of America for the people of North Africa.
Furthermore, since

Germany ·had promised to supply Iviorocco

but had failed completely, it ·vlas a great asset to American
prestige to be able to defeat Germany in this aspect of propaganda warfare • . Although the British protested that such sup, pl_i.~~

wo.u ld ultimately find . their way into the Nazi war

machine, the · United States finally obtained permission to
supply Morocco if this country could guarantee that the goods
_would_ remain in North Africa.

Obviously, there was only .o ne

way to insure that this would be done--to have the supplies
_a_c_c_ompanied by · American observers who would be responsible for
them from the time they left the ship until they reac·hed the ·
consumer.
As is so often the case, there is a good reason for
-everything --and there is also the real reason. In this case,
___ the ostensible purpose for the observers in North

Afr~ca

was

to supervise the distribution of American g oods, bu.t there
~

was a more compelling reason for their presence--that was to

.,

-.·

'

.

act as informants for the State Department.6

Robert Murphy

collected a staff of some forty men and distributed them
-

throughout North Africa to act as ag e_nts for the United
States; some collected data concerning French military posit i ons and coastal defenses, tide and beach conditions, and
similar informati on of pos sible value to American armed
forces in t h e event an attack on Morocco became necessary.
These observer s, wh o traveled. under the title of
also set up underground communication

vi ce~~surs,

system~_..,..._among

Moroccans
.

who could be counted on t .o support the Ame r icans when they
landed in North Africa.

Some of the vice--c onsuls organiz-ed

small grou ps of anti- Vichy Frenchmen who "\"iere to sabotage
important defense positions and power plants when called on
by Murphy's organization.7
The vice-consuls were not trained State Department
employees for they had been picked primarily because of their
knowledge of French, but they were able

~o ·

do their job effec-

tively even though the German Armistice Commission protested
to the Protectorate authorities that the observ.e rs were really
American Army and Navy officers in mufti.

On the whole, the

French officials were not at all sympathetic nor cooperative

6Kenneth Pendar, Adventures i n Diplomacy Our French
Dilemma, (New York: Dodd , 1'-iea d , and Company , 1945T;" p . 3.
7Kenneth Crawford, Report-'-411 North Af r i ca (New York:
Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1943), P.• 3 7.

'
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.

with the vice-consuls, but since the United States had made
arrangements for their activiti es directly with the · Sultan,
they were able to travel freely throughout lVIorocco.

The

people of the country were extremely interested in the Americans and in their job--its real nature soon being guessed
by the Moroccans--and assisted them in .many ways.s

other hand, many French led by General

Nogu~s~

On the

the French

Resident General in Morocco, did everythi:p.g they could to
hinder not only the real purpose of the vice-consuls but
also to cover u p the fact that the United States was supplying badly needed food and supplies to the Moroccans.

How-

ever, the Arab grapevine-communication system soon spread the
word that the United States was providing the tea, the sugar,
and the cotton goods that were so essential · to Moroccan wellbeing.9

The effect on Moroccan opinion about America was very

encouraging and proved to b.e well worth the effort and money
expended for the goodwill and cooperation engendered.
Little could be said in favor of the American supply
mission in so far as the effect that it had on French opinion
in Morocco was concerned.

For two and a half years, the State

Department had carried on diplomatic relations with the Vichy
regime in spite of adverse criticism in the United Stat.es,
but it never had succeeded in winning much real support · among ·

8Pendar, .£E• cit., p. 14.
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---- Frenchmen either in France or in Morocco.

Murphy had made

contacts -wit h General Mast in Al g eria and General Bethou.art
in Morocco, both of whom were friends of the United -States,
for the purpose of enlisting their support When the time
arrived for the invasion of North Africa by the Americans and
the British.
,.

-· .-

However, most of the last minute attempts to

~

convert French commanders to the American side met with
failure.lO
II... _ OPERATION TORCH
Operation TORCH, the code name for the Allied invasion
of Morocco, finally g ot under way shortly before dawn on

N;v~mber 8, 1942, when American landings, under the direction
. - . . . -.
61 General George Patton, we·r e made at Fedala, Port Lyautey,
and Safi.

The efforts of Mlirphy' s miss_ion had met with some

5;Iccess in Algie_rs, - i or t -here, Admiral Darlan and General
Alphonse juin were forced by· American sympathizers to issueorders directing that French ·forces in Algiers and Oran cease
resistance.

However, the American hopes that the French in

.Morocco would be equally willing to ·cooperate were dashed by
'

-

I

the actions of General Nogues, who arrested General Bethouart
,~i-~e-~ the latter informed him that t -he American forces were
:...,.

-

'-

-

10 John Mac Vane, Jo-urney into Vl ar: \!J ar and Diplomacy
in North Africa ( New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1943),
pp. 48 f. -

~

-

.------

-

-
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about to land and that the French forces should lay do'!fm
their arms.ll
\

Nogues had at first Seen willing to cooperate with the
United States and to hand over Morocco to the invading forces,
but when he was informed that t-here was no evidence to show
that the landings wefe anything more than a hit-and-run raid, ·
he reversed his decision and ordered full resistance to "•"t--he
invasion. 12

Bethouart's abortive coup thus served no purpose

but to alert Nogues and to give him time to prepa-re his
forces to resist the attack of the American troops.
personally directed the attack

~gainst

Nogues

the American troops at

Port Lyautey where the resistance was stiffest, and with the
help of Admiral Michelier, he held a line between that port
and Casablanca that resisted the best efforts of Patton's
troops for three days. · To complicate matters, the sea, which
had providentially quieted on the morning of the attack, .
returned to its usual rough condition a.nd severely hampered
the efforts of the American navy to supply the ground fo-rces
that had been put ashore .13
11
. Demaree Bess, "The Backstage Story of our African
Adventure, n Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 21-6 (July 10·, 194.3), .
p. 8?.
. .
12MacVane, oo. cit., p. 66o General Nogues displayed
such ability for cha'nging his decisions whenever it suited his
purpose best that the Americans soon gave him the nickname
"General No-yes."
13nwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1948~ p~ 104•
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The heavy fighting produced many casualties · among the
invaders, and even though Nogues had received

~

message from

his superior, Admiral Darlan, to the effect that French
troops should stop their resistance, he continued the fight
for three days.

'

One .source claims that the General refused

to give the "cease

fire~'

order until the Gennan Armistice

Commission informed him that all ammunition was exhausted.
Then after ordering the French ships that had not been sunk
by the American navy to scuttle themselves, he grudgingly

ended all overt resistance to the Arnericans.l4

Although

Nogues later maintained that ;i.f he. had r~alized that the
attack on November eighth was a real invasion, he would n.e ver
have resisted, the fact remains that the many .J:\inerican and
French deaths would never have occurred had it not been for
the Resident General's intransigence.

By November eleventh,

the impatient and angry Patton ·was . ready to order the destruc- ·
tion of Casablanca in an attempt to break the resista't1ce of_
'
Nogues'
forces,

but fortunately for the inhabitants of the

city and for the future relations between Moroccans and Americans, the French finally obeyed Darlan's orders frbm ' Algiers.
After the "second Armistice Day" of November 11, 1942,
had ended, the American military forces began consolidating

14Emile Bure, "Nogu~s--Case Study in Opportunism," The
Nation, Vol. 156 (April 17, 1943), Po 563 •

-

-

-

...-

~

their hold on Morocco and prepared to establish supply bases
that

~ould

Africa.

serve to support

th~

Allied drive

~cross

North

The complete success of the military aspects of

TORCH gave the victors much to be thankful for, but serious
-.problems p.f. a political nature allowed no time for mutual
c-ongratulations to be exchanged by the Allies.

The confusion

that reigned in American military headquarters in Rabat and
Algiers was refLected in General Eisenhower's telegram to
President · Roosevelt which read, "Existing French sentiment
here does no·t remotely agree with prior calculations. nl5
~

•..

......__.,.,

The State Department probably was responsible for the
political miscalculations that the military commanders made
·-

in Morocco - and Algeria, for it had ·recommended that General
Giraud be helped to escape from France so that he could serve
as the leader of theFrench iri North Africa.

The theory was

that the French would not follow the directions of Charles

De

Gaulle because he was too obviously . linked with the British, ·
and it seemed equally logical that Vichy leaders who had been
cooperating with the

Germans in Algiers and Rabat would not

have the support of loyal Frenchmen.

Consequently, it was

felt that . some third element was needed to swing the sentiments

of · ~orth

Africa to the side of the Allied cause, and

that estimate seemed to indicate that Giraud was the logical .

15Eisenhower, QE• cit., p. 109.

choice since he had never b-een associated with any political
m ovement~

He had managed a daring escape from a German

prison
and,. .. with the help of loyal Frenchmen, made his way to
. - ..

.

~

southern France and to Gibraltar where Eisenhower explained
'"

~ the

role·-·tn.:at t he A'llies had for him.

Giraud, who always

spoke of himself in the third person, insisted that he be
given complete control of the American and British.forces,

'-but

whe-n~ ~ was firmly disabup ed of this grandiose idea, he

agreed to : settle for the job as head of the French govern.m-ent in N6tth Africa.16
Subsequent events proved that the Americans were polit- ·: < :;:; :~
ically as naive as was Giraud, for when General Mark Clark
informed

D~rlan

and Juin, -the French leader _in · Alger-ia, that

Giraud was to direct the government of Nor-th Africa, ·t he
result completely surprised the American c-ommander.

Far from

agreeing to submit to Giraud •s leadership, the Vichy officials. .
accused him of treachery and absolutely refused to have anything to do with him.

Strangely enough from the American

standpoint, Giraud seemed to agre€ fully with Darlan, and he
told Clark that it would be futile for the Americans to place
him in charge of the . French in the area.l7
The

Americans had badly underestimated the · strong

hold that traditional andlegal procedures had on French

l ~ es s , .2E.. cit • , p • $7 •

l7JviacVane, .2£• cit., p. 79.

2-9L _
- offic-ialdom.

A1thoughmany French leaders in Morocco and

Algeria were sympathetic with the Allies, they :were bound by
t ies of loyalty to their superior, who, since Vichy had been

overrun by the Germans, was Admiral Darlan.

Even Giraud had

to adffiit that · such was the case and suggested that parlan be
given the political leadership of North Africa.

The Admiral

had informed .the Americans that Giraud was not the man· to run
Morocco and Algeria, stating, "for politically he ia_a child.nlS
Obviously, Darlan was anything but a "child" when it came to
political machinations, for he '\'Tas · able to convince ·the
Allied commanders that only he could weld the different French
,.

., __

elements into a cooperating whole.

Faced with the patent

ineptitude of their choice . for the'·· governmental head of North
Africa and reaHzing that there was an urgent ne.e d for . stability in Algeria .and Morocco, Eisenhower authorized Dar-lan to
take command .of the

civ~l

government and Giraud to become the

milttary commander of th-e French forces .•
The storm of criticism that brok.e in the United States
on November seventeenth over the alleged deal with Vichy
necessitated a strong declaration from Roosevelt, who stated
that the political actions of his military commanders were
merely "temporaryn expedients necessitated by existing

lBRobert E • .Sher-vrood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: .
Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 648o ·
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exegencies. _ Needless to say, Darlan was none too pleased
with his role as a tem porary expedient and remarked, "I am
4

•

only a lemon which the -Americans will drop after they have
squeezed it dry.ttl9

However, he philosophically acce pted

his role and prepared to entrench himself in . the complexities
of the North Africqn political swamp so that ultimately he
would prove to be indispensable to the .Allies.

Unfortunately

for his plans, he was much more temporary than even Roosevelt
had envisaged, for

t~rw

bullets from an assassin's gun ended

his checkered career before more than a few of his plans for
Nort·h Africa had been instituted.

However, Darlan' s death

did little to eliminate Vichyites from control in Norocco,
and public censure of Eisenhmver mounted apace.
- Although Eisenhower and Clark may have been mistaken
in .their choice of Darlan and his group to run Nort h Africa,
they cannot be blamed for not understanding a compl ex situa- .
tion that even the supposedly well informed State Department
badly misunderstood.

Petain and Darlan were names that, how-

ever distrusted iri the United States and in Great .::::-i tain,
meant a great deal to

U~e

French in North Africa.

':'l:e Ameri-

can military stated that with the coope-r--a:ti·o il.of Df:.r.lan, th_e
Allies were able to exert all of their efforts

ag~~~~ ~

Rommel

in Libya and Tunisia instead of using part of the:..!" .:D!'"ces to

19rbid., .p. 653 ..
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- - - ~l ic_e possibly hostile French armed forces.

Right or wrong,

the Americans used the same system of utilizing .existing
civil governments to free the army for fighting that was
suc-e-essfully followed in Italy, Germany, and
~: ark

Jc;~.pan.

General

Clark-probably··· expressed the sentiments of the Allied

forces whe-n· he said:
·,:·.- ·' .· We are driving into T·unisia to kick Rommel in the
back. vJ e are being realistic. We cannot afford to risk
___ o.ur bases and lines of communication over a political
squabble.20
Nogues, the Resident General in Morocco, was as
ardently pro-Vichy as his superior Darlan had been.

During

the two year period prior to the Allied invasion, Nogu'es had
\....-.

__

--

cooperated fully w;i.th the German Armistice Commission, even

-

to the extent of attempting to carry out the anti-Jewish
Nuremberg laws to which Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef had
refus~d to agree.21

The Resident General was able to evade

the Sultan's wishes in some cases involving his Jewish subjects, especially when it was a matter of issuing the allirrJportant food ration slips without which little could be
purchasedo22

As has been indicated, Nogues' record during

the American invasion was what could .have been expected by
his friendship with the Germans and his long career of
toadying to _Nazi-dominated Vichy.

--20rv1acVane, .21?.· cit., p. 81.

21tandau, .2£• cit •., . p. lJ4.
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Nogues' continued resistance to the American landing,
even when ordered by Darlan to cease, may have been the result
of his

idea ~ that

the Germans would reinforce hi s army through

Spanish Morocco, or he may possibly have thought that the
i nvasion could be repelled by his own troops.

He had expres-

sed himself on several occasions previously that he was cer·tain that Hitler would win the war,23 and his resistance to
the Allies may have stemmed from thi s conviction.

Whatever

Nogues 1 motives may have been, he .was unrepentant about his
actions and maintained that he had surrendered only when
ordered to do so by his superiors.
That Nogues resisted the Americans is not surprising~
but that he was given complete charge of Moroccan affairs for
nearly eight months after the invasion can only be explained
by appealing to military necessity for an excuse.
grudgingly

stopp~d

After he

fi ghting, he continued to resist the

efforts of the Allies to establish themselves in Morocco and
to use its ports and storage facilities to supply .t he Tlinisian
front.

The Resident General flatly stated that he had no

intention ·of bringing Morocco into the war on the side of the
United States; rather, he was prepared only to give "right of
passage" to American troops and supplies.

When the Americans

23"The Iv'i oral Crisis of the War," The Ne\v Republic,
Vol. 108 (February 8, 1943), p. 163 •
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emphatically informed him that he was to obey Allied orders
and to cooperate in every way to speed Germany'.s defeat,
-- ~

Nogues said that he could not comply until he had communicated
with Vichy to get its approval.

Needless to say, American

authorities refused to allow any such action and stated ti:E. t
the United States did not recognize the existence of the
Vichy government.24
If it had not .been. for General Patton, who proved to
be impressed by the military pomp that Nogues displayed, the
Resident General would not have remained in pm1er as long as .
he did, for the rest of the American leaders were anxious to
rid themselves of him and his

henc~~en.

To impress American

newsmen with his supposed change of heart in favor of the
Allied cause, Nogues graphically explained how he had fooled
the German Armistice Commission by having ammunition -and
arms hidden and by dispersing many of his soldiers into outlying areas so that the Germans wo'!J.ld not know how strong his
forces were.

The effect of this story was somewhat lessened

by the c omrnent from an t,mimpress ed reporter to the effect
that the trouble with Nogues' maneuver, as far as the United
States was

conce~ned,

was that the arms so carefully hidden

were effectively used against American troops.

Similar

'
stories, coupled with Nogues'
statement overheard by Allied
! .

24Pendar, op. cit., p. 119.
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·newsmen to t .he effect that Americans were easy to handle and
__ __

-~-o
_
u~d

be made to do anything , served to convince almost

everyone that Nogues was not really t r ying t o help the Allied
cause and -should be replaced.25

However, Patton was con-

vi nced that 1vithout Nogues t he American · army \'fould have to
-

.

maintain a large force to guard its rear from attacks by t h e
I•1oroc.cans.26

Naturally, Nogues did all that he could to

reinforce this idea, and it was not -until after the Casablanca
conference and after Pattori had moved on to other battlefronts
that the Americans were able to replace t be Resident.
III.

THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE.

=After t ·h e military occupation of Morocco had been suecessfully ·a ccomplished, the attention of the world shifted to
the more newsworthy areas, such as Libya and the South Pacific,
but the

t\\io

most important men ·-rn ·th-e Allied camp began plan-

ning a ·move that would be as -dramati-c and noteworthy as ·TORCH
had been.

Roosevelt and Churchill realized that recent events

in the world necessitated another personal · conference on even
a larger scale than the Washington meeting iri June, 1942.
The two leaders hoped that picking recently liberated Casablanca as the site of the proposed meeting would strengthen

25MacVane, ££• cit.; p. 180.
2~lliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell,
Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 88.---
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the world's impression that the fortunes of war were beginning to swing toward the Allies.

Also, that city was chosen

in hope that Stalin would consent to join the British and
the American leaders to map out joint

strate~J

against Ger-

many; this plan failed to mat€rialize, for the Russian leader
claimed that his job as commander of the army made it mandatory that he stay in the Kremlin.
Undertaking a precedent-shattering trans-Atlantic
flight_.-the first a·irplane trip Roosevelt had taken since
1933--the President arrived in Casablanca on January 14, 1943
where he was met by Prime _Minister Churchill, who had been on
the scene for several days.

The Secret Service men assigned

to watch over the safety of the President had been making
advance ·p reparations for· his arrival, but were particularly
concerned about the pro-Fascist Frenchmen who still were in
the area.

Extremely rigid security measures were instituted

to insure the inviolability of the President's living
quarters--Dar

~

Saada, a villa .in the modern Anfa Hotel--

which were surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by Patton's
troops.

The British w~re app~ehensive about the possibility

of German bombing raids, f9r a few weeks before the confer·enc~,

Casablanca had been hit from the air; Churchill was all

in favor of moving south to the beautiful city of Marrakesh,
but settled for the Anfa Hotel when Roosevelt e.A"'pressed his

yi sh to remain there.27

The conference was primarily concerned with military
..

~ a tters,

-

.

for Roosevelt had brought the American Chief of

Staff General George Marshall a:nd the Naval Chief Admiral
King as well as Eisenh.ower and Clark; the British counterparts of these leaders- were also there and many decisive .
moves were planned that pointed out the way to final victory
for the United Nations.

However, although the conferees

would have preferred to limit their talks to matters directly
connected with the defeat of the Axis; they were obliged to
spend valuable time trying to resolve the political tangle
that they had encountered in

l~1 orocco

and which had reached

serious proportionso
De Gaulle insisted from . his London headquarters that
.

.

'

.

.

the Resident General of Morocco, Nogues -, be arre.s ted and
tried as a Nazi . collaborator, and American ne\vspapers were
decrying the use of Marcel P .eyrouton, an ardent
a replacement for Darlan in Algeria.

Vichyi~

as

These problems were

comparatively minor ones when compared with the difficulties
arising betweeh De

Gaulle and Giraud as to the manner in

which North Africa shouJ,.d be governed ana which group should
be in power.

The President and the Prime Minister realized

that the best way to attempt a settlement of the difficulty

2 7rbid., p. 64.
- - ..

..
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-was to stage a face to face meeting of the two Frenchmen, and
to accomplish this, Churchill sent several telegrams to
De Gaulle in London requesting him to come to Casablanca.
The Prime Minister reported to Roosevelt that his "problem
child"--as he wa s wont to call De Gaulle--nwas on his high
horse • • • and was furious over the methods used to get
·c-ontrol ~of I·1orocco and Al g eria.n28

Churchill finally told .

De Gaulle that ·if he did not .come to the meeting, the. British
would replace him with a more

r~asonable

leader.

This threat

accomplished what polite requests had not done, and the haughty Free-French leader condescended to com.e to North

:Af-r-ica.
: =- ~ .:. ::· _c-

~. ~

':: . -. ---- . -·-=·- -

Ir- De Gaulle was a problem to the British, Roosevelt

found that he too had a "problem child" on his hands in- -the
person oi General Giraud.

Rob~rt

Murphy had long talks -...rith

the situation
in ·Morocco and was enthusi- .
-the· President about
'
.
as'tic about· Giraud's capabil1Xies as the only possibl-e leader
for

the French in North Africa.

On the ev·e ning of January

sixteenth, the President, the Prime Minist:er, Murphy, Eisenhower, -and Macmillan spent several hours trying to develop a
policy that could be used to direct the .future course of
North African politics, and all through . the discussion,
Murphy insj?ted that Giraud was the man to lead the government ·
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of North Africa.

Although t h e American political expert was

the only one convinced on this scor e , the President a greed to
meet with Giraud the following day to assess for himself the
General's potentialities.
In the ensuing meeting , Roosevelt realized that Giraud
was completely unconscious of the political problem involved
in the area and was only interested in procuring arms and an
army with which to fight the Germans.

As laudable as this

ambition was, it was not Giraud's task to · carry on the military campaign in the deserts of North Africa; it had been
hoped by Murphy and the President that the French general had
the political acumen which would enable him to unite the
French behind the Allied efforts, but Roosevelt admitted in
disgust to his sori that as far as being a leader .a nd as an
administrator, Giraud was a "dud.n29

The Americans had plent-y

of able military leaders, and Giraud's offer

w~s

not particu-

larly appreciated, especially when the President knew that the
State Department had made a serious mistake in its estimate
of the General's abilities--a mistake that the President was
forced to cover up as best he could to save the reputation
of the Department to preserve its prestige for more important negotiations in the future.30
As unsatisfactory as was Roosevelt's interview with
Giraud, his talk v1ith De Gaull e was even less encouraging.

JOrbid., p. 68.
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;hurchill's prote g e was too politic ally c onscious for his own
c ood , and the Pres ident realize d that t he Frenth .lead er was
acting in t h e present t o assure
s ost - wa r France .

~e

hi ~se lf

the top position in

Ga ulle would n ot cooperate with Giraud,

fearing tha t t h e latter mi ght ga in too much

~opularity

thus prov e a pos s ibl e dange r to his own ambitions.

and

He demanded

from Roosevelt as s urances that he be given t h e ri ght to be the
sole judg e as t o '\,.' hat form t he post - \'i a.r French political
scene ""IOuld t ake and t hat t h e French empire 1•roul d be restored to
its pre-v;ar greatness .

Both of these

~oints

l'rere arrogantly

couched in t h e form of c ommands , and the President later
• ."i

-~10

spoke bitterly about the iriflated op inion t hat De Gaulle had
of his ov-m im portance . 31

Ne edless to say, both Giraud 's

re quest for su preme military c ommand and De Gaulle ' s demands
were c onveniently left by t h e Allied l ead ers to di e a natural
death.
The poss ibly apocry phal account of De Gaulle's description of himself for Ro osevelt' s edificati on did illustrate
the type of man he was and how difficult i t must hav e be en to
deal with him .

Th e Free- French leader

re p ort~ d ly

told the

President on one occ asion that since Fran ce ne eded a dynamic
soldier-leader, h e consid ered hims elf the mod ern Jeanne d'Arc;
later, vrhen

~oosevelt

remarked t ra t tte North African

3lrbid., p . 112 .
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- ~ i tuation

required an astute diplomat and statesman,

De Gaulle was of the

opin~on

that he embodied all the charac-

ter istics of Georg es Clemenceau. - wh en the President wryly
suggested that De Gaull e could har dly be the reincarnation of
both, the General dismissed th e irony with a grimace.32
Although Giraud had been a disappointment and De Gaulle had.
not even been trusteo enough to be informed in advance of the
Allied landings in Morocco, both men did have followings that
were important to the succ es s of the Allied forces throughout
the world, as well a s in t h e Ma ghrebo

For this reason,

Churchill and Roosevelt staged a meeting of the rivals for
th e benefit of newsmen and photographers; t h e resulting pictures of the reluctant hands hak e may not have won any prize
as an example of friendship or joy, but it did make a g ood
impression on those Fr enchmen who had been siding with one
leader in opposition to the other.
Being parti cul arly concerned about the local situation
in Morocco, Rodsevelt called in the Resident General to find
out just how his area was faring thus far in the North
African campaign.

The Allies had made it a point not to use

any local foodstuffs, mos t of which were in short supply, and

had even been providing the native population with the necessities of life.

Milk was being distributed free of charg e

th roughout Morocco, and other suppli es were being sold at
nominal prices to supply the needs of the people.

Conse-

•
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quently, the President was very interested to know just how
the Moroccans were getting along under the American relief
program, and he wished to determine just what the Protectorate was doing to improve the c onditions under which the
Moroccans were living.

The President reported that when he

asked Nogu'es these questions, the General was completely at a
loss for an answer, although he was able to tell the President exactly to the franc hovlf much money the exports of
Morocco were worth.
Roosevelt was not particularly surprised at the
Resident's ignorance of the people that he was supposed to be
" · .• ...:

caring for.

J

He told a group of nevrsmen later, concerning

Nogues:
Well, it's a perfectly simple thing: this French
Governor, Auguste No gues--is all for one pa)5Y• He
is all for Nogues. He is pro-Nogues • • • •
The President's interview with Nogues and his information
from the

Americans in Morocco made him realize fully that

the French were not interested in the Moroccan

peopl~

but

rather in their country's value to the economy and prestige
of Franc·e.

Roosevelt told his aides that he wanted to meet

with Sultan Mohar.uned ben Youssef to find out the true picture
of Morocco--past, present, and future.

\vhen told that all

33samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt-rNew York : . Harper--arid
Brothers, Publishers, l950) , Vol. 1 943, !!The Tide Turns,"
Po B5 •
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contacts with the Sultan had to made through the Residency,

R oo ~e velt brusquely stated, "This N ogu~s • • • he's not to be
considered. "

This the President said because h e realized

that Nogues had a great deal of influence over the Sultan
\'Thich he wi shed to retai n .3 4
Roosevelt had ot her reasons to be irritat ed with the
Resident General, for he had been informed that his D-Day
letter, which had been sent to the Sultan, had never been
delivered.

The President's p ersonal letter to Mohammed ben

Youssef gave t he reasons for the American invasion, expl aining that the United States had been interested in &uarding
the sovereignty of the Sultan and his
violation.

country from Axis

Roosevelt had included his salute . to the Sultan

as the head of an independent and friendly state, and he was
quite disturbed that no ansv1er had been received from His
Majesty.
A few days after t h e Allied invasion, an American viceconsul was sent from Algiers to determine the fate of the
President's letter and to deliver a duplicate to the Sultan.
'
The agent found that General Nogues
had intercepted the

orig inal message, and after reading its contents, the Frenchman realized that the sentiments it contained would weaken
his position in Morocco.

Thus, the letter was not delivered,

34Elliott Roosevelt, QE• cit., p. 88.

---~
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and the

Sultan remained unaware of the Allied plans until

troops actually began t h e i r land ing .

When the du plicate

letter was handed to General Patt on for delivery to

~ ohammed

ben Youssef, t h e American g eneral 's reactions \'rere little
different from those shown by Noguks a few days before.

With

his characteris tic tactle ss ness, Patton pro posed to add
several sentences to t h e letter be f ore deli ve ring it, and
when the American a g ent questioned this unparalleled example
of lese majeste, the General ~as visibly displeased.

However,

after some sober reflection on the effect his action might
have on his own future, Patton grudg ingly deliVered the
letter intact .35 '
The Sultan's gracious answer to the President's delayed
message, and his c onduct during the Allied invasion, made
Roosevelt realize that here was a leader who understood his
people and was very friendly towar d the United States.
Mohammed ben Youssef had refused to take any official notice
of the German 'A.rinistice ··commission in Morocco, 3 6 .a nd he did
not support Nogues 1 decision to resist the Allied inv.a sion,
"affirming his solidarity with t h e Americans."

The Sultan's

conduct was in marked contrast -t o that displayed by the
Protectorate officials and the col ons, who barely tolerated

35Pendar, QE· cit., pp. 122 f.
3ctandau, .QE• cit., p. 20 9 .
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the Americans-- making it abundantly clear that the Allied
f ore es were not overly welcome.
~a s

interested in

meet~ng

Consequently, the President

t h e -Sul tan and d iscussing the

future of Morocco witn --him.

To facilitate this historic

event, on January tll{enty-sE:cond, the American leader invited
the Sultan to a dinner--including in the invitation the Grand
Vizier, the Chief of Protocol, and the Sultan's young son,
Prince Mulai Hassan.

Churchill and several of his advisers,

' and Giraud, attended the banquet,
joined by Generals Nogues
.

but this contingent was not too pleased with the
t~at

corive~sation

ensued nor with the precedent that Roosevelt was estab-

lishing.

At~er · in~~~xchange of gifts in which the President

received a handsome gold dagg er and the Sultan was presented
with a silver framed picture of Roosevelt, the real purpose
of the dinner became apparent) 7
Observers at the dinner reported that Churchill was
evidently somevvhat miffed with the absence of alcohol from
the menu--a concession to the religious convictions of the
Muslims present--but bec&lle even less enchanted with the
conversation between his American collffigue and the Moroccan
leadero

Roosevelt asked many penetrating questions about

conditions in Morocco and what the Sultan thought could be
done to improve the living standards of his people. Roosevelt

37Elliott Roosevelt, 2£· cit., p. 110.
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....

r " rtiall y answe red h is ovm question by statin£ that , in the
~uture, Norocco must try to k eep the profits from its mineral

3. nd a g ricultura l 1:Iealth in the c ountry rather than to al l ow
fore i g n i:':lt er ests to drain them av.'ay .
::inist er a t

Th e Brit i sh Prime

fir st trie d to st eer the conversation into chan .,..

nel s tha t were not so close to t he c olonial policies in
Gener"'a,J,,.,. but when th e other t vro p rinci pal s r efu sed t o be
c~ i vert ed,

Churc hill lapsed into a g l um silence.

In ans we r to t he Sultan's query as to how Morocco was
to deal with t he French d eterm ina t i on to retain its colon ial
. ,.

-~ em p ire

'.

•.

- ·~f' ~ .

ihtact, the Presid ent repli ed that t h e post - war scen e

·\'wul·d dif fer s har pl y from c ::m ditions th at had p reva iled prior
to 193 9 .

r~I oh amm ed

ben Yous sef was pleased wit h this st ate-

nent but vJi s hed to know s pe ci f ic al l y vvhat t he term "diffe r
~h arply 11

really e'ntailed.

Roosevelt explaine d t hat

it

>iJa S .

not the -i ntentioii~ of t h e United Stat-es t o fi ght a costl y wa r
fo r freed om from Ax i s tyranny only to have Eu ro pean financiers
and gov~rmn e nts "con bin e to subject the underdeveloped areas
or the world to their controlo37
To permit I< orocco to build up its n ational economy,
' th e· Pres i dent sur: f~ e s te d that local business interests be
en courag ed t o expl oit t h e min er a l resources of the cou ntry
r ather tha n permitt ing foreign con cerns to export the v-realth.

37rbid.

.;.
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T:: e Sultan also 1-vas in favor of such a move but expressed the

fea r that
tra in ed

~orocco

did not have t h e educated and hi ghly

t e chnici a~s

nor the capit 3 l required to operate the

omplex industry that vwuld be n eed ed .

The President had

sound anS\•:e rs t o these !lroblems and · sug:3:es ted that Ho roccan
,.:

..

~t udents

be ser..t to the United States to be educated in

. ocierh-··industr ial
·.·:h o could direct

~ractices
I·~ orocc

and trained t o b e t h e scientists

o 1 s future develo pm ent.

In addition

,·..,. ,,
~

to this aspect of t h e pro bl em , ~oosevelt proposed that American industrial- f irms be hired on a fixed p ercentag e basis to
develop the potential res our ces of t h e Sultani s k in gdom ; this
system '\.'i'Ould p.err:1it tl-:e rapid e:x:pansion of

~:~oroccan

industry

Qnd still keep the control in the hands of the country
· t self .3 8
At the close of the mutually profitable eveninr:; , the
-·.

Sultan t 6 ld the President tha t h e would

~ etition

the United

St ates at the wa:r 1 s e_nd for economic aid to develo p his c oun.;.t..,;. •-

try .

:

Hohammed ben Youssef left t h e dinner party stating that

he could see a

11

new future" for his country .3 9

Later that evenine , the Pre s ident rev iewed the proceedin,ss and·told his so n t hat tte Sultan h ad im press ed him
. ..

~-

-..~\.;,:

.

~

·.-

·,·: ith·'"fh''e g rasp of the situation th a t he displayed .

3 8roid .
-~-

· 3 9rbid 0, 9 • 111.
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heatedly criticized so-called French ownership of foreign
areas and stated t hat after the war, he was not g oing to
allow France or England to further ·their imperialistic
ambitions at the expense of less pmverful nations.

When he

had asked about conditions in Algeria and found that there,
too1 a small wealthy European grou p controlled the riches of
the country and ruled the lives of the majority, Roosevelt
exp~essed

ang er with colonial policies:

Imperialists don't realize what t h ey can do, what
they can create! They've rob b ed th i s continent of
billions, and al l because they were too shortsighted
to understand that their bil l ions were pennies, corri pared
to the pos s ibilities! Possibilities that must include
a better li f e for the people ·who inhabit this land •
n40
There were many reactions to the historic meeting
between Roosevelt and Hohammed ben Youssef--a meeting which
marked

th~

first time a Moroccart sultan had conferred directly

with a non-French head of state.

The French tried to blame

the meeting for the nationalist a g itation that began in
earnest after the war, and for
in North Africa.

Fr a nce'~

subsequent troubles

This fe eling persisted even though the

United States di d not carry out any of the promises which
Roosevelt had made to the Sultan.
at being. treated

,~ ike ~.~lj: zens

The Moors were overjoyed

of a sovereign state and took

the conversation as an indication that the United States was

,.. .40rbid., p. 85.
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prepared to support the Moroccans a gainst continued French
interference.41

The Sultan left the din ner with the firm

conviction that Roosevelt "\voulCl . spa re no effort to assist
l'!orocco in ·its struggle for independence and that he had a
genuine concern for Morocco's fUtu re.
Following the conference, Churchill and Roosevelt made
the one· hundred and fifty mile trip to Marrakesh, where they
were entertained in a beautiful I>Ioorish-styled villa temporarily occupied by an American vice-consul.

Although the

principal reason for the trip had been for the purpose of
relaxation before the cares of . global warfare had to be
resumed, Roosevelt did emphasize to his host his interest in
Morocco and its place in the family of nations~42
The President's private conversations, in which he
heartily condemned French colonialism and supported Morocco's
wish for independence, were couched in some1t1hat different
language than the official interviews he had with newsmen. '
The news conference at Casablanca merely recorded the statement
that he and the Sultan had gotten on very well and that they
both were greatly interested in the welfare of the Moroccan
people.43

A week later in Washington, the President merely

41Pendar, QE• cit., p. 145.
January

42Ibid., p. 150.

43Franklin D. Roosevelt press interview, Casab1anc·a,
2L~, 1943, in Rosenman, .2..1?.• cit., p. 44.

Jll
5

1i d that he h ad enjoy e d his v i sit 1·. rith I:lohe.rnm ed V and had

: nvited hirr. t o visit '•!e.s hi nr-;ton vrr,en the war V·l~s over.44
~Y!E? s

:n

e stat em ent s, ·wh ile not indic a t ine; any s p ee ial interest

~ orocc a n

~h ow

i nd e p enden ce a nd fut ur e nati onal as pira tio ns, did

Roosevelt's f ri endly attitude and understandinr; of the

:or occ a n

pro b l e~ ,

but a later

st a t ~n e nt

t o t h e pre s s presag ed

:it t l e he l p f or a n inde p end ent h or occo.
On Feb ruary 1 2 , 1 9 43 , t h e President began hi s statement
oncerni nt; t r.. e

Sul tan' s k inr;dom by saying that Morocco v1 as not

a Frenc h colony , but r a ther a prot ected a rea knovm as "the
-:. i f fian IJic7 R"Ylp ire of E orocco."

Th is f a ir beg inning was

conpletely overshad owed by h is concluding remark s in \'lhich
~o o s evelt

said c oncerninr; t h e L oroccans :

Now th ey li k e th e F r e nc h i·:h o are over them, because
the French und ers tand t hem . mh e y have had exp erience
and they don 't "~il ant any c ha nge . And t h e Sult a n is an
intimate friend of tt e Frenc h Govern oro 4 5
Such statement s , althoug h p ossibly necessary to demonstrate
he s~pp ort bf the United Stat es f or its Frenc h allies, did
~ ittl e

to increase Horoccan confidence in American pr omises .

mv;o l etters from Roosevelt to .Mohamm ed ben Yous s ef written
a fter their Casab lanca meeting informed the Sul tan that t h e
President vwu ld do all in his power to as s ist I-'Ioroc c o, an d

44a oosevelt pr e s s interview, Washington, February 2 ,

1943, in ibid., p . 59 .
45rbid.
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it \.Yas a great disappointment to the Moroccans to find that
Roosevelt was unable to implement his promises before his
death.46
IV.

POST-INVASIO N POLITICS

The years between the Casablanca Conference of

19~

and t .he end of the war passed uneventfully for l'Iorocco, from
a military point of view at least.

The fi ghting in North

Africa, after the initial Allied attack on Morocco, was confined to Tunisia and the Libyan desert, and the Moroccan
people had little direct contact with the war.

HO\,rever,

just because the armies were no long er struggling in the
country, it must not be assumed that peace had been restored
in Morocco.

The political unrest--temporarily subdued, as it

was, by the war emergency and by Moha.nuned ben Youssef's
pledge to support the French against the Germans--began to
reappear because the Allies had done nothing to resolve the·
political problems caused by the French occupation.

Moroccans

who had risked their lives and freedom to resist the Axis in
North Africa found themselves i gnored by the Ame r icans who
were duped into accepting the assurances of fealty proffered
·. · · ~·· ·

by the Vichyites.

46Information from Rom Landa u who read the orir,inals in
Moroccoo (Personal intervi ew , American Academy of Asian
Studies, San Francisco, February 24, 195 e)
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Wh e n Ga b r i el Pu aux was

appointed Resident General in

\

nl a ce of !Toe;ues , t he situation was n ot i mpr oved , fo r he had a
- r .ec.CJrd of_ c ol onia1 a dr:1 in i,;3tr::.t _io n th a t bo ded i ll fo r
hope s for inde penden ce ) r7
~e re

~ :o roccan

~-~any Am eric an officials in ~· ~ oro cc o

deluded int o bel i ev i ns that t l1 e people were f a vorabl e to

F r ~ nc h

domination and t hat i.f t h e Trichy adm inistrators 1,-rere

replaced , t h e populace wou ld be unc ontroll a ble .

Consequently i

wh en the ·war i n Europe ended , Korocco had litt le reason fo r
rejoicint; be c ause its p os ition 1tJas a s unpromi s in,c:: as it h a d
been prior to hostilities .
The only major c h ange tha t

c am e as a result of the vrar

had little direct effect on t h e peo pl e of Ilorocco, fo r it c o ncerned t he stat us of Tang ier.

The pro-Axis forces of Franco ,

vrho had occu p i e d. the Inte rnational Zone du ring t h e vmr , b egan
withdra1..rinr; fr om Te.n e;ier in June, 1 9 45 .

On l·.ug ust tenth, t o

re-establ ish t h e internat ional st a tus of t he p ort

city , ·F r a nce,

Great Br itain, t h e United St ates , a nd the U. S. S. R. met in
Paris and. f orm ed a provi s ional g o-v e rnment for Tan g ier.

In

contrast to the St a tutes of 1 923 and 1928 , t h e Pa ris resolution gave th e United States an equal s h a re in t he c; overnment
of Tang ier-- t h2t

i s , in i ts

C o~~ it tee

of Control a nd in it s

le g isl ative A~sembly o 48

lr7Landau , ;.:oroc can Drwna 1~ 0 1 - 1~· 55 , 22?. · c i t., p . 2ll.;. .
0

.

4 vcro.harn Stua rt , Th e Internc~t i onal ~ of T.e n r·ier
(sec ond ed itio n ; St a nf or d , Cal i fornia : Stanford Univers i ty
Press: 1 9 55 ), flp . 1hG- 5l o
(
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~

-
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Hmvever, e xce pt fo r interes t in the g overnm ent of
Tang ier and c oncern for American c omm er cial ri ghts in Morocco,
---th e United St a tes s e emingly lost interest i n Mohammed ben
Youssef's country and n egle cted to follow up President Roosevelt's oral commitments to the Sultan.

It was unfortunate

that -American policy was so confused in the latter months of
World War II t hat nb positive st e ps wer e t aken to help Morocco
regain a respected place in the world community.

The tremen-

dous harvest of go od will that the United States had garnered
as a result of championing enslaved peoples was sl owly being
diss ipated in the Ma ghreb because of t h e uncertainty demonstrated by our representatives there and by their continued
support of French claims of soverei gnty in Morocco.

The

United States nearly lost completely the respect g ained for
it by its troops and the person of its · wartime president,

and more than a decade had to pa s s before the United States
even partially fulfilled the impli ed promises made to its
wartime allyo

CHAPTER XI
.MOROCCO AND THE UNITED NATIONS
With the foundin g or the United Nations Organization
in San Francisco,

th~ Morocca~

nationalists felt that at

l ast they had an opportunity to present t heir case to the
~or ld.

_Therefore, in March, t945, a message was sent in the

name of the Independence Party, the Istiqlal, to the President of the international organization asking that Morocco
be admitted to the group and be invited to the opening session.

The Istiqlal did not expect to have its request

granted since it would not be considered qualified to speak
for Morocco.

However, the party's purpose was accomplished

--to call the attention of the world to the fact that Morocco
was restive under its foreign protectorate and desired its
freedom. 1
Undoubtedly the nationalists - considered it propitious
that t .he first meeting of the United Nations vras being held
in the United States, the country which had gained such a
reputation in the eyes of the oppressed people of the wbtld
for championing the cause of freedom.

But if the Moroccans

vtere depending on the United States' delegates to the United

lRom Landau, :Morocc a n Drama 1000-J:ill (San Francisco:
American Academy of _Asian Studies, 1956), p. 250.
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N.a.tions to . carry .the figM;.. for Moroccan independence, they
were doomed to a t en y ear period of disappoint8 ent and frustration. -· This chapt er wi l l survey t h e role of t h e United
States, ·and some indicat i on of t h e dilemma faci ng our delegates will be given; the at t empts of those countries in
sympathy vrith J.1orocco to bring t h e problem to the United
Nations for positive action will be discussed.
In October, 1 947, the Istiqlal again

~ent

a mes s age to

the United Nations in whic h it pointed out France's many

vio~

lations of the Prot ectorate a gre ement and requested a hearing
of Moroccan complaints before the international body.2

This

plea had to be officially i gnored although many member
nations were sympath etic to :filorocc o' s desire for political
freedom, and it was not until 1951 that the
dispute received a hearing .

Franco- ~ oroccan

By 1951, it became evident that

the Moroccan question could not be solved by France and
Morocco alone, and t h e Arab-Asian bloc of nations sponsored
a request that the problem be placed on the ag enda of the
General Assembly.

The Egyptian delegate stated that France

had violated the Charter of the United Nations and had
ignored the Declaration of Human Ri ghts by its persecution of
nationallt3ts and by its adamant refusal to allow Morocco some

2Henry c. Atyeo, "Mor occo, Tunis ia, and Algeria Before
the UoN.," Middle Eas tern Aff airs, Vol. 6 (August-September
1955), p. 230 •
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~ easure of self-government.3

The American delegates at first indicated that they
'ioi'o uld abstain from voting, .but much t .o the disappointiT!ent of
~ he

Arab-Asian states, the United States reversed its position

and voted to postpone debate for a year.4
had hoped that the United States

11

Morocco's friends

would follov.; its tradi-

tional support for colonial peoples and for the airing of
controversial issues in the United Nations.n5

Because the

United States supported the French position, most of the
Latin American countries did likewise, arid in a vote of
twenty-eight to t\venty-three with seven abstentions, the
General Assembly decided not to take up the Moroccan question.
The Arab-Asian countries did not allow this initial
setback to stop their efforts, and in October, 1952, they
requested the inclusion of the "Question of r.coroccon in the
agenda of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly.

The

request pointed out that although France had promised reforms,
it still persisted in using the old methods of unenlightened
colonialism, for Morocco was tttreated as a colony and -c.he

3 Harry N Hov.rard, "The Problem of Tunisia and Morocco
in the Seventh Session of the General Assembly," Department
.2.£ State Bulletin, Vol. 28 (r1arch 9, 1953), p. 359.
·
0

4New York Times, November 8, 195lo
5Rom Landau, IlT;orocco (New York: Carneg ie Endowment for
International Peace, September 1953), Po 316.
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~ ~inci9les

of both the Chart er and the Universal Declaration

.J f Human Rights hav e been flouted.

--- ~::e

..

.!16

For g ood measure ,

1 ett er added that France 1.,.-as In enac ing the -·p eac e -of the

·,:orld by arming F r en c h civilians and encouraging them to
'.:i olence a gainst the r.:oroccans. 7
When France realized that the general sentiment of the
:1 ember nations favo red debat e on the

lf~ oroccan

is s ue, it

.1 tternpte d to forestall discussion by c;:hall ene;ing the compet. ence of the 'Jnited : -.rations to take up this allegedly ttdomesti ctt issue.

Using Articl e Two , Paragraph Seven, of the United

::ations Chart er as justification, France asserted that its
?roblem 1-..rith I-Iorocco v.ras not in the provi nce of the inter!'lational grou;) as it \vas purely an internal issue.

Further-

:1ore , France stated, if the mat ter 1vas broue;ht u p , the dele; ation from the Republic would boycott all debates and the
?rench authori tie s i n Eorocco would not allow any kind of a
'nited Natior:s commission to enter the Protectorate.$
France's argume nt that its problem with r:orocco was a
domestic one had many weaknesses.
A.l~eci r as

First of all , the Act of

of 1906 had guaranteed the sovereignty of Morocco's

sultan and the inde pend ence of t he country, and since the Act

6Unit ed Natio_ns Bullet in, Vol . 13 (Septer1ber 15, 1952),
7rbid.

$New York Time s, October

a,

1952 .

had not been abro gated, the majority of the world looked upon
~~o rocco

as an individual, political, and national entity.

The most import ant proof of Mo rocco's independent status came
as a result of France's suit with the United States before
the International Court of Justice in 1952.

In its conclu-

s ions, the court voted that:
It is not disputed by the French Governm ent that
M6rocco, even under the Protect orate, has retained its
personality as a State in i nternational la~.
The court further stated that the Protectorate Treaty of 1912
did not alter Morocco's sovereign status.9
Robert Schuman, the French Foreign

M inister~

insisted

that the difficulties between his nation and Moroccq were
purely internal ones and did not endanger the peace of the
world.

He spoke of the ttdang erous lure of premature inde-

pendence" and ad rl. ed that France was doing all possible to
assist Morocco prepare someday to rule itself.l 0

Despite

these assurances, the threats of boycott, and repeated French
protests, the United States reversed its stand of 1951 and
joined the Arab-Asian bloc for the purpose of putting the
Moroccan ques ti on on the agenda.

9"The Moroccan Question and the United Nations," (New
York: The Moroccan Delegation, November 1952), pp. 14-15.
(Mimeographed.)
lOunited Nati ons Bulletin, Vol . 13 (December l, 1952),

p. 497.
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'I'?+s Americ~~ switch \vas more apparent than real, how- .·
ever, for when it came to concrete action in the Assembly,
the _United States changed its mind and supported the French
point of view.

It was one thing to support the inclusion of

the problem on the agenda, but it v1as something else again to
condemn an ally· vrhich
the United States felt was vital to its
.....
' ' "~"

...~fense ·· ·p.lans.

Pfiwlip Jessup , the head of the United States

delegation, put into these words the dilemma faced by this
country:

. . .. ..-....
. ..

We of the United States cannot sit in judgment
between our friends to say this should be done today
and that tomorrow.ll

He added his feeling that the United Nations coul d not profitably c·on"'Cern itself with problems that could best be solved
by direct negotiations between the parties involved.l2
Even though the United States had opposed a strong
resolution condemning France's action in Morocco, this country, .
along with forty-five other nations, did

~gree

to a watered-

down resolution :!.'V'hich, in part, expressed confidence:
That in pursuance of its proclaimed policies, the
Government of France will endeavor to further the
fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco • • • • 13

llnaniel M. Friedenberg , "Our Foreign Policy in North
Africa," The Antioch Review, Vol. 14 (June, 1954), p. 150.
12 Landau, Moroccan Drama, QE• cit., p. 352.
l3united Nations Bull etin , Vol . 14 (January 1, 1953),
p. 29.
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Alt h ough the resolution was g enera l ly regarded as unsatisfa ctory, it did re present a modest victory for r-1orocco and a
moral defeat for France; for not only did the United Nations
r eaffirm its competence to discuss t h e problem but also no
nation spok e in defense of the Protectorate policies.l4
Although t h e Seventh Session had urged France to seek
amicable solutions to the crisis in Morocco, the French
i gnored this sound advice and heightened the tension in 1953
by summarily deposing Mohamr:1ed ben Youssef.

Ahmed Balafrej,

the Secretary General of the Istiqlal, wrote a letter to
United Nations Secretary General Dag Hamrnerskjold in which he
protested the de position and cha rged that France was launching a systematic campaign to annihilate all Moroccans who
Y.rere opposed to the colonial reg ime.l5
torian

c.

The noted French his-

H. Julien charged that "not only the Istiqlal had

been suppressed but als6 the Moroccan intelligent~ia."l6
These criticisms coupled with the French violation of the
Sultan's sovereignty occasioned

anothe~

protest to the United

Nations.
On August 26, 1S53, fifteen Arab-Asian nations

14Landau, r.Iorocca~ Drama, op. cit., p. 3 52.
l5Moroccan News Bulletin (New York: Moroccan Information Office, 1953), June 5, 1 953, P· l.
16c. H. Julien, quoted in Fr ee t-.orocco (New York:
Party, 1 953-1955), April 20) 1 953, p. 3.
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re qu ested tbe Security Council " t o i nvestigate t he inter...
national friction" th at had been generated by t h e-·'i:l'ren·c h
dep ositi on of the Sulta.n.l7

France immediately brought up

i t s old argument t hat Nor occo's pr oblems were the exclusive
concern of Fra nce as an internal matter.

The defenders of

Moroccan freedom retorted that t h e Act of Algeciras had guaranteed Morocco's place in the family of inde pendent nations
and thus permitted it to re quest a hearing before the Security
Council.

Great Britain and the United States contested

tti~

premise, and t h e American Representative, Henry Cabot Lodge,
stated concerning t he crisis:
It must be obvious to anyone who looks at the facts
candidly that t h e sit uation in Korgcco do es not endarigBr
international peace and sec urity.l8
After extensive debate at six meetings of the Council, during
which time the United States backed France in its c ontention
that the problem of r-1ohammed ben Youssef's exile did not pose
a threat to peace, the delegates were deadlocked in a vote of
five to five.

Since seven affirmative votes were required to

put any problem on the Security Council's agenda, t h e Moroccan question was dropped by that bodyol9

17united Nations Bulletin, Vol. 15 (September 1, 1953),
p. 204.

lSRichard P. Stebbins , Th e Un ited St ates in World
Affairs 1 953 (Ne\·J York: Harper Br oth ers , 1 95 5): p . 321.
19New York Times, September 4, 1953.
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When it became evident that the Security Council was
not going to act on the Moroccan matter, t h e Arab nations
introduced a request in the First Committee (Political and
Security} that the General Assembl y take up the crisis which
they felt was threatening t h e peace of the world as well as
depriving the

I.,~ oroccan

people of t h eir freedom.

Th e resolu-

tion asked t hat martial law be terminate d , that democratic
representative institutions be established through free elections and that
years.20

~ orocco

be granted independen6e within five

This resolution received the requisite majority in

the First Committee .and vms therefore sent to t h e General
Assembly for implementation.
The French dele gation boycotted t h e session in which
their country's administration of l':Iorocco was to be discussed,
but the United States delegatioh led by Lodge spoke for the.
French position.

Contrary to the hopes of the · Arab nations

that the United States would follow its traditionally anticolonial policy, Lodg e

stre ~ sed

America's syTipathy for inde-

pendence movements in general, but pointed out that since the
Moroccan situation did not pose a danger to peace, the Uri.ited
States c ould only hope that some satisfactory bi-lateral solution could be worked out between France and her Protectorate.21

2°Landau, r.:oroccan Drama , op. cit., p. 3 54.
21 stebbins, op. cit., p. 32lo
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Lodge was in the dif f icult pos ition of

tryin ~

to

re cognize nationalist aspirat ions while avoiding an attack on
:· ranee, but since such f enc e-sitting was impossi ble, he was
bliged to make a decision.

It was stated by the American

del egates tha t they were faced with a dilemma and the middleof-the-road approach wh ic h they would have pre fer r ed to follow V·ias untenab l e.

Therefore, Lodge tried to compromise by

s ugg esting that t h e United Nations encourag e the contending
parties to take up direct negotiations in an effort to settle
their differ ences.

He added that a "detailed discussion" of

the problem would not be in the interest of the Moroccan
people and th at a resolution would tend to "exacerbate the
relationstt betwe en ? ranee and I'.1orocco.22

Although the final

vote favored the Ar a b-Asian resolution condemning France's
regime in Morocco by a marg in of thirty-two to twenty-two,
as a result of the position taken by the United States, the
vote fell short of the two-thirds majority needed for passage
in a plenary sessiono

Again world opinion

f~vored

the Maroc-

can side of the qu estion, but the General Assembly could not
act.
In

1954, fourteen nations asked the General Assembly

tQ take up the Moroccan question because the situation had
deteriorated so badly that the country was an armed camp in

22Atyeo, ~· cit., p. 240.
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wh ic h violence vms a daily occurr ence.

The Syrian delegate

s ubmitted a mild resolution that said in part that:
It-- rec om.rne nds t hat an at:n osphere conducive t o peaceful s et tleme nt of t he qu es t ion c r eated in Mor oc co • • •
- f or the r eali zation of t he leg itimate a spirati ons of
the Moroc can peopl e i n co nfo r mity wit h th e purp oses and
principles of the Charter [be created7. 23
In t h e course of t h e debat e over the resolution, t h e
Syrian de1egate propose d an int er nat ional conference to solve
the Moroccan crisis and add ed tha t his delegation felt t hat
this was needed si nce the United States and the Western
povrers had refused to allovr the General As s embly to act on
t h e matter of the illegal dis p osition of the Moroccan sultan.24
Notwithstanding the Syria n charg es, the weight of opinion in
the General As s embly supported the viewpoint that France was
beginning to find a peaceful and fair solution for the crisis
in Morocco.

Lodge said that the United States was "strongly

impressed by the sincerity and t h e ing enuity of M. Mendes
France and the progress achieved in Tunisia."25
When the Arab-Asian nations realized the tenor of
United Nations sentiment, they withdrew their original resolution and replaced it wi t h one t hat called for a postponement

23united Nati ons, General Assembly, " The Morocco Question." A/C.l/1.122/Corr.l, 10 December 1954; Ninth Session,
First Commit tee, Ag enda Item 56o
24

N ~I York Times, December 10, 1 954.

25Landau, Moroc can Drama , ££• cit., p. 358.
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of discussion for the time being.

By l eaving the door open .

for a re-evaluation of the \Ioroccan probl em if France's promised reforms did not materialize, the

Arab -Asian nations

insured a r eh.earint:; of the crisis wh en the situation warranted
it.

During the vote on the resolution, which passed by a

vote of t h irt y-nine to fifteen, Lodg e expres s ed t he confidence
of

~he

United States that France was sincer ely tryi ng to set-

tle the problem in the best interests of Morocco.26
During the summer of the follovling year, the ArabAsian bloc reinstituted proceedings to obtain United Nation
action to "end the bloodshed in ~orocco.n27

The group

appealed to the Security Council because it was felt that the
violence in the Sultan's country was "likely to endange r the
maintenance of international peace and securityo~2S

The

Moroccan matter was included in the agenda of the General
Assembly, but developments in Morocco and France indicate.d
that Moham.11ed ben Youssef was being r estored to his throne
and that France was beginning to realize that only by cooperation V<Tith the Moroccans could its economic investments be
protected.
On November 25, 1955, the

Arab~Asian

bloc introduced a

resolution, that was approved by a vote of forty-nine to zero,

26New York Times, Decembe r 14, 1954.
27rbi d ., July 21, 1955 .

28Ibid., July 30, 1955.
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expressing the confidence of the United Nations that France
and Morocco would be able to solve t heir difficulties.

This

resolution was something more than the pious platitudes
expressed at previous sessi ons, for the situation in Morocco
did improve and the French actually began making an .effort to
give Morocco its freedom.
~ations'

Lodge claimed that the United

policy of waiting for developments, that the United

States had advocated, had vindicated itself, for the two
countries involved in the dispute were resolving their difficulties bi-laterally.29

Hov1ever, France's trrea,sonablenessn

was not the outcome of a change of heart .or · of the many
United Nations resolutions, but ca'Ti e principally as a result
of the war in Morocco.

French fear of complete economic ruin

in Morocco and the effectiveness of Moroccan resistance combined to force the return of Moharmned V and the restoration
of Moroccan independence.
Morocco's long struggle s upported by its Arab-Asian .
friends finally culminated in a unanimous vote by the United
Nations to admit Morocco for membership, and on November 12,
1956, the Moroccan minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Balafrej,
thanked the member nations for including his nation in their
number)O

29Department of State Bull et in, Vol. 33 (December 19,
1955), p. 1040.
3 Ouni ted i~ations Revie1rl , Vol. 3 (January, 1957) , p. 43 •
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The American delegat-ion used this opportunity to
attempt belatedly to i mprove its re putation in the Arab world
by statine that

the a pplication

"the United $tates wh olehea rtedly supports

. . . for_ membership

in the United Nations"

of a country wh ose nationhood extended back twelve centuries.31
Fortunately ,

th~

Moroccans took the pr offered fr i ends h ip at

face value, and this country began to demonstrate through its
financial and technical as s istance program that it had the
best interests of the

~ -~ oroccan

people at heart.

3lttl\1or occo Recom.rnended for Admission to United
Nations,n Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 35 (August 6,
1956) ~ P• 24.4o

CHAPTER XII
MOROCCO'S STRUGGLE FOR I NDEPENDENCE
Although

fe'v'T

Americans before V{orld \•i ar II \ITere aware

that there was an independence movement in Morocco, the
Moroccans themselves had b e en working for more self- government almost from the very moment France had inflicted the
Protectorate regime on them.

Und er Lyautey 's egis, Moroccan

progress had been promising, and th e people were not at first
particularly interested in replacing the French with their
own government.

Hm11ever, within t vm years after Lyautey had

been recalled, many politically a l ert Moroccans real ized that
the whole tenor of the Protectorate was svfinging from its
former paternalism to outright colonial exploitation.

It is

the purpose of t h is chapter to tra ce the evolution of nationalism in Horocco from the time of Lyautey 1 s resignation, in
1925, to independence in 1 956 and t h e beginnings of a modern
national entity, with special emphasis being placed on the
part that the United States played in this movement.

I.

THE GE NESIS OF MOROCCAN NAT IO NALISM

It was in 1927, two years after Marshal Lyautey had
left Morocco and in the year that .f\•Ioharnmed V became sultan,
that

t"VIO

separate grou ps of young r.•Ioroccans began formulating

plans and purposes that would ultimately lead to independence

-

.-

~

--~=
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for their nation.

vl ithin a short time, th e t wo g roups, led

respectively by Ahmed Balafrej, t h e first f oreign minister of
i ride pendent Morocco, and Allal el Fassi, t he leader of Morocco's major political party and its guidi ng s pirit, merg ed into
what they called the ;.ioroccan r4 eague.

In 1930, t h e notorious

Berber Dahir (decree) was promulgated by t he French in an
attempt to split the Arabs and the Berbers and to prevent the
formation of a united front agains t the. d omination of FraDce.
Nationalists today mark the proclamation of the Dahir as the
stimulus whic h awakened their movement and gave it a larger
measure of popular support than it had theretofore.l
During the 1 930's, the nationalists continued to gain
adherents and began to be feared by the French authorities,
who branded them as intellectual extremists interested not in
the Moroccan people but rather in fanatical opposition to
France.

Several of the leaders of the movement were exiled

or imprisoned for varying lengths of time by the French, but
by 1943, led by the encouraging example of Mohammed ben
Youssef, the nationalists bega n to ma,ke their inf luence felt
throughout Morocco.

During the war, the Moroccan League

changed its name to the Istiqlal (Inde pendence) Party and
became recognized as the chief instrument of nationalism.2

lRom Landau, Moroccan Drarna 1 900 -1.2.2..2. (San Francisco:
American Academy of Asian .:) tud ies , 'f95t)j,
p. 147o
r.
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In 1944, the Istiqlal presented the French Resident General
\dth a document in which it demanded:
ence and unification of I•:iorocco;
Po~ers"

(1) complete independ-

( 2) that all "interested

guarantee Moroccan independence;

(3) that Morocco be

considered a signatory of the Atlantic Charter; and (4) immediate introduction of a democratic constitution.3 - This d emand
was labeled the work of extremists and
by the Protectorate authorities.

~ras

discounted entirely

Nevertheless, this formula-

tion of a concrete program shm·1ed the Moroccan people and
foreign observers that the Istiqlal was a responsible group
that had a definite program for the future of its country.
II.

THE NOROCGA.a HOPES FOR AMERI.CAN SUPPORT

- ' The interest of the United States in the problem of
nationalism and in the aspirations of Morocco for independence
did not

re~lly

start until

P~esident

Franklin Roosevelt by-

passed the French authorities at Casablanca to meet Mohammed V.
The French were disturbed not only by Roosevelt's invitation
but. even by the seating arrangement at the dinner, which was
\

organized so as to separate General Nogues as far as possible
from the President and the Sultan--giving them complete freedom to discuss Moroccan problems witho1ft fear of an official

3Ibid., Po 215.
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censor.4
Roosev elt's precedent-s hatt ering conversation with
Mohammed V indicated t o t h e Sult a n and to the nationalists
that at last a major power was inte rested in t h e future freedom of Morocco.
what was

The fact that the two leaders had met q.nd

discus~ed

were soon circulating throughout the coun-

try; every Moroccan feeling sure t hat he knew the sum and
substance of what had been said.

Adding impetus to the

general feelin g that the United St ates was g oing to intervene
actively in the cause of Moroccan independence were the two
letters, previously alluded to, which the President sent to
the Sultan after the Casablanca meeting.

Although they have

not yet been released for publication, indications are that
they c ontained assurances that Roosevelt was planning to
assist the national as pirations of the ro'l oroccan people.5

vlhat

the letters may contain is nm'/ relatively uni.ln portarit, but
what was of vital interest during the struggle for Moroccan
freedom was that the letters had been written and that they
were thought to be missives encouraging the Sultan to press
for the end of French control.
after the historic · Casablanca

Nearly a ·:Eie-cade and ·. a half
m~eting,

th~

people of Morocco

4John A. Narcum, "The United States and Mor occo,tt
Middle EastP.rn Af f airs, Vol. 8 (Janua ry 1957), p. 7.
5Ne·N York Times, Nov ember 26, 1957o
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still honored the memory of Roosevelt for his assistance in
giving impetus to t h eir struggle for national sovereignty.
·Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt reported that she met many Moroccans
in 1957 who referred to the great role that her husband had
played in setting in motion the forces that finally led to
complete independence from the French regime.

She

~Jrote

that

in one tmm she was touched to see a crudely made American
flag raised over a gateway with a sign which read, "We will
always remember President Roosevelt ."6
The Moroccan nationalists displayed greater faith in
America's pro-Moroccan sentiment than the facts warranted,
for the period followin g the war's end shoNed that the United
States was more concerned with placating the French than in
helping a "colonial" people achieve their freedom.

In 1951,

President Truman was asked by a group of North African
patriots to "frm,m formallylt on continued French repression
in Morocco and to persuade France to grant a

great~r

measure

of self- government to the people than it had been willing to
do.

V!hatever Truman' s- sentiments may have been in the matter,

he was not in a position to oppose himself to the State
Department's policy of non-interference in what vras termed a
purely European problem that could be worked out by the
6Eleanor Roosevelt, "My Round-the-~!Jorld Adventures, n
The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 230 (March l, 1958), P• 96.
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oarties involved.?

Secretary of St ate Dean Ac h eson refused

to comment on the ap peals fr om the I:Ioroccans, and a fe\v
months later \'>"h en t he Ist i qlal l eader, Allal el Fa ssi, was
arrested in Tang ier for criticisi ng the French reg ime, the
Stat·e Depart·ment declined to instruct its representatives on
t he International Council to interfere.$
Even the matter of capitulations seened to encourage
t he Moroccans to ho pe that the United States was backing them
in their contention that t h e Ma ghreb was not a French dependency.

Vlhen the State Department refused to negotiate with

the -French for the purpose of abandoning American extra-territorial rights in Norocco, the Moroccans took this to mean
that the United States did not recognize their country as a
Frenc h possession.

Our retention of capitulatory privileges

would have been, if

"f'.~ orocco

had been free, a sore spot in

relations betv-1 een the t vTO countries and would have been protested as an infr i ng ement on l\Toroccan legal ri ghts, but as
long as the French were claiming sovereignty over the Sultan's
country, the Moroc cans we r e more than glad to have the United
States defy t h e Quai d'Orsay in this matter.

Additional com-

fort was taken in the fact that the United States still

k~pt

a minister in Norocco who was accredited to the Sultan and

7Nev; York Times, February 22·,- 1951.
$Ibid., March 11, 1951.
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not to the French Resident General--even though our representative was unable to deal directly \'lith Mohammed ben
Youssefo"0
The Moroccans did all in their power to encourage a
sense of res ponsibility for Ivioroccan freedom in the people of
the United States.

\'!hen sixteen units of the American fleet

made a fourteen day visit to Tangier , the l'-1oroccans found a
ready-made opportunit y to reveal their pro-American feelings
and to . acquaint the sailors with the fact that Morocco was
still a "colonized" area.

The nationalists first made sure

that the merchants, cab drivers, peddlers, and all those who
\'Tould naturally consider forei gners fair game for exploitation
underst ood that the American sailors \'Jere to be treated as
guests of Morocco and with genuine respect and friendship.
Then, because Tangier's international government ignored the
native population in the official welcome of the United
States Navy, a leafle.t vras prepared to inform the Americans
of the real situation.

After greeting t h e sailors in friendly

terms, the leaflet explained that if the local poverty and .
misery were offensive to American sensibilities, the sailors
should realize that the Moroccans v1ere a subject people who
were not masters in their o:vm house.lO

The leaflet . was
•

9rbid., February 5, 1952o
lORom Landau, ft~ ong the Ame ricans (London: Robert
Hale Limited, 1953), p. l •
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eag erly receiv ed by the Americans "V'T ho were much i mpres s ed by
its contents and who were ev en re ported to be collecting
extra copies a s souvenirs of tteir visit.ll
The strateg ic value of North Africa and particularly
of Morocco wa s emphas ized by s pokesmen of t h e nationalist
mov ement in an ef fort to enlist Am erican i nterest in the land
of Mohammed V.

Ahmed Balafrej, Secretary General of the

Istiqlal, explained Morocco's place in Am erican security
plans in the followin g paragraph written in 1 953!
\'J e readily realize t hat i n t his atomic a g e, frontiers
shrink a nd nati ons bec om e more and more interd ep endent.
We are t herefor e ready to pro cl a im our solidarit y with the
West, es pecially t h e United St ates. Again we wish to m ak~
it clear that in t h e ideolog ical c onf lict dividing the
world today , we stand with t h e West • • • •
Ame r ic~, havi ng a direct stake in the · future of. our
country, must re a lize t hat we ca n be of greater as s istance to the West as a free peo ple. Americ a n strateg ic
interes ts and invest ement s would be bett er pr otected
and more secure.~2

This and similar statements did not stir up much interest in
the United States, but the Moroccan people remained convinced
that the maj?rity of Americans were opposed to colonialism
and in favor of independence for all subject peoples.

llrt was g enerally suppos ed that t h e paper, which is
reproduced in full in Appendix G, was "V'rritten by Rom Landau
fo~ the Istiqlal Party .
·
12Morocco Office of I nf ormation a nd Docum entation,
Fre e Moro cc o (New York: Isti ql a 1 Pa rty, 1 953-1955), May 25,
1953. p. 1.
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III.

THE FRENCH FEARS OF UNITED STATES' INTERVENTION
Even thou gh the United States was doing ~ery little to

encourage the J.1oroccan nati onalists, the French were convinced
that this country was b eh ind the surge for independence that
was apparent in l'·Iorocco.

Therefore, after se eing something

of the Moroccan hopes in connection with American support of
their freedom fight, it is necessary to survey the French
attitude in this matter.
The basic attitude of the French can best be illustrated by referring to the statement of one of the Protectorate officials, who said, "You. Americans i"iere once colonial
rebels, and you still embody something of the missionary.nl3
This feeling cont i nued to be evident in all French pronouncements that had to do with America and its interests in Maroccan affairs and formed the basis for the Quai d'Orsay 's
American poli cy.

As i'ar back as 1943, Gabriel Puaux, the

Resident General who replaced .Nogues , tried to suppress all
contacts betvveen American officers and r.Ioroccan leaders
because it had been .reported that the conversations were many
times ab out the French adm inistrat ion in terms that were
considerably iess than flattering .

When the Americans refused

l3nv.Jatch rv1orocco," Fortune, (S eptember 1 951), p . 95.
An Arab nationalist 'V·Tho heard a r e port of this statement
changed a few wor ds, nr ou Am ericans were once colonial rebels,
and you should embody more of the missionary."

to follow the sugg estion of the Resident General in this
regard, the French resorted to spreading rumors that the
nationalists had all been Nazi collaborators during the early
part of the war.

This strateg em, when set against the record

of Vichyite cooperation with the Germans, served no purpose
other than to make the Protectorate a uthorities look foolish
in American eyes.l4
In 1951, the French attem pted to link the Istiqlal
with Communism for t h e purpose of alienating American sympathy
from the JI·Ioroccan nationalists.

This effort was given a high

priority at that time because the United Nations v;as about to
consider the Moroccan problem at the General Assembly, and to
make the charge look more realistic, several nationalist
leaders were arrested, charged with being Communist paid
agitators.

This canard \•Tas less than a complete success, for

evidently French propaganda was not too well coordinated; at
the

s~u e

time as one French source accused the nationalists

of representing a Communist-inspired movement, another claimed
that the United States had ag ents in Morocco who were fomenting nationalism as a way to combat international Communism in
North Africaol5

l4Edmund Stevens, North African Powder Keg (New York:
Cmvard McCann Ind., 195 5 )-,-p.-70.
l5New York Times, Marc h 9, l S5lo
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Whether the Americans, the Communists, or the Arab
League were blamed for France's troubles in Morocco, made
little difference to those responsible

fo~

the propaganda

attacks, but they refused to acknowledg e that the basic cause
\'Tas

their own repressive rule.

To insure that the French at

home would continue to think that the

~ oroccans

would have

been peaceful and content had it not been for outside interference, official news releases echoed such sentiments as the
following:
The ambiguous and, to say the least, disloyal attitude
of our allies tm·:ards us, es pecially after taking a position in favor of submitting the Eoroccan issue to the
United Nations, was well desi gned to encourag e the outbreak of ag itation • • • in Morocco. \lithout wishinr, to
impute it to the Americans, one should ascribe to them
their share of res ponsibility.l 6
So convinced was he that the United States was in
sympathy with the nationalists that to counteractthis, General
Juin spread the rumor throughout the tpibes that the purpose
of the nevily arriving American troops 1.-..ras to support the
French regime.

Possibly hoping by this maneuver that the

nationalists would lose

~-..rhatever

faith they still retained in

American interest in their cause, the Resident General supplemented his statement by saying that the United States vms
in full accord with existing French policy and had committed
itself to lend support to the Protectorate in the event of a

16Stevens, ££• Clt.,
.
· Po 52o
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nationalist uprising .l7

Some credence may have been given to

these reports because Juin had just returned from the United
States, but most of the

~or o ccans

really believed that the

State Department had told him to cease his repressive measures a gainst t he people and to discontinue his attacks
against the sovereignty of Mohammed ben Youssef.l8

Juin's

claims ttat United States' troops v-rere in Morocco to protect
the French rule, were partial ly discounted by the fact that
American units made it a practice to declin e invitations to
take part in French patriotic demonstrations and anniversary
celebrations, and t h e Moroccans also kne-v.J t hat American airmen were required to wear their uniforms wh en t h ey vlere away
from their bases so that there would be no danger that they
might be mistaken for Frenc r~ en.l9
The French fears that t h e United States vras supporting
nationalism were increased by t h e words of a State Department
official Nho had been in l·-:orocco from 1941 to 1 945.

He corn-

plained bitterly about the role this country had played in
promoting 1:oroccan hopes for independence:
I saw the rec kless manner in which the late President
Roosevelt and his advisers encouraged the Sultan to
aspire to greater autonomy and even to inde pendenc·e.

17New
York
--. - - Times, May 31, 1 951.
lSLandau, f:Toroccan Drama, l S00 -!.22.2., .2£· cit., p. 275.
1 9stevens , ££• cit., p. 84.

.•
t.N ·~·

'

,_ .... ,

~-

341
American officers • • • did much to encourage the
nationali sm of t Le ;roroccans .20
In the light of such statements from State Department officials, it is not surprisin8 that, ten years after the dinner
party, colonial diehards still complained about Roosevelt 1 s
encounter v-1it h the Sult an and the ninsidiousn propaganda of
independence and freedom that the fuaerican leader dispensed.
In 1953, t h e i l legal deposition of t h e Sultan brought
with it renewed Fr ench fears that the United States might
intervene in

I'·~ oroccan

affairs.

General Guillaume, the nevJ

Resident, said, nrf Eisenhow·er gave open or indirect aid to
Moroccan nationalists, it would only injure the already
strained ties uniting the partners of the North Atlantic
Pact.n21

If the bonds of NATO were being strained, it was

primarily because the French ·were using, to s uppress the free-dam-seeking I1:ioroccans, American supplies and equipment t hat
had been destined for the prot ection of Europe.

As a matter

of fact, the fears of t t e Protectorate authorities were
unfounded, and America did nothing to su pport the le[itimat e
ruler of Moroccq; rather, this country hastened to recognize
the French puppet, Ben Arafa, who was placed on the Sultan's
throne.

20J. Rives Childs, in New Yo rk Times, F ebruary 9, 1953.
21'1
.t
1\ arcum, _Q£. 9_.,
p. 6•
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In 1954, the French were agai n convinced that the
United States

"~:la s

waging a campaign against their contr ol of

j.:orocco, vJhen Will i am 0. Douglas, a justice of t h e Supreme
Court, stated in a radio address that "Horocco presents
colonialism at its '\-.rorst.n

Ee continued with the prophecy

that violence v10uld explode in I"Iorocco in t h e n ear f uture and
that the French would then claim that the trouble was Communist-inspired.

Dougl as emphasized that t h e u prising would

not be the work of forei g n elements . of any kind but would
come as the result of t he nationalist 1 s desire for selfgovern"llent. 2 2

The French were horror-stricken at vrhat they

were afraid was a reflection bf official Washington thinking
and made frantic protests to the State Department about the
violation of the ri ghts of France and the gratuitous interference in the internal affairs of the Republic.

Unfortun-

ately for the hopes of the nationalists, Douglas h ad been
speaking as a private citizen, .and his words did not reflect
the official position of t h e United States.

However, the

conscience of the French had been pricked, and they continued
to fear that this country was planning to ease t hem out of
Morocco in much the same way that the British had pushed them
out of Syria and L.ebanon follo·wing ';Jorld War IIo 23

22 New York Times, August 9, 1954o
23stevens, QE· cit., p. 86.
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French fears about American motives \·rere a contributing

facto~

in the Protectorate's discrimination against the

business interests of United States' c itizens.

American

capital was very interested in h el ping to develop the mineral
wealth of the Ma ghreb --especially des iring to have a part in
the mining of lead, zinc and manganese, but Frenc h finance
was not at all dis posed toward sharing the plum which it had
..

retained for itself since the early years of the twentieth
century.

Conse quently, \\1he n Point Four technical aid was

offered for Uorocco, the French refused for fear that the
people of the country would realize that American scientific
and industrial progress had far out-stri pped that of France
and would be eager to follow t h e leadership of the Americans.24
The French oress took up the cry and began to accuse American
businessmen of covetous aims in J;i:orocco, and the call for a
halt to Am erican economic imperialism began to echo in the
Chamber of Deputies.25

Even after l '1 orocco severed its polit1

ical ties with France, the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs felt c ompelled to reassure the

Parlia~ent

that French

interests would not be re placed by United States dollars.
The French Secretary said that the United States should be
permitted to aid Iviorocco but that "it could only be done in

24:f!larcum, .2.1?.· cit., p . 5.
25 New York Times, August 24, 1955o
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agreement with France .n
11

Then h e c..dded the sant:;uine statement,

\•J e ardently hope that America

u ~ 2. e rstands

this in the very

interests of Nort h Africa. 1 r ~6
It mig ht be difficu:Lt to se e v;hy the interests of
North Africa dependeJ so excl 1.lSi vely on agreement 1tJith the
French viewpoint, but our a.u bassador to France in 1956,
C. Douglas Dillon, certainly ·went out of his way to assure
the French that America would carry on in the
w1-1 ich it had previously "supported France. u

s~ne

manner in

He continued by

saying that the United States '·rould back up France in its
search for nliberal solut i ons that will insure the continuance of its presence in North Africa.n27
avo-~·1ed

The ambassador dis-

the actions of private American citizens who had given

the impression that they v;ere sympathetic to I!loroccan aspirations for self-government, and he pledged the moral support
of the United States for the French position in Algeria •.
This dubious statement was played up throughout the Middle
East and

the prestiEe of the United States was dealt another

serious blm-1.

French criticism of the American position r.mst

have been very severe to have caused our ambassador to affirm
this country's supn ort of the French position in so positive
a manner.

2~aurice Faure quoted in New York Times, April 3, 1957.
27Richard P. Stebbins, Th e Uni t ed States in World
Affairs 1956 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1 957),
10 9 .-

P:
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IV.

AMERICA'S PRH'iARY I NTEREST:

l~D ROCCA N

AIHBASES

The main interest that the United States had in Vorocco,
both as a protectorate and as an independent state, revolved
around the status of the airbases, the French attempts to
limit their us efulness, and the Kor occan concern that the
United States had not consulted the Sultan in negotiating for
their establishment.
"Facing defeat in Korea in December 1950 • • • the
United States negotiated a hurried

agre~~ent

with France per-

mitting constru.c tion of five mammo"th airbases in the Protectorate."28

In this short statement are the seeds of two

important trouble spots that have since materialized in the
Strategic Air Force's program.

First of all, the hurry that

characterized the negotiations was carried over into the constr~ction

progra.'TI, resulting in mill ions of '1asted dollars and

tons of equipment.

The other problem that has survived to

plague the United States is the fact that this country ignored
the legitimate ruler of Morocco and worked out details of land
o-vmership arid construction rights exclusively wi th the French
Protectorate aut h orities.

The matter of wastag e, although

having aspects bordering on the

crL~inal,

could be and was

partially corrected, but the harvest of ill-will gained by

28"Airbases Are United States' Stake,
(May, 4, 1953), p. 35.

11

Life, Vol . 34

the United States for our presumptous by-passing of the
Moroccans has b een imp os 2i ble to overcome completely.
- -·--- The rtcrash- programn that began in December, 1 950 with
Franco-American talks on t n e sub ject did not mark the first
occasion that this c0untry had wanted bases in Morocco, for
following World War II, the United St ates asked for and
received permiss ion to maintain a naval base at Port Lyautey,
a short distance from Rabat.29

Wh en the United States decided

to su pplement that establishment vTith airbases, the

Army

Engineers gave contracts to a pool of five g iant construction
firms that called themselves the Atlas Constructors.

This

company received a contract in which nobody but the American
taxpayer could lose; cost plus a flat commission of five million dollars made the . hard work in the Moroccan sun more than
worth the time and energy spent.

However, that natural

adjunct of haste--waste--made its inevitable appearance at
about the time when the United States Congress began to . realize ·t hat a great many dollars were being spent in a part of
the world about which they knew very little.

'1/Jh en it b.ecame

apparent that the first cost est imate of three hundred million
dollars would probably soar to half a billion, t h e Air Force
lov1ered the s pe ed priority in an effort to save mon ey, but
for some reason, the costs still climbed.

After a series of

29Landau, Moroccan Drama 1 900 -1..22.i, oo. cit., p. 190o
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Congressional investi gations on t h e spot, some improperly
s pent money was rec ov ered , but poor c ons t r uction work that
- --·--·--had passed inspec tion because of -the cry for s peed had to be

completely red one.JO
As a monument to remind futur e planners of t h e dang er
of "cras h" pri orities, El Dj erna Sah im remains to s h ow the
tremendous waste that can accompany poor planning .

In 1 950 ,

it had been decided to put a small base at Sahim, and to save
time, an oil pipeline v.ras laid stretc h ing fifty miles ·from
the completed air base of Ben Guerir.

Nmv

that plans for the

El Djema Sahim base have been aband oned, not h ing remains t here
but the ga ping end of a very expensive pipeline s upplying
nothing to nowhere.

At Nouaseur, near Casablanca, thirty-

five million dollars worth of equi pment had to be sold as
surplus when the proposed airbases were cut from five large
bases to three large ones and a small fi ghter stand-by strip.Jl
Although the airbases

we~e

plagued with wa ste and mis-

manag ement, they .,,rere of vital i mportance to American plans
for the defense of Euro pe a gainst attac ks from Russia.
M oro~co

Air

was ideally situated for t h e purposes Of the Strategic

Command, wh ich h a d the respon sibility for intercontin-

30"The American Invasion," Time, Vol. 59 (March 31,
1952), p.32.

3l~·1 orocco Of f ice of I nfo rmat ion and Documentation,
Q£. cit., June 25, l 954, _p. 6.

•

=t- .• .

... ental.. warfare, because of the almost perfect flyinB; weather
that had sunshine for more than three hundred days of the
year.

The location of

;~pocco

on the northwest s houlder of

the African continent made it possible to control the airlanes of three continents; yet, it was far enough removed
from the military centers of the world to be comparatively
safe against ground attacks.

All these features, when added

to the hundreds of square miles of flat desert eminently
suitable for the longest rum<Tays needed, combined to make
Morocco of primary importance in American defense plans.
As has been stated, the problem of wastage and indecision as to where the bases should be located could be
remedied; but the well-nigh insurmountable handicap under
which the Air Force labored resulted from the lack of cooperation from our "allies" the French.

From the very outset of

negotiations with .t he French authorities, these made it
abundantly clear that neither the J'.'lorocca..Ds nor the Americans
had any ri ghts in the matter but were both merely being suffered to

partici ~ ate--the

United States actively by supplying

the money, the equipment, the airplanes, and the technical
skills; and the Moroccans passively by giving up their land
and their sovereignty.

(One wonders just what . the French

thought they were contributing to the arrangement.)
'I'he -Protectorate authorities f irst displayed their
fear of American influence in Vorocco \'!hen, in March 1951,

......__ -
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they refused the then Secretary of the Air Force Thomas
Finletter permission to visit Morocco as part of his world
tour of Americ an air facilities.32

Although the main details

of the airbase a gre em ent were ke pt secret bec ause of French
insistence, t h eir results
were.

g iv~

a good indication of what they

Behind them all seemed to lurk the ill-concealed

French fear that the Americans would undermine the Protectorate's control over Morocco and, with the help of t he native
population, would c onspire to eject the French.

As the first

step to circumvent this eventuality, the Protectorate expropriated l\1oroccan land and leased it at an undisclosed figure
to the United States.

This country

"\'las

not permitted to buy

the land nor to obtain any kind of assurance that the bases
would remain American for any specified length of time.
Thus, American diplomats were faced with the nightmarish possibility that the French might withdraw from the Western
bloc and become neutral, forcing the United States to abandon
its expensive and vitally i.mportant bases.

Using this ever-

present but never-mentioned thre.at, the French forced the
Americans to limit their troo ps to 7,400 men, a restriction
which resulted in obliging the Americans to rotate their
bomber

win~ s

sible number.

frequently to give training to the maximum posThe French imposed t his numerical limitation

32commonweal, Vol. 53 (Marc h 9, 1951), p. 533.
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in an attempt· to keep the native population from realizing
the strength of the Americans and to keep the amount of
American money s pent from driving the local prices too hi gh.
The French also took advant age of the fact th at the
United States -1·1as forced to import nearly all the equipment
needed for the

const~uction

and maintenance of its bases by

levying high duties on American su pplies.

Thus the United

States was faced with the almost ludicrous f a ct that it not
only was building bases to v1h ich the French held title, but
it was also forced to pay import taxes on the very supplies
that might have to be given to the French.33
To further minimize the impact of the Americans on
Moroccan political and economic life, the Protectorate
authorities insisted that they be given the full power to
hire and control the native workers that wer e needed by the
thousands to operate the giant

b~ses.34

The French tried to

give the Moroccans the i;·npression that they were actually in
control of the bases and were merely allm'ling the United
States to share them as a temporary measure.

This subterfuge

was enhanced by forbi<;iding the Air· Force to fly the Stars and
Stripes over its bases and only al lowi ng the French tri-color

33John D. La.,.,., ,,...W'here !•lore Trouble Bre'ttls for the United
States," U. S. Nmvs and V.J orld Report, Vol. 3 6 (l\Iay 2 8, 1954),
p. 43.

3 4tvrarcum, .2E.· cit., p. 6.
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to be displayed.
French troops took t he res ponsibility for guarding the
bases and i r:specting the cr edent i als ef Americans leaving and
entering, but this insistence backfired somev.rha t v-rhen it came
to guarding
airbas es.

Am eric a ~

supplies c oming fr om the seaports to the

The Frenc h as k ed t hat the Americans supply guards

along the routes and on the trains, but the United States
took refuge behind the ori g.:.nal Frenc h dema nd v1hich had given
them the right and the full responsibility for the security
of the American forces and property.

Probably the Americans

realized full well that the Frenc h would have been only too
glad to have an American soldier injured or killed by an a·ct
of sabotag e, thereby pushing

American public opinion off the

fence and into the camp of France and opposed to the Moro.ccan
nationalists .3 5
The commanding general of the Seventeenth Air Force in.
Morocco, Frederick E. Glant zb'e rg, spent most of his time trying to keep on good terms '\•Tith both the French and the Moroccans when he should have been able to devote all of his time ·
to the training of his personnelo

He was constantly faced

vlith major and minor crises involving questions of French

rights and protocol that were al leg edly viol ated by some
American action.

For example, when the United States began

35stevens, c o . cit., p. 85.

3 52
i nstalling its

o~~

television stati on to entertain the men in

their off hours, the French protested this as an infringe::1ent
--- on vhe-ir -s cv erei z:; nty and -flatly refuse d to perm it the c on:struction.

Finally after much debate, t h e Protectorate

authorities grudgingly aereed to

per~ it

the setting u p of a

small one k ilov:att radio tr ansm itter that would be able to
bearn prog r 3_"1s over a very restricted area . 3 6
The r.1aj or effort of the French authori :-i es in I-:o rocc o
\vas aimed at insulating the :!.:oroccans from the Americans in
an effort to prev ent unre s t among the natives 'tlho might be
struck with the obvious friendliness of the airmen .

On the

other hand , t he French i·Je re anxious to i mpress the .Americans
with the peace and pr osper ity that characterized the Protec torate re[).me in lior occo, and c onsequently, they did everything they coul d to minimize intercul tural contacts.

At

first, t he French insisted th<J.t all _.'!.mericans li·ve on t he
bases , but whe n t h is becarne patently impossible with the
arrival of thous ands of wives and children , the authoriti es
tried to segrer,ate the Americans i nto cert ai n areas of the
cities; at the s1 i .e;ht es t excuse cert .:j_in native quarters would
be declared

out - of- bounds for Americ a ns .

It soon became

obvious· to all but the most unobservant American that the
pleasant pi ctur e that the French were trying to paint of

3 6rbid.
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native contentment and prosperity was a false one at best.
Americans gained first-hand impressions of the riots and
unrest that characterized t he era following the - forceful
deposition of Sultan IViohammed V.

On many occasions, American

....person~el were . restricted to their bases even though General
Guillaume maintained t hat there was no civil disturbances
because of t he r emoval of the

Sultan.

The situation in I·. Iorocco became so explosive that
General Glantzberg demanded to be allowed to fly the American
flag over all United States installations to shov; the native
population which bases v.Jere American.

The French bitterly

protested, but when faced with the f a ct that the General
would have done it anyway, t h ey finally consented.

Thus, not

until September l, 1955, nearly five years after the Americans
had been in lVforocco, were they permitted to fly their ovm
flag, and then only with the Tri-color.

Even then, the

French would allow the American colors to be flovm only over
the airbases and isolated radar outposts but not at USAF
headquarters in Rabat because there they might become emblems
that the nationalists could use as a rallying symbol) 7
With the achievement of Moroccan independence and the
end of the Protectorate regim e, the problem of French interference with the American airbases did not come to an end.

37Nevr York Times, September 2 , l955o
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The French still maintained that _they held title to the land
on which the bases were built as wel l as to the very buildings,
roads, and runways c onstruct ed

ent i ~ e ly

without t h eir help.

Because t h e Fr ench still assumed the res ponsibility for the
security of the bases, many embarra ssing and potentially
dang erous situati ons develo ped .

In Dec ember, 1956, Moroccan

stev__edor es refused to unload French military supplies for the
estimated seventy-five thousand French tr oops who were still
the unwa nted guests of inde pendent Morocco.

Since Casablanca

was thus closed to the French, they proce eded to unload their
supplies at the American naval base at Port Lyautey.

When

the Moroc c ans realized that this was happening , they blockaded the roads, and an extremely delicate situation developed
that was prevented from leading to violence only by .the quick
action of the Moroccan authorities.38
The followin g year a not so serious incident occurred
which illustrated the petty attitude of the French concerning
_their presumptous control of American bases.

The Amer-ican

high school operated by the United States Navy at Port Lyautey
permitted. a few non-Americans to attend class Es. · However,
when it was discovered by t h e French that the daughter of the
Egyptian ambassador was attending the school, the French
guards received t heir orders to bar her from the baseo39

3 gibid., December 17, 1956o

39rbid., March 28, 1957.
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The status of t h e four hundr ed and fifty million dollar bas es in Morocco is still cl ouded by French

intran~igence

and- by their refusal to -permit t he Uni-ted States to reveal

the terms of the airbase a greements to the 1V1oroccan government.

The Moroccano reiterate their vievi that the orig inal

agreem ents are invalid because the y did not include the
Moroccan side of the argum ent, and they want bi-lateral talks
with the United States to determine t h e future of the Strategic Air Command facilities in t heir country .

However, the

French are continuing to hold up progress by their insistence
that all talks be conducted on a tripartite basis, claiming
that the United States is merely a tenant on French
property. 40
V.

AIRBASES AND MOROCCAN OPINION

Because r.·:orocco is now an independent C0'4Jltry responsible for its own foreign relations, the attitude of the
French toward the airbases is becomi ng more of historical
interest than a contemporary problem.

Therefore it will be

profitable to see just what the IJioroccans themselves think
about the American bases in their country.

As was indicated,

the primary objection voiced by the Moroccans was that the
plans and preparations for the bases were discussed with the

4°Ibid., December 2lh 1956o
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French but no attention was paid to the legitimate ruler of
the country.

In 1951, the Ilf.oroccans protested

t L~tt

the agree-

ments "violate the integrity of .i:·:[orocco," but t-h e 1, rench countered that the Treaty of Fez in 1912 gave them the responsi- bility for the defense of the country.41

Ahmed Balafrej

opposed this claim by saying that alt hough the Prote ctorate
treaty did make France responsible for the defense of Morocco
and for its

ter~itorial

integrity, it did not autl1orize the

French to ....seize land and sublet it to foreign pm'i ers .42
Not only did the

~ oroccans

object that we bypassed the

Sultan whom we reco gnized as the legitimate soverei gn, but
they also were bitter because the terms of the airbase · agre ements ,..:ere kept secret from the rest of t h e world and from the
Ivioroccan g overnment.

Apparently nations never seem to learn

the lesson of history that secret agreements only lead to
unrest and sus nicion and that instee.d of strengthening the
ties between the parties involved, they provide a source of
irritation that event ually leads to an outright break.
B.e caus e of the secrecy involved, rumors 1.\'ere rampant throughout official I\:Ioro ccan circles, and high officials 1trere convinced t-hat the United States had agreed t o turn the bases

4lrbid., April
12, l95lo
42Ahmed Balafrej , "Morocco Plans for _Inde pendence,n
Foreign Af f airs, Vol. 34 ( April 1956), p. 48 S o

--
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over to the French when t h e dang er of war with Russia had
subsided. 43
Since the United

State ~b ad

chosen to i g nore the

Sultan in its dealings with the French for land in Eorocco,
Mohammed V matched this acticn by officially ignoring the
existence of the bases in his country.

It is alleged that

when a visiting Air Force g eneral offered to conduct the
Sultan on a tour of the American faci l ities,

M oham.n~ ed

ben

Youssef declined with the comment that he had no idea to ,...;hat
bases the General wa s referring .

This official refusal to

admit the presence of American bases4'4 ended with the signing
of the independen ce treaty viith the French .

However , it was

not until October, 1956, when t h e French had kidnapped the
Algerian leaders who had been the guests of the Sultan , that
Iviohamrned V himself acknowledged the existence of the bases.
This came about when the sultan's airplane landed at the Port
Lyautey naval base instead of at an airfield in Casablanca
that was control l ed by a French company , thereby indicating
de facto reco gnition of the existence of the United States
airbases6

This move was taken by observers as demonstrating

a desire for closer cooperation betvieen I{orocco and the

43New York

Times, Februa ry 10, 1952-.

44stevens, or. cit., p. S9e
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United States. 45
Moroccan off icial feeling concerning the airbases was
made quite clear

durin g ~ the

details of independence.

neg otiations with France over the

On May 2 5, 1956, a Franco-Moroccan

treaty was signed that incl uded i n Article Eleven the clause
that Morocco ·v1ould assume all treaty obligations that France
had contracted for the government; hovfever, the r·. Ioroccan
'

delegation specifically excluded the
ment.46

~~erican

base agree-

I1'Iorocco considered the ag reements an infring ement on

its sovereignty and demanded separate negotiations v'fith the
Americans to solve the problem--a sentli.1ent echoed by the
Moroccan Foreign Minister Balafrej when he said, "Independent
Morocco completely i gnores the treaties France concluded for
the use of airbases in our territoryon47
Because of the prime importance to both the Moroccans
and to the Americans of stabilizing the situation, all talks
between the two countries have included, to some extent at
least, plans whereby the bases could be put on a sound legal
footing that would preserve the sovereignty of Morocco and at
the same time insure the continued use of the facilities for
the United States Air Force.

During

Vice ·president

Nixon ~'

s

visit to Morocco, a major topic of conversation was the air-

45stebbins, on. cit., p. 282.
46New York Times, May 29, 1956.

47Ibid., June 26, 1956.
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bases.

Nixon assured the Sultan that the United States was

willing t o chang e t h e status of t he bases to conform to t h e
fact that Morocco had become inden end ent and was no long er
dominated by the F renc h .4-S

In turn, Hrs. Eleanor

Roosevelt

received assurances from a ;>.ror occ a n official, vlh o visited
Hyde Park, that h is country wa s not going to press for United
States' v.rit hdravral from l\:oroc c o.

S? eak ing to his hostess, he

said:
We never f or g et a kindne s s. The Sultan as k ed me to
say he recalls y our husband as one forei gn head of state
who gave him disinterested a dvice. He also believes
that, if your husb and had l ived, t h ere would have be en
no secret trea ty between Fr an ce and t h e United States in
regard t o est ab lis hm ent of Un i ted States airbases i~
Morocco. Th er efore we do n ot blame t h e United St ates
and will raise no dif f icul t i es now in the neg otia tions
for the bases between your government and ours.49
Although 1-1 orocco has no\:0, been independent since 1956,
concrete pro posals concerning the

~n erican

bases have not

been made, and while it is evident that Morocco v-rishes to
cooperate, it do es not want to become dependent on this country in t h e same way t hat it had been compelled to follow
France's direction.

There had been ho pe that the visit o:f'

Iviohammed V to the United States would bring v-rith it a clarification of the air'oase problem, but except for \vhat were
termed npreli:11inary talksn between Dulles and the Moroccan

48Ibido, Harch 3, 1957.
49Roosevelt, QE· · c it., p. 95.

------~--

leader, only uns pecified provisional agreements were reached.50
However, a note of hope for the future \·Tas

voic~d

by Ivloham;·ned

bert Youssef on his return to :r:Iorocco wh en he praised t h e
United States f or its

11

g ood intentionsn and tha nked this

country for its plans to comb ine the airbase negotiations with
plans- to provide i ncreased economic and technical aid for
Morocco.51
VI.

AJ'::ERICA!,f SUPPORT FOR h OFI.OCCAN I NDEP ENDENCE

The import ance to t h e United States of Moroccan
ship has been indicated, and

"~H hat

fr~end

the Moroc cans and the French

thought about American relations I'J ith the Sultan's country
have be en dis cussed ; t h erefore, in this concluding section it
will be nec.essary to survey just what this count ry really
thought about Moroccan inde pendence movements and 1vhat we have
done in support or in opposition to these efforts.

. ...

Unfortun-

ately, with the possible e xception of Roosevelt's support of
Sultan Iviohammed ben Youssef's d esire to achieve s ome kind of
freedom for his people, the official record of knerican
actions in favor of Moroc can independence has not been one of
which we can be proud.

.· · ~

.. -·

During the decade followin g the North

African invasion, a bo ut the only interest s h own by the United

50New York Times, November
5lrbid., December 16, 1957.

27, 1957.
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States in Moroccan affairs concerned our fear that France was
usurping too much aut t ority and thereby infring ing on American - economic privileg es.

Officially, the ·state Department

tried to i gnore the existence of a nationalist movement and
chose to accept French assurances that the internal s ituation
in their Protectorate was stable and that the people we re
happy Hi t h the status quo.
The French informed our representatives that it was
the purpose of the Protectorate authorities to give the
M oroccans ~ a

democratic form of government that would replace

the "autocratic" rule of the Sultan.

Consequently, when

Mohammed V refused to sign decrees giving the four hundred
thousand French citizeris equal representation with nine million Moroccans, he was accused before the world of hindering
"democratic reforms.n52

Of course, the problem was not as

obvious as has been stated because the Resident Gen eral was
careful to conceal the real motives of the "reforms" 'tThi ch
never were publicized.

Mohammed ben Youssef continued hi s

opposition to French attempts· to legalize their hold on the
Moroccan

people~

and as a result, the Protectorate officials

headed by General Juin plotted to g et rid of him.

With the

connivance of Thami El Glaoui, the pasha of r.1arrakesh , the

ill· ,

·t; .

--

..~-

•

52Morocco Office of Information and Documentation, QE•
April 20 , l 9 53 , p • 5 •

J~
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Resident General staged

caref~lly

planned Berber gatherings

purporting to be the result of t h eir discontent with the
Sultan's policies .

ActuaJ ly, the tribesmen had no idea why

they were being brought out of their mountain homes and would
have refused to take part if they had realized that they wer e
being used hy t h e

French against the religious and political

ruler of their country.53
Juin's machinations culminated on August 20, 1953 in
the arrest by his successor, General Guillaume, of the
Prine e

Jv~oulay

Has san, and Prine e Abdullah.

Sult~n,

Spirited away

from Rabat aboard a ivaiting plane, the _legitimate leader of
the Moro ccan people was deposed and sent into exile.

If the

people of Morocco had hoped that such gross infringement on
their sovereignty would provoke a storm of official criticism
from t he United States, they were doomed to disappointment.
The strongest languag e the

State Department felt able to use

was that it "viev-rs with deep concern" the remov.:H of the
Sultan and the events _that led u p to it.54 When on August 27
our re presentative to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge ,
voted with France against putting the crisis on the agenda of
Security Council, many Moroccan nationalists were convinced
of United States complicity in the French plot.

They rea·s oned

53Landau, .Moroccan Drama -1900 - l2.U, .2£• cit., p . 314.

5 4f-1arcu'TI, .£!?.. cit., p. 9 .

that t he Frenc h would not have dared t o take such drastic
stens unl ess the Vnit ed States had ful l y a p0r oved, but no
indications ha ve come to light yet t&a£ would lead t o the
c o nclusion t'c'lat this c ountry did anytpi ng more than passively
acquiesce t o the Frotecto-rate's c oun de f or ·c e.55
Many iunericans were dis turbe d with this lack of good
fait h dis play ed by the gove rn'Tient, es pe cially whe n it v-ras
pointed out that as a signatory of t he Act of

Algecir~s,

the

United States was c ommitted t0 support the sovereignt y of
Moroc c o ,and to support th e rights of t he Sult an .56

However,

of f ici a l \'Jash ington felt compelled t o go along

t he

·w ~th

Frenc h t o k eep fr of.'l disturb ing the NATO alliance and possibly
jeopardizing t he status of t h e airb2.ses in t he Protectorate.
Acting vJit h unseemly haste, the State Department sent Joseph
Sathert hwaite to Rabat 11here he presented . his cr edentials as
the United States minister to the usurper ben Arafa, thereby
off icially recogn i zing the French puppet as t he ruler of
Morocco a 57
The only bri ght s pot in the Americ a n re a ct ion to the
Sultan's ex ile to I•.:adagascar and t o the c ontinu ed struggle

55rbi d .
QE·

5q.j orocco Office of Informa t ion and Documentation,
ci t ., Septembe r ~- , 1953, p. 4.
57New York Times , September 9, 1953 o
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for independence by the Istiqlal Party was provided by the
labor unions in this country .

The American Federation of

Labor had long be en concerned over the status of I>-Ioroccan
workers und er t he

French Protectorate and protested vigor-

ously that in the name of "friendship for France" this country abandoned its principles a nd its treaty obligat ions.5 b
In 1953, Georg e Meany , President of the American Federation
of Labor, urge d the State Department to reverse its attitude
and to take a

"positive democratic coursen to end "the.

unfortunate position taken by our govern;Ti ent" in
events.59

l·~oroccan

Pressure was constantly being exerted by the

unions of this country on t he State Department to discontinu-e
its policy of catering to the wh ims of the French and to live
up to American historical tradition of anti-colonialism.

In

fact, the most effective support of the :r--oroccan p eople cai11e
from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions .to
which the AFL-CIO belonged.
In January, 1955, supported by the ICFTU and by the
American labor unions, the Moroccan workers organized a
union called the Union Narocaine du Travail which immediately

5SLet ter from Matth evJ Holl, Chairman, International
Labor Relations Cornr·1ittee, A. F. of L., to Senator A. \IJ iley,
in Morocc an Office of Information and Documentation, 2£• cit.,
July 25, 1954, p. J •
59George Meany quoted in ibid., July 1 955 , p. 4.

~: ~----------------------------------------------------------------~~-

joined its international counterpart.

However, as soon as

the organization was established, t n e French authorities
declared it illegal.

They even tried to force the Moroccan

workers to join the Confederation Generale du Travail, the
Communist

dominat~d

them to form t heir

French trade union, rather than allowing
O"Vm

organization which mi ght upset the

French economic strangle-hold on

f··~ orocco.

The vehement pro-

tests of the AFL-CIO and the international organization to
the President and to the State Department proved of little
avail, and the French authorities, taking solace in American
official disinterest, beg an attac k ing the 1trork of the ICFTU,
refusing to permit its
l 11orocco.6o

European representative to visit

It was fortunate for the prestig e of the United

States in Morocco that the American trade unions showed their
sincere interest in that country's future independence and
freedom.

Had we depended entirely on official efforts in

that direction, this country would probably have lost all of
its d1trindling reservoir of good will in North Africa .. 61

60New York Times, March 24, 1955.
6lnuring the period when the unions were actively supportin8 the ~Ioroccans and t heir bi d for inde pendence, an American congressman, on his return from a short stay in North
Africa, claimed that the Moroccans were not . nearly ready for
independence a nd that if the French left the country, the
J ei.,rish popul ati on woul d be pers ecut eci a nd t h e Am~rican airbases would be left defenseles s a gainst attac k by the nat i ves.
He maintai n ed that without the Fr enc h protecting the bas es,
"four or five" American divisions vvould . be n eeded to · insure
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Even without the su pport that they expected to receive
from the United States, the nationalists
for the return of

l\~ ohammed

sul~an,

to work

ben You ss ef, their guiding spirit,

and for the elimination of
puppet

contin~ed

French dominance in Morocco.

The

ben Arafa, lost what po oular support the French

had managed to work up for him, an d he remained in his palace
not daring.. even
to go to the mosque on Fridays.
.
-::,~-· ~

·.:

~-

Finally, even

the French were for.ced to admit that their deposition of the
l~itimate - soverei g n

had served no purpose other than to stif-

fen resistance a gainst the Protectorate.62
In September, 1955, ben Arafa finally agreed to step
do\'lm 'from the t hrone and go to France, leaving \"lhat remnants
of power that he had in the hands of a cousin, but all the
while protesting that it really was his divine mission to
remain in Moro cco .

The followin ;'":'; month even el Glaoui real-

ized that the people of Morocco would not cease their active
resistance and violent opposition until the legitimate Sultan
was restored .to

his

throne~

return of ben You s sef.

and he offered to support the

This was a staggering blm-T to the

Pr9tectorate which had hoped to establish some sort of a

the security of our installations. New York Times, November 2,
1954. ( Needless to say, none of the"S'e"dire events occurred
when Moro cc o became independent.)
62
New York Times, August 13, 1955.

regency council that it could control, but when the Pasha of
Marrakesh a nd the caids that he controlled defected, the
Fren~~.J_ _b-~§: vi ng no l-1oroccan sup port, we re.. forc ed on November 5,

1955, to recognize Mohammed V a s the sultan of Morocco. 6.3
By the middle of the summer of 1955, before the Sultan
had returned from exile, ev en the State Department began to
realize that all si gns in Morocco indicated that the Frenc houtlawed Istiqlal Party was finally forcin g the Protectorate
to make drastic concessions to its demands for independence
and for the Sultan's return.

Consequently, this government

began sending dis patc h es to its repres entatives in Morocco
and Paris to determine just 'V'ihat the French were preparing to
do for the people of Morocco and to meet their demand for
~ndependence.

France assured the United States that Morocco

would soon be given a "representative 11 government, but this
statement was considered meaningless in the li ght of past
French interpretation of democracy in Morocco.

Moreover, the

Istiqlal made it quite clear that the people were not prepared
to settle f or anything le 2s _than compl'ete freedom, territorial
integrity, and the abrogation of the Treaty of 1912.64
The State Department tardily began investigating
charges that France was using American arms and equi pment

6.3Ibid., No vember 6, 1955.
6 4Ibid., September 1, 1955.

·
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designed for the defense of Europe under NATO commitments, to
suppress nationalism in Morocco and in Alg eria.

When Walter

Reuther, the president of t h e GIO, charg ed t hat Am erican helico pters were bei ng used thr·ough out Frenc h-control l ed r.! orth
Africa to hunt freedum-fighters, the State Department asked
France to inform this . country of any furth er tra nsfers of
American equipment to Morocco, and it a dd ed that the Depart- ment was keeping Tra close watch on the situation.rr65
Fortunately for the prestige of the United States in
Morocco, t hese half-hearted efforts to support the people in
their fight for inde pendence were not the criteria upon which
the Iviorocc ans based t h eir opinion of this country.

Mohammed V,

the leader and ins piration for t h e nationalist drive for freedom, set the tenor of public opinion by receiving American
representatives immediately on his return to Morocco in
November1 1955 and as s uring them that his country was anxious
to cooperate with . the United States both politically and
economically.

This interview marked the first occasion in

which a modern ruler of l'/Iorocco ever spoke officially of the
economic role of any country other than France.

He concluded

his remarks with the statement that Morocco was ttthe oldest
United States' frienct.n66

It is not difficult to ima~ ine the

65rbid., August 26, 1955.
66Ibid., November 25, 1955.

-

relief felt in the State Departm ent when it was realized that
the Moroccans had a g enuine frien dsh ip for the. United States
that had not been dim.rned by the questionable way this country
had treated th e Sultan and his nationalist su pp orters.
Presid$nt Eisenhower, ag a in suggesting that his grasp
of international realities was usual ly better than that displayed by the State

Department, used the occasion of the

Sultan's r eturn to his country to open of f icially a new era
of coo peration with independent r•Iorocco.

In the folloNing

dispatch from his home in Gettysburg, Pehnsylvania, the President emphasized the mutual respect and friendship that the
two couptries had maintained for nearly two centuries:
On the annivers a ry of your accession to the t hrone,
it gives me great pleasure to send to your l'Ia j esty and to
the people of Morocco greetinFs from t he people of t h e
Uriited States . It also ~ ives me particular satisfaction
to recall the go od and friendly relations between your
country and mine v.rhich ()egan in the early days of our own
history.
May your rei gn open new vistas of that com,rnunity of
nurnose which has contributed so much to the greatness of
~or~cc o, and restore t h e peace and prosperity~iliich the
United St a tes so dee plv desir es for all t h e inhabitants
of your countryo 67 - ~
.
Julius C. Holmes, t he minister to Iviorocco from the United
States, passed on the President's g ood wishes .and was told in
return by Mohammed V that he was pleased to see that the r.timehonored friendshi p of our two countries r emains intact."

The
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Sultan further stated that as far as the United States and
his country were concerned , it was his feeling that "we are
-

-~--

-

---

friends, former com rades at arm s and united by t he same
principles. 11 68
Apparently trying to make amends for its lack of
interest in the Sultan's plight in exile and the struggle the
nationalists had been waging against French domination, the
United State s took advantag e of every conceivable opportunity
to extend its best 1.,;ishes a nd to assure t h e Sult:an that ·t h-is
country was pleased with t h e turn of events.

On March 2 7 1956,

the sig ning of a joint declaration and protocol in Paris
between Moroc t o and

Fr~nce

showed to the world tha t Moroccan

independence was a legal reality.

The French had been hoping

to p-ersuade the Moroccans to agree to a statem ent that mutual
"interdependence" in military, economic, and di plomatic aff airs
would characterize the ne1tr relationship between the two countries, but Morocco wa s not willing to curtail its newly won
freedom in any of these ways. 69

Shovdng promptness which had

heretofore been sadly lacking in connection with Moroccan
matters, the State Department sent its re presentative to the
Sultan, authorizing him to say:
· · My government renews its wish for the peace and

68rbid., November 17, 1955.
6 9stebbins, .2.E." cit., p. · 105.
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prosperity of Morocco, and has asked me to express its
gratification th at Morocco has freely c hosen, as a sovereign nation,_, to continue t h e path of its traditional
friendship. tO
In reco gniti on of t h e newly ac h ieved inde p end ence of
Morocco, t h e United St ates in fo r med the Sultan th a t it
planned to set u p an embas s y in Rabat to r eplace the consulate general that had served to r e pres ent this country during
the French occu pation.

However, the State Department was

afraid to move to o rapidly for fear of embarrassing the
French wh o still retained, in the person of their High Commissioner, a remnant of colonialism.

The perennial American

dilemma was well illustrated by this problem because the
'

State Department was afraid t hat if it waited too long to
establish its embassy, t h e U. S. S. R. would have the honor
of being the first in the field; if, on the other hand, it
moved too preci pitously, French sensibilities undoubtedly
would be hurt.7l

Fortunately, the State Department decided

?OnFranco-Moroccan Declaration," Department of State
Bulletin, Vol. 34, (March 1 9, 1956), p. 466.
A press release from the Department of St a te gave an
additi onal text c oncerning th e mes s ag e from its r epresentat ive
on the occasion of the si gning of the Franco~M oroccan declaration: "I have just been instructed by my government to convey
to Your Majest y and His Government and to the Ivioroccan people
warmest congratulations on the reco F,nition of :.·[oroccan independence as emb odied in the Franco-I•i oroccan Declaration of
i.tJ:arch 2, 1 956 . 11 For the Pr ess, Department of State, Number 119 7
March 7, 1 956. - - 71New York Times, May 11, 1 956~

372
to ignore t h e existence of the French commissioner and to set
up its embassy as soon as possib le.

Thus, within a fev.; days

after announcing its plans, this c ount ry leased a five story
building and established in it political, economic, and consular sections, as

w~ll

as the United States Information

Service library.72
Another step toward modernizing its relations wi th
Morocco ·was made by the United States when it began planning
to abandon its outdated extra-territorial ri ght s.

The State

Department let it b e known in FebruarY) 1956 that it would like
the Senate, since this was a mat t er of treaty abrogat ion, to
take up the problem as soon as possible.73

In response to

this request, the Senate passed a bill which 9tated that since
the United States wa s the only country which maintained capitulations in IVIo roc co and that extra-territorial privilege v.;as
a "symbol of colonialism," it was therefore. decided to abandon
this anachronism entirely.74

Eisenhower signed the enabling

bill to this end in August, and, on October 6, 1957, the new

American ambassador to l';J:orocco, Cavendish

v?.

Cannon, notified

7 2 Ibid., May 22, 1 956.
73nunited States Policy on Treaty Rights in Morocco,"
Departm.e nt _ of StgteBul l etin, _o p . cit., Vol. 34 (February 6,
19 56) ' p . 20 4.
74united States Senate, Committee on For e i gn Relations,
Appro vin 0 the Relinou ish~e nt of t he C onsu ~ a r Jurisdiction of
the United Jtates, E4t h . Congress 2nd Sess1on, on S . J. Res.
165, July J, 1 S56 . (1.\fashington: Government Printing Off ice,
1956)' p. 2.
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Ahmed Balafrej that the United States gave up the extraterritorial privileges it had received from

th~

Treaties of

' 1787, 1836, and 1906, as "Vfell as the proteg e system regularized by the Treat y of Madrid in 188o.75
- - - - - -An even more important step in the direction of com_ .plete I'iroroccan sovereignty than the abandonment of United
States capitulatory rights took place in October, 195.6, when
nine powers met at Fedala, nBar Casablanca, to decide the
future status of Tangier

Intern~tional

Zone.

Several months

before the conference took place, the United States had gone
on record as favoring a drastic revision of the treaties
- governing the zone and proposed to give Morocco a more important place in ·the control of -the area.76

This country's some-

,_ what condescending attitude toward Moroccan ability to govern
the Tangier zone was shaken on July tenth when the Sultan's
government moved in and assumed control.

Faced with this

fait accomoli, the United States led a move to meet with
Morocco to revise Tangier's status.
At the very outset of deliberations, Ivir. Balafrej made

75nu. S. Consular Jurisdiction in l~ orocco Relinquished,"
Department of State Bu l letin, QE· cit., Vol. 35 (November 26,
1 c; 56) , p • 844.
The United States retained its "most favored nation"
status, howev er, with t he f ul l a ~ re ement o f the Moroccan
government.
Nevr York Times, Octob er 8, 1956.
-·
-- - ~--·· · -

.

.

76New York Times, March 11, 1 956.
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it very clear that although his country appreciated the
interest

sho~m

by those nations at tending the conference and

though the viev.rs of the delegates would be "taken into consideration," Morocco planned to make the final "unilateraln
decisi ons as to the form the Tangier government would t ak e.77
Cavendish Cannon, the

American del egate, was somewhat dis-

turbed by t his pronounceme nt because he had been instructed
t -o do all he could to protect t h e c ornm ercial inter ests of t h e
United States in Tang ier.78

He- ob jected to the Moroccan pro-

posal to levy a tax of thr e e gold centimes (one cent) on each
word transmitted by the American commercial radio stations,
and since R. C. A. - and Mackay tog et her broadcast over fifty
million words per year, it is readily apparent that a large
sum of money

v~ould

be -involved.

Our representative stated .

that the Moroccan-French declaration of Marc h , 1956, provided
that all international treaties, e xce pt the airbase agreements,
entered into by France in behalf of Morocco would be honored;
therefore he felt that Morocco should not insist that the

77rbid., October 11, 1956.
78Even thoug h less t han four hundred American citizens
lived. in Tang;i,er , t h e United Stat es was very inter ested in t h e
future of t h~ 1riternational Zone be caus e the Voice of America
radio syst em had in vest ed over four and a half milli on dollars
in t he area, and t h e Radio Corporation of America and Ea ckay
Radio also mai ntained l a r £e and very c ostl y oper at ions there.
Hew York Times , .July 6, 1 9 56 ~
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communication

a g ree~ents

be changed.

Because of the disagree-

ment over the matter of the status of the American radio

s._t._a:t ions, the

Am bas s ad or at first refus e·d- to s i t;n the report

of the conference, but v-rh en the l.'ioroccans agreed to allow
this matt er to stand, ·pending future ne gotiations, all the
nations attending the conference accepted the re port.7 9
The final declaration of the international conference
and its "annexed protocol" firmly established the right of
1'-'l orocco to g overn Tang ier by l\iioroccan laws as an integral
part of the Sultan's domain.

The signers of the protocol

agreed to ,the abolition of the International Administration
that had ruled the cit y since 1945 and turned the rec6rds and
the property of that body over to Morocco.SO

The declaration

that had been signed ''to settle questions raised by the
abolition of the special regime of theTangier Zonett ma.rked
the end of the international status of Tangier but did not
completely abolish its peculiar monetary characteristics.Sl
The Moro ccans wished to retain Tangier's free market where
money could be exchanged on a basis of supply and demand.

79Ibido, Octob er 15, 1956.
SOttinternational Conference on Status of Tang ier,"
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 35 ( Nove1nb er 26, 195 6) ,
p. 841 .
.
·
Slunited Sta tes Treaties a nd Oth e r International
Agreements (\'j a sh ingt on: United States Governme nt Print.ing
Of f ice, l S57), Vol. 7, part 3, p. _3046.
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\'lith the ending of the International Administration in
Tangier, the Moroccans had succeeded in restoring the geographical unity of their country, leaving only their economic
crisis and the

pr~sence

of thousands of French troops still

as major problems to be solved.

The United States expressed

concern in 1 956 that the rapid withdrawal of French capital
and technicians from Morocco would seriously hamper the
development of the country and possibly leave it open to
influences inimical to the \'1 est o 82

This country realized

that even the American dollars that the airbases brought into
the Moroccan economy would not be sufficient to re place the
money being withdra\•m by French investors; so to survey what
could be done to help the ne\,Tly independent nation, the
United States sent teams of experts to Morocco to see where
money could most advantageously be spent.

As a result of

their reports, America agreed to supply twenty million dollars
for the fiscal year ending in June, 1957.

This money was

used primarily to buy consumer goods such as sugar and edible
oils in the United States.

This country also made provision

to supply technical assistance if the Moroccan govern"llent
8
expressed an interest in receiving this kind of help. 3
\'~ hen

President Eisenhower invited Mohammed ben Youssef

S2Ne"'' York Times, Novemb e r 27, 1956.
SJibid., April 3, l957o

to visit the United States, an important milestone in the
long history of American-Moroccan relations was about to be
F..eached .• · ""F.:er the Moroccans, ·this vis it-·wa.s a fulfillment

·or- ---- -

the of:er made by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1943 at Casablanca,
and for the Americans, it was an opportunity to begin to know
better an important friend of the United States who could do
_ a great __deal to improve this country's reputation in the
whole of the l"Iiddle East.

The Sultan-, who changed his tit.le

to King as an indication of- the modern, constitutional basis
on which he was going to reconstruct his country, accepted
the invitation and arrived in the UnitedStates on November 25,

.J•.95.7.

A.t .,rneetings with Eisenhower and Secretary of State

Dulles, the King reaffirmed the long-standing friendship that
his country had with the United States and expressed a will-.
ingness to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding concerning the airbases in Morocco.

Dulles countered with the

offer to assist Morocco to "stabilize and expand its economy"
and pledged the support of the United States for the King and
his country. 84
One can only hope that the extensive heritage of good
will that the United States now enjoyed in 1957, in the
hearts and minds of the lvioroccan people will be preserved and

8411 Visit of Illlohammed V, King of .f\1orocco," Department
of State Bulletin, oo. cit.; Vol. 37 (December 16, 1957)'
p. 956.

will continue to grow.

However, since our record in support

of Moroccan s overei gnty and fr e edom during the past half
century ha s not been very goo d, it is i mp os sio f e to be complacent about t h e future; but t h e fine picture that America
received of t h e King when he came to this country and the
impressions that he and his cabinet took back wit h them
should go a long way toward insuring a healthy friendship
for the future.

CHAPTER XIII
SUMMARY AI\TD CO NCLUSION
In order to see more clearly the broad picture of the
diplomatic relations between the United States and Morocco,
it will be helpful to survey the important milestones in its
nearly two-hundred year development.
Morocco, a country on the northwest shoulder of Africa,
is about the size of California and enjoys a climate similar
to it.

The natural resources of I'-:orocco have made it ·important

to th e economy of t h e world; and its people, Arabs and Berbers
\

alike, have contributed much to the philosophy, arc h itecture,
and religious development of not only the ·Muslim countries
but of western nations as well.
Although h orocco's long history is rich in examples of
cultural achievement and governmental develo pm ent, it was not
these items that attracted the attention of the infant repub-·
lie on the Atlantic shores of North America.

On the contrary,

the Congress of the United States and George Washington made
overtures to Morocco in an effort to insure the safety of
American commerce in the Mediterranean against the assaults
of the Barbary pirates, who had been a serious menace to the
ships of all nations almost from the days of t h e Roman Empire.
The persecution of t h e j ..!oors .and t he ir expulsion from Spain
caused many of them to turn to piracy as a means of revenge

-

:'tt . .

---

.~-

-

.

380
and as a livelihood, and the nations of Europe either suffered
the depredations of the corsairs or paid tribute in an effort
to safeguard their commerce. When the United States began
sending its shipping into the Mediterranean area following
the Revolutionary War, the Barbary corsairs were more than
willing to take advantage of this new source of income .
Investigation by the representatives of the Unit ed
States in Europe revealed that the Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed.
ben Abdullah, had prohibited his subjects from engaging in
piracy and had expressed interest in making a treaty of amity
and commerce with this country.

After several abortive

attempts to use foreign interrnediaries to establish relations,
the Congress of the United States authorized Thomas Barclay,
in 1785, to treat with the IJioroccan emperor.

Despite many

indications that his mission would fail, the American envoy
set out fat the Moroccan court with little more than a few
gifts and the best wishes of Franklin, Jefferson, and Adams.
Barclay was to make a treaty of friendship and to find out as
many things about Eorocco as he could: imports, exports, c ondition of the navy and the port facilities, the language of
the natives, and "by what principle of their

reli ~ ion

is it.

that they consid er all Christian powers as their enemies,
until they become friends by treaties."
Congress' very friendly letter of May 11, 1785, and
Barclay's personal qualities combined to facilitate negotia-

~.

-
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tions with t h e Noroccans to such an extent that a twenty-five
article treaty was a greed t o in 1786 by both nations that
pledg ed mutua l fr i endship and co operation for a period of
fifty years.

Mohammed b en Abdullah sent several letters to

Congress emphasizing h is friendshi p for t h is country and
stating that he ho ped that Morocco and America would always
remain at peace.

Barclay's missi on established a pattern of

friendly relations with Morocco that persisted

ev~n

when

cris es threatened to imp eril the p eace between the two
countries.
Because of the difficulty involved in communicati.ons
across the Atlantic, the friendly atmosphere begun by Barclay's
mission to Morocco was endangered during the period when the
United States was at war with Tripoli.

Because Sulayman,

Mohamm-ed ben Abdullah's successor, had not had the opportunity
to renew the treaty of ai1 1ity with the United States and was
not avmre of the friendly sentiments that this country held
for Morocco, several rifts appeared in the pattern of friendship instituted by the Treaty of 1786.

The Moroccan emperor,

in his desire to help the pe ople of Tri poli., provided assistance to these enemies of the United States and precipitated a
crisis in wh ich the American navy was forced to capture
several Moroccan vessels and to send a squadron into Tang ier
Bay to force the Emperor to renew the treaty and to cooperate
fully with t h is country .

Sulayman, r ealizing that the United
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States was sincerely interested in maintaining good relations
with Morocco, reaff irmed the Tre a t y of 1786 a nd ordered his
g overnors to refrain from assisting any country that was at
-war with America.
During the first seventy y ears of the nineteenth
century, the United States maintained what was termed "somewhat irregular 17 c ontacts with t h e JJioroc c an empire.

During

the 1830's, the American consuls in Tang ier had some difficulty with presents of horses and lions that the
insisted on bestowing on the United States.

I~'I oroccans

Several such

animals had to be kept in the c onsulate until transportation
could be found for them to this country, and Congress was
hard pressed to dispose of these awkward gifts.
In 1836, it was necessary for the United States to
renew the Treaty of 1786, which had run its fifty-year course.
Only

~wo

articles of the early pact were alt ered, and so much

had the friendship of the two countries increased that the
new treaty was signed without the necessity of first giving
presents to the Moroccan emperor.

In 1 855, the Moroccan

government began to fear the encroac hm ent of European interests, especially French, on its sovereignty.

To forestall

any attempt on the part of foreign powers to colonize Morocco,
the Emperor requested that the United States assume a protectorate over his country.

The St ate Department politely

declined this request by stating that if this country bec am e

so involved, it would be . violatine its traditi9nal policy of
non-interference in foreign aff airs.
During the Civil Uar in t he United St ates, Morocco
maintained

its~~ friendship

showed on many occa 3ions
Confed eracy.

~h en

with the Federal g overnment and
tha~

it was not sympath etic to .the

two agents from the Confed erate ship

Sumter attempted to g et supplies in Tangier, the American
~

consul captured and imprisoned them with the aid of Moroccan
soldiers, and when a large mob of Europeans attempted to
free the rebels, t h e governor of Tang ier sent his troops to
disperse t he men and to protect the consulate.

Confederate

raiders were not given access to any Moroccan port and
Morocco reaff irmed its

fri~ ndship

with the United States.

The Conference of 1880 marked a radical shift in American foreign policy; up until that time, the United States
had made it a policy to remain aloof from political affairs
in the eastern hemisphere.
Spartel

li ghth.D~ e

(Arneric·a 1 s interest in the Cape

agreement was based solely on its interest

in preserving the safety of its commerce.)

Because of the

special rights enjoyed by foreigners in Morocco, many serious
abuses had . dev e'foped, an·d the auf'hbri ty of the government vTas
being weakened.
the

prot~e

To remedy t his c ondition and to regularize

system--the providing of protection to Moroccans

by foreign powers--a conference was held in Madrid attended
by most of the nations of Europe and by the Unit ed States.

-.:,..:-;-;r··
•"""·'-'i . .

The Convention signed at the meeting did not help the situation, which steadily deteriora ted until the Powers gradually
be gan giving up their extra-territorial ri ghts in the Maghreb.
With the appearance on the world scene of Theodore
Roosevelt, the United States
"Moroccan problem.n

a~ain

became involved in the

Roosevelt was led to believe that Euro-

pean tension over the question of ri ght s in Morocco 1·:as a
danger to world peace.

Consequently, living up to his role

of peace-maker, the President was instrumental in helping to
set u p a conference at Algeciras, Spain.
whic~

This conference,

met in 1906, had as its ostensible purpose the fixing

of policies tha t \vould govern the actions of the European
powers and the United States in Morocco.

The Act of Algeciras

provided for the policing of Moroccan ports by French and
Spanish forces, the establishment of a state bank which would
control the finances of the country, and the reorganization of
the tax structure and the customs rates.

The conference and

the resulting Act did little to improve conditions in Morocco,
but enhanced the diplomatic position o.f France and opened the
way for its ultimate control of the Ma gh reb.
France had long been interested in controlling the
destiny of I•Ioroc c o and had been successful in weakening the
internal structure of the country until a series .of disturbances and the apparent weakness of the government gave the
French the excuse they had been waiting for.

-~

·-

-

In 1912, France
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forced the Moroccan g overnment to turn over its real

pov.: er

to

a Resident General and his staff , wl1 o t h en proceeded to run
the country for Frenc h benefit.
This policy naturally encroached on t h e freedom of
trade in Moroc c o, and the United States began to protest-usually with
'\'lere

bei n~

fevJ

positive results--that Amer ican businessmen

discriminated aga i nst.

The nearly fifty years of

the Frenc h Protectorate wa s a hi story of attempts by the
Resident General to eliminate American commercial competition
in Morocco, and it is a record of the continued objections by
the United States to t his infring ement of the nopen door."
Even though, in 1952, the International Court of J-ustice at
the Hague ruled t hat the United States was being de piived of
its legal ri ght s in Moroccan trade, the French continued
their old methods until r·1oroc.co finally was able to free itself of the Protectorate regime.
American

com~ ercial

Along with their attack on

ri ghts, t h e French continually attempted _

to weaken t h e posi t i on of this country in conne ction with i ts
extra-territorial privileges.

Although

~~ericans

and their

proteges were und er the j urisdiction only of the United
States consuls, the French used every means ava ilable to
interfere

v~ ith

American prerogatives.

Commercial and

dip l om ~tic

prob l ems were su perseded by

military int erest in Morocco when the f ortunes of war dictated
that Americ a n troo ps invade Nor th Africa in t h e fall of

1942.

]86

For several mont hs before the invasion, American vice-consuls
had been preparing the way, but t h e majority of the French
authorities, who were loyal to Vic hy, refused to cooperate.
_ Afte ~

the troops f i nally landed and cons olidated their posi-

tion in Morocco, the

F~ench

grud gingly cooperated to a

limited extent, but it was t h e i<oroccan peo ple and Sultan
.Mohammed V who proved to be the true friends of the Americans.
At the historic Casablanca conference of January,

19~,

Presi-

dent Franklin Roosevelt met with the Sultan and thanked him
for his cooperation and as s ured him of the future support of
the United States in his struggle for independence.

The

untimely deat h of t h e President deprived l;Iorocco of a true
friend and left the fi ght for freedom squarely on the shoulders
of the people themselves.
S_parked by the example of the Sultan and led by the
Istiqlal Party, Moroccans increased· t heir opposition to the
frencho

Helped by its Arab and Asian friends, I.,Iorocco was

able to have its demands presentedrepeatedly to the United
Nations in an attempt to force Fr ance to modify its policy and
to grant Morocco its freedom.

The United States, fearing for

the most part to injure French sensibilities, maintained that
the Moroccan question was not one that would jeopardize world
peace and usually voted against resolutions condemning France
and its Protectorate

~olicy.

Although France wa s afraid that the United States was

favorable to

~ oroccan

inde pendence, this country did very

lit t le dir ectly to assist the nationalists.

Many Americans

c_ondemned the repressi v e Frenc h policies,. and labor unions
advocated a ch ange in the State Department practice of supporting the French position.
to build airbases

i~

When the United States wanted

Noroccoi instead of approaching the

Sultan, t hi s cotintry went to the French and received leases
for sui table land.

The French ·were very careful to exclude

any Moroccan representative from the deliberations and made
it abundantly clear that the United States was merely a
tenant with no ri ghts --even being unable to fly the Stars and
Stripes over the airbases.
Even without the help of the Americans or any other
outside assistance, the people of Morocco continued their war
against French domination until, in 1955, the French, who had
·deposed Mohammed V in 1953, were forced to capitulate and to
restore the Sultan to his throne.

In March, ·1956, the French

signed an agreement with Morocco recognizing its independence
and restorinc-c the rule of the country. to Mohammed V.
United States

re~lized

\llhen the

that Morocco was at last free of for-

eign domination, it was quick to send an ambassador to the
capital to extend this country's congratulations and to offer
a modicum of financial asf;istarice to the g overnment.
Mohammed V's visit, in 195 7, to the United States augured well
for the future relations between the tvw countries, but the

State Departme nt was still appar entl y unable to formulate a
definite policy concerning

~oro~ c o

and the North African

situ a ti on.
The long history of g ood relations started by the
letters e xchanged b et·v'l e en George \'ias hington and Mohamm ed ben
Abdu ll ah i n t he e i ghteenth cent ury should portend a long
future of friends h ip and coopera ti on betwe en Moroc c o and the
United Sta tes.
.. --· :

have be en of a t yp e that are " go od" merely because t h ere has
been no serious breach in diplom atic intercourse.

There have

been only a few occasions since 1 836 that t h e United States
has made positive moves toward affirming its friendship and
respect for

l\~ orocco;

this country seems to be unable to make

up its mind whether it will support the nati onal aspirations
of the North African countries or revert to its fatal policy
of trying to placate both sides in a crisis.

~
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
THE MOROCCAN-AMERICA N TREATY OF 17$6
To all persons to whom these presents shall come or be made
known-Whereas the United State s of Am erica in Congress a ssembled
by their commission bearing the dat e t h e ti'Ielfth day of I,Iay,
One thous and Seven hundred and Ei ghty four thought pro per to
constitut e John Adams, Benjamin Fr anklin and Thomas Jefferson
their I<inisters P1enipotentiary, g i vint; to them or a majority
of them full Fovrers to confer, treat and negotiate l':ith the
Ambassador, Iviinist er, or Comm issioner of His }.J:aj esty the
Emperor of Eorocco concernir..g a Treaty of Amit y and Comn erce
to make and recei ve propositions for such a Treaty and to
conclude and s i g n the same, transmitting it to the United States
in Con ~ress assembled for their fi nal R ~tification, and by
one other Corm.1iss ion bearing the date the Eleventh day of
March, One thousand Seven hundred and Eighty five did furt h er .
empower the said I'·linisters Pl enipotentiary or a ma j ority _of
them by writing und er their hand and Seals to a pp oint such
Agent in the said business as t h ey might think prop er with
aut ho rity under the Directions and Instructions of the said
ministers to comoence and prosecute the said Negotiations and
Conferences for the said Treaty provided that t t e said Treaty
should be signed ·by the said ministers : And wh ereas, We the
said John Adams and Thomas Jeff ers on, t vw of the said i·.: inist ers
Plenipotentiary (the said Benjamin Franklin being absent) by
writing under the Hand and Seal of the said John Adams at
London, October th e fif~h, One thousand Seven hundred and
Eighty five , and of the said Thomas Jeff~rson at Paris,
October t he elevent h of the sa~ e year, did appoint Thomas
Barclay, Ag ent in t h e business aforesaid, g i v ing him t h e
Powers therein , v.:h ich by t h e said second c ommission we \'>'ere
authorized to give, and the said Thomas Barclay in purs uance
thereof hath arrang ed Articles for a treaty of A~ity and
Commerce betvre en the United States of America a nd His -~ _aj e st y
the Em p eror of l·lorocco, whic h Articles written in the Ar a bic
language confirmed by His s aid Majesty t h e Emp eror of ~< orocco
and seal'd with His Royal Seal, b eing transl ated into the
language of t h e said United St a tes of America, tog ether w~~h
the attestations thereto, are in the followin g words, To W1t,
In the nillne of the

A~n i ~ h ty

God ,

This is a treaty of Peace and Friendship established
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between us and the United States of America, whi c h is confirmed, and VIh ich we have ordered to be v:ritten in this Book
and sealed \'lit h our J. oyal Seal at our Court of 1-iorocco on the
__ twenty fifth day of t h e b lessed mo nth of Shahan , in the Xear
One thousand Two hundred trustine in God it will remain
permanent.

ARTICLE I
\'i e declare that both Pa.rt ie s have a g re ed t hat this
Treaty consisti n_s of tvre nty f i ve Articles shall be inse r ted
in t h is book and delivered to th e Honorable Thomas Barcl ay ,
the a g ent of the United States now at our court, :with whos e
approbation it h&s been made and who is duly a uthoriz ed on·
their part, t o treat with us all the matters conta ined
therein.

ARTICLE II
If either of tte parties shall be at Wa.r with any
Nation whatever, the other Party s hall not take a CoiTU::ission
from the .Enel1).y nor fi g ht under their colors.

ARTICLE III
If either of the Parties shall be at \"Jar with any
Nation whatever, and . take a Prize belong ing to that 11ation,
and there shall be fciund on board Sub jects or Effects belon ~ 
ing to either of .t h e Parties, t he Subjects s hall be ~et a t
Liberty and the Effects returned to t he Ov-mers. And if any
Goods belong ing t o any Nation, 1.-vith whom either of tt e t \\'O
shall be at - wa-r, shall be loa ded on Vesse ls belong in,c to th e
other Party, t hey shal l pass free and unmolested v:itr.out any
attempt being made to t~ke or detain them.

ARTICLE

TV

A Signal or Pass shall be given to all Ves s els b elonc ing to both Parties, by v:hi ch they are to be knovm v1hen t.r.ey
meet at Sea, and if the Com ·anC.er of · a Ship of i."!a r o : eit~·.c ~
Party shall hav e other Ships under his Convoy, t h e Dec la r at 1cn
of the Com1J1ander shall alone b e sufficient to exempt any o f
them from examination.

ARTICLE V
If either of the Parti es shall be at \'Ja r, and sh - 11
meet a Vessel at S ea belong i ng to t h e other, it is a ~ e ~d
that if an examination is to be made, it shall be do ne by
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sending a Boat with two or thr ee Men only, and if any Gun
shall be fi r ed and injury done without Reason , the of fending
Party shall make good all damag es.
ARTICLE VI
If any Eoor shall bring Citizens of the Uni te d States
or their Effec~s to His l'Iajest y , the Citizens shall be immediately s et at Libe r ty and tte ir Effe cts r es tored , and in
like Manner, if any Moor not a Subje ct of t hese Dominions
shall mak e Prize of any of tte Ci tizens of Ameri ca or th eir
Effects and bring th em into any of the Fort s of His Hajestv
they shall be immediately r eleased , as t hey will then be ·'
considered as under His ~ ajesty 1 s Protection.
ARTICLE VII
If any Vessel of either Party shall put into a Port of
the other a nd hav e occasion for Provisions or other Supplies,
they s hal l be furnished wi thout any interrupt ion or molestat i on .
ARTICLE VIII
If any. vessel of the Un ited States s hall meet wi th a
Disaster at Sea and put into one of our Po rts to repair, she
shall be at liberty to land and reload her cargo, withoui
paying any duty whatever.
ARTICLE IX
If any Vessel of the United States shall be cast on Shore
on anyPart ·of our Coasts, she shall. remain at the dis position
of the m·mers and no one shall att em~t g oing near her vvi thout
their Approb at ion, as she is then consid ered particularly under
our Pr otec tion ; and if any vessel of the Un ite d St ates shall
be forced to put into our Ports, by stres s of weather or
otherwise , s h e s hall not be comp elled t o land he r Cargo , but
shall remain in tranquil l ity until the Commander s hall think
proper to proceed on his Voyage .
ARTICLE X
If any Vessel of either of the Parties shall have an
eneagem ent l'l i th a Ve2sel belong ing to any of the Chri::>tian
Powe rs within gunshot of the Fort s of t h e ot her , the Vesse~ .
so en Pa ~ ed s hall be defen d ed and orotected as much as posslole
unti l ,__,s he is in safety; and if an}r American Vessel s ha l l be
cast on shore on t he Coast of T
( adnoon or any c oast t h ereabout,
t he Peo ple belong ing to her s hall be protected and a s sis ted
until by the help of God , they shall b e sent to t he ir Country .
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ARTICLE XI
If we shall be at 1!I ar v-rith any Christian Power and any
of our Vessels sail from t he Ports of the United States , no
Vessel belonging to the enemy shal l follow until twenty four
hours after the Departure of our Vessels; an d the same regulation shall be observed tov,Iards the Ameri can vessel sailing
from our Ports --b e their ener1ies Moors or Christians.
ARTICLE XII
If any Shi p of F ar belong ing to the United States shall
put into any of our Ports, s h e s hal l not be examined on any
Pretense whatever , even though she shoul d have fug itive slaves
on b oard, nor shall t h e Governor or tte Commander of the Place
compel them to be brought on Shore on any pretext, nor require
any payment for them.
ARTICLE XIII
If a Shi p of War of eith er Part y s hall nut into a Port
of . the other and salute, it shall be returned from t he Fort
with an e qual I~ umber of Guns, not vlith more or less.
ARTICLE XIV
The Commerce of the United St c.tes shall be on the same
footing as is the Commerce of Spain or as that with t h e most
favored Nation for the time being and t h eir Citizens s hall be
res pected and esteemed and h ave full liberty to pass and

repass our Country and Sea Ports vihenever they please v-Iithout
interruption.
ARTICLE :Dl
r.-::erchants of both countri es s hall employ only such
interpreters and such other persons to as sist them in their
Business, as they shall think proper. No Commander of any
Vessel shall transport his Cirg o on board another Vessel, he
shall not be detained in Port, l onger .than he may think
proper, and all persons employed in loading and u~loading
Goods or in any other l abor whatever, shall be pa1d at the
customary rates, not more and .not les s .
ARTICLE XVI
In case of war betwe en the Parties , t he Prisoners ar e
not to be made slaves, but to be exchang ed for one another,
Captain for Captain, Offic·er for Off icer and one private man
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for another; and if there Shall Prove a deficiencv on either
side, it s hall be made u p oy the-payment of one hl:rnd red
r-'l exi can dollars for · each Person \-.rant ing ; and it is agreed
that a ll Prisoners shall be exchang ed in t we l v e l'fonths from
the Time of t he ir being taken, and that this exchang e may be
effected by a Merchant or any other Person authorized by
either of the Par t ies.
ARTICLE XVII
Merchants s hall
kind of Goods but s uc h
buy and sell all sorts
t~ the other Christian

not be c omp elled to buy or sell any
as they shall think proper ; and may
of 1·-~erc .andise but such as prohibited
Na tions.
ARTICLE XVIII

All g oods shall be we i Jh ed and examined before they are .
sent on board, and to avoid a l l detention of Vessels, no
examination shall a fte rwards be made, unless i t shall f irst
be proved , that contraband Good s hav e been sent on board, in
which case the P e rsons v:ho took the contraband Goods on board
shall be punish ed accor di ng to t he Usage and Custom of the
Country and no other Person whatever shall be injured, nor
shall t h e Ship or Cargo incur any Penalty or da'Uage whatever.
ARTICLE XIX
No vessel shall be det ained in port on any pretence
vlhatever nor be oblig ed to t a ke on b oard any Arti cle without
the consent of the Commander, l·iho shall be at ful l Liberty
to agree forth~ Frei ght of any Goods he takes on board.
ARTICLE XX
If any of the Citizens of the United States or any
other person under their protec t ion, s hall have any dis putes
with eac h other, the Consul shall decide betwe en the Pa rties
and whenever t h e Consul shall reouire any aid or as s istance
from our Gover nment to enforce his decisions, it shall be
immediately gr a nted to him.
ARTICLE XXI
If any Citizen of the United States shall kill or
wound a Koor, or on the contrary if a Moor shall kill or
wound a Citizen of the United St ates , the Law of the Country
shall t ake place a nd equal Justice shal l be r ende re~, the
Consul assisting at the Tryal [Sic7, and i f any Dellnquent

.....

·--~

.

.-

407 .
shall make his excaoe, the Consul shall not be answerable
for him in any manner whats oever.
ARTICLE XXII
If an Ameri can Citizen shall die in our Country, a nd
-- no Wil l shall appear, the Consul shall take possess ion ~f his
Effects, and if there shall be no Consul, the Effects shall
be deposited in the hands of some Person worthy of Trust
until a Party shall ap pear who has t he Ri ght to demand t h em
but if the Heir to the Person deceased be present, the
'
Property shall be delivered to him without interruntion; and
if a Will shall ap pear , the Property shall de s ce nd · a~ reeable
to that will, as soon as the Consul shal l declare the
validity thereof.
ARTICLE XXIII
The Consuls of t h e United States shall reside in any
Sea Port of any Do:ninion that they shall think pro per; And
they shall be respected and enjoy all the Privileges which
the Consuls of any other Nat ion enjoy, and if any of the
Citizens of the United Stat es s hall contract any Debts or
engagements, the Consul s hal l not be in any Jl.lanner accountable for t hem , unless he shall have given a Pro::1 ise in
writing for t he payments or fulfi lling thereo f , VJithout v:::: ich
promise in Writine; no Application to him for any redress
shall be made.
ARTICLE XXIV
If any differences shall arise by either Party
infringing on any of the Articles of this Treaty, Peace and
Harmony s hal l remain notv.rithstanding in the fullest force,
until a friendly Application s hall be made for an Arran ement, and until that Application shall be re jected, no a p : eal
shall be made to Arms. And if a War shall break out bet ~ een
the Parties, Nine Months shall be g ranted to all the Sub i ect s
of both Parties , to dis pos e of their eff ects and retire With
their Pro per ty . And it is further d ecl ared that wnatever
indulg ences in Trade or otherv.Jise shall be g r ant ed to. any of
the Christian PovJers, the Citizens of t he United States
shall be equally entit led t o them.
ARTICLE XXV
This Treaty shall continue in full Force, .wit h the
help of God for Fifty Years.

•.
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.LAddition to the tenth article a pp ended to the treaty?
That if any Vessel belonc ing to the Untted States
shall be in any of the Ports of His 1Jiaj esty' s Dominion, or
within Gunshot of his Forts, she shall be protected aS much
as possible. And no Vessel whatev er belong i n ~ eit h er to
Moorish or Christian Powers with whom the United States may
be at war, shall be permitted t o f ollow or ehgag e her, as
we now deem the Citizens of America our good Friends .

APPENDIX B
LETTER FROI·1 GEORGE WAS HI NGTON TO I·IOHAMiv!ED BEN ABDULLAH, El.!PEROR
OF MOROCCO, DEC EI·,B ER l, 1789

Great and Magnanimous Friend:
Since the Qate of t .e let t er which the late Congress,
by their president, ad dressed t o Your I mp erial Majesty, the
United States of America have t hought proper to chang e their
government and to institute a n ev.r one, a greeable to the Constitution, of wh ich I have the honor of, here~ith, enclosing
a-. copy. The time necessarily employed in the arduous task,
and the dera ng ements occasioned by so great, though peaceable
a revolution, will a polog ize, and account f or your Majesty's
not having received those regular advices and marks of
attention from the United States which the friendship and
magnanimity of your conduct toward them afforded reason to
expect.
The United St·ates, having unanimously appointed me to
the supreme executive authorit y in this Nation, your Hajesty's
letter of the 17th August, 1788, which by reason ofthe diss ouluti on of the late go·rernrnent, remained unansv1ered, has
been delivered to me. I have also received the letters which
your Imperial ~ajesty has been so kind as to write, in favor
of the United States, to the Bashaws of Tunis and Tripoli, and
I present to you the sincere acknmvledgement and thanks of the
United States for this important mark of your friendship f or
them.
\'Ie great'ly regret that the hostile disposition of
those regencies toward this nat ion, who have neve~ injured
them, is not to be removed, on terrils in our power to comply
with. Within our territories there are no mines, either of
gold or silver, and this young nation,
just recovering from
the waste and deso1ati :m of a long war, have not, as yet, had
time to acquire riches by a griculture and conunerce. But our
soil is bo~ntiful, and our people industrious, and we have
reason to flatter ourselves that Y.Te shall gradually become
useful to our friendso

The encourag ement which your Hajesty has been pleased,
generously, to g ive to our c ommerce v.rith your dominions, the
punctuality '>'l ith which you have caused the Treaty with us to
be observed, a nd the just and ~ enerous measures t a ken in the
case of Capt~in Proctor, make a deep impression on the United
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States and confirm their res pect for, and attacbJnent to your
Imperial Majesty.
·-

- -

----

+

It gives me pleasure to have this opportunity of

assurin.e; your I,·'i ajesty tha t, 'v'T hile I re:naih at the h ead of
this nation, I shall not cease to pr omote every measure that
may conduce to the friendship 2-nd harmony whic h so happil y
subsist between your Empire and them, and shall esteem mvself
happy in every occasion of convincing you~ ~ aj e sty of t h ehi gh sense (wh ich in com'Ti on v.rit h the whole f~ ation) I entertain of the mag nanimity, wisdom and benevolence of your
Majesty o In the course of t h e approaching winter, the
national leg islature , which is called by the former name of
Cong~ess, will assemble, and I shall take care that nothing
be omitted that may be necessary to causethe correspond ence
between our countries to be maintained and conducted in a
manner ~gree able to your Majesty and giving satisfaction to
all the parties concerned in it.
May the Almig hty bless your imperial Najesty, our
Great and Magnaniznous friend with His constant guidance and
protection.!
·

lLetter from George \'Jashingt on to l''iohamrn ed ben
Abdullah, Nei'l York , December 1, 1789, . in John C. Fitzpatric k
( ed.), The \J ritings of Geor;; e •,·Jashinr:ton (':lashington:- Unit ed
States Gove rnm ent Printing Off ice, l 93 S' ) , Vol . x=
·:X, PP • 474- 6 .

APPENDIX C
LETTER FROM GEORGE WASH I NGT01 TO AL-XAZID,
Ei',IPEROR OF Y,.iOROCCO, MARCH 31, 1791
Great and VIa gnanimous Friend,
Separated by an immense ocean from the more ancient
nations of the earth, and little connected with their politics
or proceedings, we are late in learning the events V'thich take
place amonG t hem , and later in conveying to them our sentiments thereon.
The death of the late Emperor, your father and our
friend, of glorious memory, is one of those events, wh ich,
though dist a nt , attracts our notice and concern. Receive,
great and g ood friend, my sincer e s ympathy ifTith you on that
loss; and permit ~e at the s~~ e time, to e xpress t h e satisfaction with ·wh ich I learn the accession of so vwrthya successor to the Imperial throne of Uorocco, and to 6ff er you
the homage of my sincere cong ratulationso • • •
·
The late Emperor very soon after the est ab lis hme nt of
our infant nation, ma nifested his royal regard and amit y to
us by ma~y friendly and generous a cts, and partici9ated by
the protection of our citizens in t h eir commerce with h is
subjects. And as a further inst ance of h is desire to prom ote
our prosperit y and intercourse wit h his realms, h e ent ered
into a treat y of a'Tlity and c omm erce wi t h us, for himself and
his successors, to continue £ifty years. The justice and
magnanimity of your majesty leave us full of confidence,
that t h e treaty will meet y our royal patronage also, and it
will g ive me gr eat satisfaction to be assured t hat t h e citizens
of the United St a tes may expect from your Imperial 1'-Iaj esty t h e
same protecti on an d kindness , whic h t h e exarnple of your il l ustrious father has taught them to expect from t h ose who occupy
the throne of Larocco, and to have your · royal V!ord , that t h ey
may count on a due ob s ervance of t h e treaty, whic h cements
the two nations in friendshipol

lLetter from Georg e ~'J ashing ton to Al-Yazid, Philadelphia,
r.1arch 31, 1791, in Jared Sparks ( ed.) , Th e V.J ri t in R;s of Geo rre
Washington ( Ne\'l York : Harper and Brot hers , Pub lis hers, 1847 , .
Vol. X, pp . 144-6.
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APPENDIX D
CONVENTIO N AS TO CAPE SPARTEL LIGHTHOUSE
Concluded_be~ w een

the lJ nite~ St ates, Austria, Belg ium,
Great Brltaln, Italy, Th e Netherlands, Portugal,
Spaln, and Sweden and Norway, and Morocco, May 31, 1865.

Fra~ce,

ARTICLE I
His J..ajesty Scherifienne, having , in the interest of
Humanity, ordered t h e construction, at the expense of the
-.. Government of i''1oroc co, of a light-house at Cape Spartel, consents to devolve, throughout t h e duration of the present
convention, the superior direction and administrat ion of this
establis runent on the represent ativ es of the contracting
Powers. It is well understood that this dele ~at i o n does not
import any encroachment on the rights, propri~tary and sovereignty, of the Sultan, ~1ose flag alone shall be hoisted on
the tower of the Pharos.
ARTICLE II
The Govern1nent of TI·Iorocco not at this time havin.s aJ1Y
marine either of war or com.l'!lerce, the expenses necessary for
upholding and managing the li gh t-house shall b e borne oy t h e
contracting Powers by means of an annual contri but ion, th e
quota of \vhich shall be alike for all of t hem . If, hereafter,
the Sult an s hould have a naval or cor:J.m ercial marine, he binds
himself to take share in t h e expenses in like prop·ortion with
the other subscribing Powerso The exp enses of re p ~irs, and
in need of rec onstruction, shall be at his cost.
ARTICLE III
The Sultan will furnish for security of the li Eht-house ·
a guard, com posed of a Kaid and four soldiers. He engag es,
besides, to provide for, by all means in his power, in case
of war, whether internal or external, the preservation of
this establishment, as \'rell as for the safety of t h e k e epers
and persons employedo On the other part, the contract ing
Powers bind themselves, eac h so far as concerned, to res pect
the neutrality of the light-house, and to continue the payment
of the contribution intended to uphold it, even in case (whi ch
God forbid) hostilities should break out either between them
or bet vie en one of them and the Empire of Iloroc co.

413 ARTICLE IV
The re presentatives of the c ontracting Powers, ch a rged
in virtue of Arti cle I of the present convention, with the
superi or direction and r anag ement of t h e li ght - house, shall
establish the n e cess a ry re ~ ulations for the service and
s u perinten de nce of this establisrun ent, and no modification
shall aft erward be applied to these articles, except by common
agreement between the contracting Fovvers.
ARTICLE V
The present convention shall continue in force for ten
years. In case, within six months of the expiration of this
' - term, none of the hi gh contracting parties should, by official
declaratio n, have made known its pur pos e to bring to a close,
so far as may concern it, the effects of this convent ion, it
shall continue in force for one year more, and so from year to
year, until due notice.
ARTICLE VI
The execution of the reciprocal engagements contained
in the present convention is subordinated, so f ar as needful ,
to the accomplisrunent of the forms and regulat ions established
by the c onstitutional lavm of those of the hi gh contra cting
Pmv-ers Hho a re held to ask for their application thereto,
which they bind themselves to do ~ith the least possible delay.
ARTICLE VII
The present c onvent ion shall be rat ified , and the
ratifications be exchanged at Tangier as soon as can be done.
In faith whereof t h e respective Plenipotentiaries have
signed and affixed th ereto the seals of their arms.
Done in duplicate orig i rial , in French and in Arabic,
at Tang ier, protected of God, the fifth day of the moon of
Moharrem, year of the Heg ira 12 82, which c orr esponds to the
31st day of the month of i-Tay of the year one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-five.l
Lsigned for the United States by Jesse H. McJ.1ath7

lText from \'! illiarn M . Malloy, Treaties, Con vention ,
Internat ional Acts , P:totoc ols a nd A g r e~__I'le nts betv.Je,er: the United
States of America a nd Oth er Po -I ers 1776-l SD 9 ( ·; asnlngton :
Government F-rintint; Off ice , 1 910 ), Vol . I, pp . 1217-1 220 .

APPE im iX E
CO NVENTION AS TO PROTECTION--1880
Concluded between the United States, Germany, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark , Spain, Fra.nce , Great Britain, Italy, the
Netherlands , Portue:al , and SVJeden and Norway, and ~,!orocco,
July 3, 1 880 .
ARTICLE I
The conditions under v1h ich prote cti on may be conceded
are those established in the British a nd Spanish treaties with
the Government of :::orocco, and in the conventi on made betv1een
that GoverT117lent, Franc e and other powers in 1 863, . , 1 i th the
modifications introduced by the present convention.
ARTICLE II
Foreign Representatives at the head of a Legation nay
. select t heir int erpreters and employees from among the subjects of r.=orocco or others·.
These protected persons ihall be subject to no duty,
impost or tax whatever, other than those stipulated in
articles 12 and 13.
ARTICLE III
Consuls, Vice Cons~ls or Consular Agents having char g e
of a post, and residing within the territory of the Sultan of
Morocco, shall be allm·.Jed to select but one inter preter, one
soldier and two servants from among the subjects of the
Sultan, unle ss they may require a native secretary.
These protected persons shall, in like manner, be subject to no duty, impost or tax whatever, other than those
stipulated in article.s 12 and l3o
ARTICLE IV
If a Representative s hall appoint a subject of the
Sultan to the office of Consular Ag ent in a town on the c oast ,
such agent shall be respected and honored, as shall the members . of his family occu py ing the same dwellin 2; VIith him, and
they, like him shall be subject to no duty, impost or tax
v..rhatever, other than those sti pulated in articles 12 and 13;
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but he shal l not have the right to prote ct any subjects of
the Sultan other than the members of his own family.
He may , however, for t h e exercise of his functions,
have a protected sold ier.
Of f icers in a ctine chare e of Vice Consulates being
subjects of t h e Sultan, shall, durin g the exercise of t h ei r
functions , enjoy t h e same rit;hts as Consular Ag ents . who are
subjects of the Sultan
ARTICLE V
The Government of Horocco reco gnizes the . ri ght of
_ Mi nisters, Charg es d 'Affai res ~nd other Re presentatives,
whi ch is g r a nt ed to them by tr eati es, to select the persons
whom they employ, either in t h eir own service or that of
their g overnments, unless · such persons shall oe sheiks or
other employees of the Govern'7l ent of I. l orocco, such as
sol diers of the line or cavalry, excepting the }:aghaznias
ap pointed as t h eir guar d . In like man ner they s hall not . be
permitted to em ploy any subject of Noroc c o \'lho is under
prosecution.
It is understood that civil suits c ommenced before
protection, shall be terminated before . t h e courts which have
instituted such pro ce edings. The execution of t h e sentence
shall suffer no hindrance. Nevertheless, the local aut horities of Eorocco shall take care to communicate without delay ,
the sentence pronounced, to t h e Legation, Consulate or Consular Agency upon whi ch the protected person is dependent.
As to those persons formerly protected, who may have
a suit 'I:Jhich was commenced before protection was withdre.vm
from t hem , their case shall be tried by the court .before ''lhi ch
it was ori ginally brought.
The right of protect ion shall not be exercised towards
persons under prosecution for an offense or crime , before
they have been tried by the authorities of the country, or
before t h eir sentence, if any has been pronounced, has been
executed.
ARTICLE VI
Protection shall extend to the family of the person
protected. His dwellinE shall be resnected.
It is understood that the family is to consist only

416
of the 1·iife, the c h ildren, and the minor relatives dwelling
under the same roof.
Protection shall not be hereditary. A sin~le exce ption, whi ch was established by t h e c onv enti on of 1863, but
\'Ihich is not to create a precedent, shall be maintained in
favor of t he Benchimol family.
Nevertheless , if the Sultan of ·. Iorocco shall grant
another ex ce ption, eac h of the Contra cting pO\'Iers shall be
entitled to claim a similar conc es si on.
ARTICLE VII
,
Foreign representati ves shall inform the Sultan 's
Minister of Forei gn Af f airs, in writing, of any selections
of an employee made by tham .
They s hall furnish annually to the said Einister a
list of the names of the persons protected by them or by.
their Agents t hroughout the States of the Sultan of I·~ oroc co .
This list s hall be transmitted to the local authorities, who shall consi d er as persons enjoying prote ction only
those v:hose names are c ontained therein"!
ARTICLE VIII
Consular officers shall transmit each year to the
authorities of the district in which they reside a list,
bearing t heir sea.l, of t t e persons protected by t h em. Th ese
authoritie s shall transmit it to the I<iinister of For eig n
Affairs, t o t h e end that, if it be not c onformable to the
regulations, the Representatives at Tangier may be informed
of the fact.

A consular officer sha l l be reouired to give immediate
information of any ch ang es that may have taken place among
the persons protected by his Consulate.
ARTICLE IX
Servants, farmers, and other native employees of nat ive
secretaries and inter preters shall not enjoy protection. Th e
same shall be the cas e with 1.:oorish employees or servants of
forei gn subjects.
Ne~ertheless , the local authorities shall not arrest
an employee or servant of a native of f icer in t h e service of
a Leg ation or Consulate, or of a foreign sub ject or protected
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-----person, without having notified the authority upon which he
is dependent.

If a sub j ect of Morocco in the service of a forei Fn
subject s hall kill or wound an:,.~ oers on , or v iolate his
~
domici le, h e shall be arrested imned iately, but t l e di Plomatic or c onsular aut hority unde r "\'rhich he is shall be .
notified wit hout dalay .
ARTICLE X
~ ot h in g is changed with re ~ ard to tte situation of
brokers, as established by t he tr~aties and by the convention
of 1 863, except "~'That is stipulated, relative to taxes, in tte
followin g articles.

ARTICLE XI
The ri ght to hold propert y is recogniie d in Morocco
as belonging to all foreigners.
The purchase of property must tak e place with the
previous c ons ent of the Govermnent, and the title of such
property s hall be subject to the forms prescribed by the lav.rs
of the country.
Any question that may arise concerning this ri ght s hall
be decided according t o the s2me laws, with t h e privile g e of
appeal to the =-:inister of Foreign Affairs stipulated in the
treaties.
ARTICLE XII
Foreis ners and _crotected persons who are the owners or
tenants of culti vated land, as well as brokers engag ed in
agriculture, shall pay the ag r i cultural tax. They shall s end
to t heir Cons ul annually, an .exact stateme nt of what they
possess delivering into his hands the amount of the tax.
He who sha ll make a f alse statement, s hall be fined
double t he ~n ount of the tax t 1 a t h e would re cularly have been
obliged to pay for the propert y not declared. In case of
repeated offe nse ttis fine s hall b e doubled.
The natur e , method, date and apoortionment of this tax ·
shall form t he subject of a s ~> ecial re~ulation bet\·Jeen t{~ e
Representatives of the Powers and the ''- Tinister of Forei gn
Affairs of I! is Sher eefian i-1ajesty.
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ARTICLE XIII
Forei gners, protected persons a nd brakers owning b easts
of burden sha l l pay what is ca ll ed t he gat e-t a x . Th e ao nortionme nt and ..1anner of coL.ecting t h is tax 1.fh ic h is pai d a like
by for e i gners a nd nativ es , s ha Ll_ lik ewise for::1 the s ub" ect of
a s pecial r egu.lat ion oetv1ee::1 t h e llepres enta.t i ves of u-.~ p m·te rs
and the T·1inist er of Foreign Affairs of His Shereef ian l-:aje sty.
Th e sai d tax s hall not be increased withou t a new
agre ement with t h e ]epres entati v es of t he Pm·rers.
ARTICLE XIV
The mediation of inter pr et ers, native secretari e s or
soldiers of the different Legat ions or Consulat es , ,.-1h en
persons who are not under the protection of t h e Le ~ a tion or
Consulate are c oncerned, _s hall be admitted only \·rh'8n they
are the bear ers of a doc maent si gned by the h ead of a mission
or by t h e consular authority.
ARTICLE X:v
Any subject of 1-Iorocco 1.'fho has been na tur a lized in a
foreign c ountr y , and ~ho s hall re tur n to Eorocco, s hall after
having renaine d for a lengt h of tioe equal to that whic h shall
have been res ularly necess a r y fo r him to obtain suc h naturalization, choose between entire subm ission to the laws of the
Empire and t he obligation to quit ;,:~o r o cco, unles s it shal l be
pro~ed

that h iB natural ization in a f oreig n c duntry weB

obtained with the consent of the Government of .i-Iorocco.
Forei gn naturalization h eretofore ·acquired by _subjects
of Horocco accord ing to the rules established by t h e laws of
each country , s hall be continued to t t em as rega rds all its
effects, without any restric tion .
ARTICLE XVI
No irre Eular or unofficial protecti on s hall be g r a nted
in f!-h!:] futur e . The authoriti es of 1-1orocco v:ill ::ecogniz e
no prote ct ion, of any kind •Hhatev er, save such as 1s expressly
provided f or in this c onvention.
Ne vertheless, the exe rci se of the cus t omary ri ght of
protection s ha ll be res erved f or t h ose cases only i n whi ch. it
may be d esired t o reward signal services rendered by a nat 1ve
of 1-ioro cc o to a f orei gn pov-ter, or for other altoge t r.er exceptional reasons .
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The Minister of Foreign Affairs at Tang ier shall be
previously info r r:1e d of t he nat ure of the services, and
not ifie d of t he intenti on to r ev;ard t hem , in .order t hat f-, e
may , if need be, nr esent hi s observations t here on; ye t t h e
final decision Ehall be r es erv ed for the Gove r ru1ent to ~h: ch
the s e r vi ce shall have been re nd ered •
. The numb e:i of persons t hm: . rot ect e d · sh.:tl l r.o t e::c eed
twelve for each power , and this number is fixed as the ma ximum unl ess t he con sent of t h e Sult a n sha ll be obtained .
The status of persons who have obtained protection in
virtue of t he custo::n whi c h is hencefortl: to be res;ulated by
this stipulation sh3.ll be without li1nitation of the nu_r:Joer
of persons belonging to t his class and novl so protected, t h e
same fo r them s elves and t h eir fa::n ilies a s t hat i··.rhi ch is
establis hed fo r other protected p ersons.
ARTICLE XVII

The ri cht of the treat~ent of the ~ost f a vor ed nation
is rec or; nized by I~ orocco as belonc. ing to all t he po•;lers
r epre sented at the Madrid c onfer ence.
ARTICLE X'JIII

This c onv ention s hall be ratified. The ratific a tions
shall be exchanged at Tangi er with as little delay as
possible.l
·Lsi gned for the United St ates by Lucius FaircLiJ..£7

1F rom 1~-:1a 11 oy, 2£. ..s:.L.
.t ,
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APPENDIX F
~~IN

POI NTS OF THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS
April 7, 190 6

-!'II( ~·

••

The fir s t chanter d ea lt with t h e p olice and decl a red:

1.

Police should be under Sultan ' s authority , recruited from
native po ~ula tion, and stationed i n ei ght " t rade ports ."
2.. • Frenc h and Span i sh non-commi ss i one d officers to a ss ist t h e
Sult a n in ore; a ni zing t h e f ore e--thes e of f ie ers t o be employed f or a f ive- year period . Det ailed arrang ements to
be sub:ni tte d. fo r appr oval t o the di pl or:Jatic body at
Tang ier.
3. Police to number not more than 5, 000, not l es s than 2,000.
4. The State Bank to suppl y funds .
5. The Ins pector Gen eral to be a Swi ss citizen.
6. Copi es oi t he Ins pector General's r ep ort to be sent to
Tang ier, a nd Tang ier ent it led to demand reports of him in .
case of need .
7. The salary of the Ins pector Genera l to b~ discussed .
8 . His c ontract to be com;!lunicated to Tangier.
9. Inspectors to b e Spanis h at Tetuan and Lar aiche ; Frenc h at
Rabat; mixed at Tang ier and Casablanca; Fre nc ~1 at three
remaining portso
The s·. e c ond cha-:Jte r dealt i;Jit h arms traff ic, dravring u p detailed
regulations. Fr an ce to sup:Jl y these r egulations on the Alg erian
frontie r , and S·pai n in t h e Spanis h zone .
The t h ird cha:)t er deal t with t he State Bank--the "S tate ' Ba nk of
l'.i orocco 11 --having t h e ri ght to is su e paper money , act as Treasury
of ~ orocco, a nd moreov er:

1.
2.
3•

4.

Should have e xclusive ri ght of s h ort-term loans and
priority publi c issues .
Hay, on conditions, n ake a dvanc es to t he ~ . :o o rish Govern:11ent .
V!ill as sume the fun ctions of a Roval
Hint.
1
VJill k eep se parate account for a s- ·~J ecial tax of 2 flo
ad
valor em on f orei gn im port s .
4

The Bank to be und er ·F rench law, and subse qu ent a greement to
d etermi ne exact relations bet1'1e c-.: n t h e Bank and :.·oorish Government .
Th e Board of the Ba nk to be at Tangiero
In all, t his ch apter embodied twenty-seven clauses.

421 -The fourth chanter dealt with revenue and taxation (th e
clauses numberinc; ei(;ht e en .)
One clause declared that forei~n na tionals must nav tert i b .
Another gave them the ri e:ht to' :mrchase l and a nd· e~ect bui ldings . The minor clauses dea lt wit h fiscal pr oposaJ.s , duti es ,
etc., and the ipportant__J ;:)..aus e 66, allm"fed the r.·:oo rish Gove rnment to· i m-p ose teho orary 2 ~% ad va lorem duty on for e i gn il n~ ort e: ,
the r evenue t her~f rom to te devoted to public works (co ntracts
under s unervisins diplomat ic oody ).
The fifth chapter (Clauses 77 to 104) was c oncerned with
Customs .
~

The sixt h chanter dealt with Public works and services and
establishe d that :

1.
2.

3.

4.

None of these co uld be ali enated to private inter~sts .
The si.gnatory pov1e rs could reserve to thensel ves t he ri ght
to see that concessions granted to foreign capital were not
of a na ture to v·:eaken the control of the ;,ro or ish Government over i mportant publ ic services.
The Eo .J rish Gove r n'":lent should sub."'l it . al l contracts t o the
diplomatic body .
The di p lo~ atic body should have rights of super~sion over
c oncess i ons for mines , quc:.rries, fo rests, and all matters
of expropriati on .

The seventh, and las t , l hapter dealt i:lith general dispositions
re gardi ng ratification .
·

lThis sum:r:1ary t aken from Rom Landau, I•.:oroccan Drama .
1 900 -1 955 (San Francisco: American Academy of As ian Studies ,
1 9 5 6) , p p • 3 S'O- 91 •

AP PENDIX G

..

A F ACSI1 :ILE OF A LEAFLET GIVEN TO AI'·'lERI CAN SAILO:tS IN
TA iJGIER I N THE FALL OF 1~52 - BY THE I ST IQLAL

LONG LIVE ANiER ICA

LO NG LIVE EOROCCO

ABER.ICAN SAILO RS,

I· ~EL.B E RS

LO NG LIVE Af:IEH.ICA

OF A PROUD

AND VICTO'liOUS NAVY!

We, t h e Eoroccan peopl e of Tangier, our country's
diplomatic capital,
WELCOh E YOU H J OUR IviiDST Ai·ID WIS H YOU A HAPPY TU1E

ori our soil. 'd e hope you may enjoy every moment of your
visit, and de part with the happiest o! mernbries.
We are sorry if various si gns of povert y , misery, and
illiterac y a.rn ong our people should sadden or offend you .
But vTe trust you ,,_:ill meet t hem \·Jith f orbearance. F or we
want you to realize th3.t since 1912, •:.r e are n o longer a f re e
and inde pendent country and no masters in our owfi house.
At one time ours was a r,reat and pros perous c ountry, and
our achieveoents in science, art, arc hit ecture and many crafts
were the envy of t l-l e entire 1:-rest ern world. For 1200 y ears
vle were free and inde oendent .
And ·we "'' ere one of the first
countries to acknowle~ge the newly ~ wo n indep endence of the
United States . Your
GREAT

P~ ESIDE N T

GEORGE VJASH I NGTO N

expressed the gratitude of the American nation in a letter
he vn·ote in 17 6"9 to our KI NG, and Jefferson , Franklin a nd
Ada:1s pre pared t he first Treaty of Friendship beti-J e en
yours and our country . The tr eat y is in force t o the present
day. In 1 942 fSi~7 President Frankl in D. Roosevelt rea f f irmed
AHERICA'S FRIENDSHIP FOrt HOROCCO

in pers·Jnal conversati ons vrith our present KING, l·,oba.m:::J.ed V
Like Your~elves, we
THE 1'·'10 ROCCAN PEOPLE

423
wish to be free and inde perident, a nd to play our part in the
com;-1 on defense of a
FREE, ENLIGETE1-.TED AND DE:'. IOCRATJ:C ViAY OF LIFS.

It is as FRIElffiS of y est erday and today , and as
ALLI ::::S OF TOn ORJ:OW

that v.re gr eet you among us, and that v:e extend to you 8ur
HEA~TFELT WELCOMEl

LONG LIVE A.IviKi.ICA

LO NG LIVE h:OROCCO

LO I~ G

LI VE

.~· :.C: :ti :A

(On the reverse side of the printed leaflet was a porticin ~ ~
· George Viashingt on ' s lette r t o I 10harmned ben Abdullah \\T it ten
in 1789 .)

l ??.eproduc ed fr om one of the or i g inal l e<J.fl et.s
the wr iter's possessio n.
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